99.351
COURT OF APPEAL
McMURDO P
McPHERSON JA
CHESTERMAN J
CA No 48 of 1999
B W INGRAM
v.
| GORDON ARNOLD JONES | Applicant |
| BRISBANE ..DATE 23/08/99 | |
| JUDGMENT | |
| 230899 T8/RB28 M/T COA202/99 |
THE PRESIDENT: This is an application for an extension of
time for leave to appeal from a decision of the District
Court in appellate jurisdiction under section 118 of the
District Court Act 1967.
The applicant was originally convicted of the offence of breach of the Bail Act 1980 under section 33(1) of that Act.
He was sentenced to two months imprisonment with a
recommendation for parole after one month. His appeal was
rejected in the District Court on 23 February 1999.
The first application is for an extension of time. On otherwise the application would have been within time. When the applicant's lawyers were informed that the appeal had been incorrectly commenced in mid-June 1999 this application was made.
3 March 1999 the applicant's solicitor mistakenly filed an
application for leave to appeal against sentence rather than
an application for leave to appeal under section 118 of the
In those circumstances, there being no fault on the part of the applicant, the application for an extension of time should be granted.
The next issue is whether leave to appeal should be given under section 118 of the District Court Act 1967. As the point is a short one it is convenient to deal with the leave
issue and the merits of the appeal together.
2 JUDGMENT
230899 T8/RB28 M/T COA202/99
The bail which was breached related to a charge of creating a disturbance pursuant to section 141 of the Transport Operations Act 1994, an offence punishable by a maximum of 20 penalty units and no term of imprisonment. The applicant was granted bail at the watch-house seemingly after signing an undertaking.
On a number of other occasions in his criminal history it seems he had been given watch-house bail and bail was forfeited. Counsel for the applicant and the respondent have made submissions as to the effect of the Bail Act to the effect that where an undertaking is signed for bail, bail may not be able to be forfeited and that is what seems to have occurred here.
The applicant was 51 years of age at the time of his sentence. He had a criminal history for street offences, some petty dishonesty in 1970 and 1971 and on-going street offences and traffic offences. In 1993 he breached a domestic violence order and a warrant was issued when he failed to appear in respect of that matter.
He was dealt with for that offence one month later and no charge was brought against him under the Bail Act. He has never been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. His criminal history seems consistent with the submission made at his sentence that he had an alcohol problem.
3 JUDGMENT
230899 T8/RB28 M/T COA202/99
The applicant pleaded guilty to this offence at the first opportunity. The applicant's lawyer informed the…
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- Case
- [1999] QCA 351
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that there was no fault on the part of the applicant, and the extension of time for the appeal application should be granted. The Court further considered whether leave to appeal should be granted. The applicant had pleaded guilty to the offence of breaching bail conditions, which related to a charge of creating a disturbance. The applicant's criminal history included street offences, some petty dishonesty, and ongoing street and traffic offences. The District Court Judge had considered the appeal and noted that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive but may have been on the high side.
The Court of Appeal found that the applicant's lengthy criminal history, which included an alcohol problem, and the fact that he had never been sentenced to a term of imprisonment before, should have been considered. The Court held that the last resort of imprisonment was not warranted in this case and that the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was outside the exercise of a sound sentencing discretion. Consequently, the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and substituted the sentence imposed by the Magistrate with a $500 fine.
The orders made by the Court of Appeal were as follows: the application for extension of time within which to appeal was granted; the application for leave to appeal was granted; the appeal was allowed; the sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court was vacated; and a conviction was recorded, and the applicant was fined $500 with four months to pay, in default of which one month's imprisonment would be imposed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Court of Appeal as an application for an extension of time for leave to appeal from the District Court's decision. The District Court had rejected Ingram's appeal on 23 February 1999. Initially, Ingram's solicitor filed an incorrect application for leave to appeal against sentence on 3 March 1999. Upon realising the error, the correct application for an extension of time was made. The Court of Appeal heard the application for the extension of time and the leave to appeal concurrently.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Should the application for an extension of time be granted?
2. Should leave to appeal be granted under section 118 of the District Court Act 1967?
Held
1. The application for an extension of time should be granted.
2. The application for leave to appeal under section 118 of the District Court Act 1967 should be granted, the appeal allowed, and the sentence imposed by the Magistrate should be vacated and replaced with a $500 fine.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court of Appeal considered the application for an extension of time for leave to appeal from the District Court's decision. The applicant's solicitor had mistakenly filed an application for leave to appeal against sentence instead of an application under section 118 of the District Court Act 1967. The Court found that there was no fault on the part of the applicant and therefore granted the extension of time. The Court then proceeded to consider the merits of the appeal and whether leave to appeal should be granted. The applicant had been convicted of breaching bail conditions under the Bail Act 1980 and was sentenced to two months imprisonment with a recommendation for parole after one month. The District Court had rejected the applicant's appeal on 23 February 1999. The Court found that the District Court Judge had erred in not upholding the appeal, as the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was outside the exercise of a sound sentencing discretion. The Court noted that imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort and that a sentence that allows the offender to stay in the community is preferable. The Court also found that there was no evidence that the undertaking was explained to the applicant, that he was told that he needed to attend Court, or that the undertaking was produced to the Court. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and substituted the sentence imposed by the Magistrate with a $500 fine. The Court noted that the offence was more one of inadvertence and recklessness rather than a deliberate contempt of the Court. The Court's ratio decidendi is that where an applicant has no fault in an appeal process error, an extension of time can be granted. Additionally, in sentencing for breaches of bail conditions, imprisonment should only be imposed as a last resort, and a sentence that allows the offender to stay in the community is preferable.