In the Matter of Cuckow

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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

No. 5500 of 1999
Brisbane

Before Justice Byrne

[In the matter of Cuckow]

IN THE MATTER of an application under O.74 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland

- and -

IN THE MATTER of the Estate of CHARLES ERNEST CUCKOW

- and -

IN THE MATTER of an application by MARK ANDREW MASEE and RUTH DIANA MAY and CATHERINE ANN TAYLOR

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - BYRNE J

Judgment delivered 29 July 1999

CATCHWORDS: WILLS - gift of residue to “grandchildren” - effect of s. 28(1) Adoption of Children Act 1964.

ADOPTION - SUCCESSION - impact on gift to “grandchildren” of their adoption between will and testator’s death.

Counsel:Mr D C Andrews for the applicants

Mr K J Lynch for the respondent

Solicitors:Carne and Herd solicitors as town agents for Collas Morro Ross solicitors for the applicants

Official Solicitor to the Public Trustee for the respondent

Hearing Date:               7 July 1999
IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF QUEENSLAND

No. 5500 of 1999
Brisbane

Before Justice Byrne

[In the matter of Cuckow]

IN THE MATTER of an application under O.74 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Queensland

- and -

IN THE MATTER of the Estate of CHARLES ERNEST CUCKOW

- and -

IN THE MATTER of an application by MARK ANDREW MASEE and RUTH DIANA MAY and CATHERINE ANN TAYLOR

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - BYRNE J

Judgment delivered 29 July 1999

  1. Though in form an application pursuant to RSC O 74 to compel a distribution of the estate of the late Charles Cuckow, the decisive question is whether the applicants, three siblings, are beneficiaries under the will, which relevantly provided:

    “I give ... my carpentry tools .. to my ... grandson Mark Andrew Cuckow ... and subject thereto I give ... the whole of my estate ... unto my trustee ... to hold the net proceeds .. upon trust until my youngest living grandchild shall attain the age of twenty-one years ... for the maintenance education benefit advancement or support in life of such of my grandchildren as shall for the time being be living and under the age of twenty-one years ... and upon my youngest living grandchild attaining the age of twenty-one years ... for such of them my grandchildren as shall be living at my death ... in equal shares as tenants in common.”

  2. The testator made his will in August 1974. He then had three grandchildren - the applicants. He died in 1987. The applicants all survived him and attained age 21. Yet distribution of the residue to them is resisted on the basis that they are irrebuttably presumed[1] by statute not to have been the testator’s grandchildren by the time he died, so that none of them can take under the class gift to “my grandchildren”. This curiosity is said to be the consequence of the applicants’ adoption[2] in 1976.

    [2]The applicants were…

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Details
Case
[1999] QSC 175
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case under consideration was an application to compel the distribution of the estate of Charles Cuckow, deceased. The applicants, Mark Andrew Masee, Ruth Diana May, and Catherine Ann Taylor, sought to inherit under the terms of the will, which included a bequest to "my grandchildren." The will, executed in August 1974, specified various gifts, including carpentry tools to Mark Andrew Cuckow, and the residue to be held in trust for the testator's grandchildren until the youngest reached the age of twenty-one. The key issue was whether the applicants, who were adopted by their stepfather in 1976, qualified as "grandchildren" under the will given the statutory changes in their legal relationship with the testator. The court had to determine whether the adoption, occurring after the execution of the will, affected the applicants' eligibility to inherit.

The central legal question revolved around the interpretation of the will in light of the statutory adoption provisions, specifically section 28(1) of the Adoption of Children Act 1964. This section legally severed the applicants' previous relationship with the testator upon their adoption, thereby raising doubts about their status as "grandchildren" at the time of the testator's death. The applicants argued that despite the adoption, the will's language indicated an intention to include them as beneficiaries. The court needed to assess whether the testator's intention, as expressed in the will, could be fulfilled despite the legal changes caused by the adoption.

Justice Byrne examined the will's language and the surrounding circumstances to ascertain the testator's intention. The court noted that the specific bequest of carpentry tools to Mark Andrew Cuckow, described as the testator's "grandson," indicated that the testator intended to include him in the residuary gift to "grandchildren." The court also considered that the plural "grandchildren" suggested that the testator intended for more than just Mark to benefit from the residue. Given the testator's intent to include all his grandchildren at the time the will was made, and the surrounding circumstances supporting the identification of the applicants as intended beneficiaries, the court concluded that the applicants should inherit as if the adoption had not occurred. The court ruled in favor of the applicants, finding that the testator's intention to include his grandchildren in the residuary gift was clear and that the applicants, despite their adoption, were entitled to inherit.

The final orders of the court were that Mark Andrew Masee, Ruth Diana May, and Catherine Ann Taylor were entitled to participate in the residue of the estate of Charles Cuckow, deceased, as his grandchildren under the terms of the will.

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