IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S159 of 2010
B e t w e e n -
INSIGHT VACATIONS PTY LTD T/AS INSIGHT VACATIONS
Applicant
and
STEPHANIE YOUNG
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 2010, AT 11.09 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.E. SEXTON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR D.I. TALINTYRE, for the applicant. (instructed by Lee & Lyons)
MR M.J. JOSEPH, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR A.P.L. NAYLOR, for the respondent. (instructed by Malouf & Partners)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Sexton.
MR SEXTON: Your Honours, the special leave question is whether section 74(2A) of the Trade Practices Act applies a State statute which authorises the inclusion of a contractual provision that limits or precludes liability for breach of the warranty implied into all consumer contracts by section 74(1).
GUMMOW J: What is the significance of the exemption clause, if I can use that expression, number 4 on page 23 of the application book?
MR SEXTON: The significance?
GUMMOW J: Of its construction for the utility of this whole appeal in this Court. Would it turn one way or the other on the construction of 4?
MR SEXTON: It could ultimately, yes, your Honour. Obviously, that is an issue in terms of whether it is an appropriate vehicle, but what we say about that is that it is a short point. It was determined, clearly, in a way favourable to the applicant by Chief Justice Spigelman, with whom Justice Sackville agreed on this point. For that reason, in the context of the importance of the issue thrown up by the statutory construction point we would say that would not be an overwhelming impediment to a grant of leave in this particular case.
Obviously, any case in which the issue is the implied warranty under section 74(1) and the application of 74(2A) there will be either a statutory provision or if our argument is right a contractual term that will have to be construed so that that should not be a supervening impediment, in our submission.
GUMMOW J: What do you say about the costs point flagged by your opponent at paragraph 28 on page 116?
MR SEXTON: I have instructions to give the undertaking in the terms of paragraph 28 of the respondent’s submissions, your Honour.
FRENCH CJ: Mr Joseph, we would be assisted by hearing from you as to why special leave should not be granted.
MR JOSEPH: Your Honour, we are not going to suggest that there are not two views open to the court below as to the meaning of 74(2A). Our submissions are simply these. One is that is that the majority were correct, secondly, that in addition to the majority’s reasoning is the view that the words “another term”, which were not…
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- Case
- [2010] HCATrans 305
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine the proper construction of the travel insurance policy, particularly the meaning and effect of the clause excluding cover for pre-existing medical conditions. The central question was whether Ms Young's condition, which had been diagnosed and treated prior to the commencement of the tour, fell within the scope of this exclusion, notwithstanding that she had not experienced any symptoms or sought medical advice for that specific condition in the period immediately preceding the tour.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the interpretation of the exclusion clause by the Full Federal Court was erroneous. The Court reasoned that the clause should be construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning, and that the term "pre-existing medical condition" encompassed any condition that existed at the time of entering into the contract, regardless of whether it was symptomatic or had been diagnosed. The Court emphasised that the policy did not require the insured to have knowledge of the condition for it to be considered pre-existing. Therefore, Ms Young's stroke, arising from a condition that existed prior to the policy's commencement, was excluded from cover.
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