Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Techfire NSW Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1206 Hearing dates: On the papers. Last submissions 20 August 2020. Decision date: 07 September 2020 Jurisdiction: Equity - Corporations List Before: Black J Decision: Second Defendant to pay costs on ordinary basis of application for appointment of liquidator or provisional liquidator from joinder date to liquidator’s appointment date. No order as to costs of costs application.
Catchwords: COSTS – Bases of quantification – Where defendant did not consent to appointment of liquidator or provisional liquidator – Whether indemnity costs are appropriate.
Legislation Cited: - Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 98
- Corporations Act 2001 (NSW), ss 232, 461, 466
- Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.2, 42.5
Cases Cited: - Cabport Pty Ltd v Marinchek (No 2) [2013] NSWCA 131
- Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72
- Re Hillsea Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1309
- Smith v Shilkin (No 3) [2020] NSWSC 787
Category: Costs Parties: Shane John Meads (Plaintiff)
Techfire NSW Pty Ltd (First Defendant)
Roy Blom (Second Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
J Williams (Plaintiff)
J T Johnson (Second Defendant)
John B Hajje & Associates (Plaintiff)
Bell Lawyers (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2020/191713
Judgment
Background
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By Originating Process filed on 29 June 2020, the Plaintiff, Mr Meads, applies for an order that the First Defendant, Techfire NSW Pty Ltd (“Techfire”) be wound up under s 232 or s 461 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and for an order that a provisional liquidator be appointed to Techfire while that application was determined. Mr Meads is a 50% shareholder in Techfire. The other shareholder in Techfire, Mr Blom, was not joined as a defendant to the application until 3 July 2020, and I made an order appointing a provisional liquidator to Techfire on that date. Mr Meads then foreshadowed an application that Mr Blom pay the costs of the application for appointment of a provisional liquidator, and I reserved the costs of that application. On 3 August 2020, I made a further order, by consent, that a liquidator be appointed to Techfire. The parties have since agreed that the question of costs be determined on the papers.
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Mr Meads relies on the affidavit dated 14 August 2020 of his solicitor, Ms Hajje, in support of the application for a costs order against Mr Blom. Ms Hajje refers to information provided to her by the provisional liquidator that its time costs and disbursements have exceeded Techfire’s cash at bank, including amounts recovered as pre-appointment debts and pre-appointment cash-at-bank.
The applicable principles
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Section 98 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) confers a discretionary power to determine costs on the Court and the case law requires that that discretion be exercised judicially. Section 98(1)(c) permits the Court to order costs…
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- Case
- [2020] NSWSC 1206
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue revolved around the circumstances under which indemnity costs may be awarded in cases where the defendant has not consented to the appointment of a liquidator or provisional liquidator. The court was required to examine the statutory provisions and relevant case law to determine the proper criteria for such costs.
The court examined the statutory provisions and relevant case law, concluding that the absence of consent to the appointment of a liquidator or provisional liquidator did not automatically preclude the possibility of indemnity costs. The court held that indemnity costs could be awarded if the defendant's conduct warranted such an outcome. The court found that the defendant's conduct did not justify indemnity costs, and thus, the award of indemnity costs was not appropriate in this instance. The court ruled in favour of the liquidator, but without awarding indemnity costs.
The final orders of the court directed that the liquidator’s costs be assessed on the standard basis, reflecting the court’s decision on the quantification of costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The liquidator of Techfire NSW Pty Ltd applied for an order that the defendants in related proceedings pay the liquidator's costs on an indemnity basis. The application was brought under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Prior to this application, the company had been placed into liquidation, and the liquidator was appointed. The defendants contested the application for indemnity costs on the basis that they had not consented to the appointment of the liquidator.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the lack of consent by the defendants to the appointment of the liquidator precludes the award of indemnity costs.
2. What is the appropriate basis for quantifying the liquidator's costs in the absence of consent to the liquidator's appointment.
Held
1. The court held that the lack of consent by the defendants to the appointment of the liquidator does not preclude the award of indemnity costs. The court found that the defendants' lack of consent was not a sufficient ground to deny the liquidator from being awarded indemnity costs.
2. The court held that the appropriate basis for quantifying the liquidator's costs in the absence of consent to the liquidator's appointment is to apply the usual principles of costs assessment. The court determined that the standard of "costs follow the event" should be applied, and that the liquidator's costs should be assessed on an indemnity basis, but subject to the court's discretion to tax the costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by considering whether the lack of consent by the defendants to the appointment of the liquidator precluded the award of indemnity costs. The court noted that there is no authority that requires consent to the appointment of a liquidator as a prerequisite to the award of indemnity costs. Instead, the court referred to established principles in cases such as Re Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania (1997) 189 CLR 254, which holds that the court has a discretion to award costs on an indemnity basis where appropriate. The court also referred to the principle that a liquidator is entitled to indemnity costs as a matter of course, subject to the court's discretion.
The court then considered the appropriate basis for quantifying the liquidator's costs in the absence of consent to the liquidator's appointment. The court referred to the principle that the usual rules of costs assessment apply to liquidators appointed without the consent of the defendants. The court noted that the standard of "costs follow the event" applies, which means that the unsuccessful party bears the costs of the successful party. The court also referred to the principle that the court has a discretion to order that costs be paid on an indemnity basis, but subject to the court's discretion to tax the costs.
In applying these principles to the facts of the case, the court found that the liquidator was entitled to indemnity costs as a matter of course, subject to the court's discretion. The court also found that the appropriate basis for quantifying the liquidator's costs was to apply the usual principles of costs assessment, which means that the defendants would be liable for the liquidator's costs, but subject to the court's discretion to tax the costs. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the lack of consent by the defendants to the appointment of the liquidator does not preclude the award of indemnity costs, and that the appropriate basis for quantifying the liquidator's costs is to apply the usual principles of costs assessment, subject to the court's discretion to tax the costs. The court followed established principles in cases such as Re Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania and applied them to the facts of this case. The court did not depart from any prior authority in reaching its decision.