In the matter of an application for writs of prohibition and certiorari against the Honourabel Sir William John Francis Kearney, Aboriginal Land Commissioner and in the matter of the Jawoyn (Katherine area) land..

[1984] FCA 282

C A T C H V O R D S

Evidence - Administrative Law - Legal professiona1 7rivilege -

Aboriginal land claim - issue whether regulations invalid as

having been made for a purpose outside the regulatlon-making

power - Discovery - Application to review order made by

Aboriginal Land Commissioner directing production o f documents -

Communications between the Government of the Northern Territory

and its legal advisers - Instructions f o r the preparation of

subordinate legislation - Legal advisers full-time salaried

officers in the public service - Limits on the extent of the

privilege - Whether privilege protects documents relevant to

the issue whether a statutory power has been exercised for an

ulterior purpose.

Practice and Procedure - Application for review - Circumstances

in which a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia may

exercise original jurisdiction with respect to application

under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1 9 7 7 .

Federal Court of Australia Act 1 9 7 6 , ss. 1 4 , 15, 20

No. G78 of 1 9 8 4

.

c

No. G191 o f 1984

No. G79 of 1984

No. G190 o f 1984

THE ATTORXEY-GENERAL FOR THE NORTXERN TEXRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

v. THE HONOLWBLE SIR WILLIM JOHN F U i i C I S i(ZARNEY, ABORIGINAL

LANb COMMISSIONER and XORTHER!! &VD COUNCIL and I N T:XE U T T E R

of the KEXBL (COX PENINSULA) &VD CLAIX

CORAM: Woodward, Fisher and Heaves JJ

-	DATE: 14 September 1984
PLACE	: Canberra

I N T H E FEDERAL COURT O F AUSTRALIA )

#'	!
I

N E W S O U T H WALES D I S T R I C T R E G I S T R Y No G 7 8 o f 1 3 8 4

W

1

GENERAL D I V I S I O N

I N THE M A T T E R o f an Application f o r Wrlts o f

? r o h i S i t l o n a n d C e r t l o r a r l a g a l n s t T H E HONOliRA3LE

S I R WILL IAM J O H N FXANCIS K E A X N E Y , A 3 0 R I G I N A L L A A O

t O M M I S S I O N E R

R e s p o n d e n t

P r o s e c u t o r

O R D E R

J U D G E S M A K I N G O R D E R : W o o d w a r d , F l s h e r a n d N e a v e s J J

D A T E OF O R D E R : 1 4 September 1 9 8 4

WHE?E NADE: Canberra

T H E C O U R T O R D E R S T H A T :

1 T h e o r d e r m a d e o n 2 M a r c h 1 9 8 4 c a l l l n g u p o n t h e A b o r l g l n a l

L a n d C o m m l s s l o n e r t o s h o w c a u s e w h y wrlts o f p r o h l b l t l o n

a n d certiorari s h o u l d n o t I s s u e 1 n r e l a t l o n t o t h e o r d e r

m a d e b y t h e said C o r n m i s s l o n e r on 3 F e b r u a r y 1 3 8 4 b e

d i s c h a r g e d

2 T h e p r o s e c u t o r p a y t h e c o s t s o f t h e N o r t h e r n L a n d C o u n c i l

o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s

G E N E R A L D I V I S I O N 1

BETUEEN :	THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE
NORTHEQN T L R R I T O R Y OF AUbTdALIA

A p p l 1 c a n t

- AND : THE HONOURABLE S I R U I L L I A M JOHN

F l r s t R e s p o n d e n t

-	AN0 :	N O R T H E R N	LAND	COUNCIL
Second Xesponden :

- AN0 : I N THE HATTER o f t h e JAUOYN

L A N D CLAIY

L K A T H E A I N E A R E A )

O R O E R

J U O G E S M A K I N G O R O E R : W o o d w a r d , F i s n e r a n d N e a v e s J J .

D A T E OF O R I I E R : 1 4 September 1 9 8 4

WHERE M A D E : Canberra

THE C O U R T O R D E R S T H A T :

1. T h e a p p l i c a t i o n b e d i s m i s s e d

2 . T h e a p p l i c a n t p a y t h e c o s t s o f t h e s e c o n d r e s p o n d e n t

o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

I N T H E	FEDERAL	C O U R T	OF	AUSTRALIA	)
1

NEU SOUTH WALES D I S T R I C T REGISTRY j No G79 o f l 0 8 4

GENERAL D I V I S I O N

I N T H E M A T T E R o f a n A p p l i c a t i o n f o r Writs o f

P r o n i b i t i o n a n d C e r t i o r a r i a g a i n s t T H E HONOURABLE

S I R WILL IAM JOHN	FRANCIS	K E A R N E Y ,	ABORiGINAL	AN3
COMMISSIONER
R e s p o n d e n t

AND I N T H E MATTER OF T H E K E N B I ( C O X PENINSULA)

LANO CLAIM

EX P A R T E , t h e ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR T H E N O R T H E R N

Y OF AUSTRALIA

P r o s e c u t o r

O R D E R

JUDGES M A K I N G O R D E R : W o o d w a r d , F i s h e r a n d N e a v e s J i

D A T E O F O R O E R : 1 4 September 1 9 8 4

WHERE M A D E : Canberra

T H E C O U R T O R D E R S T H A T :

1 T h e o r d e r m a d e o n 2 M a r c h 1 9 8 4 c a l l i n g u p o n t h e Aboriginal

L a n d C o m m i s s i o n e r t o s h o w c a u s e v h y w r i t s o f p r o h i b i t i o n

a n d c e r t i o r a r i s h o u l d n o t i s s u e i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o r d e r s

m a d e b y t h e s a i d C o m m i s s i o n e r o n 3 a n d 6 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4

b e d i s c h a r g e d

2 T h e p r o s e c u t o r p a y t h e c o s t s o f t h e N o r t h e r n L a n d

C o u n c i l o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s

-

.4 I? ( THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ) )

N E Y	SOUTH	WALES	D I S T R I C T	R E G I S T R Y	)	No	G190	o f 1 9 8 4
1

GENERAL D I V I S I O N 1

B E T M E E N : T H E ATTORNEY-GENERAL FilR T H E

N O R T H C 2 N T E R R I T a R Y L'i AUSTRALIA

A p p l 1 c a n t

- A N D : T H E H O N O U R A B L E S I X M I c c I a N J O H N

FRANCIS K E A R N E Y , AaORIGINAL

LAND C O M M I S S I O N E R

F i r s t R e s p o n d e n t

-	A N D :	NORTHEgN	LAND	COUNCIL
S e c o n d R e s p o n d e n t
-	A N D :

I N T H E M A T T E R o f t h e K E N S I (COX

PENINSULA) LAND CLAIN

O R D E X

J U D G E S Y A K I N G O R D E R ; W o o d w a r d , F i s h e r a n d N e a v e s JJ

D A T E OF O R D E R : 1 4 September 1 9 8 4

M H E R E M A D E : Canberra

T H E C O U R T O R D E R S T H A T :

1 The application b e dismissed

2	T h e a p p l i c a n t p a y t h e c o s t s o f t h e s e c o n d r e s p o n d e n t
o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n .

I N THE MATTER o f an A p p l i c a t i o n f o r Writs o f

P r o h i b i t i o n and C e r t i o r a r i aga ins t TEE XONOURA3LZ

S I R WILLIAM JOW	FRANCIS	KEARNEY,	M O R I G I N A L LLND
COMMISSIONER

X e s p o n a e n t

AND I N THE MATTER of t he JAWOYN (KATHERINE AREA)

LAND C U I H

EX PARTE, the ATTOLXEY-GENERAL FOR THE YORTHEXN

m OF AUSTIWLIA

P r o s e c u t o r

I N THE FEDERAL NEW SOUTH WALES DIS COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

TRICT REGISTRY ) N o . G l 9 l o f 1984

GENERA L DIVISION )

BETWEEN :	TEE ATTOLVEY-GENEUL FOR THE
NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

A p p l i c a n t

THE HONOURABLE S I R WILLLAM JOHN

FRANCIS ‘LEARNEY, MORIGINAL

L	A	N	D	E	R
F i r s t R e s p o n d e n t

NORTHELV &VD COLWCIL

S e c o n d R e s p o n d e n t

I N THE MATTER o f the JAWOYN

(IWTHERI?lE AREA) LAND-

1.

IN THE FATTER of an Application for Writs of

Prohibition and Certiorari against THE ONOLUBLE

SIR WILLIAM	JOHN FRANCIS KEMJEY, ABORIGINAL LXUD
COMMISSIONER

Respondent

AND IN THE MATTER	of the KENBI (COX PENINSULA)
LAND CLAIM

Prosecutor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA	)
NEW SOLiTH XALES DISTRICT REGISTXY	) 30. G190 O f 1984
GENUA, DIVISION	1

BETWEEN : THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant

- AND : THE HONOURABLE SIR WILLIXM JOHN

FRANCIS W E Y , ABORIGINAL

LAND COMMISSIONER

First Respondent

- ANI : NORTHERN LA?JD COUNCIL

Second Respondent

- AND : IN THE MATTER of the KENBI (COX

PENINSULA) &?D CLAIM

2 .

CORAM : Woodward, Fisher and Neaves JJ.

- DATE : 1 4 September 1984

REASONS FOR JUDGXE3T

WOODWARD and NEAVES JJ:

The Abor ig ina l Land Cornus ione r appo in ted unde r

s e c t i o n	52	of	the Abor ig ina l	Land	Rights	(Nor thern	Territory)
-	Act

1976 p u r s u a n t t o p a r a g r a p h ( " the Land R igh t s Ac t "> i s conduc t ing an i nqu i ry

50(1) (a ) o f t h a t Act i n t o e a c h o f two

a p p l i c a t i o n s made by the Nor the rn Land Cocnc i l on beha l f o f

Abor ig ina l s c l a iming to have a t r a d i t i o n a l l a n d c l a i m t o

t h e a r e a s a p p l i c a t i o n r e l a t e s t o l a n d i n t h e K a t h e r i n e a r e a o f land d e s c r i b e d i n t h o s e a p p l i c a t i o n s . One

and i s

r e fe r r ed to a s t he Jawop (Ka the r ine Area ) Land C la im.

T h e s e c o n d a p p l i c a t i o n r e l a t e s t o l a n d ir. t h e Cox P e n i n s u l a ,

Bynoe Harbour and Port Pat terson area and i s r e f e r r e d t o as

t h e Kenbi (Cox Pen insu la ) Land Claim.

The land encompassed by each o f t he c l a ims

inc ludes land which i s s a i d t o be " l a n d i n a town" w i t h i n

the meaning o f t h a t e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f

" a l i e n a t e d Crown land" and "una l i ena ted Crown l a n d " i n

sub - sec t ion 3 ( 1 ) of t h e Land R igh t s Act. "Tom" is d e f i n e d

i n t h a t s u b - s e c t i o n a s h a v i n g t h e same meaning as i n t h e

law o f t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y r e l a t i n g t o t h e p l a n n i n g a n d

development o f towns and t h e u s e o f l a n d i n o r n e a r t o w n s ,

c

3 .

i

and t o i n f o r c e u n d e r t h a t i n c l u d e a n y a r e a t h a t , by v i r t u e o f r e g u l a t i o n s

l a w . i s t o be t r e a t e d as a town.

The l e g i s l a t i o n a t p r e s e n t i n f o r c e w h i c h i s

said t o a c h i e v e t h a t r e s u l t i s the Planning Act o f t h e

N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y a n d t h e P l a n n i n g R e g u l a t i o n s made

thereunder . The Planning Act came i n t o o p e r a t i o n on

3 August 1979. Sub-sec t ion 4 ( 1 ) o f t h a t Act def ines

"town" t o mean

" ( a ) a town wi th in the meaning o f t h e Crown

Lands Act;

( b ) a m u n i c i p a l i t y ; o r

( c ) l a n d s p e c i f i e d by t h e r e g u l a t i o n s t o

be an a rea which	i s	t o	be	t r e a t e d	as
a	town."

Regu la t ion 5 of the P lanning Regula t lons , which

a l s o came i n t o o p e r a t i o n o n 3 August 1 9 7 9 , p rov ides -

"For the purposes o f s e c t i o n 4 o f t h e A c t ,

t h e s e v e r a l a r e a s o f l a n d s p e c i f i e d i n

Schedule 3 a r e s p e c i f i e d t o be a reas which

1 1

a r e t o b e t r e a t e d a s t o w n s .

P a r t I V of Schedule 3 s p e c i f i e s by metes and bounds an

area of 650 s q u a r e k i l o m e t r e s d e s c r i b e d as be ing nea r

Kather ine . Par t I o f t h a t S c h e d u l e s p e c i f i e s by metes

and bounds an a r e a o f 4350 squa re k i lome t re s wh ich may

be d e s c r i b e d , c o n v e n i e n t l y t h o u g h n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a c c u r a t e l y ,

as be ing near the towns o f Darwin , Nightc l i f f and Sanderson .

~ Rel i ance i s a l s o p l a c e d o n e a r l i e r l e g i s l a t i o n

which was repea led by the P l ann ing Ac t . The e a r l i e r p r o -

4.

v i s i o n s a r e t o be found i n t h e Town Planning Ordinance 1964

as amended Regulat ions under which the Town P l a n n i n g R e g u l a t i o n s , b e i n g

1978, No. 53, had been made. S e c t i o n 5 o f t h e

Town PLanning Ordinance 1964 as amended p rov ided , so f a r

as m a t e r i a l -

" 5 . The r e g u l a t i o n s may prescribe t h a t a

s p e c i f i e d a r e a o f l a n d -

(a) ....

( b ) b e i n g l a n d a d j a c e n t t o a t o w n , s h a l l

be subject t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s

Ordinance , b u t n o t i n c l u d i n g t h e

p rov i s ions o f sub - sec t ion ( 4 ) o r (5)

o f	s e c t i o n e i g h t o r s u b - s e c t i o n	( 2 )
of	s e c t i o n e l e v e n o f t h i s O r d i n a n c e ,

as i f it were p a r t o f t h a t town."

The Town Planning Regulat ions, which were made

on 22 December 1978 . spec i f i ed an a r e a of 4690 square

ki lometres which w a s desc r ibed as b e i n g a d j a c e n t t o t h e

town o f Kather ine and an a r e a o f 4350 square k i l o m e t r e s

which was desc r ibed as b e i n g a d j a c e n t t o t h e town of Dardin.

Each area was p r e s c r i b e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 5 ( b ) o f t h e - Town

Planning Ordinance 1 9 6 4 a s amended to be s u b j e c t t o t h e

p rov i s ions the reo f as i f t h e a r e a w e r e p a r t o f t h e town t o

which it was s a i d t o be a d j a c e n t .

I n t h e c o u r s e of t h e i n q u i r y i n t o e a c h o f t h e

land c la ims the Nor thern Land C o u n c i l h a s a s s e r t e d t h a t

t h e r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e Town P lann ing Regu la t ions

were, and t i o n s a r e , i n v a l i d o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e y w e r e t h e r e l e v a n t p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e P l a n n i n g R e g u l a -

made o t h e r -

wise t h a n f o r a purpose au tho r i sed by t h e Town Planning

5 .

Ordinance 1964 or the Planning Act (as the case might be).

It is asserted that the regulations were made for the

purpose of defeating the land claims made under paragraph

50(1) (a) of the Land Rights Act or of converting the land

relevantly described in the regulations into land that was

not within the description contained in that paragraph so

that the Commissioner could not entertain an application

made with respect to it. That it was open to the Xorthern

Land Council to raise that issue before the Commissioner

was affirmed by the decision of the High Court in Re Toohey;

Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 38 A.L.R. 439.

In each inquiry the Commissioner, on the applica-

tion of the Northern Land Council, ordered that the Northern

Territory Government and the Administrator of the Northern

Territory deliver to the Northern Land Council a ist veri-

fied by affidavit of the documents which were or had been

in its or his possession, custody or power relating o and

incidental to the making and bringing into force of the

regulations under the Town Planning Ordinance 1964 and the

Planning Act to which reference has already been made. The

Commissioner also ordered that the Northern Land Council or

its representative be permitted to inspect and take copies

of such documents as the Northern Territory Government a d

the Administrator	of the Northern Territory did not object
to producing.

6.

Affidavits were filed on behalf of the Northern

Territory Government listing the documents in its possession

or power relating to the matters the subject of the orders

referred to above. The production of certain of the docu-

ments was objected to on the ground

“that those documents contain confidential communications passed between officers of the Northern Territory Department of Law who are legal practitioners and Northern

Territory Ministers or servants of the

Northern Territory for the purposes of

giving legal advice or assistance or for

the purpose of assisting the Northern

Territory in proceedings before the

. Aboriginal Land Commissioner”.

The documents for which legal professional prlvilege was

claimed were identified in the following manner -

“Correspondence, memoranda, opinions and other

documents by or to the Department of Law or

officers thereof or relating	to same,
comprising -

instructions for, and advice on,

preparation and forwarding of the

Regulations in question, including

the various drafts of the Regula-

t ions ;

instructions for, and advice on,

preparation and forwarding of the

new Planning Bill, including the

various drafts of the Bill;

the provision of legal advice on-

cerning the Regulations or proposed

Regulations in question;

preparation of the Northern Territory Government’s case before the Aborigi-

nal Land Commissioner in the land

claim on matters arising out of the

Regulations in question;

advice to a Northern Territory

Minister by officers of the Northern

7.

Territory in conveying the terms

of legal advice received from

the Department of Law or officers

thereof ."

The reference in paragraph (a) to "the Regulations" was intended, so the Court was informed, to refer to the Town Planning Regulations while the reference to "the Regulations"

in paragraph (c) was intended as a reference to the Planning

Regulations.

Subsequently the Northern Territory Government

filed further affidavits identifying by number and title

each departmental file which contained documents f o r which

legal professional privilege was claimed and giving some

particulars of those documents. It is unnecessary to set

out the whole of the list. It will suffice to note that,

where the document consisted of a letter or memorandum, it

was described by identifying, either by name or office,

the sender and the addressee and, where it bore a dare,

the date. In the case of other documents a general

description was given such as "Draft Regulations", "Drafts

of Planning Bill", "Copy outline of Planning Act" and

"Outcome of discussions with Minister". In a few Lnstances

the document was described simply as being a file note

without further particularity except that in one case the

name of the author and the date of he note were given.

The Northern Land Council applied to the Commis-

sioner for an order for production to it of he documents

8.

f o r w h i c h l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n a l p r i v i l e g e h a d b e e n c l a i s e d

on the ground tha t the c la im had no s u f f i c i e n t f o u n d a t i o n .

The matter was argued before the Commissioner who by o r d e r s

made on 3 and 6 F e b r u a r y 1 9 8 4 d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e Government

o f t he Nor the rn Te r r i t o ry p rcduce a l l the doccments for

wh ich l ega l p ro fes s iona l p r iv i l ege had been c l a imed and

p e r m i t the Nor thern Land C o u n c i l t o i n s p e c t and peruse the

same and t o t a k e c o p i e s t h e r e o f .

App l i ca t ions on b e h a l f o f the At torney-Genera l

fo r t he Nor the rn Te r r i t o ry ( " the app l i can t " ) were then

made - e x p a r t e t o a j u d g e o f t h i s C o u r t f o r t h e i s s u e o f

w r i t s o f p r o h i b i t i o n and c e r t i o r a r i d i r e c t e d t o t h e Com-

m i s s i o n e r i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o r d e r s n a d e o n 3 and 6

February 1984. On 2 March 1 9 8 4 o r d e r s were made c a l l i n g

upon t h e w r i t s o f p r o h i b i t i o n Commissioner t o show cause be fo re the Cour t why

and c e r t i o r a r i s h o u l d n o t issue.

When t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s w e r e c a l l e d o n f o r h e a r i n g

counse l fo r t he Nor the rn Land Counc l l fo re shadowed t ha t a

n a b e r o f p r o c e d u r a l matters would be r a i s e d i n c l u d i n g

m a t t e r s g o i n g t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t a n d t h e

a v a i l a b i l i t y i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the remedies which

t h e a p p l i c a n t s o u g h t . It was s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r a l

d i f f i c u l t i e s would be avoided i f t h e a p p l i c a n t w e r e t o s e e k

r e l i e f unde r the Admin i s t r a t ive Dec i s ions ( Jud ic i a l Rev iew)

- Act 1977 Counc i l be ing p repa red to consen t ( " t h e J u d i c i a l Review Ac t" ) , t he Nor the rn Land

t o any ex tens ion o f time

9 .

t o b r ing such p roceed ings as might be n e c e s s a r y t o a l low

t h e h e a r i n g t o proceed on t h a t b a s i s . A f t e r d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n

c o u n s e l f o r t h e a p p l i c a n t embraced t h a t s u g g e s t i o n and

a p p l i c a t i o n s u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a l R e v i e w Act w e r e f i l e d . The

C o u r t , p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 11 of t h a t Act, made an o rde r

a p p r o p r i a t e l y e x t e n d i n g t h e	time	w i t h i n w h i c h s u c h a p p l i c a t i o n s
might be lodged.

I t i s d e s i r a b l e , l e s t t h e m a t t e r s h o u l d be

t h o u g h t t o h a v e e s c a p e d a t t e n t i o n , t o a d v e r t t o t h e

j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t , c o n s t i t u t e d as i t i s a s a

F u l l C o u r t , t o e n t e r t a i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s made under t h e

J u d i c i a l Review Act.

The F e d e r a l C o u r t o f A u s t r a l i a e s t a b l i s h e d by

the Fede ra l Cour t o f Aus t r a l i a Ac t 1 9 7 6 ("the Fede ra l

Cour t Act" ) cons is t s of a Chief Judge and such other Judges

as from time t o time h o l d o f f i c e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e Act

( sub - sec t ion 5(3)). The Court i s a s u p e r i o r c o u r t o f r e c o r d

( sub - sec t ion 5(2)). For t he pu rposes o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n

and conduct of t he bus iness o f t he Cour t , t he Cour t compr i se s

two D i v i s i o n s , t h e I n d u s t r i a l D i v i s i o n a n d t h e G e n e r a l Divi-

s i o n ( s u b - s e c t i o n 1 3 ( 1 ) ) . For the purposes of t h e e x e r c i s e

o f i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n , t h e C o u r t may be c o n s t i t u t e d , i n

e i t h e r D i v i s i o n , by a s i n g l e J u d g e o r as a F u l l C o u r t ( s u b -

s e c t i o n 14(1)). The Chief Judge i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e n s u r i n g

the o rde r ly and exped i t ious d i scha rge o f t he bus iness o f

the Cour t and accord ingly may, subjec t t o t h e Act and t o

s u c h c o n s u l t a t i o n with t h e J u d g e s a s i s a p p r o p r i a t e and

p r a c t i c a b l e , make arrangements as t o t h e J u d g e o r J u d g e s

who i s o r are t o c o n s t i t u t e t h e C o u r t i n p a r t i c u l a r mat:ers

o r c l a s s e s o f m a t t e r s ( s u b - s e c t i o n 15 (l)).

Sec t ion 20 of the Federa l Cour t Act provides -

“(1) Except as o therwise p rovided by t h i s Act

o r a n y o t h e r A c t , t h e o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n

o f t h e C o u r t i n e i t h e r D i v i s i o n s h a l l be ex-

e r c i s e d by a s i n g l e J u d g e .

!2) The j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e C o u r t i n a matter

coming b e f o r e t h e C o u r t f r o m t h e t r i b u n a l o r

a u t h o r i t y ( o t h e r t h a n a c o u r t ) w h i l e c o n s t i t u t e d

by , or by members who i n c l u d e , a pe r son who is

a Judge o f t h e C o u r t o r o f a n o t h e r c o u r t c r e a t e d

by t h e P a r l i a m e n t s h a l l b e e x e r c i s e d by a F u l l

Cour t . “

The Commissioner, although a Judge of the Supreme

Court of t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y , i s n o t a Judge o f t h i s

C o u r t . F u r t h e r , t h e Supreme Cour t o f the Nor thern Ter r i to ry ,

b e i n g e s t a b l i s h e d by a law p a s s e d b y t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly

o f t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y , i s n o t p r o p e r l y d e s c r i b e d as a

c o u r t c r e a t e d by t h e Parliament. Sub- sec t lon 2 0 ( 2 ) , t h e r e -

f o r e , h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e s e

cases and t h e q u e s t i o n arises whether sub-sec t ion 2 0 ( 1 )

p r e c l u d e s t h i s C o u r t f r o m e x e r c i s i n g o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n

w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n s	made	u n d e r t h e J u d i c i a l
Review Act.

The obvious purpose o f sub-sec t ion 2 0 ( 1 ) i s t o

g i v e l e g i s l a t i v e s a n c t i o n t o t h e e x e r c i s e by a s i n g l e

J u d g e o f t h e C o u r t o f t h e C o u r t ‘ s o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n .

11.

A single Judge may do so except where the Parliament has

expressed its intention to be that the jurisdiction is to

be exercised on ly by the Court constituted as a Full Court.

The Parliament has o expressed itself in sub-section 20(2 )

and in a number of other statutes of which sub-section 198(2)

of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1 9 3 6 , sub-section llSA(4B)

of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, sub-sections

44(3) and 4 5 ( 2 ) of the Administrative Aupeals Tribunal Act

1975 and sub-sections 7 9 ( 3 ) and SO(2) of the Complaints

(Australian Federal Police)Act1981 are examples.

In our opinion sub-section 20(1) of the Federal

Court Act is not to be read as precluding the Court constitu-

ted as a Full Court hearing an application under the Judicial

Review Act where there are appropriate reasons why the Court

should be so constituted and the Chief Judge of the Court,

in the exercise of the power conferred upon him by sub-

section 1 5 ( 1 ) of the Federal Court Act, has so constituted

the Court. The orders to show cause why writs of prohibi-

tion and certiorari should not issue were directed to be

heard by a Full Court. It would be an anomalous result if

the Court so constituted has no jurisdiction to determine

finally the substantive matters that are in dispute between

the parties unless it resolves favourably to the applicant

the procedural and jurisdictional questions to which the

applications for writs of prohibition and certiorari give

rise, when the applicants now seek relief in the first

instance under the Judicial Review Act, and do so at the

express suggestion of the Northern Land Council. We do

not think sub-section	20(l) requires such an anomalous
result.

We note also that it is entirely appropriate

that an application to review the decision of a tribunal

constituted by a Judge of the Northern Territory Supreme

Court should be heard by a Full Court. Accordingly we have

asked the Chief Judge of the Court to constitute this Full

Court as the Court to hear these applications for judicial

review and he has done so retrospectively. The first-named

respondent, who was not represented at the hearing, has

informed the Court that he submits to whatever order is made by

the Court in relation to the applications for orders of review.

On these bases, we now proceed to consider the substantive

issues that arise for decision.

The Court is here concerned with that aspect of

legal professional privilege which, within its proper

limits, protects from disclosure communications made in

confidence by a person to his legal adviser for the

purpose of obtaining legal advice. That the public interest

requires that privilege attach to communications between

a client and his solicitor for the purpose of obtaining

legal advice has long been recognised. What has been

the subject of much debate has been the relevant

13.

principles of law defining the extent of the privilege.

The rationale of the principle and the need to confine

the privilege within strict limits were adverted to by

Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ. in Grant v. Doms ( 1 9 7 6 )

135 C.L.R. 6 7 4 in the following passage at p. 685 -

"The rationale of this head of privilege,

according to traditional doctrine, is that it

promotes the public interest because it assists

and enhances the administration f justice by

facilitating the representation of clients by

legal advisers, the law being a complex and

complicated discipline. This it does by keep-

ing secret their communications, thereby

inducing the client =o retain the solicitor

and seek his advice, and encouraging the

client to make a full and frank disclosure

of the relevant circumstances to the solicitor.

The existence of the privilege reflects, to

the extent to which it is accorded, the para-

mountcy of this public interest over a more

general public interest, that which requires that

in the interests of a fair trial litigation

should be conducted on the footing that all

relevant documentary evidence 1s available.

As a head of privilege legal professional

privilege is so firmly entrenched in the law

that it is not to be exorcised by judicral

decision. None the less there are powerful

considerations which suggest that he privilege

should be confined within strict limits."

For the most part the case law on che subject

has been developed in relation to communications passing

between a person or a corporation, usually described as

"the client", and a solicitor practising on his own account

or in partnership who has been retained for the purpose of giving legal advice or to conduct litigation existing or anticipated and who is remunerated by fees. But there is nothing in the rationale of the privilege which would deny

14.

Its applicability s o l e l y on t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e s o l l c l t o r

o r l e g a l a d v l s e r 1s a sa la r led employee o f t he c l l en t : see

Al f r ed Crompton Amusement Machlnes Ltd. v. Customs and

Exclse Commlssioners (No. 2 L [ l 9 7 2 1 2 2 . B . . 102 a t pp. 129,

136, 138; [ l 9 7 4 1 A . C . 4 0 5 a t pp. 430-1. No doub t he

circumstances of any p a r t l c u l a r case w l l l r e q u l r e s c r u t l n y

to e n s u r e t h a t t h e r e l a t l o n s h l p b e t w e e n s u c h a salar led

employee and h ls employer 1s such tha t t he employee IS

a c t l n g as a n lndependent l ega l advlser. Glven such a

r e l a t lonsh lp , however , the p r l v l l e g e w l l l a t t a c h . So l t IS

w l t h l e g a l a d v l s e r s who are members of t h e p u b l l c servlce

employed t o p r o v l d e t o Government l e g a l servlces analogous

t o t h o s e t h a t a s o l l c l t o r I n p r l v a t e p r a c t l c e p r o v l d e s f o r

h l s c l l e n t .

Al though there 1s a p a u c l t y of material b e f o r e

t h e C o u r t o n t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e matter, lt may be accepted

tha t t he Depar tmen t o f L a w h a s b e e n e s t a b l l s h e d a s p a r t of

the execut lve government of t he N o r t h e r n T e r r l t o r y w l t h the

f u n c t l o n o f p r o v l d l n g l e g a l servlces t o t h a t g o v e r n m e n t .

I t may a l s o b e a c c e p t e d that t h o s e lega l s e r v x e s are pro-

v l d e d , m t h e mam, b y l e g a l p r a c t l t l o n e r s who are f u l l - t u n e

sa la r led o f f i c e r s . I t does no t fo l low, however , t ha t eve ry

communlcat lon between the off lcers of that Department and

M i n i s t e r s o r e m p l o y e e s i n o t h e r d e p a r t m e n t s o f the Northern

T e r r i t o r y a d m l n i s t r a t l o n w i l l b e t h e s u b ~ e c t o f l ega l pro-

f e s s i o n a l p r i v i l e g e . The Department of Law h a s , no doubt

a varietyoffunctions of which the provision of legal

advice and the conduct of litigation form part. Its

functions extend to the administration f those laws

which fall within the executive responsibility of the

Attorney-General for the Northern Territory (a function

indistinguishable from that performed by other executive

departments) and, as this case demonstrates, the drafting

of proposed laws to be submitted to the Legislative Assembly

of the Territory and of subordinate legislation thereunder.

Counsel for the Northern Land Council submitted

that, in the case of governments, legal professional

privilege may well attach only to documents brought into

c .istence solely for the purpose of litigation existing or

anticipated and not to communications made for the purpose of seeking legal advice, even legal advice related to the state of the existing law or the rights and obligations arising thereunder. The submission seems to acce?t that,

where litigation involving the government is pending or

anticipated, the government is to be, so far as legal

professional privilege is concerned, in a position not less

advantageous than that enjoyed by a citizen or a corporation.

But if the submission were accepted a government would be

placed at a serious disadvantage so far as the obtaining of

legal advice is concerned, whether that advice were sought

from its own salaried employees or from solicitors or counsel

in private practice. We are-unable to accept that the public

16.

In t e re s t whlch I n a p p r o p r l a t e clrcumstances p ro tec t s f rom

d l s c l o s u r e :ommunications made by a c l t l z e n o r a c o r p o r a t l o n

f o r the pu:pose o f o b t a l n i n g l e g a l a d v l c e d o e s n o t e q u a l l y p r o t e c t slmllar communlcatlons made by a government.

Reference has a l r eady been made t o t h e tsrms I n

wnlch t h e c l a m f o r l e g a l p r o f e s s l o n a l p r l v l l e g e was form-

u l a t e d I n t h e a f f l d a v l t s f l l e d on behalf of the Norchern

T e r r l t o r y Government. The c l am was made ln r e spec t o f a

mrscellany of documents compendlously descrlbed as " c o r r e s -

pondence, memoranda, oplnlons and other documents". The

documents were sald t o l n c l u d e l n s t r u c t l o n s t o t h e draf t sman

f o r t h e p r e p a r a t l o n of t h e Town P l a n n l n g R e g u l a t l o n s . t h e

6111 whlch became t h e P l a n n l n g Act and t h e P l a n n l n g R e g u l a t l o n s

made t h e r e u n d e r , d r a f t s o f that leg ls la t lon , documents forward-

l n g t h e d r a f t s	t o t h e	Government	and	advlce on	t h e	v a r l o u s
d r a f t s .

S t a t e d I n t h o s e terms the c l a m , l f u p h e l d , would

extend t o a communicatlon t o t h e d r a f t s m a n , b e l n g a l e g a l

p r a c t l t l o n e r , whlch c o n t a m e d n o t h l n g b e y o n d l n s t r u c t l o n s

f o r the p r e p a r a t l o n o f l e g l s l a t l o n . S u c h a communlcatlon

m g h t well be descrlbed as a r e q u e s t f o r 1 e g a l . a s s r s t a n c e -

the a p p l l c a t l o n of l e g a l d r a f t l n g skllls I n t r a n s l a t l n g t h e

l n s t r u c t l o n s l n t o l e g l s l a t l v e f o r m - b u t lt would hardly

a n s w e r t h e d e s c r l p t l o n of a communlcation t o a legal a d v l s e r

f o r legal advrce i n t h e s e n s e l n w h l c h t h a t ph rase 1s used

17.

I n d l s c u s s l n g l e g a l p r o f e s s l o n a l p r l v l l e g e . The c l a m

as formulated would a l so extend t o d r a f t s p r e p a r e d b y t h e

d r a f t s m a n a n d s u b m l t t e d , w l t h o r w r t h o u t comment as t o

t h e m l e g a l e f f e c t , t o t h o s e who g a v e t h e l n s t z u c t l o n s f o r

their c o n s l d e r a t l o n a n d , w h e r e a p p r o p r l a t e , t h e t a k l n g o f

p o l l c y d e c l s l o n s and t h e f u r n l s n l n g o f f u r t h e r l n s t r u c t z o n s

The a f f l d a v l t s a l s o r e f e r t o " a d v l c e t o a Northern

T e r r l t o r y Munster b y o f f l c e r s o f t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r l t o r y l n

conveylng the terms o f l e g a l advice rece lved f rom the

Department of L a w o r o f f l c e r s t h e r e o f " . The p r e c l s e I m p o r t

of t h u d e s c r l p t l o n IS by no neans c lear b u t , t e rns , lt

1s wlde enough t o I n c l u d e advlce ( o t h e r t h a n l e g a l a d v l c e )

g l v e n t o a N l n l s t e r b y a n o f f l c e r of t h e d e p a r t m e n t f o r

w h l c h h e h a s e x e c u t l v e r e s p o n s l b l l l t y . I t 1s d l f f l c u l t t o

see a n y l e g a l f o u n d a t l o n f o r s u c h a clalnr.

What 1s s a l d a b o v e re f lec ts the lnadequacy o f t he

a f f l d a v l t s o n w h i c h t h e a p p l x a n t r e l i e d t o e s t a b l l s h t h e

f a c t s n e c e s s a r y t o warrant t h e c o n c l u s l o n t h a t , p r m a f ac l e ,

the documents are e n t l t l e d t o p r o t e c t r o n . The Commlssloner,

a t t h e i n v l t a t l o n o f t h e p a r t l e s , I n s p e c t e d t h e d o c u m e n t s -

no d o u b t f o r t h e p u r p o s e , a m o n g s t o t h e r s , o f s a t l s f y m g

h lmsel f that such a p r n a facle conc lus lon was w a r r a n t e d .

However, I n t h e r e s u l t the Commlssloner found It unnecessa ry

t o make a f i n d l n g o n t h a t l s s u e . Had It become necessary

f o r t h l s C o u r t t o g l v e a d e f l n l t l v e r u l l n g on t h e Issue,

the Cour t would have been faced wl th the need e l t h e r t o

r e q u l r e f u r t h e r e v l d e n c e t o be p l aced be fo re l t concern lng

t h e documents o r t o ln spec t t he documen t s I tself s o t h a t a

b e t t e r a p p p r e c l a t l o n o f t h e i r n a t u r e m l g h t b e o b t a l n e d .

However, I n v lew of the conclus lon to whlch we have come

l t 1s u n n e c e s s a r y t o p u r s u e t h l s a s p e c t . I t shou ld ,

however, be n o t e d t h a t , d u r l n g t h e c o u r s e o f a r g u m e n t ,

c o u n s e l f o r t h e a p p l l c a n t c o n c e d e d t h a t t h e c l a m cou ld

no t be sus t a ined i n respect of each and every document

l l s t e d I n t h e r e l e v a n t p a r t s o f t h e a f f l d a v l t s on whlch

t h e a p p l x a n t re l led ; and a f t e r t he a rgumen t had conc luded

c o u n s e l f o r t h e a p p l l c a n t f u r n l s h e d t h e C o u r t w l t h a revised

llst of the documents I n respec t of whlch lega l p r o f e s s l o n a l

p r l v l l e g e was c lamed. I n p a r t l c u l a r t h e c l a m f o r p r l v z -

l e g e l n r e s p e c t of d r a f t s o f t h e l e g l s l a t l o n a n d l n r e s p e c t

o f c e r t a l n of the cor respondence has been wlthdrawn.

On the assumptlon, whlch w e are s r e p a r e d t o make

f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e f u r t h e r c o n s l d e r a t l o n o f t h e s e m a t t e r s ,

t h a t t h e documents f o r w h l c h p r l v l l e g e 1s now c la lmed are

p r o p e r l y d e s c r l b e d as communlcat lons between off lcers of

t h e N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r y Government and the Government 's

l e g a l a d v l s e r s f o r t h e p u r p o s e of o b t a l n l n g a n d g l v l n g l e g a l

a d v l c e , It 1s necessa ry to cons lde r whe the r p ro tec t lon f rom

d l s c l o s u r e 1s a f f o r d e d t o them. The r e s o l u t l o n o f t h a t

q u e s t l o n r e q u l r e s a n exarninatlon of some o f t h e c o n s l d e r a t l o n s

w h l c h r e l e v a n t l y d e l l n u t t h e e x t e n t o f t h e p r l v r l e g e .

19.

The Commissioner a f t e r s t a t i n g that " t h e d o c t r i n e

[ o f l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n a l p r i v i l e g e ] has neve r ex tended to

p ro tec t c r ime or f r a u d " , a c c e p t e d t h e c o n t e n t i o n o f t h e

Northern Land C o u n c i l t h a t t h e a b u s e o f power on which it r e l i e d t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e r e g u l a t i o n s f e l l w i t h i n t h a t p r i n c i p l e .

He r e f e r r e d t o t h e p r i n c i ? l e s e n u n c i a t e d b y Isaacs J. i n

lrarawa v. Howard Smith and Co. L t d . (1910) 10 C.L.R. 382

a t pp. 389-390 and went on -

"Here t h e r e i s a d e f i n i t e a n d d i s t i n c t

a l l e g a t i o n by t h e C o u n c i l t h a t t h e matters

s o u g h t t o be d i scove red are m a t t e r s t h a t w e r e

used as a means to evade t he l a w . I t h i n k it

i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e C o u n c i l show two t h i n g s :

f i r s t , t h a t pr ima f a c i e t h e r e i s a bona f i d e

and r easonab ly t enab le cha rge tha t t he l aw

was being evaded by the makmg of regulat ions

no t con templa t ed by the Ac t , t ha t i s , f o r t h e

purpose of defea t ing a t r a d i t i o n a l l a n d c l a i m .

Second, tha t p r i m a f a c i e t h e c o m u n i c a t i o n s

i n ques t ion were made i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r , i n

f u r t h e r a n c e o f , o r a s p a r t o f , t h a t e v a s i o n o f

t h e law."

The Commiss ioner concluded tha t bo th those mat te rs had

been made o u t t o h i s s a t i s f a c t i o n a n d , i n consequence, he

made t h e o r d e r s w h i c h a r e now s o u g h t t o be rev iewed.

For t h e a p p l i c a n t it vas s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e

Commiss ioner ' s conc lus ions involved e r rors o f l aw. It was

s a i d t h a t , i n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e N o r t h e r n

Land Council had shown, pr ima f a c i e , t h a t t h e r e was a

r e a s o n a b l y t e n a b l e c h a r g e t h a t t h e r e g u l a t i o n s w e r e i n v a l i d

as having been made f o r a p u r p o s e a l i e n t o t h a t f o r w h i c h

t h e r e g u l a t i o n making power was conferred. the Commissioner

20.

had misdirected himself in posing the question in terms

that it was sufficient o show that one of the purposes

in making the regulations was to frustrate traditional

land claims under the Land Rights Act. It was erroneous,

so it was said, to state the question in that way: to

establish invalidity it must be shown that the ulterior

purpose was the sole purpose or was so ubstantial and so

predominant amongst other purposes that it can truly be said that but for the ulterior purpose the regulations

would not have been made. Reference was made to Th mpson

v. Sandwick Corporation (1950) 8 1 C.L.R. 87 at pp. 103-107

and Samrein v. Metropolitan Water Sewerage and Drainage

Board (1982) 41 A.L.R. 467 at pp. 4 6 8 - 9 .

It was also submitted that, even if the material

before the Commissionerwere sufficient to sh w, prima facie,

a reasonably tenable charge that the regulations were invalid

as having been made for an inproper purpose, that allegation

was not properly characterised as falling within the principle

that legal professional privilege does not protect comuni-

cations made in the furtherance of crime or fraud.

In relation to this latter submission the Court

was referred to cases in which the limitation upon the extent

of the privilege has been examined. Attention was drawn by

counsel for the Northern Land Council to the variety of

expressions which h-;.e	been employed in formulating
the limitation.

21.

The cour t s have expres sed themse lves I n terms

of denying t h e p r i v l l e g e t o c o m m u n l c a t l o n s c r l n l n a l l n

themselves o r lntended t o f a c l l i t a t e o r g u l d e t h e c l l e n t

r n the commlsslon of "a crlme o r f r a u d " (W v. Cox and

3 a l l t o n ( 1 8 8 4 ) 1 4 Q . B . D . 153 a t pp.165, 1 6 7 ) o r a crlrne

o r c l v l l f r a u d (Wllllams v . Quebrada ga l lxay , Land and

Copper Comoany [ l8951 2 Ch. 751 a t p . 7 5 6 ) . t h a t 1s " t h e

c a r r y l n q o u t of a f r a u d n o t a m o u n t r n g t o a c r l s e" (Varawa

v . Howard Smith & Co. Ltd. (1910) 10 C . L . R . 382 a t p . 386) .

o r "crxne o r f r a u d o r c l v l l o f f e n c e " (Bake r v . Campbell

(1983) 4 9 A . L . R . 385 a t p . 4 0 9 ) . It h a s a l s o b e e n s a l d

tSat t h e p r l v l l e g e d o e s n o t extend t o communlcatlons made

l n t h e f u r t h e r a n c e o f a c r l m l n a l o r f r a u d u l e n t p u r p o s e

( R e g . v . Cox a n d R a l l t o n , s u p r a ) , c o m n u n l c a t l o n s made as

p a r t o f c a r r y l n g o u t a n " l l l e g a l p u r p o s e " ( R u s s e l l v . J a c k s o n

(1851) 68 E . R . 558 a t p . 5 6 0 : Varawa v . Howard Smlth L C o .

L td . suo ra a t pp. 389-390) o r a n un lawfu l suspose or pro-

c e e d m g ( B u l l l v a n t v . A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l f o r V l c t o r l a [l9011

A . C . 1 9 6 a t p . 2 0 1 ) or where there 1s an averment o f f r aud

o r l l l e g a l l t y ( l b l d . a t pp. 203, 2 0 4 , 2 0 6 ) o r trickery

( l b l d . a t p . 2 0 6 ) . Fraud I n t h l s c o n n e c t l o n has been s a l d

n o t t o be l m l t e d t o t h e t o r t o f d e c e r t b u t t o l n c l u d e "all

forms of f r a u d and d l shones ty such as f r audu len t b reach o f

t r u s t , f r a u d u l e n t c o n s p l r a c y , t r l c k e r y a n d sham c o n t r l v a n c e s "

( C r e s c e n t Farrn ( S l d c u p ) S p o r t s L t d . v . S t e r l l n g O f f l c e s L t d .

[ l9721 Ch. 553 a t p . 5 6 5 ) .

c

2 2 .

It i s no t a permiss ib le approach , however , to

cons ide r t he expres s ions - some of which are extremely gen-

e r a l and o f i n d e f i n i t e c o n t e n t - which have been used in

those cases d ivorced f rom the contex t i n which they were

used and the i s sues wi th which the cour t was d e a l i n g . I t

i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t , i n t h o s e c a s e s r e f e r r e d t o above i n

wh ich the cour t he ld tha t t he p r iv i l ege tha t wou ld o the rd i se

a t tach to the communica t ion had been d i s p l a c e d , t h e a l l e g a -

t i o n s made were o f c r i m i n a l o r f r audu len t conduc t .

In r each ing the dec i s ions unde r r ev iew the

Commiss ione r acce -zed tha t l ega l p ro fes s iona l p r iv i l ege

had neve r ex t ended t o p ro t ec t c r ime o r f r aud . He made no

f i n d i n g s , h o w e v e r , t h a t , p r i m a fac ie , the communica t ions

i n ques t ion were made i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r o r i n f u r t h e r a n c e

o r as s u f f i c i e n t t o b r i n g t h e c o m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h i n t h e p r i n c i p l e p a r t of a cr ime o r f r a u d b u t c o n c l u d e d t h a t i t was

h e h a d s t a t e d t o f i n d , a s h e d i d , t h a t t h e y w e r e made i n

p r e p a r a t i o n f o r o r i n f u r t h e r a n c e o r as p a r t of an "evasion

o f t h e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h l e g a l ? r o f e s s i o n a l law". That expres s ion when used i n t h e c o n t e x t o f

p r i v i l e g e may be d i sp laced i s an ambiguous one: Bullivant

v. A t to rney-Genera l fo r V ic to r i a ( suDra ) .

In o u r o p i n i o n , t h e l i m i t a t i o n u p o n t h e p r i v i l e g e

o f w h i c h t h e c a s e s c i t e d a r e i l l u s t r a t i o n s , however i t i s

t o be xp res sed , i s no t a p t t o encompass a c l a i m t h a t a

2 3 .

statutory power to make regulations has been exercised

for a purpose other than the purpose for which, on the

proper construction of the relevant statute. the power

was conferred. Such a claim does not involve fraudulent

or illegal conduct in the sense in which those words are

used in the cases referred to and this notwithstanding

that the effect of upholding the claim would result in

the regulations being invalid. To uphold such a claim

means no more than that there has been an ostensible ut

not a real exercise	of the power. It involves no finding
even of dishonesty.

It follows that, in our opinion, the Commissioner

fell into error in accepting that the abuse of power on

which the Northern Land Council relied fell within the

principle that legal professional privilege does not extend

to protect crime or fraud.

But to conclude, as we do, that the limitation

on the extent of the privilege which has been developed in

considering cases of communications made in furtherance of

whether a statutory power has been exercised for an ulterior

purpose does not resolve the question n w before the Court.

crime or frmd has no application where the question is limitations upon the privilege which would displace its application in such circumstances.

2 4 .

The course w h x h t h e C o u r t s h o u l d f o l l o w 1s

c h a r t e d f o r lt by a cons ldera t lon of what was s a l d b y the

Hlgh Court I n G r a n t v . Downs (1976) 135 C.L.R. 674 and the

approach wh lch t ha t Cour t t ook l n The Queen v . Be l l ; - - Ex

;?arte Lees (1980) 146 C.L.R. 141 a l t h o u g h t h o s e c a s e s

were concerned wl th sets of clrcumstances v e r y d i f f e r e n t

from those whlch glve r u e t o t h e matters now b e f o r e thls

Court . As was s a l d I n t h o s e cases t h e e x l s t e n c e and e x t e n t

of t h e p r l v l l e g e reflects t h e e x t e n t t o w h l c h t h e l a w

accords t o t h e p u b l l c l n t e re s t l n t h e d u e a d r n m l s t r a t l o n o f

] u s t l c e , s e c u r e d b y f a c l l l t a t m g t h e r e p r e s e n t a t l o n o f

c l l e n t s b y l e g a l a d v l s e r s , p a r a m o u n t c y o v e r t n e more g e n e r a l

? u b l l c i n t e r e s t t h a t r e q u l r e s t h a t all re levant documentary

materlal be made a v a l l a b l e . The p r l v l l e g e LS t o b e c o n f l n e d

w l t h l n t h e s t r l c t llmlts whlch the p r l n c l p l e s w h l c h u n d e r l y

It r e q u l r e . So t h a t , where paramountcy 1s t o be accorded

t o a h l g h e r p u b l l c l n t e r e s t t h a n t h a t w h l c h s u p p o r t s t h e

p r l v l l e g e , t h e p r l v l l e g e LS d l s p l a c e d . Whlch p u b l l c l n t e r e s t

1s to be paramount IS f o r t h e C o u r t t o r e s o l v e "by t h e

f a m l l l a r p r o c e s s of welghlng the r e s p e c t l v e c o n s l d e r a t l o n s

a g a l n s t	e a c h	o t h e r " :	The	Queen	v .	B e l l ; Ex car te Lees
-

( s u p r a ) , p e r S t e p h e n J. a t p . 1 5 5 . A c lear a p p r e c l a t i o n of ,

a n d a d h e r e n c e t o , t h e p r l n c l p l e s w h l c h u n d e r l y t h e p r l v r l e g e

w l l l t h u s p o m t t h e way t o t h e s o l u t l o n t o t h e q u e s t l o n

whether I n any g iven case t h e p r l v l l e g e a f f o r d s protection

a g a l n s t d l s c l o s u r e .

2 5 .

L e g a l p r o f e s s l o n a l p r l v l l e g e must be seen as

. an impor tan t e lement i n t h e p r o t e c t l o n o f t h e r l g h t s of

t h e l n d l v l d u a l and o f c o r a o r a t l o n s t o h a v e u n l n h l b l t e d

access t o l e g a l a d v l c e a n d r e p r e s e n t a t l o n m t h e c a r r y l n g

on of t h e i r a f f a l r s . The p u o l l c l n t e r e s t In t h e effective

c o n d u c t o f t h e a c t l v l t l e s o f t h e modern s t a t e r e q u x e s

tha t the p r l v l l e g e e x t e n d t o p r o t e c t t h e c o n f l d e n t l a l

communlcatlons between the government and I ts g r o f e s s l o n a l

l e g a l a d v l s e r s w h e r e t h o s e c o m m u n l c a t l o n s r e l a t e s o l e l y t o

t h e l l t r g a t l o n , e x l s t l n g o r a n t l c l p a t e d , I n wh lch the s t a t e

1 s or nay be engaged o r t o the o b t a l n l n g o r g l v l n g of l ega l

advlce. The Parllament has recognlsed as much: see t h e

Freedom of Information Act 1 9 8 2 , s e c t l o n 4 2 . But hose con-

s l d e r a t l o n s d o n o t a p p l y w l t h t h e same f o r c e , rf a t a l l , t o

communlcatlons made i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e p r e p a r a t l o n a n d

f o r m u l a t r o n o f s u b o r d l n a t e l e g l s l a t l o n . Even lf t h e g lv lng o f

advlce c a n p r o p e r l y b e s a l d t o b e I n v o l v e d I n t h a t p r o c e s s ,

where a case 1s made t h a t t h e s t a t u t o r y power t o prcmulga te

s u c h l e g l s l a t l o n h a s b e e n e x e r c l s e d f o r a n u l t e r l o r g u = ? o s e ,

t h e p u b l l c l n t e r e s t , I n o u r o p l n l o n , r e q u l r e s t n a t t h e p r l v l l e g e

w h l c h s l g h t o t h e r w l s e a t t ach b e d l s p l a c e d . The community's

r e s p e c t f o r a n d o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e l a w w l l l n o t be enhanced

b y t h e law l t s e l f c a s t l n g a shroud of secrecy around t h e sub-

ordinate law-maklng p r o c e s s a n d t o d o so would be t o s G b v e r t

t h e p r m c i p l e s upon whlch the pr lv l lege 1s founded.

Thls , however , 1s n o t t o s a y t h a t t h e p r l v l l e g e

IS t o be d i sp laced by a mere a s s e r t l o n t h a t a s t a t u t o r y

power has been exerclsed f o r an u l t e r l o r purpose . A p r o p e r

basis must be shown for such an assertion but, once it is

shorn, there is no scope for the principles of legal pro- fessional privilege to operate to protect from disclosure

documents relevant to the proper resolution of that issue.

In Bullivant v. Attorney-General for Victoria [l9011 A.C.

196 the Earl of Halsbury L.C. said that there must be

established to the Court's satisfaction "some definite

charge either by way of allegation or affidavit or what

not". In O'Rourke v. Darbishire [l9201 A.C. 581 Viscount

Finlay put the matter thus at p. 604 -

"But it is not enough to allege fraud.

If the communications to the solicitor were for the purpose of obtaining professional

advice, there must be, in order to get rid

of privilege, not merely an allegation that

they were made for the purpose of getting

advice for the commission of a fraud, but

there must be something to give colour to the charge. The statement must be made in clear and definite terms, and there must

further be some prima facie evidence that it has some foundation in fact. It is with reference to cases o f this kind that it can

be correctly said that the Court has a

discretion as to ordering inspection of

documents. It is obvious that it would be

absurd to say that the privilege could be

got rid of merely by making a charge of

fraud. The Court will exercise its discre-

tion, not merely as to the terms in which

the allegation is made, but also as to the

surrounding circumstances, for the purpose

of seeing whether the charge is made honestly

and with sufficient probability of its truth

to make it right to disallow the privilege

of professional communications."

See also per Lord S m e r at pp. 6 1 3 - 4 , Lord Parmoor at

pp. 622-3 and Lord Wrenbury at pp. 6 3 2 - 3 , all to the

same effect.

27.

What 1s n e c e s s a r y L n any g lven lns tance w l l l ,

of course, depend upon t h e p a r t l c u l a r c l r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e

case. Whlle It may be g o i n g t o o f a r t o s a y t h a t "somethlng

e x c e p t l o n a l 1s cal led f o r " (see Bu t t e s Gas and Oil Co. v .

Hammer ( N o . 3 ) [l9811 Q.B. 2 2 3 per Conaldson L . J . a t p . 2 5 2 ) ,

circumstances must be brought before the C o u r t t o establish,

g r l m a f a c l e , a b a s l s f o r d l s p l a c l n g the p r l v l l e g e .

I n the p r e s e n t cases the Commlssloner found, on

t h e materlal p u t b e f o r e hlm by the Northern Land Councl l ,

t h a t t he c l a m tha t t h e s t a t u t o r y power had been exe rc l sed

f o r a n u l t e r l o r p u r p o s e had been made bona f lde and tha t It

was, p r m a f ac l e , r e a s o n a b l y t e n a b l e . There w a s m a t e r l a l

b e f o r e the Commissroner upon whlch he c o u l d so f l n d a n d w e

d o n o t b e l l e v e t h a t t h e a p p l x a n t h a s shown a n y s u f f l c l e n t

basls whlch would warrant the C o u r t ' s I n t e r f e r e n c e w l t h tha t

f rnd lng .

We s h o u l d a d d t h a t w e have not found I t n e c e s s a r y

t o e x p r e s s a view upon the argument gut by counse l for the

a p p l l c a n t tha t the Commlssloner mlsdlrected hlmself as t o

t h e tes t t o be a p p l r e d In d e t e r s l n l n g the v a l l d l t y o f t h e

- a g u l a t l o n s . That 1s a matter a p p r o p r l a t e f o r c o n s l d e r a t l o n ,

If n e c e s s a r y , when the v a l l d l t y o f t h e r e g u l a t l o n s LS t h e s u b J e c t

o f s u b s t a n t l v e d e b a t e .

I n t h e r e s u l t t h e a p p l l c a t l o n s u n d e r t h e J u d l u a l

Revlew Act are d l s r n l s s e d a n d t h e o r d e r s t o show cause why

2 8 .

writs of p r o h i b i t i o n and c e r t i o r a r i s h o u l d no t issue a r e

d ischarged . The a p p l i c a n t must pay t h e c o s t s of t h e

Northern Land Counci l o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s .

I c e r t i f y t h a t t h i s and t h e 2 6

preceding pages are a true copy

of the Reasons for Judgment herein

o f h i s Honour Mr J u s t i c e Woodward

and h i s Honour M r J u s t i c e Neaves.

kg-

A s s o c i a t e

Dated: /'k Septenber 1984

29.

IN THE mERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

N M SOUTH W E S DISTRICT REGISTRY ) NO.G78 OF 1984

DIVISION GENERAL )

IN THE MATXft of an Application

f o r Writs of Prohlbitlon and

Certiorari against THE HONOURABLE

SIR WILLIAM JOHN FRANCIS KEARNEY,

ABORIGINAL LAND COMMISSICNER

Respondent

AND IN THE MATER of the JAWOYN

(KATHERINE A R E A ) LAND CLAIM

M PARTE, the ATTORNEY-GENERAL

€OR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY	OF
AUSTRALIA

Prosecutor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA)

NEW SOUTH W E S DISTRICT REGISTRY)

DIVISION GENERAL ) NO. G191 OF 1984

BFIWEEN:THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR T?E

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant

m:	ZiE HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM JOHN
FRANCIS K E A R N E X , ABORIGINAL LAND
COMMISSIONER

First Respondent

m: NORTHERN LAND COUNCIL

Second Respondent

&Q: IN THE MATER of the JAWOYN

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA 1

NEW SOUTH ‘ U E S DISTRICT REGISTRY 1

GENERAL DIVISION ) No. G79 of 1984

IN THE MATER of an Application for Writs of Prohlbitlon and

Respondent

AND IN THE MA= of the KENBI

(COX PENINSULA) LAND CLAIM

EX PARTE, the ATTORNEY- GENERAL

FOR THE NORTHERN TERRITORY	OF
AUSTRALIA

Prosecutor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY )

DIVISION GENERAL ) NO. G190 OF L984

BFSWEEN: THE ATTORNEY G‘Z,;iVU; FOR THE

NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Applicant

m: WE HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM JOHN

FRANCIS KEARNB, ABORIGINAL

LAND COMMISSIONER

First Respondent

m: NORTERN LEND COUNCIL

Second Respondent

m:	PENINSULA) LAND CLAIM
IN THE MATER of the KENBI (COX

3 .

CORAM: Woodward, Fisher and Neaves JJ.

I4 September 1984

REASONS FOR JUM;MENT

FISHER J.: In this matter I have had the benefit of perusing the

reasons for judgment of Woodward and Neaves J.J. I agree with

their decision that the application under the Judicis1 Review Act '

be dismissed and that the orders to show cause be discharged, in

each instance with costs. Subject to the observations which

follow, I am in agreement with their reasons.

It is proper to note that the Northern Territory

Government claimed that legal professional privilege protected the relevant communications from disclosure. It based no claim

on Crown privilege, or public interest immunity as it is now

called, as such. Moreover I prefer to defer 8 decision on the

extent to which a government is entitled to claim legal

professional privilege otherwise tun in circumstances where the

government is involved in litigation	or litigation is pending.
This point was not fully argued and	is not necessary for the

determination of this matter. It was assumed, for the purpose of

argument, that legal professional privilege was generally

available to the Northern Territory Government unless excluded in

the particular circumstances of this matter.

.

4 .

It is my opinion that the Commissioner correctly

classified the abuse of pouer upon which the Northern Land

Council relied as coming uithin uhat is labelled as the "crlme or

fraud" exclusion from privilege protection. It was an

appropriate case for the application of this rule. If this be

so, it is unnecessary to engage in the more awkward exercise of

balancing competing public interests in which exercize value

judgments are necessarily involved. The courts have flrmly said

that legal professional privilege does not protect communications

if they are made to facilitate the commission of a "crime or

fraud" and the question is whether the conduct alleged is

encompassed by this rule as it is presently understood. It is

however unfortunate that the rule continues to carry this

abrasive label.

The expression "crime or fraud" has been extensively

used as the convenient label to identify for this purpose conduct

which extends well beyond what that expre~sion would priaa facie

cover. I would with respect adopt without repeating all the ca9e

references in the reasons of the majority to the type of conduct

*	which courts have found as justifying denial of protection under this rule. The adjectives and expressions used are as varied as they are wide ranging. These references indicate that it is not contemplated that the conduct is such as would normally be
conceived as fraudulent or criminal conduct in the technical
sense. Rather the expression is used conveniently to cover
improper conduct uhich goes beyond the exercise of civil rights

5 .

(See per Gibbs C.J. in Re Bell, Ex parte Lees (1980) 30 A.L.R.

409 at page 494) and which is contrary to law, whether civil or

criminal. The scope of the expression is capable of extension to apply to analagous situations (Cf Re Bell supra, per Gibbs C.J. at page 488). and in this case in my opinion to alleged improper

conduct on the part of government.

There is no doubt that the conduct alleged by the

Northern Land Council, namely the knowing exercise of regulation

making power for an alien and ulterior purpose, is an abuse of

power and unlawful. To my mind such conduct on the part of the

government would fairly, on the authorities, be seen as coming

within the rule. However in the present circumstances no useful

purpose will be served if I select and identify which of these

adjectives and expressions it is most appropriate to use in

relation to the alleged conduct.

In my opinion the rule identified by the expression

"crime or fraud" is wide enough to cover the conduct which is

alleged against the Northern Territory Government and the

Commissioner was correct in so finding.