In the Matter of South Australian Perpetual Forests Limited 1964 Trust Deed: IOOF Australia Trustees Limited No. SCGRG 94/275 Judgment No. 5037 Number of Pages 17 Trusts and Trustees (1995) 64 Sasr 434
[1995] SASC 5037
•12 April 1995
COURT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA BOLLEN J
CWDS
Trusts and trustees - powers, duties, rights and liabilities of trustees - applications to the court for advice and authority - Trustee - advice and directions - power and duty of trustee to insure trees against risk of damage by fire - Trustee Acts25(1) does not speak only of property of which the trustee is legal owner - Trustee Acts4 - definition of "property". Administration and Probate Acts 69 and Trustee Actss.4, 25, 25(1), 91. Pateman v Heyen (1993) 33 NSWLR 188, applied.
HRNG ADELAIDE, 27 March 1995 #DATE 12:4:1995 #ADD 23:5:1995
Counsel for applicant: Mr M F Blue
Solicitors for applicant: Fisher Jeffries
Counsel for other party Seas Safford Forests: Mr D J Bleby QC
Solicitors for other party Seas Safford Forests: Piper Alderman
ORDER
Questions answered.
JUDGE1 BOLLEN J This is an application by a trustee for advice and directions. The application is made under s69 of the Administration and Probate Act and under s91 of the Trustee Act.
2. Eleven questions, or requests, for directions (with some subsidiary questions therein) are before the court. But I am asked by the parties to answer the first four only. Of these, Mr Blue, for the Trustee, said:
"The application made by the trustee is based on two
alternative provisions. The first is that it is based on,
in effect, s.69 of the Administration of Probates Act which
is applied by s.91 of the Trustee Act to trusts and is
seeking directions on certain questions that have arisen.
3. In the alternative, the trustee is seeking that certain
questions both under the trust deed and under statute, and
in relation to the trust generally, be determined under Rule
63 of the Supreme Court rules. I will come back to this.
4. It is our submission that the first four questions upon
which we are seeking directions from your Honour are
appropriate questions for your Honour to give directions.
That, the trustee is truly in doubt about the answers to
those questions and seeks the guidance of the court."
5. The parties agreed on facts. A "Statement of Agreed Facts" was filed. I should set it all out. It is:
"THE SCHEME
1. IOOF Australia Trustees Limited (the 'Trustee') (previously
Farmers Cooperative Executors and Trustees Limited) is trustee
of a forestry scheme pursuant to the terms of the Southern
Australian Perpetual Forests Limited 1964 Trust Deed (the 'Trust
Deed' (annexure 1).
2. SEAS Sapfor Forests Ltd ('SEAS/the Forest Company')
(previously Southern Australian Perpetual Forests Limited) is
the manager of the forestry scheme.
3. The constituent documents of the forestry scheme are the
Trust Deed, a Tripartite Agreement to which the Trustee, the
Forest Company and SEAS Sapfor Harvesting Pty Ltd (the 'Milling
Company') (previously Sapfor Timber Mills Ltd) are parties
(annexure 2), prospectuses pursuant to which covenants are
issued to the public and the covenants issued to the public
(example annexure 3). Each covenant is issued subject to the
provisions of the Trust Deed.
4. The forestry scheme operates by members of the public
purchasing covenants, the purchase price of which provides funds
for the Forest Company to plant, maintain and tend pine
plantations. When the timber attains appropriate maturity, it
is sold. Certain deductions in favour of the Forest Company and
Milling Company are made from the gross timber proceeds and the
net balance is paid to the Trustee for distribution to the
covenant holders. In addition, and prior to clear felling, the
standing timber is thinned in a manner which is designed to
enhance the potential for the remaining stock of timber.
5. There are approximately 26,000 covenant holders holding
covenants in respect of planting years 1956 to 1985 in the
forestry scheme the subject of the Trust Deed.
6. The value of the covenant holders' plantations is
approximately $82 million net of salvage. A map showing the
geographical location of covenant holders' plantations is
annexure 4.
7. Clause 2(c) of the Trust Deed provides:
'(c) That for the purpose of making provision against any
timber losses by fire ...
(i) the Forest Company shall plant with pine trees an area
of five (5) per centum in excess of the area which the Forest
Company undertakes to plant with trees for the Covenant holders
in each planting and should the timber in any such planting
during such period be damaged by fire the Trustee may at any
time within a period of twelve (12) months after such occurrence
call upon the Forest Company to survey and prepare plans of such
damaged areas whereupon all or part of the damaged areas up to
the abovementioned proportion of five per centum shall be
dedicated to the Forest Company in satisfaction of its timber
interests therein and the Forest Company shall then have the
right in any such area to cut down, replant and in any way deal
with them without giving any account to the Trustee. The Forest
Company shall not be held accountable for any loss by fire,
however caused in excess of the abovementioned five per centum
for or in respect of any particular planting.
(ii) The Forest Company shall within two months after the
31st day of October in each year issue to the Trustee:
(a) for each twenty (20) one Acre Covenants or their
equivalent in Half Acre Covenants sold on an acreage basis
for which it shall have received full payment during the
year ended on such 31st day of October one (1) fully paid
one Acre Covenant relating to such planting years; and
(b) for such twenty (20) one Hectare Covenants or their
equivalent in Half Hectare Covenants or Quarter Hectare
Covenants sold on a hectare basis for which it shall have
received full payment during the year ended on such 31st day of
October one (1) fully paid one Hectare Covenant relating to such
planting year each of which said Covenants shall be called and
legibly endorsed 'RESERVED AREA COVENANT NOT TRANSFERABLE'. The
Trustee will be entitled to hold all such Reserved Area
Covenants and all monies payable to it as holder thereof (save
and except the proceeds of thinnings which shall be payable to
the Company for the purpose of making good to holders of
Covenants relating to the said planting year to the extent of
the value of the said Reserved Area Covenants and monies any
loss resulting from damage to the said planting caused by fire
during the said period of supervision from the end of the said
planting year but subject as aforesaid will hold the said
Reserved Area Covenants and monies for and on behalf of the
Forest Company.'
8. The covenants issued to members of the public provide:
'In order to provide against losses by fire the Company
agrees that within two (2) months after the 31st day of
October it will issue to the Trustee:
(a) for each twenty (20) one Acre Covenants or their equivalent
in Half Acre Covenants sold on an acreage basis for which it
shall have received full payment during the year ended on such
31st day of October one (1) fully paid one Acre Covenant
relating to such planting year; and
(b) for each twenty (20) one Hectare Covenants or their
equivalent in Half Hectare Covenants or Quarter Hectare
Covenants sold on a hectare basis for which it shall have
received full payment during the year ended on such 31st day of
October one (1) fully paid Hectare Covenant relating to such
planting year each of which said Covenants shall be called and
legibly endorsed 'RESERVED AREA COVENANT NOT TRANSFERABLE'. The
Trustee will be entitled to hold all such Reserved Area Covenant
certificates and all monies paid to the Trustee as holder
thereof (save and except the proceeds of thinnings, which shall
be paid to the Company) for the purpose of making good to
holders of Covenants relating to the said planting year to the
extent of the value of the said Reserved Area and monies any
loss resulting from damage to the said planting caused by fire
during the period of twenty (20) years from the end of the said
planting year, but subject as aforesaid will hold the said
Reserved Area Covenant certificates and monies on behalf of the
Company. The Company shall not be held accountable for any loss
by fire however caused in excess of the abovementioned five (5)
per centum reserved area for or in respect of any particular
planting'.
9. Covenants issued for planting years to 1973 were issued
for a twenty five year period. Covenants issued for
planting years 1974 to 1985 were issued for a twenty year
period.
10. Although covenants are issued only for a period of
twenty or twenty five years depending on the planting year,
clause 24 of the Trust Deed provides a mechanism for a
plantation to be left to mature.
11. In some planting years the reserve area has been reduced
or eliminated because of fires which have occurred from time
to time.
RECOMMENDATION TO INSURE
12. SEAS as Manager of the forestry scheme recommended to
the Trustee that fire insurance be effected at the expense of
the covenant holders over covenant holders' plantations in
respect of plantations. Initially that proposal related to fire
insurance in respect of covenant holders plantations both in and
beyond the covenant period. Subsequently that proposal, or
alternatively a separate proposal, was recommended by SEAS as
manager to the Trustee to provide fire insurance over covenant
holders plantations in respect of plantations only in the beyond
covenant period.
13. Other than as set out in paragraphs 1 - 12 above, the
facts deposed to in the affidavits sworn by the parties in
this application have not been agreed between the parties
and remain the subject of disagreement."
6. SEAS proposed that fire insurance be taken out. It now says that that cannot be done without amendment of the Trust Deed.
7. SEAS applied to intervene in the proceedings. It was joined by order of Master Anderson made on the 31st of March 1994.
8. In his Outline of Argument Mr Blue wrote:
"As SEAS is effectively the other party to the trust deed,
the trustee does not accept that SEAS has a right to be
heard in relation to directions to the trustee."
9. Mr Blue spoke to these submissions. I think that the joining of SEAS carries with it a right to be heard in relation to the directions sought. And I welcome the submissions made by Mr Bleby QC for SEAS. They are most helpful.
10. Before I leave the order of Master Anderson made on the 31st of March 1994, I should say that at the same time he ordered that the trustee give notice of these proceedings by advertisement published in "The Advertiser" and "The Australian" newspapers and required advertisements to give appropriate particulars. It has been proved by affidavit that that was done and that no covenant holder has sought to intervene in these proceedings or to be joined in any way.
11. There was some coming and going about what was asked of the court. The making of the request had varied from time to time in affidavit and in notes of the questions asked which Mr Blue had prepared. The latter went into one or two editions. In the end all that coming and going came to nothing. The substance of what the trustee wanted the court to direct was constant.
12. The four questions in which directions are sought are:
"1. Does IOOF Australia Trustees Limited ('the Trustee')
have power under the Trust Deed, the general law or Section
25 of the Trustee Act to effect fire insurance in relation
to the proceeds of the trees?
2. Is the Trustee obliged to obtain fire insurance in
respect of covenant holders plantations?
3. Is the Trustee obliged to effect insurance in respect of
those plantation years when no or insufficient monies are
held by the Trustee in respect of those plantation years?
If so, how is the Trustee to pay the premium?
4. If the Trustee is obliged to effect insurance cover, is
the Trustee, pursuant to a right of indemnity, able to
recover from timber proceeds held by it any premium and
other costs associated with placing the insurance?"
13. It is at present impossible for the court to answer the second question asked in Question 3. That was conceded.
14. Mr Blue spoke of the nature of insurance which he said the trustee had power to take out as including either insurance of the trees as trees growing on the land or insurance against loss of income caused by destruction by fire of the income producing things, i.e. trees.
15. I do not find the phrase "in relation to the proceeds of trees" in question 1 helpful. I read the question as if that phrase were not there. I think the object of it will be met if I remember that Mr Blue wants a direction that the trustees may insure the trees against risk of fire and may insure, additionally or alternatively, against loss of income caused by destruction of the trees by fire.
16. Fire with its consequences is, of course, the big risk. Let it be noted that Mr Bleby emphasised that SEAS wants the trees to be insured but says that it can be done only after an amendment to the trust deed. Of course, the existence of 26,000 covenant holders would not facilitate the process of amending it if that task were essayed.
17. Clause 2(c) of the Trust Deed provides a measure of insurance (see Agreed Fact 7). Mr Blue said of it:
"One matter of relevance is clause 2C of the trust deed. It
does provide a form of insurance to the covenant holders against
fire. That mechanism is that in any planting year - if we take
for example the 1960 planting year, if SEAS plants 100 acres of
timber and sells covenants in respect of that 100 acres to
covenant holders and, on top of that, plants another 5 acres and
sets that aside. If a fire should destroy some of that 100
acres, then those five acres are applied in replacement of the
acres in respect of which the timber is destroyed. If 5 out of
the total 100 are destroyed by fire, there is a replacement of
those 5 acres. So that, the covenant holders go back up to
their original 100 acres. But, that is the limit of it. So, if
the whole 100 acres are destroyed, the covenant holders only get
5 acres in return for the 100. They have to share. A form of
partial and limited insurance, insurance against a limited fire
but not against a catastrophic fire.
That form of insurance, which is in place under the trust
deed, is limited to the period of covenant. If the period of
the covenant is 25 years, and it is decided that the trees
should be left to mature beyond that 25 year period, then this
reserve area disappears. In fact it is appropriated by SEAS and
becomes its absolute property. After year 25, no form of
insurance at all."
18. All this seems correct.
19. I do not think that it can be said that Clause 2(c) amounts to a provision for insurance which excludes any thought of further power in the trustee to insure. Clause 2(c) is of limited operation and does not cover the whole range of risk by fire.
20. Mr Bleby offered a most thoroughly prepared outline of argument and spoke with equal thoroughness in making his submissions. I have studied the outline, the transcript of his submissions and the cases to which he refers on one point. I set out (not to the detriment of others parts) that part of the outline called "The Effect of the Trust Deed". This is valuable to all his submissions but it is also a "lead in" to his primary submission. That part of the outline is:
"THE EFFECT OF THE TRUST DEED
8. When properly analysed, the trust deed sets up and
governs a number of different relationships and different
trusts for different purposes and persons.
8.1 The trustee is trustee of the maintenance fund, the income
of which is to be paid to SEAS unconditionally, the corpus being
paid to SEAS upon SEAS 'having duly and faithfully performed all
and singular the obligations of the forest company to the
trustee and to the holders of the said covenants' (Clause 4(b)).
This is the only fund which could be said to be held for the
benefit of covenant holders generally, but is to be applied in a
specific way, and that includes the trustee having access to the
fund if default is made by SEAS (see Clause 14).
8.2 The trustee is trustee of certain covenants for the purpose
of applying them (up to a certain limits) for the benefit of
covenant holders whose trees are damaged by fire. Those
covenants are not held for covenant holders generally, but each
covenant is held for the benefit of a particular group of
covenant holders (see Clause 2(c)).
8.3 Proceeds from the sale of timber eventually end up in the
hands of the trustee in accordance with the provisions of Clause
12. When received by the trustee they are to be held 'in the
interests of the respective covenant holders' (Clause 12(e))
whose plantings have produced the sales revenue from which those
proceeds are derived. Those proceeds are to be held in separate
timber proceeds accounts for each planting and are to be
distributed to those particular covenant holders in accordance
with the subsequent provisions of Clause 12. The timber
proceeds accounts are not held for the benefit of covenant
holders generally.
8.4 There is a trust in respect of the titles to the planted
land, to the extent that the trustee has to join in an order for
delivery of the titles to anyone else for the duration of the
covenant. In this respect the trustee is not the custodian of
the titles. That is a function of the State Bank.
8.5 The trustee is the trustee of certain rights to be exercised
if the occasion arises for the benefit of covenant holders
generally. In that respect it holds no particular assets or
funds, but in the exercise of those rights it may become the
trustee of and take possession of certain assets of SEAS (Clause
13) upon SEAS being in default in compliance with its
obligations. Any resort to those assets by way of indemnity for
expenses incurred would only be in relation to expenses incurred
in the exercise of that aspect of the trusteeship.
8.6 The trustee has no interest in the trees or the covenants
(other than the limited interest provided for in Clause
2(c)(ii); it has no specific power to insure; it has no
authority conferred on it which would authorise the trustee to
effect insurance on behalf of covenant holders; and it cannot
act generally as attorney for covenant holders other than in the
exercise of the specific powers mentioned."
21. I emphasise the peroration in Clause 8.6. As I say these submissions, and particularly that peroration, "lead in" to the submissions in Clauses 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the outline. They are:
"9. Section 25 of the Trustee Act, 1936 is of no relevant
assistance, as it is plainly speaking of the insurance of
property of which the trustee is the legal owner. In this
case there is no such property.
10. While the trustee may be able to effect insurance
although it has no insurable interest in property (Insurance
Contracts Act, 1984, sections 16 and 17) it cannot do so as
agent of covenant holders, and will suffer no conceivable loss
if fire occurs, other than in respect of the covenants referred
to in Clause 2(c)(ii) of the Deed.
11. The Deed sets up its own form of protection for loss against
fire (Clause 2(c)), and makes no provision whatever regarding
the source of payment of insurance premiums or the method of
allocation of the proceeds of any claims - provisions which are
essential in a scheme of this complexity.
12. This whole application is therefore misconceived and should
never have been made, as the applicant is not relevantly a trustee
of any property in respect of which directions are sought.
Accordingly, the Court should therefore decline to answer the
questions posed."
22. As I have said Mr Bleby spoke to all this. Of course, Mr Blue spoke in opposition to the submissions offered by Mr Bleby. Mr Blue, too, offered a most thoroughly prepared outline and spoke equally thoroughly in making his submissions. He wrote, in relation to the four questions asked:
"14. The first and most important question which the trustee
requests the Court to determine is whether the trustee has
power to insure the trees or proceeds of the trees against
loss or damage to the trees caused by fire.
Trust deed
15. The trust deed gives no express power to the trustee to
insure. The only reference to insurance is in clause 2(c) which
refers to the reserve areas as a form of 'insurance' during the
covenant period only.
General law
16. It has been said that, apart from statute, it is not
clear as a matter of law whether a trustee has a power to insure
if it is not conferred by the trust deed. Pateman v Heyen
(1993) 33 NSWLR 188 at 194.
Statute
17. Section 25 of the Trustee Act gives a statutory power to
trustees to insure property against fire. Two issues arise.
18. First, neither the trustee nor the covenant holders
appear to be given a direct right of property in the trees or
land (eg profit a prendre). It might be argued that there is
therefore no 'property' within the meaning of Section 25 which
the trustee is empowered to insure. Three possible answers to
this need to be considered. First, 'property' is defined very
broadly by section 4(1) of the Trustee Act to include 'personal
property ... and anything in action, and any other right or
interest, whether in possession or not'. It therefore includes
a chose in action, which might be argued to include the right
(as against SEAS) to the proceeds of the trees. Indeed, the
whole purpose of the trust deed is to vest the legal chose in
action in the trustee as trustee for the covenant holders.
Second, neither the Section nor the Insurance Contracts Act
requires the trustee to have an insurable interest in the trees
to insure the trees themselves. Third, it may be that 'risk or
liability' is not tied in Section 25 to 'property'. The trustee
therefore considers it is arguable that Section 25 does empower
the trustee to insure the trees or proceeds against fire. As
the question is a vexed one, the trustee seeks a determination
by the Court of that point. Again, the question is a vexed one.
19. Secondly, do the provisions in the trust deed providing for
a form of insurance by the reserve areas (clause 2(c)) negate a
power which would otherwise arise? In support of such an
argument, it might be said that each covenant holder
contemplated that there would be no expense incurred for
insurance (see eg clause 20D), and that the sole form of
insurance would be provided by clause 2(c). On the other hand,
it might be argued that clause 2(c) merely provides one form of
insurance, and does not exclude a power to insure with an
underwriter, particularly in 1995."
23. I have disposed of the questions asked in Clause 19.
24. Mr Blue says that s25 of the Trustee Act gives power to the trustees to take out insurance here. Mr Bleby denies it. He wrote (as I have said) that s25 speaks of insurance of property of which the trustee is the legal owner only. The trustee is not the legal owner here.
25. Section 25(1) of the Trustee Act is:
"A trustee may insure any building or other insurable
property against loss or damage whether by fire or otherwise
and against any risk or liability against which it would be
prudent for a person to insure if he were acting for
himself."
26. During the submissions of Mr Blue I became very excited about whether you should read "other insurable property" eiusdem generis with "building". Mr Blue said no and argued that, in any event, trees and buildings were here of the same family. But Mr Bleby took no point on interpretation. Amongst other things Mr Bleby said:
"The trustee's role is essentially a passive one of approval
and policing. The active role, the managing and acting in
the best interests of the covenant holders in the management
of the forest, is that of the manager or the forest company
as the deed describes.
So, the trust deed did not authorise the trustee to do
anything about insurance. It didn't even contemplate insurance.
Because, at the time the deed was entered into, it was not
possible. Correspondence makes it clear that insurance of
forests of this nature is a relatively recent phenomena. It has
only been available in the last few years. But, it has its own
in-built somewhat limited form of protection for covenant
holders in clause 2C. So, if insurance was to be effected in a
scheme of this nature and complexity, it would demand something
be written down in the scheme for amount of premiums and what
you would do with the proceeds of claims. Because, it is a very
complex matter of distribution. There is no particular acre or
hectare which is nominated for a particular covenant holder,
they are in planting years. So, you need to devise some scheme
for appropriating the proceeds. You would possibly even need to
make allowance or make some provision in the deed for adjustment
to the existing clause 2C scheme or at least some provision as
to how the two interact.
So, it is not surprising in our submission that the initial
proposal for the insurance of these trees indeed came from a
forest company with a request to the trustee to agree to the
effecting of such insurance. It was always recognised that that
would require substantial amendment to the deed and the
covenants which of course requires the trustee's approval. When
that request was made, the trustee said no. The point is, it
was for the manager to devise the scheme, the trustee in its
passive trustee role to approve it or not or, if in doubt as to
whether it should approve the scheme, to seek the directions of
this court at that stage.
So, with that analysis of the deed, and what the respective
rights and responsibilities are, it is our submission that the
whole application to this court is misconceived.
S.25 of the Trustee Act does not assist in any way. I take
your Honour to s.25 of the Trustee Act. It can't assist the
plaintiff in these proceedings in any way because it provides
that the trustee may insure any building or other insurable
property for purposes of argument. The fact of the matter is
that the only property the trustee is trustee of, and which it
can insure pursuant to that given power to insure pursuant to
that section are two funds, the maintenance fund and the
proceeds distribution account, which are moneys which it holds.
It does not have any interest in the trees. So, s.25 doesn't
give it any power to insure the trees.
As I pointed out, there is no general authority or general
power of attorney given to the trustee by the covenant holders.
So, it can't act as their agents. We would also submit that the
phrase 'against any risk or liability which it would be prudent
for a person to insure if they were acting by themselves',
relates back to buildings or other insurable properties. The
construction of the section in our submission requires that
there must be properties or buildings to insure, either against
loss or damage by fire or other ways - it could be burglary, it
could be all sorts of other things - the section is not to be
construed in our submission as though it reads a trustee may
insure against any risk or liability against which it would be
prudent for a person to insure if he were acting for himself.
The whole thrust of this is directed to the care, maintenance
and insurance and other obligations relating to trust property.
So, given that there is no property to insure under this deed,
of course s.25 doesn't assist.
In para.10 of our outline we recognise that since the
enactment of the Insurance Contracts Act there is no need to
have an insurer's interest. So, technically I suppose the
trustee can insure somebody else's property but it will suffer
no loss. It will be the covenant holders who suffer the loss if
there is a fire other than in the limited case of the covenant,
perhaps of which it is trustee in the s.2C type situation, which
are held otherwise for the covenant holders or ultimately for
SEAS. There has still got to be a loss against which the
trustee can insure which is just not there.
We also note that the deed, as I pointed out, sets out its
own form of provision for loss against fire. Makes no provision
at all about the source of payment of insurance premiums or how
the proceeds of any claim are to be allocated which would be
essential in a scheme of that perplexity. Because of that, it
is our submission that the whole application is really
misconceived. There is nothing - there never was - that the
court could properly give directions about particularly in
relation to the plantations of covenant holders which is what
the original question is all about, nor can it properly give
directions in relation to fire insurance in relation to the
proceeds of sale of the trees. That is not an interest which
you could insure against fire anyway, except as I say for a
piece of paper or if it happens to be in bank notes, the bank
notes which are to be handed over. But, apart from that, the
proceeds of sale - if it does mean proceeds of sale - can be an
infinitely variable figure. It may turn out to be nothing
anyway by the time the costs of marketing and processing and
everything else are taken out. A decision would have to be made
in any one year whether it was worth harvesting at all. There
may be no proceeds of sale. You can't talk about insuring that.
If we are talking about insuring covenant holders' plantations,
the trustee has no interest in them and no authority to act on
their behalf.
It is our submission in relation to question 1 the court
must decline to answer it because the application should never
have been brought. But, if it is inclined to answer it at all,
the answer should plainly be no, but not for the reasons my
learned friend has advanced through the discussions of the
various cases."
27. I cannot agree with Mr Bleby that s25 does not apply.
28. Given the lack of need for an insurable interest, I think that s25 does apply here. I think that the section does empower the trustee here to insure in the sense mentioned earlier. I think that the definition of property in Section 4 of the Trustee Act is helpful. But over and above all else I think that the words in s25 permit the taking out of the relevant insurance. Section 25 tells the trustee that he may insure against any risk or liability against which it would be prudent for a person to insure if he were acting for himself. Risk of loss of fire is something against which a prudent owner would insure. I cannot see any reason to deny the words in the section their full meaning on the score that the trustee is not the legal owner. Mr Bleby said that s25 is plainly speaking only of insurance of property of which the trustee is the legal owner. It does not say so. I think it applies here because it says that it does. And I think that the submissions of Mr Blue in Clause 18 of his outline, quoted above at page 11, are all sound.
29. On this question and on the second question (duty to insure) I have been much assisted by the (if I may say so) admirable reasons for judgment of Cohen J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales in the case of Pateman v Heyen
(1993) 33 NSWLR 188. I first quote from the headnote:
"Held: (1) Where an executor and trustee of a deceased
estate is holding property for the benefit of other persons for
a period of time and there may be a risk of suffering loss or
damage by fire then, providing that funds are available to the
executor and trustee, he or she has a duty to act prudently and
to effect an insurance policy; failure to do so will make the
executor and trustee liable for any loss suffered.
(2) The executor and trustee is only required to ensure that
the value of the property which was held on trust would be
retained."
30. This is an accurate summary of the reasons for judgment.
31. Cohen J said:
"Section 41 commences as follows:
32. 'Insurance
41. (1) A trustee may insure against loss or damage, whether
by fire or otherwise, any insurable property, and against any
risk or liability against which it would be prudent for a person
to insure if he were acting for himself.
(2) The insurance may be for any amount, provided that,
together with the amount of any insurance already on foot,
the total shall not exceed the insurable value or
liability.'
This may be contrasted with s19(1) of the English Trustee
Act 1925, where there is power only to insure up to
three-quarters of the value of the property.
If the trust instrument gives no express or implied
direction concerning insurance of trust property, it has been
said that a trustee is not under a duty to insure against loss
or damage by fire, and consequently will not be liable for loss
arising from a failure to insure: see Jacobs' Law of Trusts in
Australia, 5th ed (1986) at 540; Pettit, Equity and the Law of
Trusts, 6th ed (1989) at 394; Riddall, The Law of Trusts, 3rd ed
(1987) at 317; Sheridan and Keeton, Law of Trusts, 11th ed
(1983) at 262. The last three of those text writers rely for
the statement as to there being no duty on Re McEacharn; Gambles
v McEacharn (1911) 103 LT 900, to which I shall refer later. No
authority is given in Jacobs.
A number of other commentators however have been critical of
this position, some recommending to trustees and executors that
they insure trust property wherever prudent management or normal
business practice would require it, providing that there are
funds available to pay the premiums: see Ford and Lee,
Principles of the Law of Trusts, 2nd ed (1990) at 572; Williams,
Mortimer and Sunnucks on Executors, Administrators and Probate,
17th ed (1993) at 733-734; Underhill's Law of Trusts and
Trustees, 14th ed (1987) at 495; Mason and Handler, Wills
Probate and Administration Service New South Wales, Sydney,
Butterworths at pars (1249.2.4), (10, 105). In a footnote (at
495), Underhill suggests that no prudent trustee would fail to
see that trust premises are fully insured. In Mason and
Handler, it is said that the correctness of the statement in
Jacobs, above, is to be doubted in view of the widespread
practice of insuring property of virtually every description.
It is necessary therefore to look at the authorities upon
which the earlier statements are based. Re McEacharn dealt with
the question of whether under a particular will the trustees
were bound to insure a property which had been left on a series
of life interests and which required the trustees to pay all
necessary expenses out of the income. The point argued before
the court was whether insurance ought to be maintained at the
expense of the tenant for life. Eve J found that this was not
required, either under the description in the will of necessary
expenses or by way of a general duty on the part of the
trustees. He did not extend that principle to the question of
whether the trustees ought to insure the property at the expense
of the estate generally. He said (at 902):
'... Although I apprehend that most persons having property
subject to loss or damage by fire would agree in considering an
insurance against fire to be a prudent and proper precaution to
adopt, I cannot bring myself to hold that it is an expense
necessary to be incurred by trustees in the face of authorities
such as Bailey v Gould (4 Y and C 221) and Fry v Fry (27 Beav 144,
146), which go to show that the court will not hold an executor
or trustee liable on the footing of wilful default for losses
occasioned by fire on premises left uninsured by him.'
Those two authorities referred to by Eve J did not establish
a general principle that there is never a duty on the part of
trustees to insure property under their control. In Bailey v
Gould (1840) 4 Y and C Ex 221; 160 ER 987, the deceased had
carried on a partnership business in premises held under a long
lease. The executors of his will continued the business with
the remaining partner but failed to insure the premises (the
previous policy having expired shortly before the death of the
deceased). The remaining partner, described as a reasonable man
taking reasonable care of the property, had not himself
reinsured the property. In those circumstances, which Alderson
B described as material, the court would not charge the
executors for wilful default in not insuring the premises. Fry
v Fry (1859) 27 Beav 144; 54 ER 56 concerned trust property
consisting of leased premises, where there was a covenant to
insure in the lease. The deceased had complied with that
covenant by obtaining a policy of insurance which expired on 25
March and the deceased died two days later. Fire destroyed the
premises on 26 May before the grant of probate. The issue was
really whether an allegedly intermeddling executor had a duty to
comply with the covenant by taking out an insurance policy. No
reasons were given by Sir John Romilly MR in Beavan's Reports
but in the report in 28 LJ Ch 593 it was said that it would be a
strong measure to make the executor liable in negligence in
failing to cure the testator's default where the facts were in
any case not clear. This could hardly be regarded as an
authority that there is no general duty of a trustee to insure
property if a prudent person would do so.
The only reference to the principle in Australia that I have
been able to find is contained in an obiter remark of Brereton J
in Davjoyda Estates Pty Ltd v National Insurance Co of New
Zealand Ltd (1965) 69 SR (NSW) 381 at 390; 85 WN (Pt 1) (NSW)
184 at 192, where he said: 'While a trustee is not bound to
insure the trust property, he should do so in the interests of
the beneficiaries.' This somewhat ambiguous comment was
followed by a reference to Re Betty; Betty v Attorney-General
(1899) 1 Ch 821 at 829, where North J expressed the view that in
that case the executrix and trustee ought to insure certain
furniture at the expense and for the benefit of the estate
because it belonged, subject to the tenancy for life, to the
estate. There was no issue in the Davjoyda Estates case as to
the duty of a trustee to insure.
There are however other authorities which suggest that a
trustee might be liable for the loss sustained by a beneficiary
by virtue of a failure to insure. In Garner v Moore (1855) 3
Drew 277; 61 ER 909, a deceased was owed money and the debt was
secured by a promissory note and a life assurance policy over
the debtor. After the death of the creditor the executor paid
premiums on the life policy for some years but then decided not
to continue with that policy. The debtor shortly afterwards
died. Kindersley V-C found that it was a wise and sound
discretion for the executor to continue to pay the premiums but
it was not a sound exercise of that discretion to allow the
policy to lapse without consulting the beneficiaries. The
executor was found liable for the amount which would have been
realised had the policy been kept on foot, on the basis that
there was a duty not to unreasonably abandon insurance
previously obtained. Although this decision was referred to in
argument in Fry v Fry, it was not mentioned in the judgment.
A question similar to that raised in Re McEacharn, was
considered in Kingham v Kingham (1897) IR 170. The executors
sought the advice of the court as to whether the widow of the
deceased who was a tenant for life of premises of the deceased
was liable, whilst she occupied the house, for various expenses,
including fire insurance premiums. Having found that the widow
was bound to pay the rent due under the head lease and the
rates, Chatterton V-C said (at 174):
'... I think the trustees are bound to take care that the
premises are insured against fire, so as to preserve the
property for their cestuis que trust, and that they cannot
require these premiums to be repaid them by the widow.'
He made declarations, including one that it was the duty of
the trustees to keep the premises sufficiently insured against
fire.
In Canada it has been held that executors were liable for
loss arising from their failure to insure certain farm buildings
against fire: Re Gamble (1925) 57 OLR 504. Mowat J declined to
follow Re McEacharn and Bailey v Gould and said (at 505):
'A trustee's duty is not to take such care only as a prudent
man would take if he had himself alone to consider; but rather
to take such care as an ordinary prudent man would take if he
were minded to provide against loss to people for whom he felt
morally bound to provide.'
This decision was followed with approval in a more recent
case in the Supreme Court of Ontario, namely Jeffery Estate v
Rowe (1989) 36 ETR 217, where Granger J found that it was the
duty of the executors in that particular case to insure and
maintain property until it was conveyed to the beneficiaries.
This view has been followed in the United States of America.
In Scott on Trusts, 4th ed (1987) vol II A, at 484, it is
said:
'... In the United States it would seem clear today that
since it is a general custom among prudent men to insure
buildings against a loss by fire the trustee under ordinary
circumstances is under a duty to take out such insurance and is
subject to liability if he has failed to do so and the building
is damaged or destroyed by fire. Where the trust, however, is
one under which the trustee has no active duties of management,
he is not under a duty to insure the premises.'
A similar view is expressed in Bogert, Trusts and Trustees,
Revised 2nd ed, s599. Support for those propositions is
obtained from a small number of cases. Willis v Hendry 20 A
(2d) 375 (1941) was an appeal from an application by trustees of
a will for judicial advice. It was held by five members of the
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut that in the circumstances
it was the duty of the widow of the deceased, who had a life
estate in a house, to insure the buildings, but if she failed to
do so the trustees should insure them and charge the premiums
against the interest of the widow. In that case there had been
a requirement that the widow pay the expenses of the upkeep of
the house. In a later decision of the same court, Merchants
Bank and Trust Co v New Canaan Historical Soc 54 A (2d) 696
(1947), it was held that there was a general duty of a trustee
to insure in such a way and in such an amount as would an
ordinarily prudent person. Re Estate of Lychos 470 A (2d) 136
(1983) was a decision of three members of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. It confirmed on appeal that a bank which was
trustee of an estate had a primary duty to preserve the assets
of the trust and that this required the taking out of adequate
insurance of trust property. At the same time the court
rejected an argument that the trustee was under a duty to insure
the building concerned for its full replacement cost value. It
was said that the duty of the trustee is to preserve the corpus
of the trust but was not under a duty to replace an asset in a
new condition in the event of a loss.
In my opinion the principles referred to in the American
cases are correct. The basic duties of executors and trustees
are not in doubt. Jacobs, 5th ed, at 610, cites with approval a
passage from the 3rd ed of Scott on Trusts which says that a
trustee is 'under a duty in administering the trust to exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would
exercise, and he is liable for a loss resulting from his failure
to comply with this standard, even though he does the best he
can'. In Underhill, 14th ed at 485 it is said that 'unpaid
trustees are bound only to use such due diligence and care in
the management of the estate as men of ordinary prudence and
vigilance would use in the management of their own affairs'.
It would be part of normal commercial practice for persons
to insure their property, particularly buildings, against fire.
A prudent person would normally take out fire insurance, the
exact nature of which may depend on the circumstances. Although
it would seem appropriate in some cases to insure on a
replacement value basis, there may be other circumstances where
it is sufficient to insure for the present value of the
property. I see no reason why a trustee should not be required
to act in respect of insurance in the same way as it would be
expected that a prudent person would do in respect of his or her
own property. There may of course be circumstances in which it
would not be reasonable to expect the trustee to take out an
insurance policy, as would be the case where there is no income
available to pay the premiums. There may be other circumstances
in particular cases. Where however a trustee is holding
property for the benefit of other persons for a period of time
and there may be a risk of suffering loss or damage by fire
then, providing that funds are available to the trustee, he or
she has a duty to act prudently and to effect that policy."
33. These remarks are addressed mainly to "duty" but there can be no duty if there is no power. In this case there will be difficulties as mentioned by Mr Bleby. But they are difficulties of exercise of power and duty.
34. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of Cohen J in Pateman v Heyen. During a luncheon adjournment of the hearing before me solicitors for the trustee were good enough to make enquiries of solicitors who had acted in Pateman v Heyen to discover that no appeal had been instituted in that case.
35. In his outline Mr Bleby wrote:
"In the further alternative, the Court should not answer the
questions referred to in paragraph 16 as they seek directions as
to the exercise of the trustee's discretion which the Court will
not give: Re Osborne (1863) 2 SCR (NSW) Eq.89 at 91-92; Re
Gilchrist (1867) 6 SCR (NSW) Eq.74 at 78 and 80; Gisborne v.
Gisborne (1877) 2 AC 300 at 307; Re Driller and Nebenson
(1972-1973) ALR 735. Furthermore, directions will not be given
in relation to an ongoing discretion based on facts not yet
known or subject to possible change: Re Allen-Meyrick Will
Trusts (1966) 1 WLR 499; Re Green (1972) VR 848, and the Court
will certainly not give advisory directions where matters are in
dispute between the relevant parties: Harrison v. Mills (1976) 1
NSWLR 42."
36. The cases there mentioned may be taken to support the proposition advanced by Mr Bleby. But, with all respect, I do not think that the Court in answering questions 1-4 will be giving directions about exercise of discretion. It will be saying whether or not power and duty exist.
37. I have reached the conclusion that I should answer the questions asked, should give the directions sought. When I had reached the stage of having a tentative view that I should answer I reviewed all submissions offered to me in this matter. But that which was tentative became firm.
38. I think for the reasons given by Cohen J and which I adopt, that both under s25 of the Trustee Act and, setting that aside, at common law the trustee has the power to "effect fire insurance". I answer the questions asked and give directions thus:
(1) Yes. The trustee has power to insure against risk of
damage or loss of income caused by fire.
(2) Yes, subject to reasonable terms of insurance being
found and provided the trustee has sufficient funds for the
purpose of insurance.
(3) (The first question asked)
No (see per Cohen J in Pateman v Heyen (supra) at p198).
(4) Yes. I think this must follow on ordinary principles.
39. I adjourn all other questions to a date to be fixed.
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