SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal from a Master: Civil)
INDIGO FINANCIAL MONEY PTY LIMITED v MOUSTRIDES & ANOR
[2010] SASC 355
Judgment of The Honourable Justice White
24 December 2010
CORPORATIONS - WINDING UP - WINDING UP IN INSOLVENCY - STATUTORY DEMAND - APPLICATION TO SET ASIDE DEMAND - PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS - OTHER MATTERS
The appellant was served at the one time with separate statutory demands from each of the respondents - the appellant filed a single originating process seeking to set aside both statutory demands - the respondents submitted that the originating process did not comply with the requirements of s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) - relying upon the decision of Young J in Help Desk Institute Pty Ltd v Adams (1999) 17 ACLC 18, the Master dismissed the originating process, holding that separate originating processes were required - the appellant appealed against this decision.
Whether a company may, by the one initiating process, apply to the Court under s 459G of the Act for orders setting aside two or more statutory demands.
Held: appeal allowed - there is no express or implied requirement in s 459G of the Act that an originating process deal with one statutory demand, and one statutory demand only.
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459E, s 459F, s 459G, s 459T, s 588FF; Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 23; Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 79; Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 (Cth); Corporations Rules 2003 (SA) r 2; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 31, r 73, referred to.
Indigo Financial Money Pty Limited v Moustrides & Moustrides [2010] SASC 235; David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265; Filaria Pty Ltd v Carlisle [2004] ACTSC 95; Ambassador at Redcliffe Pty Ltd v Barreau Peninsula Property Pty Ltd (2006) 202 FLR 459; Isaco Pty Ltd v Davey (2003) 180 FLR 183; Cooloola Dairies Pty Ltd v National Foods Milk Ltd (2004) 184 FLR 86; Gujarat NRE Australia Pty Ltd v Williams [2006] NSWSC 518; Gordon v Tolcher (2006) 231 CLR 334; Wood v Cross Television Centre Pty Ltd [1962] NSWR 528; Meckiff v Simpson [1968] VR 62; Hinze v Zed [1926] SASR 77; Help Desk Institute Pty Ltd v Adams (1999) 17 ACLC 18; Calquid Pty Ltd v A & D R Illes Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 523; Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Limited (1993) 177 CLR 485; Remo Constructifons Pty Ltd v Dualcorp (2008) 222 FLR 375, considered.
INDIGO FINANCIAL MONEY PTY LIMITED v MOUSTRIDES & ANOR
[2010] SASC 355Appeal from a Master
WHITE J. The question on this appeal is whether a company may, by the one initiating process, apply to the Court under s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act) for orders setting aside two or more statutory demands which have been served on it.
A Master held that the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Indigo Financial Money Pty Ltd v Moustrides and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2010] SASC 355
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centered on the interpretation of section 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 and the procedural requirements for setting aside statutory demands. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether a single originating process could be used to set aside multiple statutory demands and if such a process was valid under the relevant legislation and court rules. The respondents contended that separate originating processes were mandatory, while the appellant argued that a single process could suffice under certain circumstances, supported by the uniform procedural rules and other judicial precedents.
The court found that the statutory language of section 459G did not preclude the use of a single originating process for multiple statutory demands. It also noted that the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 allowed for a plaintiff to claim relief against multiple defendants if certain conditions were met. The court held that each claim to set aside a statutory demand constituted a distinct cause of action against a single defendant. Thus, the appellant's single originating process was deemed compliant with the procedural rules. The Master's decision to dismiss the originating process was overturned, and the matter was remitted for further consideration.
In conclusion, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the Master, and remitted the matter for the hearing and determination of the appellant's originating process filed on 12 May 2010. The parties were instructed to address the issue of costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: WHITE J
Barrett J advanced two reasons for concluding that the Court should not proceed according to an abstract rule of general application that there can be only one summons dealing with one demand:First, I do not think that it is discernible from the language of s 459G: the proposition advanced by Young J in Help Desk in the words quoted at [7][36] is, I think, met by observing that the time limit expressed by the words “after the demand is so served” can quite easily be applied separately to each claim in an originating process of the kind now before me to determine whether the application represented by that claim is within time.The second reason is that, in proceedings under the Corporations Act commenced in this court, the Rules of procedure in this court apply: Gordon v Tolcher (2006) 231 CLR 334. Under r 6.18(1)(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), a plaintiff may, in any originating process, claim relief against the defendant in respect of one or more causes of action if the plaintiff sues in the same capacity and claims the defendant to be liable in the same capacity in respect of each cause of action. Each claim of the present plaintiff to have a statutory demand set aside is a distinct cause of action that lies against a single defendant in a single capacity at the suit of a single plaintiff in a single capacity. The conditions for the operation of the rule are thus satisfied. (That would not be so in a case like Help Desk, Ambassador at Redcliffe or Filaria where there were several issuers of statutory demands and therefore several defendants; the question of joinder would then probably be governed by r 6.19).[37]Barrett J went on to hold that the summons issued in Remo was valid.[36] Paragraph 7 of Remo quoted the passage in Help Desk in which Young J said “if more than one demand was contemplated, one would have expected the legislature to have said ‘after the demand is so served, or if more than one demand is served, by 21 days after the first of such demands is served’”.[37] Ibid at [36]-[37].Consideration Counsel for the respondent submitted that this Court should follow Help Desk and the subsequent decisions which have applied it. The Court should hold, he submitted, that the one originating process cannot be used by a company seeking to set aside multiple statutory demands. In the alternative, if a single originating process may be used in some cases, it is not permissible in cases like the present in which the debts claimed are due to different creditors and arise from different circumstances In support of these submissions, counsel emphasised in particular the potential for compromise to the expeditious determination of applications to set aside statutory demands in the event that the one application and the affidavit supporting it deal with multiple statutory demands. As noted earlier, this consideration formed an important part of the rationale of Young J and of Santow J in Help Desk and Calquid respectively.