In the matter of SAB

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MENTAL HEALTH COURT

CITATION:

In the matter of SAB [2017] QMHC 2

PROCEEDING:

Reference

DELIVERED ON:

19 May 2017

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

7 December 2016

JUDGE:

Dalton J

ASSISTING PSYCHIATRISTS:

Dr J Reddan and
Dr C Gray

CATCHWORDS

MENTAL HEALTH – DECLARATION OR FINDING OF MENTAL ILLNESS OR INCAPACITY – UNSOUNDNESS – INTOXICATION – where the defendant was charged with breach of domestic violence order and grievous bodily harm – where the defendant had a history of mental illness characterised by delusions of persecutions and infidelity – where the defendant used amphetamine before the offending – whether the defendant was deprived of the capacity to know that she ought not do the act and the ability to control her actions – whether that deprivation was a result of intoxication at the time of the offending

R v Clough (No 2) [2010] QCA 120

APPEARANCES:

K Prskalo on behalf of SAB

J Tate for the Director of Mental Health
MB Lehane for the Director of Public Prosecutions

SOLICITORS:

Legal Aid Queensland for SAB

Crown Law for the Director of Mental Health
The Director of Public Prosecutions (Qld)

  1. I dealt with this reference on 7 December 2016.  My finding was that in relation to the two charges before the Court – breach of domestic violence order and grievous bodily harm, both 2 January 2014 – SAB was suffering from a mental illness, schizoaffective disorder, which deprived her of the capacities to know that she ought not do the acts complained of, and to control herself in relation to doing those acts.  I made a Forensic Order.

  2. I now provide my reasons for those findings.  This case involves questions of general application regarding intoxication.

  3. SAB was 31 years of age at the time of the offending and had been living with the complainant for about 10 years; married to him most of that time.  Police were called to their home and discovered that SAB had seriously stabbed her husband with a large kitchen knife.  She made admissions to them at the time and told them where they could find the knife.

  4. I have a report pursuant to s 238 of the Mental Health Act 2000 from Dr Voita who is SAB’s treating psychiatrist. She describes a history of mental illness from about 18 years of age, complicated by a lack of insight and consequent poor adherence to treatment. SAB’s illness is further complicated by her use of illegal drugs: cannabis and amphetamines, and also her excessive use of nicotine.

  5. I will summarise some of the aspects of the illness relevant to this offending.  Dr Voita reported that when unwell SAB often presented with thought disorder, labile mood, disorganisation, poor self-care, persecutory delusions and delusions of infidelity concerning her husband.  These delusions of infidelity have characterised SAB’s illness.  On 12 February 2004 SAB was seen in the Logan Emergency Department.  She reported thoughts that her boyfriend was cheating on her; she had seen him having sex with other girls, including having sex…

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Details
Case
[2017] QMHC 2
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the defendant, referred to as SAB, was charged with breach of a domestic violence order and grievous bodily harm. SAB had a history of mental illness, including delusions of persecution and infidelity. The court had to determine whether SAB was deprived of the capacity to know she ought not to do the act and the ability to control her actions, and whether this deprivation was due to intoxication at the time of the offending. Dr Schramm, Dr Voita, and Dr Phillips provided evidence that intoxication was not a contributing factor to SAB’s mental state at the time of the offending. The court found that intoxication was an acute condition due to the ingestion of a substance, and that its effects would have dissipated by the time of the offending.

The court had to decide whether SAB was deprived of the capacity to know she ought not to do the act and the ability to control her actions due to her mental illness, and whether this deprivation was a result of intoxication. The court found that intoxication was an acute condition that would have dissipated by the time of the offending, and that the effects of intoxication would have no longer been present by 65 hours after ingestion. The court also found that the worsening of SAB’s psychotic illness was not the secondary effect being spoken of in the case of R v Clough (No 2). The court relied on the opinions of the three psychiatrists who concluded that SAB was suffering from a mental disease, and that she was deprived of the capacity to know she ought not to do the act and the ability to control her actions.

SAB was found to be suffering from a mental disease, schizoaffective disorder, and was deprived of the capacity to know she ought not to do the act and the ability to control her actions. The court accepted the opinion of Dr Phillips that intoxication was not a contributing factor to SAB’s mental state at the time of the offending. The court found that intoxication was an acute condition that would have dissipated by the time of the offending, and that the worsening of SAB’s psychotic illness was not the secondary effect being spoken of in R v Clough (No 2). The court found SAB to be not guilty of the charges due to unsoundness of mind. The court ordered that SAB be detained in a mental health facility until such time as she was no longer a danger to herself or others.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I also have a report from Dr Schramm, 22 August 2016. On the question of intoxication he was unable to elicit any clearer, or less contradictory, version of events than had Drs Voita and Phillips and concluded:“My opinion is that, unless it can be confidently established that she had used on the day or perhaps even the day before that, the question of intoxication, at least in my understanding of that term was not an issue in contributing to that mental state that deprived her of the capacity to know wrongness. That is, if she had not used for days, I do not believe that any residual presence (if at all) of that agent would still have been having a direct effect on her thinking and reasoning.”Evidence at the Hearing Drs Voita, Phillips and Schramm all gave evidence at the hearing of this matter. Dr Voita thought that of the various inconsistent accounts SAB had given, the account that she had used on the 24th and 25th and then again, after pawning the television, on the 26th or 27th was the most likely. On questioning she gave her view that, accepting use on 27 December 2013, she did not think that SAB was acutely intoxicated by the night of 2 January. Her view was however that the amphetamine use, including the use on 24, 25, 26 or 27 December led to a deterioration in SAB’s illness. Dr Voita thought that intoxication was “an acute condition due to ingestion of a substance” and that the length of time a person could be said to be intoxicated depended upon how quickly the person metabolised that substance. The metabolism of the substance is measured by its half-life; that is, the time it takes for the body to eliminate half the dose of substance. She agreed that half a dose of methylamphetamine would be eliminated from a user’s body somewhere between 10 to 13 hours after it was taken. She agreed with the propositions put by Dr Gray that 25 per cent of the original dose would remain in the body at 26 hours, and that by 65 hours after ingestion, only three per cent would remain in the body. At that stage, she agreed, the person would no longer be intoxicated. Dr Phillips also had the view that the most reliable account as to when SAB last used amphetamines was sometime between 25 and 27 December 2013. Dr Phillips said that in her view intoxication was:“… an acute, transient condition due to the administration of a psychoactive substance which then goes on to have effects on somebody’s mind in terms of their consciousness, perception, affect, behaviour or their mood, and that that condition is related to having the intoxicating substance within the body and that, once it is eliminated from the body, there is no longer an intoxicating effect, and effects thereafter would be considered, if they are persistent … a different condition, for example, an exacerbation of the underlying psychotic illness. So, in my mind, I certainly was not thinking of intoxication purely as the subject of a high that one can get with amphetamines … The intoxicating effects can last longer than that, but by the time it’s eliminated from the body I would not consider that intoxication [continued] at that point.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Both my assisting psychiatrists recommended that I accept the unanimous opinion of the three reporting psychiatrists; that is that SAB was suffering from a mental disease: schizoaffective disorder. Further, that she was deprived of the capacity to know she ought not do the act constituting the offence and, indeed, probably the ability to control her actions.Conclusions I accept the advice of the three reporting psychiatrists and the assisting psychiatrists as to unsoundness of mind. I accept the opinion of Dr Phillips as to intoxication. In fact I think her opinion was shared by both Dr Voita and Dr Schramm, although Dr Voita expressed some confusion as to the legal test. One of the reasons I reserved my reasons in this matter was so that I could say something about R v Clough (No 2).[5] Clough was a case where a man with a longstanding psychotic disorder, and longstanding cannabis and methylamphetamine abuse disorder, killed his wife, having both smoked marijuana and injected methylamphetamine in the days preceding the killing. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against the trial judge’s finding that Mr Clough was not entitled to the defence of unsoundness because he was intoxicated with methylamphetamines at the time of the killing. [5] [2010] QCA 120. The evidence of the four psychiatrists who gave evidence in Clough supported the decision that there could be no defence of unsoundness because of intoxication at the time of the killing. However, judging by the extracts of their evidence in the Court of Appeal decision, examination of them as to intoxication was not as disciplined as it might have been. The Court of Appeal found that the meaning of intoxication was a question of law and that the word as used in the Criminal Code bore its ordinary meaning. Neither of those propositions is exceptional. Resort was had to dictionary definitions by the primary judge, and therefore by the Court of Appeal. Further, resort was had to what other judges in other cases had conceived intoxication as being. None of these definitions produced anything contradictory of the evidence which I have summarised above. While the meaning of the word intoxication is a question of law, whether in any case a person is intoxicated is a question of fact and psychiatric opinion will be very relevant to the determination of that fact. In Clough the defendant smoked marijuana on Sunday; injected speed and probably smoked marijuana on Monday. On Tuesday he smoked marijuana. On Wednesday he injected half a gram of speed and smoked marijuana. On Thursday he smoked marijuana. On Friday morning he killed his wife. The psychiatric evidence was that he was still intoxicated at the time of the killing. It was in this context that the primary judge found that, although the high from methylamphetamine use on Wednesday had worn off, there was still a secondary effect operating on the defendant’s mental state at the time of the homicide. That conclusion is perfectly compatible with the evidence as to methylamphetamine intoxication in this case. It must however be understood in the context that the question before the trial judge in Clough (and the judge in any case where unsoundness of mind and intoxication are in question) was whether or not the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offending. That is, it is not just any “secondary effect” operating on the defendant’s mind at the time of the offending which is relevant. It must be a secondary effect which amounts to, or can be classified as, intoxication. Psychosis, or a worsening of a psychotic illness, which persists after intoxication has passed is not the secondary effect which is being spoken of in Clough. Nor is the withdrawal or depressed reaction after intoxication has passed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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