Innes v Lincoln Motor Company

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32 CLR 606

THE LINCOLN MOTOR COMPANY

RESPONDENT. OPPONENT,

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF Trade Mark-Registration-Imposition of condition-Disclaimer of right to exclusive

use of added matter-Discretion of Registrar and of Court--EvidenceTrade Marks Act 1905-1912 (No. 20 of 1905-No. 19 of 1912), secs. 4, 16 (1) (e), 24. MELBOURNE

The appellant applied for the registration of a trade mark consisting of a Oct. 8, 9;

design of which the word 'Lincoln was a most prominent feature, and the application was opposed. Nearly three years after the application was made, Higgins,

the Deputy Registrar decided that the mark should be registered, holding that to a large section of the public the word "Lincoln" in fact denoted the goods of the appellant in the market. On appeal by the opponent, the Supreme Court of Victoria decided that the mark should be registered provided that the applicant disclaimed any right to the exclusive use of the word "Lincoln." On appeal to the High Court,

Held, that, as there was no evidence to justify a finding that the word "Lincoln" in fact denoted the goods of the appellant in the market, there was no reason for interfering with the exercise of the discretion given to the Supreme Court by sec. 24 of the Trade Marks Act 1905-1912 to impose the condition as to disclaimer.

Quaere, whether evidence of user after the date of the application was admis- sible to prove a right to exclusive use,

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Irvine C.J.): In re Innes's Trade Mark, (1923) V.L.R., 359; 44 A.L.T., 174, affirmed.

32 CLR 607

OF AUSTRALIA

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

On 17th September 1919 Charles Innes, who traded as the Lincoln Motor Car Co., applied for the registration of a trade mark in respect of motor-cars and motor-car chassis. An illustration of the mark appears in a previous volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports 1. In his application the applicant stated: "I do not claim the registration of this trade mark under the special provisions of sec. 16 (1) (e) of the Trade Marks Act 1905-1912, in regard to names, signatures or words." The application was opposed by the Lincoln Motor Co. On 4th August 1922 the Deputy Registrar gave his decision dismissing the opposition and granting the application. From that decision the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal was heard by Irvine C.J., who made an order that the trade mark should be entered upon the register " "only provided the

applicant disclaims any right to the exclusive use of the word Lincoln,' " otherwise that the application should be dismissed In re Innes's Trade Mark 2.

From that decision the applicant now, by special leave, appealed to the High Court.

The other material facts appear in the judgments hereunder. Owen Dixon K.C. (with him Robert Menzies), for the appellant. The appellant has a common law right to proceed against anyone who uses the word "Lincoln" for passing-off…

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Details
Case
[1923] HCA 52
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria concerning the registration of a trade mark. The appellant, Charles Innes, trading as the Lincoln Motor Car Co., applied to register a trade mark featuring the word "Lincoln" prominently. The respondent, Lincoln Motor Co., opposed this application. The Deputy Registrar initially allowed registration, finding that "Lincoln" denoted the appellant's goods to a significant portion of the public. However, the Supreme Court of Victoria, on appeal, varied this decision, requiring the appellant to disclaim any exclusive right to the word "Lincoln" as a condition of registration.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the Supreme Court had erred in exercising its discretion under section 24 of the *Trade Marks Act 1905-1912* to impose a disclaimer condition, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the word "Lincoln" had acquired a secondary meaning denoting the appellant's goods in the market. The High Court also considered the admissibility of evidence of user after the date of the trade mark application.

The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, reasoned that its role was not to substitute its own discretion for that of the Supreme Court unless the latter had proceeded on a manifestly erroneous principle or misapprehended facts. The Court found no evidence to justify the Deputy Registrar's conclusion that "Lincoln" had acquired a distinctiveness in the market for the appellant's goods. While the appellant had used the word since 1918, the evidence presented was deemed too general and lacking in detail to establish exclusive rights or a secondary meaning. Consequently, the Supreme Court's exercise of discretion in requiring a disclaimer was upheld as a proper measure to clarify the appellant's rights and prevent potential confusion, given the prominence of the word "Lincoln" in the trade mark.

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