Indigenous Business Australia v Schofield

Case [2017] ACTSC 56


SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Indigenous Business Australia v Schofield

Citation:

[2017] ACTSC 56

Submissions Date:

23 February 2017

DecisionDate:

Reasons Date:

16 March 2017

22 March 2017

Before:

Refshauge J

Decision:

1.     That the order of 12 April 2016 be amended by omitting the figures “382” in the definition of “North Terrace Property” and substituting “802”.

2.     That there be no order as to costs.

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS – Amended orders – inherent jurisdiction of the Court – amendment of a consent order

Legislation Cited:

Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 18

Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), rr 1611, 6906

Cases Cited:

Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235

Mercer Alloys Corporation v Rolls Royce Ltd [1972] 1 All ER 211
Permanent Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd v Stocks & Holdings (Canberra) Pty Ltd (1976) 15 ACTR 45
R v Carmody (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 25
The Owners of Units Plan No 932 v Marhaba [2017] ACTSC 13
Thynne v Thynne [1955] P 272
VTAG v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 91; 141 FCR 291

Westpac Banking Corporation v Chamberlain [2016] SASC 3

Parties:

Indigenous Business Australia (Plaintiff)

Nicholas Schofield (Defendant)

Representation:

Solicitors

Australian Government Solicitor (Plaintiff)

In person (Defendant)

File Number:

SC 27 of 2015

REFSHAUGE J:

  1. When the defendant, Nicholas Schofield, was employed by the plaintiff, Indigenous Business Australia, he is said to have improperly withdrawn significant sums of money from its bank accounts. These proceedings have involved the plaintiff seeking to recover that money, including by retrieving assets into which the funds said to have been taken were invested by the defendant.

  1. Initially, I was asked to make interlocutory restraining orders in respect of certain moneys and also in respect of the assets of the defendant. I did so on 29 January 2015.

  1. The parties, very properly and commendably, engaged in discussions about the substance of the proceedings and how they should be progressed.  Much depended on discovery which, however, did require some judicial supervision.

  1. Nevertheless, significant progress was made and, by consent of both parties, I made detailed orders on 12 April 2016, which appeared to dispose of the proceedings. The order was sealed and entered in the records of the Court.

  1. Amongst the orders made, it was declared that certain property on North Terrace in Adelaide, South Australia, was held on trust for the plaintiff and other orders were made to give effect to this trust and to transfer the legal title of this property to the plaintiff. The order was prepared by the parties and submitted by the plaintiff’s solicitors with the express consent of the defendant.

  1. In the order, the North Terrace Property was a term defined as follows:

North Terrace Property     means the real property known at 1303/140 North Terrace, Adelaide in the State of South Australia 5000, being Lot 1303 in Secondary Community Strata Plan 21890 and more particularly described in South Australian Certificate of…

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AGLC
Indigenous Business Australia v Schofield [2017] ACTSC 56
Case
[2017] ACTSC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Indigenous Business Australia initiated proceedings against Schofield in the Federal Circuit Court to amend a consent order that had been made in the Federal Court. The dispute centred on the precise definition of property owned by the parties, specifically the North Terrace Property, where the exact number of lots in the property was contested. The Court was tasked with determining whether it had the inherent jurisdiction to amend a consent order that was made in another court, and if so, what conditions should be met for such an amendment.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether it possessed the inherent jurisdiction to amend a consent order made in another court. Additionally, the Court needed to consider whether the consent order was ambiguous and if there was a clear error in the figures pertaining to the North Terrace Property that warranted rectification. The Court also examined the circumstances under which consent orders could be amended, including the need for any party to demonstrate a material change in circumstances or a clear mistake.

The Court held that it did have the inherent jurisdiction to amend a consent order in certain circumstances. It noted that the consent order in question was ambiguous and that there was a clear error in the figures related to the North Terrace Property. The Court concluded that the amendment was necessary to correct a mistake and to provide clarity to the parties involved. As such, the Court granted the application to amend the order by substituting the figure "802" for "382" in the definition of the North Terrace Property. The Court did not order any party to pay costs.

In summary, the Federal Circuit Court affirmed its inherent jurisdiction to amend a consent order made in another court where there is ambiguity or a clear mistake. The Court amended the contested figure in the definition of the North Terrace Property and declined to order any party to pay costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. That the order of 12 April 2016 be amended by omitting the figures “382” in the definition of “North Terrace Property” and substituting “802”.

2. That there be no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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