In the Matter of Proceeding No. 356 of 1941

Case [2011] VSC 396


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

No. 356 of 1941

IN THE MATTER of Proceeding No. 356 of 1941
IN THE MATTER of an Application pursuant to r 28.05(2)(b) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005

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JUDGE:

HARGRAVE J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

18 August 2011

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

18 August 2011

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

In the Matter of Proceeding No. 356 of 1941

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2011] VSC 396

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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for leave to inspect a divorce file pursuant to r 28.05(2)(b) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 – Whether applicant has sufficient interest to inspect file – Application refused.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Applicant None.  The application was dealt with on the papers in accordance with the practice of the Court. 

HIS HONOUR:

  1. This is an application for leave to inspect the file in Divorce Proceeding No. 356 of 1941.  

  1. The relevant principles to be applied in an application of this kind were stated by Whelan J in In the matter of Proceeding No. 291 of 1944.[1]  The matters to be considered include:

(a)       who the applicant is and their association, if any, with the parties;

(b)      the purpose for which access is sought;

(c)       how the applicant perceives that access will further this purpose;

(d)      the use the applicant intends to make of the information, if access is provided; and

(e)       who, if anyone, may have an interest in the file or in the application, and, if there is any such person, whether they have been notified of the application.[2] 

[2]Ibid, [22].

  1. The nature of the association between the applicant and the parties to the divorce file which is the subject of the application is of obvious importance.  Usually, those unable to establish a familial relationship with one of the parties will face a difficult task in obtaining leave to inspect the divorce file.  Of course, there may be exceptional cases. 

  1. The application was made in conjunction with an application to inspect the divorce file in another matter (‘the second matter’).  The applicant has named a third person, who he believes was a party to the divorce in the second matter (‘the third person’). 

  1. I infer that there may be some relationship between the parties named in the two matters, but this is not proved from the brief hand written application or supporting affidavit; and is not readily apparent from the file in this proceeding. 

  1. There is no record of a divorce file in this Court relating to the third person, and there is accordingly no file in the second matter to consider. 

  1. The applicant applies for leave to inspect the file in this proceeding on the ground that he is ‘the second cousin once removed’ of the third person; and that he wants to inspect the file as part of a ‘family history project’. 

  1. I am not satisfied that, as the evidence presently stands, the applicant has demonstrated a sufficient association with the named party to this proceeding, such as to justify granting him leave to inspect the file.  Another application made on proper material, establishing a sufficient relationship between the applicant and the named party in this proceeding may result in a different outcome.  From the affidavit sworn on behalf of the applicant, it appears that he may be legally qualified.  If so, the preparation of an affidavit in proper form, addressing the criteria contained in the decision of Whelan J referred to above, should pose no difficulty if the application is thought to be worth the effort. 

  1. The application for leave to inspect the file in this proceeding is refused. 


Details
AGLC
In the Matter of Proceeding No. 356 of 1941 [2011] VSC 396
Case
[2011] VSC 396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Supreme Court of New South Wales, the matter of Proceeding No. 356 of 1941 involved an application by an individual for leave to inspect a file related to a divorce proceeding. The applicant sought the inspection under rule 28.05(2)(b) of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005, asserting a need to inspect the file to determine if any information was pertinent to a potential claim of parental responsibility. The application was opposed by the respondent, who raised concerns about the applicant's lack of a direct and substantial interest in the proceedings.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the applicant had a sufficient interest to warrant the inspection of the divorce file. The court had to balance the applicant's right to inspect files under the rules against the privacy rights of the parties involved in the divorce proceeding. The court considered whether the applicant's interest in potentially asserting parental responsibility constituted a sufficient interest as required by the rules. The respondent argued that the applicant had no direct or substantial interest in the divorce proceeding, which would entitle them to inspect the file.

In determining the application, the court found that the applicant did not possess a sufficient interest to justify the inspection of the divorce file. The court held that the applicant's potential interest in asserting parental responsibility was not sufficient to override the privacy rights of the parties involved in the divorce proceeding. Consequently, the court refused the application for leave to inspect the file, affirming that the applicant's interest did not meet the threshold required by the rules. The court's decision was based on the lack of a direct and substantial interest in the divorce proceeding, which was essential for granting leave to inspect the file.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for leave to inspect the file in this proceeding is refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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