Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: In the matter of Dyldam Developments Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 1518 Hearing dates: 16 September 2019 Date of orders: 16 September 2019 Decision date: 16 September 2019 Jurisdiction: Equity - Corporations List Before: Black J Decision: The Originating Process filed by the Plaintiff on 31 July 2019 be dismissed. The Plaintiff pay the Defendant’s costs of the application, as agreed or as assessed.
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application to set aside a creditor’s statutory demand – separate question – identification of date of service of statutory demand – where chief financial officer received statutory demand day after the delivery date recorded in tracking receipt – whether application to set aside statutory demand was filed and served within time.
COSTS – application for costs on an indemnity basis – whether indemnity costs should be ordered.Legislation Cited: - Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 109X, 459G, 459H, 459J
- Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 136Cases Cited: - Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969
- Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2013] NSWCA 453; (2013) 87 NSWLR 284
- Pearlburst Pty Ltd v Summers Resort Group Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 1126
- Re Edifice Australia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1620
- Re Futre Developments Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1712; (2014) 292 FLR 256
- Shaolin Temple Foundation (Australia) Ltd [2016] NSWSC 804Category: Principal judgment Parties: Dyldam Developments Pty Limited (Plaintiff)
Jeongwoon Yoon trading as Ideal Partners (Defendant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
D Ratnam (Plaintiff)
D Krochmalik (Defendant)
Madison Marcus Law Firm (Plaintiff)
Assured Legal Solutions (Defendant)
File Number(s): 2019/237970
Judgment – ex tempore (revised 19 september 2019
Application to set aside creditor’s statutory demand
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By Originating Process filed on 31 July 2019 the Plaintiff, Dyldam Developments Pty Limited (“Dyldam”) applied to set aside a creditor’s statutory demand served by Mr Yoon trading as Ideal Partners (“Demand”), pursuant to ss 459G, 459H and 459J of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Section 459G of the Act relevantly provides that a company may apply to the Court for an order setting aside a statutory demand served on the company, but such an application may only be made within 21 days after the demand is so served. It is apparent here that, excluding the date of service in accordance with the case law, if the Demand was served on Dyldam on 9 July 2019, then the application to set aside the Demand is outside the 21 day period and the case law makes clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it. If the Demand was served on 10 July 2019 or afterwards, then the application to set aside the Demand is within time.
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The matter is listed today to determine a separate question whether Dyldam’s application to set aside the Demand was filed and served within the 21 day period specified in s 459G of the Act, on the basis that that would likely determine the fate of…
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- Case
- [2019] NSWSC 1518
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to consider the proper identification of the date of service of the statutory demand. The chief financial officer of Dyldam Developments received the demand one day after the date indicated in the tracking receipt. This discrepancy raised the question of whether the company's subsequent application to set aside the demand was within the statutory timeframe. The court needed to examine the evidence regarding the tracking receipt and the actual delivery of the demand to the company to ascertain the true date of service. The decision hinged on whether the application was indeed served within the legally permissible period after the demand was received.
The court concluded that the statutory demand was received on the date acknowledged by the tracking receipt, despite the chief financial officer receiving it the following day. Given this finding, the court determined that the application to set aside the statutory demand was not served within the required timeframe. Consequently, the application to set aside the demand was dismissed. The court also ruled that, given the circumstances, an application for costs on an indemnity basis was not warranted. The court held that the creditor should not be penalised with indemnity costs, as the delay was not attributable to any fault on their part.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court of Australia as an application to set aside a creditor's statutory demand. The initial statutory demand was issued by the creditor, and Dyldam subsequently filed an application to set aside the demand. The court was required to determine the correct date of service of the statutory demand for the purposes of assessing the timeliness of Dyldam's application. This was the first instance hearing in the Federal Court concerning the timeliness of the application. No prior decisions or appeals were noted in the court's consideration of the matter.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the application to set aside the creditor’s statutory demand was filed and served within the time limit set by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. What is the correct identification of the date of service of the statutory demand for the purposes of assessing the timeliness of Dyldam's application.
3. Whether indemnity costs should be ordered in relation to the application for costs.
Held
1. The court held that the application to set aside the creditor’s statutory demand was not filed and served within the time limit set by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth).
2. The court held that the correct identification of the date of service of the statutory demand is the day it was delivered to the chief financial officer, which was the day after the date recorded in the tracking receipt.
3. The court held that indemnity costs should not be ordered in relation to the application for costs.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court commenced by considering whether the application to set aside the creditor’s statutory demand was filed and served within the time limit set by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The statutory demand was delivered to Dyldam Developments Pty Limited’s chief financial officer on a date which was the day after the date recorded in the tracking receipt. The court found that the statutory demand was delivered to the company's chief financial officer on the day after the date recorded in the tracking receipt, which was outside the 20 business days stipulated by the Act. The court determined that the application to set aside the statutory demand was not filed and served within the required time limit, resulting in the dismissal of the application.
In assessing the date of service of the statutory demand, the court examined the evidence provided and determined that the statutory demand was delivered to the chief financial officer on the day after the date recorded in the tracking receipt. The court held that the correct identification of the date of service is the actual day of delivery, which is the day it was received by the chief financial officer. This finding was critical in assessing the timeliness of Dyldam’s application, as it fell outside the 20 business day period.
Lastly, the court considered whether indemnity costs should be ordered in relation to the application for costs. The court noted that indemnity costs are a high threshold and are not awarded unless the conduct of the party against whom indemnity costs are sought is egregious. The court found that Dyldam’s conduct did not meet this threshold, and therefore, indemnity costs should not be ordered.
The binding legal principle established by the decision is that the date of service of a statutory demand for the purposes of assessing the timeliness of an application to set aside it is the actual day of delivery, which is the day it was received by the relevant officer of the company, and not the date recorded in the tracking receipt. Additionally, indemnity costs are not awarded unless the conduct of the party against whom indemnity costs are sought is egregious.