In the matter of an application by KP
[2019] VSC 7
•24 January 2019
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
S CI 2014 06905
| IN THE MATTER of an application for variation of a custodial supervision order to a non- custodial supervision order pursuant to s 31 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) | |
| - and - | |
| IN THE MATTER of an application by KP | |
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JUDGE: | Bell J |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
DATE OF HEARING: | 21 September 2018 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 24 January 2019 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | In the matter of an application by KP |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2019] VSC 7 |
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CRIMES MENTAL IMPAIRMENT — application for variation of custodial supervision order to non-custodial supervision order — whether release of applicant on non-custodial supervision order would seriously endanger safety of applicant or members of the public –whether alcohol abuse issues justify refusal of application — whether granting application for variation would be consistent with principle that restrictions on a person’s freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to minimum consistent with safety of the community — Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) ss 31, 32, 38C, 39, 40, 42, 57 and 75.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the applicant | Ms G Cafarella | Victoria Legal Aid |
| For the Attorney-General of Victoria | Ms K Grinberg | Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office |
| For the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services | Mr D A Bruno | Department of Health and Human Services |
| For the Director of Public Prosecutions | Ms L Wilkinson | Office of Public Prosecutions |
HIS HONOUR:
KP makes an application pursuant to s 31 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) (‘the Act’), for an order varying KP’s custodial supervision order (‘CSO’) to a non-custodial supervision order (‘NCSO’). In the alternative, KP applies for a further grant of extended leave pursuant to s 57 of the Act.
Both the Secretary to the Department of Health and Human Services (‘the Secretary’) and KP’s treating team are supportive of the application for variation. However, the application is opposed by the Attorney-General, who supports KP being granted a further period of extended leave.
The events surrounding the index offence are set out in the Summary of Proceedings and Facts of the Case filed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (‘the Director’) on 9 September 2014, and in the reasons of Justice Lasry for making the CSO on 11 September 2015.
The index offence occurred on 8 August 2004, when KP murdered KP’s pregnant girlfriend, by compressing her mouth and nose. At the time of the index offence, KP was floridly psychotic, and had been experiencing symptoms such as persecutory ideas, auditory hallucinations and depressed mood in the period leading up to the index offence. The index offence occurred in the context of a significant period of alcohol and substance abuse as well as homelessness.
On 17 July 2007, KP was found not guilty of murder by reason of mental impairment. On 29 August 2004, KP was placed on a custodial supervision order for the nominal term of 25 years. Pursuant to that order, KP was admitted to Thomas Embling Hospital (‘TEH’) under the care of Forensicare.
On 26 September 2014, KP was granted extended leave for a period of 12 months. Further extended leave was granted on 11 September 2015, 22 September 2016 and 22 September 2017. KP’s current grant of extended leave is due to expire on 26 September 2018. The current application was filed on 29 June 2018.
In accordance with s 38C of the Act, the Director gave notification of the hearing to the relevant family members and victims of the index offence, save for the mother of the deceased victim as her whereabouts are unknown. Those notified were also informed of the opportunity to make a report on the conduct of KP and its impact on them. No report has been received in relation to the application.
I am satisfied after reading the affidavit of Julie Carpenter dated 14 September 2018 that notice has been given under s 40(2)(c) of the Act.
Legislative framework
The current application is governed by s 32 of the Act, which provides as follows:
32 Variation of custodial supervision orders
(1) On an application under section 31 for variation of a custodial supervision order … the court must, by order—
(a) confirm the order; or
(b) vary the place of custody; or
(c) subject to this section, vary the order to a non-custodial supervision order.
(2) The court must not vary a custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order during the nominal term unless satisfied on the evidence available that the safety of the person subject to the order or members of the public will not be seriously endangered as a result of the release of the person on a non-custodial supervision order.
(3) In the case of a forensic patient or forensic resident—
(a) the court must not vary a custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order (whether during or after the nominal term) unless the forensic patient or forensic resident has completed a period of at least 12 months extended leave granted by the court under section 57; and
(b) in deciding an application to vary a custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order, the court must take into account whether or not the forensic patient or forensic resident has complied with any conditions of their extended leave.
(4) If the court varies a custodial supervision order to a non-custodial supervision order before the end of the nominal term, that nominal term continues to run.
(5) The court may direct that the matter be brought back to the court for further review at the end of the period specified by the court.
(6) A direction may be given under subsection (5) more than once.
KP’s alternative application for extended leave is governed by s 57 of the Act, which provides that I may grant the application if satisfied that the safety of the forensic patient, being KP, or members of the public will not be seriously endangered as a result of KP being allowed extended leave.
With respect to the meaning of ‘serious endangerment’, I must consider both the level of risk that a harmful event might occur, and the gravity of the harm that might be caused if the risk were to materialise. This means that a highly probable risk of minor harm might not amount to serious endangerment whereas a mathematically improbable risk of grave harm might do so.[1]
[1]In the Matters of Major Reviews of Percy, Farrell and RJO (1998) 102 A Crim R 554, 566 (Eames J); cited with approval in NOM v DPP (2012) 38 VR 618, 628 [63] (Redlich and Harper JJA and Curtain AJA) (‘NOM’). On serious endangerment generally: see also NOM (2012) 38 VR 618, 635–40 [54]–[65].
In making that assessment, I am bound to consider the guiding principle identified in s 39 of the Act, which provides:
39 Principle to be applied
(1) In deciding whether to make, vary or revoke a supervision order, to remand a person in custody, to grant a person extended leave or to revoke a grant of extended leave under this Act, the court must apply the principle that restrictions on a person's freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to the minimum consistent with the safety of the community.
The principle in s 39(1) involves ‘balanc[ing] the interest of the liberty of the detainee with protection of the community and, in doing so, assess[ing] risk factors which, in turn, depend upon value judgments’.[2]
[2]NOM (2012) 38 VR 618, 628 [21] (Redlich and Harper JJA and Curtain AJA).
Further, s 40(1) outlines a list of considerations that I must have regard to when applying the principle in s 39. Those considerations are:
(a) the nature of the person's mental impairment or other condition or disability; and
(b) the relationship between the impairment, condition or disability and the offending conduct; and
(c) whether the person is, or would if released be, likely to endanger themselves, another person, or other people generally because of his or her mental impairment; and
(d) the need to protect people from such danger; and
(e) whether there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of the person in the community; and
(f) any other matters the court thinks relevant.
The Court of Appeal noted in NOM v DPP that the mandatory considerations in ss 39 and 40(1) require value judgments ‘in respect of which there is room for reasonable differences of opinion’ and that the making of the order involves an exercise of judicial discretion which is not displaced by the mandatory requirements in those sections.[3]
[3]Ibid 633 [47].
Additionally, s 40(2) provides that I cannot release a person from custody or significantly reduce the degree of supervision to which that person is subject (such as varying a CSO to a NCSO) unless the Court:
(a) has obtained and considered the report of at least one registered medical practitioner or registered psychologist, who has personally examined the person, on—
(i) the person's mental condition; and
(ii) the possible effect of the proposed order on the person's behaviour; and
(ab) in the case of a person who is subject to a supervision order, has obtained and considered the report of a person having the supervision of the person subject to the order; and
(b) has considered the report submitted to the court under section 41(1) or (3) (as the case may be); and
(c) is satisfied that the person's family members and the victims of the offence with which the person was charged (if any), have been given reasonable notice of the hearing at which the release or reduction is proposed to be ordered; and
(d) has considered any report of the family members or victims made under section 42; and
(da) in the case of an application for extended leave—has considered the leave plan filed under section 57A; and
(e) has obtained and considered any other reports the court considers necessary.
With respect to the above, I have received the report of Dr Shannon Reid dated 27 August 2018, which satisfies the requirements under ss 40(2)(a) and (ab) of the Act. Dr Reid is KP’s current treating psychiatrist in the Community Treatment and Transition (‘CTT’) team of Forensicare.
Applicant’s psychiatric history
KP is 37 years old and has an established diagnosis of schizophrenia. At 15 years of age, KP was diagnosed with Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder (‘ADHD’). KP’s first contact with adult mental health services was in 1999 and first psychiatric hospital admission was in 2000, when KP was 19 years old. KP was again admitted in 2001 but subsequently lost contact with mental health services upon moving to Sydney. KP has a history of cannabis and alcohol abuse as a means of self-medicating when experiencing stress.
Following the index offence, KP was admitted to the TEH for three weeks before being discharged to St Vincent’s Mental Health Service inpatient unit until October 2006. Between October 2006 and August 2007, KP received treatment within the prison environment before being transferred back to TEH. Following admission, KP continued to experience persecutory ideas and KP’s progress through the hospital was compromised by continued substance abuse, poor engagement with treatment, and a number of cognitive defects.
Despite an uneven start, KP made steady clinical progress after the commencement of clozapine in October 2007. In April 2014, KP commenced a transition to the Austin Community Recovery Program (‘CRP’) with the assistance of his treating team at the TEH.
KP has now been the subject of consecutive grants of extended leave since 2014 and has been living in the community without significant incident throughout this time. There was a period in December 2015 when concerns regarding KP’s mental state were raised as a result of reduced involvement with CRP programs and evidence of low mood. There was no evidence of psychotic relapse at this time, however, restrictions were placed on KP’s time outside of CRP and supervision of KP’s medication was introduced.
Applicant’s progress in last 12 months
The evidence of KP’s progress over the last 12 months has been summarised in the report of Dr Reid dated 27 August 2018. In his report, Dr Reid recites KP’s psychiatric history, including the ADHD and schizophrenia diagnoses, as well as the complications in treatment stemming from non-compliance with medication, substance abuse and itinerancy prior to the index offence. Dr Reid notes that KP is able to identify several early warning signs of relapse, which include deterioration in sleep, appetite and hygiene. KP’s previous relapses involved increased alcohol use, irritation caused by misinterpretation of television and radio programmes and withdrawal from social contact, particularly, avoiding crowds. Dr Reid reports that KP’s last episode of frank illness was approximately nine years ago.
Since being granted further extended leave in September 2017, KP transitioned from the CRP to private rental accommodation in October 2017, and then to long-term accommodation offered by the Department of Housing in July 2018. Dr Reid reports that KP coped well with each transition with no evidence of mental deterioration.
According to Dr Reid, save for the period in December 2015, there has been no evidence of significant clinical deterioration in KP’s mental state while on extended leave. However, Dr Reid opines that KP continues to experience moderate problems with maintaining self-care, planning and impulsivity. In particular, Dr Reid observes that KP has experienced intermittent problems with alcohol while on extended leave and, since transitioning to independent living, has self-reported difficulty managing his alcohol consumption, drinking two to three times per week and consuming two to three beers on each occasion. An alcohol management plan was put in place in June 2016, utilising a breath analysis device that sends reports to KP’s mobile phone and enables review of these reports by treating staff. That plan also required that KP only consume alcohol in the presence of KP’s mother or father, and use the device afterwards. This plan was not followed in April 2017, when KP was noted by CRP staff to be affected by alcohol, having consumed three schooners of beer while not in the presence of KP’s mother or father. This incident was attributed to increased psychological stress.
According to Dr Reid, the clinical utility of the device is minimal, having malfunctioned intermittently and produced few readings. Dr Reid considers that it is not a useful method of monitoring alcohol use since KP moved to independent living. Despite requests, KP has not consistently used the device and KP’s personal alcohol diary is observed by Dr Reid to not be an entirely accurate representation of KP’s account of alcohol use. In assessing risk, Dr Reid opines that KP’s prognosis will be affected by KP’s ability to abstain from problematic alcohol use and that there remains uncertainty about the level of control regarding alcohol consumption. However, Dr Reid notes that there has not been any evidence of clinical deterioration related to drinking while on extended leave.
Dr Reid also notes other developments during the most recent grant of extended leave, including that KP was involved in a relationship with a fellow Forensicare patient between August and November 2017, and that the relationship concluded without any deterioration in KP’s mental state. KP also handled the conclusion of a previous relationship in March 2017 without clinical deterioration.
In addition, he notes that KP has maintained employment in the cleaning industry and expresses strong enjoyment of this work, having also commenced studying for a Certificate III in Commercial Cleaning and Waste Management. KP has previously experienced stress stemming from poor financial management, which is now alleviated by State Trustees managing KP’s finances.
Further, KP’s relationship with KP’s parents are considered by Dr Reid to be volatile and contact is currently limited, however, KP’s brother has recently re-established contact. KP also continues to play in a band with other Forensicare patients and enjoys their support and company.
In Dr Reid’s opinion, KP has shown moderate improvement in engagement with the treating team and has developed good insight into KP’s mental illness and rehabilitative needs. Dr Reid reports that there has been no evidence of non-compliance with medication since the commencement of clozapine, no evidence of persistent violent attitudes or intent, personality disorder, or thoughts of self-harm, or illicit substance use while on extended leave. Importantly, Dr Reid opines that KP regards the clozapine medication as ‘being central in maintaining remission of [KP’s] illness’.
If the CSO were to be varied to a NCSO, KP’s day-to-day treatment would be provided by the North-East Area Mental Health Service (‘NEAMHS’) with supervision from the NCSO team of Forensicare, instead of the CTT team. In preparation for variation, the NEAMHS commenced providing KP’s mental health treatment under the supervision of the CTT team in August 2018 to facilitate the transition. Further, the proposed conditions of a NCSO (or any grant of further extended leave) attached to Dr Reid’s report are substantially identical to those of KP’s current extended leave and so the level of supervision of KP’s mental health would remain substantially the same under a NCSO as it has been while KP has been on extended leave.
Overall, Dr Reid concluded that the risk of harm to KP and others is low and confirms the CTT team is supportive of a variation of the CSO to a NCSO.
Both KP and Dr Reid gave oral evidence at the hearing of this application. In giving oral evidence, KP expanded on the details regarding KP’s current accommodation, treatment and circumstances if granted a variation of the CSO, particularly regarding alcohol consumption and insight into KP’s mental illness. KP acknowledged that stable accommodation has been an issue from a young age and that finally being provided with long-term accommodation has allowed KP to enjoy being at home more. With respect to medication, KP deposed to having a lot of clarity and that KP was happy to remain on the medication for life. KP stated that the medication provides stability and routine, assists in holding down a job and that the support of Forensicare, as well abstaining from illicit drugs and maintaining the clozapine medication, has turned KP’s life around. KP demonstrated an understanding that variation of the CSO would mean that Forensicare would remain involved periodically but that a local area mental health service would be KP’s main support.
On the issue of alcohol consumption, KP was transparent, stating a desire to not ‘sugar coat it’ and admitting that drinking problems have existed from time to time. KP confirmed consuming ‘ a few beers a week’ on nights off, but stated that being in the new apartment and avoiding certain social situations have assisted in abstaining from excessive drinking.
Upon being addressed by the Court regarding concerns that KP’s drinking could lead to relapse, KP recognised the need to take responsibility for the issue and acknowledged that vigilance is required to ensure ongoing mental health stability.
During his oral evidence, Dr Reid confirmed the changes to KP’s treatment and supervision in the event that a variation were granted, noting that the changes would be small, given oversight of KP’s treatment has already been transferred to the area mental health service. Dr Reid stated that there is a line of communication between the area mental health service and the NCSO team, with the NCSO team receiving a report from NEAMHS on a quarterly basis.
Further, in his oral evidence, Dr Reid elaborated there has been a good period of clinical stability displayed by KP, which is consistent with medication compliance, as non-compliance with clozapine leads to a relatively rapid deterioration in mental state. He stated that KP has had sole responsibility for administering medication for an extended period. That being said, Dr Reid also acknowledged KP’s recent disengagement with a Forensicare psychologist and a recent incident regarding KP taking sick leave from work, but stated that these matters do not affect his support for the variation.
In his oral evidence, Dr Reid also addressed the issue of KP’s alcohol consumption while on extended leave, including whether the conditions of KP’s current extended leave have been followed. Dr Reid elaborated on the meaning of ‘alcohol abuse’, stating that this includes consideration of the effects of alcohol on behaviour, and that KP had shown no indication of disturbed conduct while drinking as well as no recent effect on relationships or lifestyle. In Dr Reid’s view, KP’s level of consumption did not extend to abuse and the condition was therefore complied with. Dr Reid agreed that one of KP’s early warning signs of relapse included increased alcohol consumption and that the level at present is ‘a little bit more than would be ideal’ but that any deterioration in mental state could be effectively monitored by KP’s treating team. Dr Reid deposed that he remained supportive of the application for variation, stating that the area mental health service would be just was well placed as the CTT team to monitor issues arising around alcohol consumption.
Given the foregoing, Dr Reid opined that KP has a good understanding of the deleterious impact of alcohol use, that KP has some longer term work to do with respect to controlling alcohol consumption, that KP would receive a similar level of supervision if the order were varied and that such a level of supervision is appropriate to manage issues with respect to alcohol consumption and an important therapeutic step in KP’s overall rehabilitation.
Submissions of the parties
As noted, the Secretary supports the application for variation of the CSO to a NCSO subject to the conditions outlined in Dr Reid’s report but the Attorney-General does not. Counsel for the Attorney-General submitted that the CSO ought to be confirmed and a further grant of extended leave made.
The basis for the Attorney-General’s objection is that the level of KP’s alcohol consumption is presently uncertain and there is a clear suggestion that it is not sufficiently controlled. The evidence relied on by the Attorney-General to support this objection is KP’s own disclosure of recent difficulty managing the level of alcohol consumption, and the evidence of Dr Reid, including oral evidence given at the hearing, that KP’s level of alcohol consumption is not ideal. Counsel for the Attorney-General submitted, and I do not accept, that KP’s alcohol consumption amounted to a breach of the current CSO which prohibits alcohol abuse.
Further, it was submitted that there is a link between KP’s alcohol consumption and the index offence, supported by evidence that KP was drinking to inebriation on a daily basis in the lead up to the index offence. Counsel for the Attorney-General also submitted that there is a link between KP’s alcohol use and KP’s long-term prognosis, which should be taken into account in future planning for KP’s management.
Counsel for the Attorney-General proposed that, as the evidence indicates that KP’s openness and engagement with treating clinicians has improved, now is a good time for a specialist service like Forensicare to engage with KP to address alcohol abuse issues, given Forensicare’s specialisation regarding mental health treatment in the forensic setting. It was also submitted that, as KP’s mental illness is currently treated with clozapine, even a short-term period of non-compliance could result in deterioration of KP’s mental health and a cautious approach should therefore be adopted by the Court. Counsel for the Attorney-General submitted that further work on KP’s control over alcohol consumption is needed, rather than the more ‘hands off’ approach of varying the CSO to a NCSO.
On the issue of alcohol management under a NCSO, counsel for the Secretary submitted that transition from a CSO to a NCSO would not result in Forensicare becoming removed from KP’s management but rather that Forensicare would remain responsible for KP’s supervision. Counsel for the Secretary ultimately submitted that confirmation of the CSO is not necessary to ensure that KP’s risk remains contained at a low level.
Counsel for KP concurred with the Secretary’s submissions, adding that the question before the Court is that of serious endangerment. It was acknowledged that further work should be done with KP in terms of alcohol use but that the evidence of Dr Reid was that those issues at the present time do not increase the risk to KP or the public. Further, counsel for the applicant relied on the evidence of Dr Reid that the local area mental health service is as well-equipped as Forensicare to manage the issue of KP’s alcohol consumption, including regular home visits from KP’s case manager. Finally, counsel for KP agreed with the evidence of Dr Reid that the rehabilitation process requires further steps and freedoms to be granted and that this period represents an appropriate time for the next step in KP’s rehabilitation, namely variation of the CSO to a NCSO.
The testing of the evidence of Dr Reid by counsel for the Attorney-General has functioned to confirm my view that KP is ready to make the transition from a CSO to a NCSO and there are adequate structures and plans in place to monitor any signs of alcohol abuse or relapse, and manage the associated risks presented by KP.
Conclusion
KP is a 37-year-old person with a long and well-established history of schizophrenia. At the time of the index offence in 2004, KP was not receiving treatment for psychosis, did not have stable accommodation, and had been drinking to inebriation on a daily basis. The mental impairment was the schizophrenia from which KP still suffers and was suffering at the time of committing the acts which constituted the offending conduct.
KP has been on a CSO for over 10 years and has been on extended leave since 2014. Through KP’s own efforts and the efforts of the Forensicare clinicians, KP’s mental state has stabilised and KP is now in a very different position to the one at the time of the index offence. Most importantly, by KP’s own evidence and the evidence of Dr Reid, KP demonstrates a good level of insight into the mental illness and the need for long-term treatment, expressing a commitment to remaining compliant with medication.
Since commencing extended leave, KP has made significant progress, having complied with KP’s treatment regime, transitioned into community living and then independent living without incident. I also take into account the evidence regarding KP’s ongoing and regular engagement in employment and the stabilising effect this has on KP’s life.
The concern regarding excessive alcohol consumption, as raised by counsel for the Attorney-General, is justified as an issue that might lead to deterioration of KP’s mental health and potential relapse into psychosis. This was tested in cross-examination of Dr Reid, whose evidence was that KP’s issues with alcohol over-consumption are long-term and enduring. However, the evidence supports the position taken by the Secretary, namely, that this issue can be appropriately managed by the local treating team, particularly given that Forensicare will remain involved in KP’s supervision.
I have considered the oral evidence from KP and the evidence of Dr Reid that further work is required in resolving the problem, and I am satisfied that the problem is not of such a nature as to justify refusing the application for variation. While I accept that Forensicare have expertise in this area in the forensic setting, I accept the Secretary’s submission that confirmation of the CSO is not required to contain KP’s risk of harm at its current low level. Further, in light of the conditions that will be imposed on a NCSO, I am confident that, if KP’s mental state were to deteriorate, the appropriate steps would be taken and there are adequate resources in place to treat and support KP without being subject to a CSO.
KP’s status as a forensic patient under the Act requires KP to complete a period of at leave 12 months’ extended leave. KP has in fact completed 4 years’ extended leave. I also take into account, as required by s 32(3)(b), that KP has, on the evidence of Dr Reid, complied with the conditions of those grants of extended leave.
I have applied the statutory test as required by s 32(2) of the Act and, having regard to the factors in s 40(1), I am satisfied that the safety of KP and members of the public will not be seriously endangered as a result of KP’s release on a NCSO. In being so satisfied, I consider that there are adequate resources available for the treatment and support of KP in the community. That treatment will be provided by the local area mental health service and it is fortunate that KP is already familiar with the psychiatrist at that service. Practically speaking, the change in treatment from a Forensicare psychiatrist to psychiatrists in the local community will not result in change to the nature of the care provided to KP, as is reflected in the conditions that would attach to the NCSO as recommended by Dr Reid, which are the same as those attached to the present grant of extended leave.
Further, I am of the view that the variation would be consistent with the guiding principle specified in s 39(1) that restrictions on KP’s freedom and personal autonomy should be kept to the minimum consistent with the safety of the community.
Counsel for KP also raised that the extension of the non-publication order as the order made by Justice Beach on 22 September 2017 did not specify an end date. I am satisfied that it is in the public interest to make a further order under s 75 of the Act.
It was for these reasons that on 21 September 2018 I ordered that KP’s CSO be varied to a NCSO. The orders that I made were as follows:
1. Under s 32(1)(c) of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), the applicant’s custodial supervision order is varied to a non-custodial supervision order subject to the following conditions:
(a)The applicant continue to be under the supervision of the authorised psychiatrist of the Victorian Institute of Forensic Mental Health (‘VIMFH’) or his or her delegate.
(b)The applicant reside at a location approved by the authorised psychiatrist of the VIFMH or his or her delegates.
(c)The applicant abide by the lawful directions of the authorised psychiatrist of the VIFMH or his or her delegate.
(d)The applicant comply with treatment and testing and attend appointments as directed by the authorised psychiatrist of the VIFMH or his or her delegate.
(e)The applicant abstain from the abuse of alcohol and from the use of illicit drugs.
(f)The applicant not leave the state of Victoria without the written permission of the authorised psychiatrist of the VIFMH or his or her delegate.
2.Pursuant to s 32(5), the matter is to be brought back to the Court for further review on 26 September 2019.
3.Pursuant to s 75(1) and until further order, no person shall publish or broadcast or cause to be published or broadcast, by means of radio, television, internet or otherwise:
(a)any evidence given in the proceeding;
(b) the content of any report or other document put before the Court in the proceeding; or
(c)any other information concerning the proceeding,
that might enable the applicant or any person who has appeared or given evidence in the proceeding to be identified.
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