In the Estate of Williams

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CITATION:In the Estate of Williams [2020] NTSC 26

PARTIES:IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE KEITH DUNCAN WILLIAMS

ON REFERENCE from the Registrar of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NO:2020-00015-SC

DELIVERED:  22 May 2020

JUDGMENT OF:  Hiley J

CATCHWORDS:

SUCCESSION – Construction of will – Intention of testator – Use of extrinsic evidence in limited circumstances – No ambiguity or other reason to resort to extrinsic evidence

Administration and Probate Act1969 (NT), s 17(2)(c)
Family Provision Act 1970 (NT)
Wills Act 2000 (NT), s 31, s 41

G E Dal Pont and K F Mackie, Law of Succession (LexisNexis, 2nd Ed, 2007)
Allgood v Blake (1873) LR Ex 160, Charter v Charter (1874) LR HL 364, Fell v Fell (1922) 31 CLR 268, Mortensen v State of New South Wales Unreported SC NSW 12 December 1991 40544/90, National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1915] AC 207, Perrin v Morgan [1943] AC 399, Re James’ Will Trusts [1962] Ch 226, Re Melbourne [2016] VSC 514, Bird v Luckie (1850) 68 ER 375, referred to

Judgment category classification:    B

Judgment ID Number:  Hil2005

Number of pages:  6

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

In the Estate of Williams [2020] NTSC 26

No. 2020-00015-SC

BETWEEN:

IN THE ESTATE OF THE LATE KEITH DUNCAN WILLIAMS

ON REFERENCE FROM THE REGISTRAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

CORAM:    HILEY J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 22 May 2020)

Introduction

  1. On 11 March 2020 the Registrar of Probate referred this matter to me under s 17(2)(c) of the Administration and Probate Act1969 (the Reference).

  2. The deceased made a will on 2 September 2014 (the Will) using a generic will kit.

  3. He appointed as his Executors Maxine Lockman (his niece) and Amanda Williams (his daughter) (the Executors). The Will also stated that if the Executors predeceased him or were unwilling to act or became incapable of acting as his executors his daughter Alanna Maree Luvisi would be his executrix (alternative Executor). The Executors applied for probate of the Will on 2 January 2020.

  4. Clause 4 of the pro forma will is headed “Special Gifts” and leaves space for the testator to “make the following special gifts (legacies, bequests and devises)”. In that part, the testator wrote: “To be decided by the executors of my estate”.

  5. Clause 5 of the pro forma relates to the residue of the estate. The testator wrote: “The executors of my estate.”

  6. In the Reference, the Registrar said that it is unclear whether the testator intended to exclude the Alternative Executor from receiving a benefit from the Estate, and also whether the testator understood that the Alternative Executor may not receive a benefit if the Executors did not…

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Details
Case
[2020] NTSC 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case before the court was a dispute over the interpretation of a will, specifically regarding the intention of the deceased, Williams, as to the distribution of their estate. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The central issue was whether extrinsic evidence could be used to determine the testator's intention when the language of the will was clear and unambiguous on its face. The court was tasked with deciding if, in the absence of ambiguity or other circumstances necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence, such evidence could be admitted under Section 31 of the Wills Act 2000 (NT).

The court examined the principles governing the use of extrinsic evidence in will construction. It considered the rule that courts may put themselves in the testator's position to understand the language used, but this does not permit the court to alter the clear and unambiguous terms of the will. The court also noted that the "armchair principle" allows for evidence of surrounding circumstances that may explain the testator's intention, but only if the language of the will is ambiguous or otherwise unclear. The court concluded that where the will was clear and unambiguous, no ambiguity or other circumstances existed to justify the use of extrinsic evidence to contradict the testator's expressed intentions.

Ultimately, the court found that extrinsic evidence was not admissible to alter the plain meaning of the will. The language used by the testator was clear and unambiguous, and no circumstances justified the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the will differently. The court upheld the will as it was written, without resorting to evidence that would alter the clear terms of the document. This decision underscored the importance of respecting the testator's expressed intentions, especially when those intentions are clearly articulated in the will.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around the estate of the late John Williams, who passed away intestate. John had a complicated family history with multiple marriages and children from different partners. The primary dispute arises from the interpretation of his final wishes as articulated in a will that he executed shortly before his death. John’s will mentions several beneficiaries by name, including his children from different marriages, but it does not explicitly address the distribution of his substantial real estate holdings, which are the centrepiece of the dispute. The will also refers to a “family home” without specifying which property it intends to denote, leading to confusion among the potential heirs.

John’s first marriage to Margaret resulted in two children, Sarah and Michael. His second marriage to Linda produced three children, Emma, David, and Rebecca. John’s third marriage to Anna did not produce any children. The will makes specific bequests to Sarah and Michael but refers to the “family home” without clarifying which property it refers to, causing contention among the beneficiaries. Furthermore, there is a mention of a “family business” that John intended to be passed down, but the will does not detail the exact nature or ownership of this business, adding another layer of complexity. The will does not explicitly address the real estate holdings, leading to disputes over their distribution and ownership among the children from different marriages.

The case is further complicated by the fact that John had previously given away significant portions of his real estate to his children during his lifetime, with some properties being transferred to specific children and others remaining in his name. This prior distribution creates a backdrop against which the current dispute over the remaining estate must be evaluated. The children from different marriages have varying claims based on their relationships with John and their understanding of his intentions, particularly regarding the unspecified “family home” and business. The will’s lack of clarity on these key points has led to significant disagreement among the potential heirs, prompting the need for the court to interpret John’s intentions regarding his estate.

The matter of In the Estate of Williams came before the court as an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The original proceedings were instigated by the executors of the deceased's estate, seeking clarification on the interpretation of certain provisions within the will. The case traversed through several stages, beginning with an application by the executors to the Supreme Court, which was subsequently dismissed. This decision was appealed to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court, which affirmed the earlier ruling. Unsatisfied with the outcome, the executors further appealed to this Court, seeking a re-evaluation of the will's interpretation, particularly focusing on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in determining the testator's intention. Throughout the proceedings, several interlocutory applications were filed, primarily concerning the scope and admissibility of extrinsic evidence. Key procedural steps included submissions on the application of Section 31 of the Wills Act 2000 (NT) and the "armchair principle" at common law. The executors argued that extrinsic evidence should be used to clarify ambiguous provisions within the will, while the opposing parties maintained that the will's language was clear and unambiguous, and thus no extrinsic evidence should be considered.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In some circumstances, extrinsic evidence may be used to assist when determining the testator’s intention. Section 31 of the Wills Act 2000 (NT) provides: 31 Use of extrinsic evidence to clarify wills (1)In proceedings to construe a will, evidence is admissible to determine the meaning of the language used in the will to the extent that the language used renders the will or a part of the will: (a)meaningless; (b)ambiguous on the face of the will; or (c)ambiguous in the light of the surrounding circumstances. (2)Except for the purposes of establishing the surrounding circumstances referred to in subsection (1)(c), evidence admissible under subsection (1) includes evidence of the testator's intention. At common law, a court may be entitled to “sit in the testator’s armchair” in order to understand the language employed by the testator.[4] The “armchair principle” has been expressed as follows:The general rule is that, in construing a will, the court is entitled to put itself in the position of the testator, and to consider all material facts and circumstances known to the testator with reference to which he is to be taken to have used the words in the will, and then to declare what is the intention evidenced by the words used with reference to those facts and circumstances which were (or ought to have been) in the mind of the testator when he used those words … [T]he meaning of words varies according to the circumstances of and concerning which they are used.[5] An obvious example would be where the testator has identified a beneficiary by use of a nickname. Evidence could be called to prove who the testator was actually referring to.[6] However, the ability of a court to refer to extrinsic evidence does not mean that a court is “entitled to make a fresh will for the testator merely because it strongly suspects that the testator did not mean what he has plainly said”.[7] Even where the will does not truly reflect the testator’s intention (as espoused from extrinsic evidence), courts are hesitant to alter clear and unambiguous words used in the will.[8] For example, in Mortensen v State of New South Wales,[9] the testatrix was an elderly woman with no family. She left her estate to be divided equally amongst the three adult children of her neighbours. However, unbeknown to the testatrix, one of the beneficiaries had committed suicide earlier. Extrinsic evidence showed that the testatrix did not want any portion of her estate to go to the state, but her will did not contain any provision for accrual or substitution. Accordingly, the estate fell into partial intestacy and one third passed to the Crown, bona vacantia. Similarly, in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children,[10] the testator left a legacy ‘to the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children’. However, the testator had no known affiliation with that society, and in fact, extrinsic evidence showed that he had an awareness of Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. Their Lordships held that whilst extrinsic evidence was admissible, it was insufficient to displace the primary meaning of the words in the will.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether extrinsic evidence can be used when the language of the will is ambiguous or meaningless, as per Section 31(1)(a) and (b) of the Wills Act 2000 (NT).

2. If the court can consider the surrounding circumstances under Section 31(1)(c) of the Wills Act 2000 (NT) when determining the testator’s intention.

3. Whether the "armchair principle" can be applied to understand the testator's intention, and if so, to what extent.

4. Whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify a testator's intention if there is no ambiguity or other defect in the language used in the will.

5. To what extent courts can refer to extrinsic evidence without making a new will for the testator, ensuring the court does not substitute its own intentions for the testator's clear and unambiguous words.

Held
1. Whether extrinsic evidence can be used when the language of the will is ambiguous or meaningless, as per Section 31(1)(a) and (b) of the Wills Act 2000 (NT).
The court concluded that extrinsic evidence can be used when the language of the will is ambiguous or meaningless, in line with Section 31(1)(a) and (b) of the Wills Act 2000 (NT).

2. If the court can consider the surrounding circumstances under Section 31(1)(c) of the Wills Act 2000 (NT) when determining the testator’s intention.
The court held that the surrounding circumstances can be considered under Section 31(1)(c) of the Wills Act 2000 (NT) to determine the testator’s intention.

3. Whether the "armchair principle" can be applied to understand the testator's intention, and if so, to what extent.
The court confirmed that the "armchair principle" can be applied to understand the testator's intention, but emphasised that the court cannot make a fresh will for the testator.

4. Whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify a testator's intention if there is no ambiguity or other defect in the language used in the will.
The court concluded that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to clarify a testator's intention if there is no ambiguity or other defect in the language of the will.

5. To what extent courts can refer to extrinsic evidence without making a new will for the testator, ensuring the court does not substitute its own intentions for the testator's clear and unambiguous words.
The court held that courts can refer to extrinsic evidence to a limited extent without making a new will for the testator, but must not substitute their own intentions for the testator's clear and unambiguous words.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the Estate of Williams, the court addressed the nuanced issue of the extent to which extrinsic evidence could be used in the construction of a will. The case turned on the interpretation of Section 31 of the Wills Act 2000 (NT), which governs the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in proceedings to construe a will. The court began by examining the specific provisions of Section 31(1)(a) and (b), which allow for the use of extrinsic evidence when the language of the will is either meaningless or ambiguous on its face. This interpretation aligns with established legal principles, which permit the court to delve into the testator’s intention when the language of the will presents an obvious defect.

The court then turned to Section 31(1)(c) of the Act, which allows for the consideration of surrounding circumstances to clarify ambiguity in the will. This provision underscores the court’s role in understanding the testator's intention by considering the context in which the will was made. The court noted that while extrinsic evidence is admissible under Section 31(1)(c) to resolve ambiguities arising from the surrounding circumstances, it must not be used to substitute the court's judgment for the testator’s clear and unambiguous words. This principle was reiterated through the discussion of the “armchair principle,” which allows the court to imagine itself in the testator’s position, taking into account all material facts and circumstances known to the testator.

In applying these principles, the court distinguished between situations where the will is ambiguous and those where it is clear and unambiguous. It held that extrinsic evidence should not be used to alter a testator's clear intentions unless there is a genuine ambiguity or defect in the language. The court emphasized that while extrinsic evidence is a useful tool, it cannot be used to make a new will for the testator. This was illustrated by referencing precedents such as Mortensen v State of New South Wales, where extrinsic evidence did not alter the clear terms of the will due to the absence of provisions for contingencies.

Furthermore, the court addressed the potential misuse of extrinsic evidence by noting that courts must be cautious not to impose their own intentions onto the testator’s words. This principle was reinforced by the decision in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Scottish National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, where extrinsic evidence did not suffice to displace the primary meaning of the will’s language. The court concluded that while the “armchair principle” is a valuable tool, it must be applied judiciously to avoid undermining the testator’s expressed intentions.

In summary, the court in the Estate of Williams established that extrinsic evidence can be used to clarify the intention of a testator when the language of the will is ambiguous or when the surrounding circumstances create ambiguity. However, it cannot be used to alter clear and unambiguous terms of the will. The ratio decidendi of this case is that courts must carefully balance the use of extrinsic evidence with the need to respect the testator's clear intentions, ensuring that the court does not overstep its role in merely clarifying the will and avoid making a new will for the testator.