In the Matter Of An Application BY Rakesh Lal for Leave To Issue Or File

The matter concerns an application by Rakesh Lal for leave to issue or file a proposed application for special leave to appeal from the Federal Court. The application seeks leave to file a special leave application to the High Court challenging the December Orders made by Collier ACJ in the Federal Court proceeding QUD623/2024. The applicant argues that the December Orders, which held his interlocutory applications as pending until a case management hearing on 6 February 2025, were made without substantive reasoning and constituted an error of law. The applicant contends that the orders caused delays and hardship, and that the Federal Court's actions raise public interest concerns. The legal issues revolve around the jurisdiction of this Court to hear an appeal from the Federal Court's orders and whether the proposed appeal has any merit.

The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the Federal Court's orders, as the Federal Court has broad discretionary powers to manage its own proceedings, and this Court's jurisdiction only extends to appeals from the Full Court of the Federal Court. Additionally, the Court found that the proposed appeal was devoid of merit. The Court noted that the December Orders did not dismiss the applicant's interlocutory applications but merely held them as pending, and there was no evidence of jurisdictional error in the Federal Court's exercise of its discretion. The Court further held that the applicant had not demonstrated an arguable basis for the proposed grounds of appeal, as the orders did not provide for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, the delay was not substantial, and there was no evidence of systemic governance failures or public interest concerns.

The Court dismissed the application for leave to issue or file a proposed application for special leave to appeal. The Court found that the applicant's proposed appeal was entirely devoid of merit and that the Federal Court's exercise of its discretion to make the December Orders was not attended by any error. The Court concluded that the application was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the Court's process.