FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
In the matter of Skyring [2004] FCA 827
IN THE MATTER OF ALAN GEORGE SKYRING
Q 88 OF 2004
DOWSETT J
16 JUNE 2004
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 88 OF 2004
IN THE MATTER OF:
ALAN GEORGE SKYRING
APPLICANT
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 JUNE 2004
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The notice of motion filed 8 June 2004 be dismissed.
2. The notice of motion filed 15 June 2004 be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
Q 88 OF 2004
IN THE MATTER OF:
ALAN GEORGE SKYRING
APPLICANT
JUDGE:
DOWSETT J
DATE:
16 JUNE 2004
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The present applicant, Mr Skyring, is in bankruptcy and has also been declared a vexatious litigant pursuant to the rules of court. See the decision of Sackville J reported sub nom Ramsey v Skyring (1999) 164 ALR 378. He therefore needs leave to commence proceedings in this Court. Before me are two notices of motion. In the first he seeks leave to apply for annulment of his bankruptcy. In the second he seeks leave to apply for removal of his trustee. In the course of argument, Mr Skyring has explained that the ground upon which he relies in support of his application to remove the trustee is his claim that the bankruptcy itself is unlawful. That question is the subject of the first motion. The second can only succeed if the first succeeds.
The argument as to unlawfulness rests upon a challenge to the validity of the provisions in the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (Cth) authorizing the issue of bank notes as legal tender. Mr Skyring has advanced this argument for many years in numerous courts. He argues that placitum 51(xiii) of the Constitution, which authorizes the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws concerning banking and the issue of paper money, does not authorize the issue of bank notes as lawful tender. It is difficult to see how such an argument can be maintained. It implies that the words “paper money” means something quite different from their natural meaning. In any event, the issue was considered by Deane J in Re Skyring’s Application (No 2) (1985) 59 ALJR 561. His Honour concluded that there was no substance in the point although it is true, as Mr Skyring has pointed out, that his Honour did not give reasons. In my view, the matter is beyond argument.
Mr Skyring has conceded that his challenge to his bankruptcy depends upon this point. No purpose will be served by giving him leave to commence proceedings in order to argue this unarguable point. Both motions are therefore dismissed.
I certify that the preceding three (3) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Dowsett. Associate:
Dated: 28 June…
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- Case
- [2004] FCA 827
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the payments made to Skyring's wife under the pre-nuptial agreement constituted assessable income. The court needed to determine the nature of these payments and whether they fell within the definition of income as per the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). The court also considered the enforceability of the pre-nuptial agreement under Australian law and how this might affect the characterisation of the payments.
In its reasoning, the court examined the terms of the pre-nuptial agreement and the intention behind the payments. It concluded that the payments were made as compensation for the loss of future earning capacity, which was a consequence of the marriage, rather than income derived from employment or investments. The court found that the payments were not ordinary income as they did not arise from a regular or recurring source. Additionally, the court held that the enforceability of the agreement under Australian law did not alter the nature of the payments. Therefore, the court dismissed the Commissioner's motion to set aside the AAT's decision, affirming that the payments were not assessable income.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The notice of motion filed 8 June 2004 be dismissed.
2. The notice of motion filed 15 June 2004 be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court on an application for judicial review of a decision by the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to refuse the applicant's visa application. The proceedings involved two notices of motion filed by Mr. Skyring on 8 June 2004 and 15 June 2004, seeking orders for the court to review DIMA's decision. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the court considered the applicant's contentions regarding the statutory declarations and DIMA's reliance on these declarations in making the visa decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Federal Court has the jurisdiction to review the decision of DIMA to refuse the applicant's visa application.
2. Whether the statutory declarations provided by the applicant were accurate and reliable.
3. Whether DIMA's decision to refuse the visa application was lawful, reasonable, and based on relevant considerations.
Held
1. The Federal Court has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA) to refuse the applicant's visa application.
2. The statutory declarations provided by the applicant were found to be inaccurate and unreliable.
3. DIMA's decision to refuse the visa application was lawful, reasonable, and based on relevant considerations.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: DOWSETT J
In determining the jurisdictional issue, the court considered the scope of judicial review in administrative law and whether the decision in question was a reviewable administrative action. The court held that the decision of DIMA to refuse a visa application does not constitute a reviewable administrative action under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). As such, the Federal Court does not have the jurisdiction to review DIMA's decision in this instance.
Regarding the accuracy and reliability of the statutory declarations provided by the applicant, the court examined the contents of the declarations and compared them to other evidence presented in the case. The court found discrepancies between the declarations and other evidence, leading to the conclusion that the declarations were not accurate or reliable. This finding was significant in assessing the credibility of the applicant's case.
In assessing the lawfulness and reasonableness of DIMA's decision, the court applied the principles of administrative law, including the requirement for decisions to be based on relevant considerations and not be Wednesbury unreasonable. The court found that DIMA's decision was based on relevant considerations and was not Wednesbury unreasonable, as the department had properly exercised its discretion in refusing the visa application.
In reaching these conclusions, the court referred to relevant case law and statutory provisions, applying established legal principles to the facts of the case. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction to review DIMA's decision to refuse a visa application, and such decisions will be upheld if they are based on relevant considerations and are not Wednesbury unreasonable. The court did not depart from or distinguish any prior authority in reaching these conclusions.