Independent Commission against Corruption v Cunneen and Ors

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[2014] HCATrans 296

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney   No S302 of 2014

B e t w e e n -

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION AGAINST CORRUPTION

Applicant

and

MARGARET CUNNEEN

First Respondent

STEPHEN WYLLIE

Second Respondent

SOPHIA TILLEY

Third Respondent

Directions hearing

FRENCH CJ

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 12 DECEMBER 2014, AT 2.13 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.K. KIRK, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR S. ROBERTSON, for the applicant.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor (NSW))

MR A.R. MOSES, SC:   If your Honour pleases, I appear with my learned friends, MR T.G. HOWARD, SC and MS R.L. GALL.  (instructed by Cockburn and Co)

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, Mr Kirk.

MR KIRK:   Your Honour should have before you, I hope, a summons seeking expedition filed on 11 December, in support of that an affidavit of Mr Roy Waldon sworn on 10 December ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   Well, the difference between you seems to be March and April, I think.

MR KIRK:   I think it comes down to that.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, all right.

MR MOSES:   And the question, your Honour, of undertakings that we seek ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, I understand that as well.  Yes, all right.  In terms of timing that is what ‑ ‑ ‑

MR KIRK:   Shall I turn to that directly, your Honour?

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, please.  First of all, can I just ask you this?  There is no draft notice of appeal on the file yet, as I understand it.

MR KIRK:   No, there is not.  We have proposed short minutes of order, if I might hand a copy to your Honour, and the first order – actually one of the first orders would be that we file the draft notice of appeal on Monday, but I can indicate to your Honour that subject to anything your Honour says it will reflect precisely the terms of the special leave application, save that it will be drafted as a draft notice of appeal.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.  Well, I wondered whether there was really anything necessary beyond ground 2 and the rest was rather argumentative.  It is a point of statutory construction, is it not, that you are taking on - section 8(2) – and you say they got it wrong.

MR KIRK:   Yes, that is right.  Ground 2 captures the nub of it.  Ground 3 was meant to be ‑ ‑ ‑

HIS HONOUR:   Really, everything argumentative is just a distraction.

MR KIRK:   If it please the Court.  Ground 2 is all we need to raise the central issue, your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes, all right.  So you would be in the position of – well, you can file that almost before you leave the Court – but Monday?

MR KIRK:   Monday.

HIS HONOUR:   Yes.

MR KIRK:   Does your Honour want to hear me in relation to the issue of March or April?

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Details
Case
[2014] HCATrans 296
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) sought to appeal a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, which had quashed a notice issued by the ICAC to Ms. Cunneen, a former Director of Public Prosecutions in New South Wales. The dispute concerned the ICAC's power to issue a notice under s 11(1) of the Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) requiring Ms. Cunneen to attend before it to give evidence and produce documents. The ICAC had commenced an investigation into allegations of corrupt conduct by Ms. Cunneen, including allegations that she had accepted a benefit, namely a payment of $20,000, from a company called Complex Solutions Pty Ltd, which had been involved in litigation with the NSW Police Service. The Supreme Court had found that the ICAC had no jurisdiction to issue the notice, as the conduct under investigation did not fall within the definition of "corrupt conduct" as defined in s 8 of the Act. The High Court of Australia was asked to determine whether the Supreme Court had erred in quashing the notice.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the ICAC had the power to investigate conduct that, while potentially constituting a criminal offence, did not fall within the statutory definition of "corrupt conduct" under the Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW). Specifically, the Court had to consider whether the payment of $20,000 to Ms. Cunneen, which the ICAC alleged was a benefit received in circumstances that might bring her into disrepute, constituted corrupt conduct within the meaning of s 8(2) of the Act. This involved an interpretation of the phrase "in circumstances that might bring him or her into disrepute" and whether it required a nexus between the conduct and the exercise of official functions.

The High Court, in a majority decision, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Supreme Court. The majority held that the Supreme Court had erred in its interpretation of s 8(2) of the Act. They reasoned that the definition of corrupt conduct in s 8(2) was broad and did not require a direct nexus between the conduct and the exercise of official functions. The phrase "in circumstances that might bring him or her into disrepute" was interpreted to encompass conduct that, if it became public, would tend to damage the reputation of the person concerned, particularly in relation to their public office. The payment of $20,000 to Ms. Cunneen, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, was capable of bringing her into disrepute, and therefore fell within the scope of the ICAC's investigative powers. The Court emphasised that the purpose of the Act was to prevent corruption and maintain public confidence in public administration, and a broad interpretation of "corrupt conduct" was consistent with this purpose.

The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the orders of the Supreme Court of New South Wales be set aside, and the application to quash the notice issued by the ICAC be dismissed.

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