Inquest into the death of Joanne Craig

Case

[2019] NTLC 26

20 September 2019


CITATION: Inquest into the death of Joanne Craig

[2019] NTLC 026

TITLE OF COURT:  Coroners Court
JURISDICTION:  Darwin
FILE NO:  D0013/2018
DELIVERED ON:  20 September 2019
DELIVERED AT:  Darwin
HEARING DATE(s):  27, 28 August 2019
FINDING OF:  Judge Greg Cavanagh
CATCHWORDS:  Failure of primary care providers to
offer vaccination (Pnemovax23),
Failure by hospital to identify sepsis,
Failure to identify septic shock,
antibiotics commenced too late
REPRESENTATION: 
Counsel Assisting:  Kelvin Currie
Counsel for Top End Health 
Service  Stephanie Williams
Counsel for Dr Brummit  Marie Savvas
Judgment category classification:  B

Judgement ID number: [2019] NTLC 026

Number of paragraphs:  70
Number of pages:  26

IN THE CORONERS COURT
AT DARWIN IN THE NORTHERN

TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

No. D0013/2018

In the matter of an Inquest into the death of

JOANNE CRAIG

ON 24 JANUARY 2018

AT KATHERINE DISTRICT HOSPTIAL

FINDINGS

Judge Greg Cavanagh

Introduction

  1. The Deceased, Joanne Craig, was a 57 year old woman of Aboriginal

    descent from the Wurrumunga clan group. She was born 5 October 1960 in

    Tennant Creek to Peggy Corp and Noel Corp. She had five brothers and

    sisters. On 20 October 1984, at the age of 24 years, she married Steven

    Craig. They had four children: Daniel, Michael, Steven Jr and Lindsie. They

    had 11 grand-children. They took on many other children also after the

    deaths of two family members and two friends.

  2. In 1994 Joanne and Steven took over management of Mistake Creek Station,

    a 4000km[2] cattle station located about 630km southwest of Katherine.

    Joanne was an equal partner in the innovations and the running of the

    station.

  3. Through their hard work they transformed the station into a modern,

innovative and successful station. They quadrupled the cattle numbers. They
developed the infrastructure and the business management. They developed

the capacity of their staff and managers. They modernised the processes and

procedures. They ran low-stress stock handling and horsemanship skills

courses and became an accredited training facility. They conducted Rural

Operations courses for the Education Department.

  1. Students from schools as far afield as Centralian Senior College in Alice

    Springs, Tennant Creek High School and Taminmin College in Humpty Doo

    have participated in 10-day courses at the Station. Joanne and Steven

    became involved in the Australian Rural Leadership Program. Employees

    involved can complete certificates II, III and IV in Beef Management.

  2. Joanne was tireless. Apart from the station business she was passionate

    about her family. She was the family organiser and connector. She loved her

    dogs and horses, she was a photographer and an avid sports person.

  3. Joanne looked after her health. She didn’t smoke and didn’t drink and saw

    the health professionals on a regular basis. Records indicate that she

    attended the doctors at Wurli-Wurlinjang Health Service in Katherine

    between 2009 and November 2017. She also attended on Kintore Clinic in

    Katherine (later taken over by Gorge Health Services) between at least 2010

    and September 2016. There are also records from the Central Clinic Alice

    Springs that show four attendances on doctors from 2004 to 11 January

    2018.

  4. On Tuesday 5 December 2017 Joanne went to the Central Clinic Alice

    Springs for a check-up prior to flying to the United States of America for

    two weeks with her daughter. She left for the USA two days later on 7

    December 2017. She returned on 23 December 2017.

  5. On 23 January 2018 Joanne and Steven were in Katherine. While having

dinner at the Katherine Golf Club, Joanne complained of feeling cold and
feverish. They returned home at about 9.00pm. She took Panadol and went

to bed.

  1. The following morning she was still unwell and Steven drove her to the

    Emergency Department of the Katherine District Hospital. She was triaged

    at 9.12am. Her presenting symptoms were recorded by the triage nurse as:

    “Vomiting/nausea. One day (1/7) fevers, vomiting x 4 this morning,

    global aching. Tolerating fluid intake, ongoing productive cough

    since late December”.

  2. Her vital signs were recorded as:

    “Temp 39.9; pulse 126/min; respiratory rate 18/min; BP 116/73

    mmHg; oxygen saturation 98% .”

  3. Venous blood gas (VBG) results showed mildly reduced potassium (3.0

    mmol/L) and elevated lactate (2.3 mmol/L). The working diagnosis was a

    likely viral illness with no clear source of infection. The plan was for

    further observations and investigations.

  4. Her condition deteriorated throughout the day. She went into cardiac arrest

    at 8.42pm. She was declared life extinct at 9.25pm.

  5. Her blood cultures grew streptococcus pneumoniae. In the opinion of the

    Forensic Pathologist, Dr Marianne Tiemensma, she died due to multiple

    organ failure caused by sepsis that was due to streptococcus pneumoniae

    infection.

  6. It was apparent that when she arrived at Katherine Hospital and was triaged

    at 9.12am she was suffering from sepsis. The only way to treat sepsis is the

    administration of broad spectrum intravenous antibiotics at an early stage.

  7. According to one expert she should have been provided broad spectrum

    antibiotics by midday at the latest. If that had happened she is likely to have

survived. According to another expert she should have had antibiotics
shortly after 3.30pm. If that had happened she may well have survived.
However withholding antibiotics until 7.40pm gave her no chance for
survival.

The bacteria

  1. Streptococcus pneumoniae is a gram positive bacteria. It is an encapsulated

    bacteria that (in simple terms) makes it more difficult for the immune

    system to combat. It is present as part of the normal bacterial flora in the

    nose and throat of up to 10% of adults and up to 40% of children.[1]

The danger

  1. The bacteria can cause septicaemia, an infection of the blood stream. An

    initial source of infection is present in less than 50% of cases.2 As indicated

    by Dr Raftos:

    “The natural course of bacterial septicaemia includes a prodrome

    with symptoms of fever, chills, and muscle and joint aches lasting for
    hours to days, followed by a precipitous decline to septic shock,

    multiple organ failure and death.

    Appropriate treatment of bacterial septicaemia includes generic
    intravenous antibiotics along with intravenous fluid resuscitation.

    Any delay in initiating intravenous antibiotic treatment significantly

    increases the likelihood of both death and permanent disability.”

The vulnerability

  1. The very young or elderly are more vulnerable. Aboriginal and Torres Strait

    Islander people lack immunity to encapsulated bacteria.[3] Streptococcus

    pneumoniae is a vaccine preventable disease.

The vaccine

  1. The Australian Immunisation Handbook[4] recommends that all Aboriginal

    and Torres Strait Islander adults receive the Pneumovax23 (23vPPV)

    vaccination when 50 years of age with a further dose five years later. The

    Handbook recommends that the rest of the population receive the

    vaccination at 65 years of age.

The statistics

  1. The Centre for Disease Control at the Department of Health (Northern

    Territory) provided statistics of the extent of coverage of the vaccination for

    Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders between the ages of 50 and 60

    throughout the Northern Territory. The average coverage across all regions

    was 50%.

  2. The Katherine region was the lowest with a coverage of only 38%. Alice

    Springs Urban area was highest with a coverage of 72%.

The General Practitioners

  1. After the age of 50, Mrs Craig utilised three General Practices in the

    Northern Territory: the Central Clinic in Alice Springs, Kintore

    Clinic/Gorge Health Services in Katherine and Wurli -Wurlinjang Health

    Service in Katherine.

    Central Clinic Alice Springs

  2. Mrs Craig attended the clinic on two occasions. Once on 5 December 2017,

    before she went on her trip to the USA and on 11 January 2018 on her

    return. On both occasions the consultation was primarily around her blood

    pressure. On the first visit it was 180/100 on the right arm and 190/85 on the

    left arm. She was prescribed Perindopril Arginine (5mg each morning). On

    her return her blood pressure had reduced to 145/84.

    Wurli-Wurlinjang Health Service

  3. Mrs Craig attended the Service on a number of occasions in 2009 and 2010

    just prior to turning 50. She then attended in 2014 in relation to a cough and

    shortness of breath and then in November 2016 primarily in relation to

    grieving after the death of her father, skin lesions, cutaneous lupus

    erythematosus and blood pressure. She was referred to the Katherine

    Hospital to be linked to specialist care and information was released to

    Gorge Health to assist with rheumatologist referral. The plan included

    returning in the new year for a full skin check.

  4. Mrs Craig had attended on Wurli-Wurlinjang on 6 February 2017 and 6

    March 2017. On that last occasion her blood pressure was taken (145/80)

    and her cardiac risk assessed (CVS screen - low 9%). Blood was taken for a

    full blood test.

  5. On 13 March 2017 she returned to discuss the blood test results. They were

    normal. On that occasion she complained of a sore toe. It was thought likely

    to be arthritis.

  6. On 24 April 2017 she attended in relation to joint swelling and pain in a

    finger and a right eye pterygium that was becoming an issue. She was

    referred to an ophthalmologist. That was the last consultation.

  7. My office asked Wurli-Wurlinjang whether it used vaccination schedules

    and why it was that Mrs Craig had not received the pneumovax23

    vaccination. In a letter dated 23 May 2019 the Health Service stated, in

    effect, that there was no vaccination schedule for pneumovax23, that the

    eligibility for the vaccination was prompted during an Aboriginal Health

    Assessment and that Health Assessments were offered annually to patients

    who identified the Service as their primary health clinic. They stated:

    “As Mrs Craig did not identify the Service as her primary health

    clinic she may not have been offered an Aboriginal Health

    Assessment”.

  8. During the course of the inquest the Senior Medical Officer stated:

    “It was probably an … oversight that she was not offered an

    Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health check at that time.”[5]

    Kintore Clinic/Gorge Health Services

  9. There were no medical notes available from Kintore Clinic. The Clinic was

    closed on 30 November 2015 and from that date the General Practice

    operating from the Clinic site was Gorge Health Services. Dr David

    Brummitt operated Kintore Clinic and works for Gorge Health Services. He

    said he could not find Mrs Craig’s medical notes from her consultations with

    Kintore Clinic.

  10. The medical notes from Gorge Health indicated that in 2016 Mrs Craig saw

    the doctors at Gorge Health on four occasions. Twice in May, once in June

    and the fourth time in September. The consultations were primarily in

    relation to ongoing tests for lupus but also included other medical issues and

    support during the final weeks of her father’s illness.

  11. My Office requested similar information from Gorge Health Service to that

    requested from Wurli-Wurlinjang. The practice manager responded:

    “I would like to inform you that on the 28 November 2016 we

    received a fax from Wurli-Wurlinjang asking us for a health would have expected them to have conducted an Indigenous health

    summary for Ms Craig, as she was now attending their clinic. As she
    never attended Gorge Health after that date, it would seem that
    actually Wurli-Wurlinjang was her primary health clinic for at least a
    year before her death. This is longer than she was a patient at Gorge
    Health.
    check and immunised as appropriate. They were Ms Craig’s primary
    health clinic.”

  12. Mrs Craig was not provided the pneumovax23 vaccination or any

    information in relation to it by any of the General Practices she attended.

The Hospital Treatment

  1. There were a number of chronologies of the observations and treatment

    received by Mrs Craig while in the Katherine Hospital from her arrival on

    the morning of 24 January 2018 until her death that same day. For those who

    have a keen interest a copy of the timeline in treatment, as provided by

    Associate Professor Dr Didier Palmer (with a few alterations), is appended

    to these findings.

  2. Mrs Craig was triaged at 9.12am. It was noted that she had vomiting/nausea,

    fever for one day, had vomited four times that morning, had global aching,

    was tolerating fluid intake and had a cough since the previous month.

  3. Her vital signs included a temperature of 39.9oC, a heartrate of 126 beats per

    minute, a respiratory rate 18 breaths per minute, blood pressure of 116/73

    mmHg, and oxygen saturation at 98%. The impression of the doctors was

    that she was suffering a likely viral illness with no source of infection. They

    believed a differential diagnosis to be a bacterial infection (sepsis). It is said

    that she was entered on the sepsis recognition pathway. The pathway at that

    time was in the following form:

  4. The risk factor of a history of fevers along with her heartrate (126) and

    temperature (39.9) fulfilled the blue and yellow zones. The doctor ordered a

    venous blood gas (returned a lactate of 2.3 mmol/L), started her on

    intravenous fluids and ordered blood tests. The blood test results were

    returned at 11.41am. They indicated a raised white blood cell count of 18.7

    (normal 4.0 – 11.0) and raised neutrophil count of 14.2 (normal 2.0 – 8.0).

    CRP was 26 mg/L (normal less than 5.0).

  5. The interpretation of those results was a point of contention during the

inquest. The expert witness Associate Professor Dr John Raftos considered
that the blood test results were much more indicative of a bacterial infection

(sepsis) than a viral infection. He said if it was a virus those markers would

be unlikely to be raised and more likely suppressed. In his opinion at that

point at the latest antibiotics should have been commenced.

  1. He stated in his report:

    “The clinical features of Ms Craig’s presentation to the Emergency

    Department at Katherine Hospital on 24 January 2018 included:

     Australian Aboriginal heritage,

fever: temperature 39.9oC,
tachycardia: heartrate 126 beats per minute,

 aches and pains:

“GLOBAL ACHING,” - triage nurse,

“myalgia” - medical student,

elevated lactate: 2.3 mmol/L (normal 0.5 - 2.0),

 markedly elevated inflammatory markers, indicating serious bacterial

infection:

White Cell Count 18.7 x 109/L (normal 4.0 - 11.0),
Neutrophil Count 14.2 x 109/L (normal 2.0 - 8.0),

Band Forms 3.1 x 109/L (normal 0.0 - 0.5).

The only safe and reasonable medical synthesis of this presentation,

regardless of any clinical guideline, would be that Ms Craig had a

serious bacterial infection, requiring immediate empirical intravenous

antibiotic therapy and management in a closely monitored clinical

environment, either the Emergency Department or an Intensive Care

Unit.”[6]

  1. He gave the following response when challenged:

Q.

But do you accept, doctor that those markers could also at the time that Mrs Craig is in the emergency department, equally represent a viral infection?

A. Well when you’re taking a bet, when you’re taking a bet on a

patient’s life … I would much rather and I think that the aim for

treatment of sepsis is you give antibiotics and if it turns out to be

a viral infection, nothing was lost … but if you don’t give the

antibiotics, you can’t go back and give them at the appropriate

time.

Q. Well can I suggest that the time at which she should have definitely been given antibiotics was when it was obvious she was in shock at 3:30 pm?
A. No you don’t wait until someone’s dying before you treat them.
  1. In contrast, Associate Professor Dr Didier Palmer was of the opinion that the

    picture was more complex and that raised inflammatory markers are just as

    often associated with persons suffering viruses. In his opinion the indication

    for antibiotics did not come until 3.30pm.

  2. Mrs Craig remained in the Emergency Department. Her observations

    remained relatively stable. Some appeared to improve a little. Her

    temperature fell until at 3.20pm when it was 37.8. Her heartrate was at 90

    beats a minute. Her blood pressure was fluctuating a little, albeit always

    above a systolic pressure of 103. By 3.20pm she had received 2 litres of

    normal saline. She still appeared to be dry. Her blood pressure was 110/50.

  3. Her doctor was finishing his shift at 3.30pm. He transferred her to the ward

    after the observations taken at 3.20pm. At the time of her transfer she wa s

    receiving fluid at the rate of 125 milligrams an hour (8 hour bag).

  4. There was no specific handover of the care of Mrs Craig at 3.30pm. At that

    point there appeared to be no specific concerns. On arrival on the ward

further observations were undertaken. Her blood pressure had dropped
dramatically to 86/54 mmHg. Her heartrate was 102 beats a min, and her

oxygen saturations were 95% on room air.

  1. Mrs Craig was at that point in septic shock. So far as the information on the

    sepsis pathway was concerned she fulfilled the criteria in the red section as

    her systolic blood pressure had dropped below 90 mmHg. Her heartrate was

    102 beats a minute. The pathway stated in the red section “this patient has

    severe sepsis until proven otherwise”.

  2. So far as the Adult Observation Chart used on the ward (between the flags)

    was concerned, the drop in her blood pressure put her in the pink area. The

    action required according to the Chart was that the RMO review the patient

    within 30 minutes.

  3. In the opinion of Dr Didier Palmer antibiotics should have been commenced.

    He stated:

    “The observations on the ward at 1530 should have resulted in

    escalation and timely medical review and the commencement of

    broad spectrum IV antibiotics (regardless of the lactate level – septic

    shock can occur with a normal lactate) shortly after 1530 (within an

    hour).”

  4. A doctor was not however called at that time. Thirty minutes later the nurse

    undertook another set of observations. Mrs Craig’s condition was

    worsening. Her blood pressure had dropped further to 81/47 and her oxygen

    saturations to 93%. The doctor was asked to attend. He ordered an

    intravenous fluid bolus but did not attend. The fluid was given at 4.25pm.

  5. At 5.00pm Mrs Craig had red and stinging hands. The nurse ceased the

    intravenous fluids. An Emergency Department registrar (different to the

    doctor who ordered the bolus of fluid) was seeing a patient nearby and was

    asked to check on Mrs Craig by the nurse. The doctor re-sited the cannula

and obtained another Venous Blood Gas analysis. It showed that Mrs Craig
had a reducing pH (7.26) and rising lactate (4.2). According to the sepsis

pathway a lactate equal to or over 4.0 is one of the items in the red zone.

  1. Repeat observations were conducted at 5.30pm. They showed a slightly

    improved picture. Blood pressure was 93/62, heartrate was 90, temperature

    was 37.0, respiratory rate was 22, and oxygen saturations 97%. Mrs Craig

    said she was feeling better. The doctor spoke to the on-call doctor and the

    commencement of antibiotics was considered. However it is clear that

    neither doctor understood the full history of Mrs Craig while at Katherine

    Hospital. It was decided to continue observations and repeat the lactate

    analysis at 7.00pm.

  2. At 6.30pm the observations showed a significant deterioration. Blood

    pressure was 75/48, heartrate was 75, temperature was 36.6, respiratory rate

    was up to 24 and oxygen saturations were down to 81%. There was a

    thought that the low oxygen saturations might have been due to a bad trace

    and they did not result in an emergency call.

  1. Ten minutes later Mrs Craig was suffering diarrhoea and vomiting. She went

    to the toilet and had dizziness. It was noticed that her lips were blue. The

    medical emergency team was called. She was put on oxygen and given

    fluids. At 6.48pm a Venous Blood Gas analysis showed her lactate to be 7.4.

    She was returned to the Emergency Department (which for Katherine

    Hospital is the most intensive care environment).

  2. At 6.50pm Mrs Craig had another two bouts of diarrhoea. By 7.10pm it was

    noted that Mrs Craig was clammy and peripherally shut down. At 7.20pm

    antibiotics were finally commenced. From 7.40pm there was intensive

    resuscitative efforts, but Mrs Craig went into cardiac arrest at 8.42pm and

    was declared deceased at 9.25pm.

Reviews and Response

  1. The failure to identify the deterioration was the subject of reviews by

    Katherine Hospital, Top End Health Service and the Department of Health.

    At Katherine Hospital improvements were sought to be made regarding

    transfer and clinical handover of patients between the emergency department

    and the ward, and upskilling in the identification of deteriorating patients

    and the appropriate escalation of care.

  2. Staff at the Katherine Hospital have made a video for continuing education

    on the dangers of sepsis along with its identification and treatment. There

    has also been personal learning from the doctors involved in Mrs Craig’s

    care.

  3. The doctor who first saw and admitted Mrs Craig said during evidence:

    “I’ve thought about this case a lot over the last couple of years, and I

    feel like in any physician’s career you’re going to have cases that do

    affect your practice into the future, and feel that a case like this - and
    having spoken to different intensivists and different specialists in
    different areas, infectious diseases and intensivists, I feel like I

    would have a lower threshold in a situation like this to be giving

    antibiotics earlier. Obviously that’s with the benefit of hindsight.

    And I guess the reasons why [we] are trying to avoid giving antibiotics are things like increased, resistance to broad-spectrum

    antibiotics; not knowing what you’re treating; there’s risk of giving

    any medication, such as anaphylaxis … So those are all competing

    factors. However, having spoken to different intensivists and different infectious diseases specialists, I feel like the risk of developing antibiotic resistance if giving a few doses of broad-

    spectrum antibiotic early on in the patient’s course until you know

    which direction they’re going in is less of an issue than I think the

    medical profession thinks, and certainly that I thought at the time.”

  4. The doctor who ordered the bolus of fluids after 4.00pm stated:

    “We are genuinely affected when these things happen … my practise

    has changed. It always will change. We will always continue to

    upskill and hopefully minimise any repetitions of any of these sorts

    of things ever happening again.”

  5. The sepsis recognition pathway is being upgraded by the Top End Health

    Service. Aboriginality has been included as a risk factor and there is an

    indication that a lactate over 2.0 is significant after adequate fluid

    resuscitation.

  6. In May 2019 the Department of Health sought from the NSW Clinical

    Excellence Commission (CEC) an assessment of the current systems for

    “diagnosis and treatment of patients with sepsis in the NT”. That assessment

    was completed in July 2019. The CEC made 23 recommendations relating to

    governance, training, standardisation, system change and continual

    improvement.

  7. The Department of Health has developed a management plan for

    implementation of the recommendations. Two of the milestones are said to

    be the development of an NT Health Sepsis Management Pathway and an NT

    Health Education Plan that includes a detailed strategy for Aboriginal

    Health.

  8. I commend Katherine District Hospital, the Top End Health Service and the

    Department of Health on their efforts to ensure continual improvement in

    combatting the challenges sepsis recognition and treatment poses since the

    death of Mrs Craig.

Comment

  1. Despite two inquests into the failure to identity sepsis at a Northern

    Territory Hospital, the need for early intervention seemed not to have been

    appropriately understood. Sepsis kills and it kills often. It is a very common

    cause of death in hospitals. It is therefore incumbent on management to

    ensure that the recognition of sepsis and its early treatment is appropriately

    and continually reinforced and the understanding of its staff is audited.

  2. For a patient who from the outset was recognised to be in potential danger

    the documentation is very poor. There was for instance no fluid balance

    chart utilised at any time. Given that urine output is a significant parameter

    when identifying sepsis that seems less than adequate. Such a chart may also

    have assisted the doctors to understand that they were unlikely to be been

    dealing with hypovolemic shock after 3.30pm.

  3. The death of Mrs Craig was likely to have been preventable.

  4. One of the significant concerns of the family was that very early on in the

    care of Mrs Craig the doctors understood that the infection was either viral

    or bacterial. If viral, there was likely no real danger. If bacterial, there was

    real danger. However, the consequences of withholding antibiotics was not

    discussed with Mrs Craig or her family. The family are confident that if that

    discussion were had she would have sought antibiotic treatment. In

    circumstances where withholding treatment may well have had and did have

    fatal consequences, that failure to discuss the options for treatment was

    significant.

  5. Pursuant to section 34 of the Coroner’s Act, I find as follows:

    (i)        The identity of the deceased was Joanne Craig born on 5

    October 1960, Tennant Creek Hospital, Northern Territory.

    (ii)      The time of death was 9.25pm on 24 January 2018. The place

    of death was Katherine District Hospital, Katherine in the

    Northern Territory.

    (iii)    The cause of death was multi-organ failure due to sepsis that

    was due to Streptococcus pneumoniae infection.

    (iv)    The particulars required to register the death:

    1. The deceased was Joanne Craig.

2. The deceased was of Aboriginal descent.
3. The deceased was a manager of a cattle station.
4. The death was reported to the Coroner by a doctor at

Katherine Hospital.

5.   The cause of death was confirmed by Forensic Pathologist,

Marianne Tiemensma.

6.    The deceased’s mother was Peggy Foster and her father was

Noel George Corp.

Recommendations

  1. I recommend that General Practitioners have a schedule for and make every

    effort to provide to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people the

    Pneumovax23 (23vPPV) vaccination in accordance with the Australian

    Immunisation Handbook.

  2. I recommend that the Top End Health Service do all things necessary to

    ensure its staff are competent in the recognition of sepsis and escalation of

    treatment and that such efforts are ongoing.

  3. I recommend that the Top End Health Service do all things necessary to

    ensure that the documentation utilised when treating patients is appropriate

    and appropriately utilised.

  4. I recommend that documentation utilised be audited on a regular basis.

Dated this 20 day of September 2019.

_________________________

GREG CAVANAGH
TERRITORY CORONER

ANNEXURE

Timeline of Events (from ED attendance 24012018) from Dr Didier Palmer

(with my modifications)

Key

Nursing or medical assessment or actions
Observations
Investigations

Treatment

Wednesday 24th January

Mrs Craig attends Katherine Hospital Emergency Department

0912hrs

Triaged: One day of fevers, vomited 4 times on the morning of presentation, global aching, cough for a month

Given an Australian Triage Scale (ATS) of 4 (to be ideally seen within an hour by a doctor)

0912hrs

Observations:

Temperature
39.9C Pulse
126
Respiratory rate 18
Blood Pressure 116/73

Oxygen saturations 98% in air

0955hrs

Medical student (6th year) takes a comprehensive history for Dr Wyllie: Ms
Craig had been unwell from the previous evening when out to dinner with
fever and had vomited 4 times on the morning of attendance, she had
reduced oral intake. She also had a headache but no red flags for meningitis
(neck stiffness / photophobia / purpuric rash / contact history). She was
noted to work on a cattle station and had had a cough for a few weeks. She
had a diagnosis of hypertension and was on perindopril and
supraventricular tachycardia and was on metoprolol when this occurred.
She had been investigated inconclusively by a rheumatologist the previous

year for cutaneous systemic erythematosus and was an ex ‐ smoker and non-

drinker. Systems review revealed no obvious infective source.

On examination she looked unwell and lethargic and systems exam revealed her to be dry but otherwise no abnormality was found except a soft ejection murmur which had been noted from childhood.

CXR was normal (as reported in the notes I have not reviewed it myself )

Venous blood gas: pH 7.35; Co2 48 Na 141 K 3 Lac 2.3 HCO3 26.5

(performed 1035)

Blood tests requested (arrived in lab and registered at 1043): FBC / EUC /
LFT / CRP / Blood cultures / melioid serology

The clinical impression was of a viral illness with no other clear infective source.

Initial management: ondansetron (anti‐ emetic) (prescribed 0915);

Ibuprofen (anti pyrexial) (prescribed 1100); IV access and IV fluids (1L normal saline prescribed 1050)

The above plan and investigation would have been discussed with Dr administration of drugs and fluids.

1100hrs

Nursing note: vomiting settled with ondansetron, vitally stable, plan: IV fluids, bloods, paracetamol

1100hrs

Treatment to this time: Antiemetic

Observations:

Temperature
39.7C Pulse 95
Respiratory rate 18
Blood Pressure 140/50

Oxygen saturations 98% in air

1141hrs

Full Blood Count results available, results included:

White Cell Count 18.7 x 109/L (Normal 4.0 - 11.0)
Neutrophil Count 14.2 x 109/L (Normal 2.0 - 8.0)
Metamyelocytes 0.4 x 109/L (Normal 0.0)
CRP 26 mg/L (Normal < 5.0)

1200hrs

Treatment to this time: antiemetic, up to 1L normal saline, ibuprofen

Observations:

Temperature
39C Pulse 103
Respiratory rate 20
Blood Pressure 120/50

Oxygen saturations 93% in air

1220hrs

Second L of normal saline charted (commenced 1235)

1230hrs

1g of paracetamol given (charted at 1220)

1251hrs

Ward test urine: negative

1300hrs

Treatment to this time: antiemetic, 1‐ 1.5L normal saline, ibuprofen,

paracetamol

Observations:

Temperature 38.7C
Pulse 90
Respiratory rate 22
Blood Pressure 103/50

Oxygen saturations 94% in air

1330hrs

Treatment to this time: antiemetic, up to 1.5‐ 2L normal saline,

ibuprofen, paracetamol

Observations:

Temperature 38.4C
Pulse 92
Respiratory rate 20
Blood Pressure 107/50

Oxygen saturations 96% in air

1425hrs

Treatment to this time: antiemetic, 2L normal saline, ibuprofen and paracetamol

Observations:

Temperature
38.4C Pulse 89
Respiratory rate 20
Blood Pressure 105/50

Oxygen saturations 94% in air

1425hrs

Dr Wyllie documents:

Treatment thus far: 2L IV fluids and 2 anti-pyretics (paracetamol and
ibuprofen):
Investigations: CRP 26; EUC 141/3.2/6.2/71; LFT alt 91 ggt 81; FBC

134/.4/18.7 (n 18, lymph 0.6); U/A Protein + otherwise NAD

Plan:

a. Admit to inpatient ward for fluids/ antipyretics/ observation

b. 2nd set of blood cultures; full melioid screen

c. Not for antibiotics as does not fit severe sepsis criteria yet –

improving but needs observation.

d. This plan was made in discussion with Dr O’Hern (the medical
registrar on duty for inpatients and on call from home after 1630 for
the medical inpatients)

1430hrs

Dr Wyllie charted IVT N/Saline with 20 mmol KCl to continue @ 125 mls/hr

1520hrs

Observations (pre-departure from the ED):

Temperature
37.9C Pulse 92
Respiratory rate 24
Blood Pressure 110/50

Oxygen saturations 96% in air

1530hrs

Arrives on the inpatient ward transported on a wheelchair, noted to be alert
and orientated. The nurse notes the patient to be hypotensive on arrival
observations at 1530 and s/he repeats the observations at 1600hrs and they
show the patient is still hypotensive. At that point s/he escalates to the
(ED) doctor by phone.

1530hrs

Observations (post arrival on inpatient ward):

Temperature
37.4C Pulse
102
Respiratory rate 24
Blood Pressure 86/54

Oxygen saturations 95% in air

1600hrs

Observations:

Temperature 37.2C
Pulse 90
Respiratory rate 20
Blood Pressure 81/47

Oxygen saturations 93% in air

1625hrs

The contacted ED doctor gives a telephone order for 1L of Hartmanns solution to be given as a bolus. The nurse noted the patient to be comfortable.

1710hrs

The patient buzzed due to pain in both hands, Hartmanns solution was ceased

Observations:

Temperature
37.2C Pulse 90
Respiratory rate 20
Blood Pressure 89/46

Oxygen saturations 93% in air

The medical officer was called again

1730hrs

Observations:

Temperature 37C Pulse 90 Respiratory rate 22

Blood Pressure 93/62
Oxygen saturations 95% in air

1730hrs

Up to this point the patient had had 2‐ 3L crystalloid

The ED registrar left the ED and attended the patient on the ward. He noted
no source of infection but she felt cool peripherally, felt subjectively
better, was afebrile, was making urine and was not confused and had a rise

in lactate to 4.5

The registrar discussed the case with Dr O’Hern who elected to observe and

repeat the lactate at 1900hrs and not give antibiotics

1830hrs

Observations:

Temperature
36.5C Pulse 75
Respiratory rate 22
Blood Pressure 75/48
Oxygen saturations 81 % in air with poor trace

The nurse documents that the patient was slightly short of breath and also had diarrhoea and was assisted to the toilet. A medical officer was on the ward reviewing another patient and the nurse was advised to repeat the

observations on the patient’s return from the toilet. When in the toilet the

patient had an episode of vomiting post toileting and her lips went blue
(cyanosis). She was brought back to her bed, commenced on oxygen and

the foot of the bed raised and a rapid response was called.

1910hrs

MET Call (emergency response medical call)

Medical officer notes presyncope, low blood pressure, peripherally shut

down, delayed capillary refill; all signs of cardiovascular collapse (shock)

despite the patient still mentating normally.

500ml bolus Hartmann’s and transfer back to ED (with a delay documented

as the patient was using the pan).

1930hrs

The patient was transferred back to the ED and the notes document her arrival in the ED at 1930

At that point the diagnosis was of decompensated septic shock and there was a very experienced medical team comprising a consultant emergency physician, an accredited emergency medicine advanced trainee, a GP

anaesthetist and a junior medical officer.

The patient was initially mentating normally with a blood pressure of over 100 systolic and a heartrate of about 100. Central venous access was attempted but proved not possible. Wet season severe sepsis antibiotics were given (meropenem and vancomycin) and peripheral inotropes commenced.

Ms Craig continued to deteriorate rapidly and lost output (went into cardiac arrest). Standard Advanced Life Support protocols were followed and she was intubated and ventilated. There was a brief return of circulation but there followed diminishing response to inotropes and further cardiac arrest.

Stephen (Ms Craig’s partner) was brought into the resuscitation and there

was discussion with him regarding the futility of further resuscitative

effort.

2125hrs

Resuscitation was ceased at 2125hrs with Stephen in the room.

Family members arrived to support Stephen at 2143.

[1] Report of Dr Raftos p10

[2] Ibid p 11

[3] Ibid p11
[4] Published by the Australian Government Department of Health
[5] Transcript p42
[6] Report dated 24 December 2018, p 12

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