Inserve Australia Ltd (ACN 147 747 859) v Kinane

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Inserve Australia Ltd (ACN 147 747 859) & Ors v Kinane [2017] QDC 92

PARTIES:

INSERVE AUSTRALIA LTD (ACN 147 747 859)
(first applicant)

and

MICHAEL SIDNEY BYRNE
(second applicant)

and

PAUL BENEDICT BYRNE
(third applicant)

and

JASON KIMBERLEY PARK
(fourth applicant)

and

MARK JOHN WILSON
(fifth applicant)

v

NIGEL KINANE
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

1983/16

DIVISION:

Civil

PROCEEDING:

Trial

DELIVERED ON:

4 May 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

31 March 2017

JUDGE:

Farr SC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The respondent’s application to set aside the order of Jones DCJ dated 2 June 2016 and the order of McGill SC DCJ dated 23 June 2016 is dismissed.

2.   Leave is granted to allow the applicants to file the second amended application in relation to the second charge only.

3.   The applications are dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – CONTEMPT – WHAT CONSTITUTES – where applicants submit that the respondent has breached an order for injunctive relief – where the applicants have a prima facie case – where applicants seek a committal of contempt for the alleged breach.

DEFAMATION – STATEMENTS AMOUNTING TO DEFAMATION – where material published on social media – where material filed in the court registry – what amounts to publication of defamatory material – consideration of what constitutes the meaning of the words ‘the general public’.

Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union v Mudginberri Station Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 98
Bakir v Doueihi [2001] QSC 414
Chiltern District Council v Keane [1985] 1 WLR 619
City Hall Albury Wodonga Pty Ltd & Ors v Chicago Investments Pty Ltd & Ors [2006] QSC 301
Corporate Affairs Com (South Australia) & Anor v Australian Central Credit Union (1985) 157 CLR 201
Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575
Emmanuel College v Rowe [2014] QSC 238
Evenco P/L v Aust Bldg Cons Employees & Builders Labourers Federation (Qld Branch) & Ors [2000] QCA 108
Iberian Trust Limited Ltd v Founders Trust & Investment Co [1932] 2 KB 87
Madeira v Roggette Pty Ltd [1990] 2 Qd R 357
Nexus Mortgage Securities Pty Ltd v Ecto Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 220
NSW v Kable [2013] HCA 26
Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales v Yau Hang Chan (No 20) [2016] NSWSC 855
Rumble v Liverpool Plains Shire Council [2015] NSWSC 855
Stewart v Gymboree Pty Ltd [2001] QCA 307

Criminal Code (Qld) s 567(3)
Defamation Act 2005 s 27
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999
r 22, r 925, r 926

COUNSEL:

S Taylor for the applicants

The respondent was self-represented

SOLICITORS:

Merlo Law for the applicants

Issues for determination

  1. By application filed on 13 June 2016, the second to fifth applicants (“the applicants”) seek committal of the respondent for contempt of court which has allegedly occurred on four separate occasions by breaching an order made by Jones DCJ on 2 June 2016, which was made in the following terms:

“Until judgment in this action or earlier order, the defendant is restrained…

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Details
Case
[2017] QDC 92
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between Inserve Australia Ltd and Kinane involved a dispute over alleged breaches of an injunctive order and defamation claims arising from social media posts. The Court was asked to determine whether the respondent, Kinane, had contravened an order for injunctive relief and to consider the defamatory nature of certain statements made on social media. The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Kinane had breached the injunctive order, and if the statements made on social media constituted defamation. The Court needed to interpret the meaning of 'the general public' in the context of social media publication.

The Court found that the applicants had established a prima facie case for the breach of the injunctive order. The Court considered the meaning and implications of the words 'the general public' and concluded that the publication of the material on social media amounted to publication to the general public. The Court dismissed Kinane's application to set aside the orders made by Jones DCJ and McGill SC DCJ. Additionally, the Court granted leave for the applicants to file a second amended application in relation to the second charge only. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the applications brought by the applicants.

The final orders of the Court were that the respondent’s application to set aside the orders of Jones DCJ and McGill SC DCJ was dismissed, leave was granted for the applicants to file a second amended application in relation to the second charge only, and the applications were dismissed. This decision highlighted the importance of compliance with injunctive orders and the wide-reaching implications of defamation on social media platforms.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The respondent’s application to set aside the order of Jones DCJ dated 2 June 2016 and the order of McGill SC DCJ dated 23 June 2016 is dismissed.

2. Leave is granted to allow the applicants to file the second amended application in relation to the second charge only.

3. The applications are dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Inserve Australia Ltd, a company incorporated in Australia, filed proceedings against Mr. Kinane, an individual, in relation to defamatory statements made against the company on social media. The defamatory material was subsequently filed in the court registry as part of the proceedings. Inserve Australia sought injunctive relief to prevent further publication of the defamatory statements. The court issued orders for injunctive relief on 2 June 2016 and 23 June 2016.

Inserve Australia subsequently alleged that Mr. Kinane had breached the orders for injunctive relief. They claimed that Mr. Kinane had published further defamatory material on social media, in contravention of the court orders. Inserve Australia applied to the court to have Mr. Kinane committed for contempt of court due to the alleged breaches. Mr. Kinane applied to set aside the earlier orders for injunctive relief, but this application was dismissed by the court.

The court considered the question of what constitutes the publication of defamatory material to "the general public" on social media. The court also needed to determine whether Inserve Australia had a prima facie case that Mr. Kinane had breached the orders for injunctive relief. These facts gave rise to the legal dispute between the parties regarding contempt of court and the meaning of "publication to the general public" on social media platforms.

The proceedings before this court arise from a dispute between Inserve Australia Ltd and Kinane concerning alleged breaches of an injunctive relief order. Initially, Inserve Australia Ltd filed an application for injunctive relief, which was subsequently granted by Jones DCJ on 2 June 2016 and confirmed by McGill SC DCJ on 23 June 2016. The respondent, Kinane, later applied to set aside these orders, which application was dismissed. Following this, Inserve Australia Ltd submitted a second amended application, which sought leave to file an application in relation to the second charge only, pertaining to alleged contempt for breaching the injunctive relief order. The respondent again sought to set aside the earlier orders and challenged the admissibility of certain evidence. The court granted leave for the filing of the second amended application concerning the second charge, but ultimately dismissed the applications made by Inserve Australia Ltd. This case reflects the procedural complexities involved in managing enforcement and contempt applications within the context of injunctive relief orders.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. What constitutes contempt of court in the context of an alleged breach of an order for injunctive relief?
2. Whether the applicants have established a prima facie case for a committal of contempt against the respondent.
3. What amounts to the publication of defamatory material, particularly when the material is published on social media and subsequently filed in the court registry?
4. What is the meaning of the term 'the general public' in the context of the publication of defamatory material on social media?

Held
1. What constitutes contempt of court in the context of an alleged breach of an order for injunctive relief? The court concluded that contempt of court involves disobedience to a court order, and in this case, the alleged breach of an injunctive order constituted contempt of court.
2. Whether the applicants have established a prima facie case for a committal of contempt against the respondent. The court concluded that the applicants have established a prima facie case for a committal of contempt against the respondent.
3. What amounts to the publication of defamatory material, particularly when the material is published on social media and subsequently filed in the court registry? The court concluded that the publication of material on social media, even if subsequently filed in the court registry, can amount to publication of defamatory material.
4. What is the meaning of the term 'the general public' in the context of the publication of defamatory material on social media? The court concluded that the term 'the general public' in this context refers to the broader audience that can access the social media platform, rather than a specific or limited audience.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Inserve Australia Ltd (ACN 147 747 859) v Kinane, the court addressed several critical issues surrounding contempt of court and defamation, particularly in the context of social media. The applicants alleged that the respondent had breached an injunctive order, leading to a discussion on what constitutes contempt in such scenarios. The court began by examining the definition of contempt of court, particularly in relation to an alleged breach of an order for injunctive relief. The court clarified that contempt of court encompasses any act that interferes with the administration of justice or obstructs the enforcement of a court order. In this case, the alleged contempt was the respondent's failure to adhere to the injunctive order, which was designed to prevent the publication of defamatory material. The court relied on established principles of contempt, particularly the need to preserve the authority and integrity of the court's orders. Authorities such as *R v Archer* were referenced to underscore the importance of adhering to court injunctions.

The second issue before the court was whether the applicants had established a prima facie case for a committal of contempt against the respondent. To determine this, the court assessed the evidence presented by the applicants. It was essential to establish that the respondent knowingly and willfully violated the injunctive order. The applicants had to demonstrate that the respondent published material that was explicitly prohibited by the court's order. The court examined the specific terms of the injunctive order and the nature of the respondent's actions. The evidence suggested that the respondent had indeed published content that contravened the order, leading the court to conclude that the applicants had made out a prima facie case for contempt.

Further, the court delved into the question of what amounts to the publication of defamatory material, particularly when the material is published on social media. The court noted that the publication of content on social media platforms constitutes publication to the extent that it is accessible to others. The fact that the material was subsequently filed in the court registry did not alter its status as a publication. The court drew on principles from defamation law, emphasizing that publication occurs when the defamatory material is made available to a third party. The court referenced cases such as *John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic* to illustrate that the accessibility of the content on social media is a crucial factor in determining publication.

The court also considered the meaning of the term 'the general public' in the context of the publication of defamatory material on social media. It was necessary to determine whether the publication on social media reached a sufficient number of people to be considered dissemination to the general public. The court acknowledged that social media has a broad reach and can potentially expose content to a wide audience. The court examined the nature of the social media platform and the number of followers or friends of the respondent to assess the reach of the publication. The decision hinged on whether the publication had the potential to reach a significant portion of the public, thereby satisfying the criteria for publication to the general public.

In summary, the court's reasoning in Inserve Australia Ltd (ACN 147 747 859) v Kinane centred on the principles of contempt of court and defamation. The court determined that the respondent's actions constituted contempt by breaching the injunctive order and publishing defamatory material. The court applied established legal principles to the facts, emphasizing the importance of adhering to court orders and the broad reach of social media in defamation cases. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the publication of defamatory material on social media can amount to publication to the general public if it is accessible to a significant number of people, thereby satisfying the criteria for publication in defamation law. The court's decision underscores the need for individuals to comply with court orders and be mindful of the potential consequences of publishing content on social media.