Ingrid Margaret Stephenson v Parkes Shire Council; Natalee Stephenson v Parkes Shire Council; Jay Stephenson v Parkes Shire Council; South West Helicopters Pty Limited v Essential Energy (formerly Country Energy);

The plaintiffs, Ingrid Margaret Stephenson, Natalee Stephenson, and Jay Stephenson, sought damages for nervous shock and associated claims under the Compensation to Relatives Act following a helicopter accident in which their family member, a deceased, was killed. The helicopter was owned and operated by South West Helicopters Pty Limited, which in turn was sued by the Parkes Shire Council and Essential Energy, for damages to the helicopter. The legal issues in this case included the validity of claims for nervous shock and damages for the helicopter itself, the apportionment of damages where multiple parties had breached their duty of care, and the statutory indemnity and interest on damages in the context of an employer's recovery against another tortfeasor. The court had to determine whether the claims for damages were apportionable under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), whether the employer was entitled to statutory indemnity despite a breach of duty of care, and whether the employer was entitled to interest on damages awarded.

The court found that the claims for nervous shock were valid, but the associated claims under the Compensation to Relatives Act were not. The court also found that the claims for damages to the helicopter were apportionable. In apportioning the responsibility, the court considered the culpability and causal potency of each party's breach of duty of care. The court further ruled that the employer was not entitled to statutory indemnity due to its own breach of duty of care, but it was entitled to interest on the damages awarded. Lastly, the court found that the two-year limitation period applied in respect of the commencement of proceedings.

The court ordered that the claims for damages to the helicopter be apportioned among the parties based on their respective culpability and causal potency. The employer was not entitled to statutory indemnity, but it was entitled to interest on the damages awarded. The claims for nervous shock were upheld, but the associated claims under the Compensation to Relatives Act were dismissed. The employer's proceedings against another tortfeasor were subject to the two-year limitation period.