IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Canberra No C8 of 2015
B e t w e e n -
BARRY CHARLES INNES
Applicant
and
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
FRENCH CJ
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 2015, AT 9.30 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.J. DAVIS, for the applicant. (instructed by Snedden Hall and Gallop Lawyers)
MR P.C.B. SEMMLER, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR M.J. O’MEARA, for the respondent. (instructed by Australian Government Solicitor)
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.
MR WALKER: Your Honours, in our submission, an error, serious in principle and very drastic in consequence for our client, has occurred in the Court of Appeal of a kind which should excite this Court’s interest in correcting an important error of principle. It is not just in the rarefied world of superannuation, which for Commonwealth employees may loom large in this city, but may not dominate the jurisprudence generally. It is not just in that area that the error of principle would operate.
In a nutshell, we submit, this is an inquiry about the way in which the robust, unalterable common law requirement for there to be loss – that is, in a relevant sense for a person to be able to show that they are worse off than they would have been but for the wrong – has occurred so as to then trigger where they are applicable, as they are universally, limitation periods in the absence of special circumstances. So stated, the problem is obviously one that transcends a statutory scheme of superannuation.
By hypothesis, given the way in which the argument was set up, with facts agreed for its purpose, the Commonwealth is responsible for negligently failing to advise someone whom it should have advised better than it did of the possibilities of benefits to be gained under membership of the scheme. The hypothesis is that that failure occurred. It is a failure to give advice rather than the giving of wrong advice.
The counterfactual, to use the jargon, is, of course, what would have occurred had the advice been given in accordance with the standard of care. On that hypothesis, according to the agreed facts, there can be no doubt whatever that there would have been the exercise of – I will call it the section 137 election about which your Honours have read, which would have the effect, to use the language of the statute, of deferring a benefit. But, the entitlement – again, to use another loaded expression to be found in the reasons below – upon that election, is to be paid in the future commencing upon certain contingencies which would include, for example, survival.
FRENCH CJ: Had he been a member of the…
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- Case
- [2015] HCATrans 292
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship had erred in law by failing to consider relevant considerations and by taking into account irrelevant considerations when assessing the applicants' eligibility for a visa. Specifically, the applicants contended that the delegate had failed to properly consider the evidence they had provided regarding their genuine relationship and had instead relied on assumptions and inferences that were not supported by the evidence.
The High Court found that the delegate had indeed failed to properly consider the evidence before them. The Court held that the delegate's decision was vitiated by a failure to engage with the substance of the applicants' submissions and evidence, particularly concerning the genuineness of their relationship. The delegate had impermissibly relied on assumptions and inferences that were not logically derived from the evidence, thereby failing to undertake the required assessment of the facts. The Court reiterated the principle that a decision-maker must genuinely consider all relevant material and not act on assumptions or irrelevant factors.
The High Court ordered that the decision of the delegate be quashed and remitted the matter to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship to be determined according to law.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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