SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction)
IN THE ESTATE OF ROBERT MORLEY (DECEASED)
[2023] SASC 102
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stanley
14 July 2023
SUCCESSION - MAKING OF A WILL - EXECUTION - INFORMAL DOCUMENT INTENDED TO BE WILL - GENERALLY
This was an application under s 12(2) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) for the admission to probate of two unsigned and undated documents as the will of the deceased.
The deceased, Robert Morley, died without making a will executed in accordance with the formal requirements of s 8 of the Wills Act 1936 (SA). Two unsigned, undated and unwitnessed documents were located among the deceased’s effects. The applicant, who is the executor appointed by those documents, sought to have both documents together propounded as the last will of the deceased.
The deceased was an only child whose parents predeceased him, and he died without spouse or children. However, he was survived by cousins, four of whom are known, all residing in Canada. The deceased’s cousins would have taken on an intestacy under s 72J of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA), being the children of relatives of the fourth degree. A solicitor was appointed by the Court to represent their interests in the estate. They did not oppose the admission of the documents to probate.
Held:
1. The document be admitted to probate as the last will of the deceased pursuant to s 12(2) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA).
2. A grant of probate of the document be made to the applicant.
3. The costs of both the applicant and the representative party of and incidental to these proceedings be paid from the estate of the deceased on an indemnity basis.
Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) s 72J; Inheritance (Family Provision) Act 1972 (SA) s 6; Probate Rules 2015 (SA) r 64(1); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) s 18; Wills Act 1936 (SA) ss 8 and 12(2), referred to.
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549; Baumanis v Praulin (1980) 25 SASR 423; Estate of Dunn [2002] NSWSC 900; Estate of John Leslie Xavier Monaghan (Deceased) [2012] SASC 130; Estate of Masters; Hills v Plummer (1994) 33 NSWLR 446; Fielder v Burgess [2014] SASC 98; In Estate of Clayton, Deceased (1982) 31 SASR 153; In the Estate of Davis (2011) 7 ASTLR 572; In the Estate of Gall (Deceased) [2008] SASC 349; In the Estate of Smith, Deceased (1985) 38 SASR 30; In the Estate of Torr (2005) 91 SASR 17; Jabado v Da Prato [2016] WASC 98; Kedzier v Postle [2002] NSWSC 875; Re Sanders [2016] VSC 694; Wood v Trudinger [2017] QSC 245, considered.
IN THE ESTATE OF ROBERT MORLEY (DECEASED)
[2023] SASC 102Testamentary causes jurisdiction
STANLEY J:
Introduction
On 18 May 2023 I made orders in an application under s 12(2) of the Wills Act 1936 (SA) (the Act) for the admission to probate…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read IN THE ESTATE OF ROBERT MORLEY (DECEASED) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] SASC 102
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the document, which had not been executed in the presence of two witnesses as required by statute, could be admitted to probate under s 12(2) of the Act. This section allows for the admission of a document to probate if the Court is satisfied that it expresses the deceased's testamentary intentions and that the deceased intended it to constitute their will. The Court had to determine whether the document met these criteria and, if so, whether it should exercise its discretion to admit it to probate.
The Court found that the document did express the deceased's testamentary intentions and that he intended it to be his will. The document contained clear statements of the deceased's intentions as to the disposition of his property upon his death and it was evident that the deceased intended it to be operative at his death. The Court noted that while the document did not meet the formalities required by statute, it was satisfied that admitting it to probate would avoid the hardship and injustice of an unintended intestacy. The Court concluded that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion under s 12(2) to admit the document to probate and grant a grant to the applicant as the executor.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that the document be admitted to probate as the last will of the deceased and that a grant of probate be made to the applicant. The Court also ordered that the costs of both the applicant and the representative party be paid from the estate on an indemnity basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
I find that the document was created by the deceased on 30 December 2019.Legal considerations Pursuant to s 8 of the Act, a will is not valid unless it is in writing and executed by the testator (or at the testator’s direction) in the presence of two or more witnesses, all present at the same time. It follows that the document is not a valid will in accordance with s 8 as, other than the fact that it is in writing, it does not conform to the formalities required. However, s 12(2) of the Act provides:(2) Subject to this Act, if the Court is satisfied that - (a) a document expresses testamentary intentions of a deceased person; and(b) the deceased person intended the document to constitute his or her will,the document will be admitted to Probate as a will of the deceased person even though it has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act. In In the Estate of Davis, Gray J described the legislative scheme in s 12(2) of the Act as follows:[2]Section 12(2) is a dispensing power, allowing the Court, where it is satisfied that a document expresses the testamentary intentions of a deceased person and that that person intended the document to constitute his or her will, to admit that document to probate notwithstanding that it fails to meet the formal requirements set out in s 8 of the Act. The remedial nature of s 12(2) is now well recognised. The section provides a power by which unnecessary intestacies can be avoided. The following often quoted remarks of Jacobs J in In Estate of Graham, the first decision to consider s 12(2) after its enactment, are apposite:But if there is one proposition that may be stated with reasonable confidence, it is that s 12(2) is remedial in intent, that is to say, that its purpose is to avoid the hardship and injustice which has so often arisen from a strict application of the formal requirements of a valid will, as dictated by s 8 of the Act. This conclusion is, I think, clearly justified upon a review of the legislative history of the relevant sections of the Act, and the cases.The liberal construction to remedial or beneficial provisions was endorsed by the High Court in IW v City of Perth, where Brennan CJ and McHugh J observed:[It is a] rule of construction that beneficial and remedial legislation … is to be given a liberal construction. It is to be given “a fair, large and liberal” interpretation rather than one which is “literal or technical”. Nevertheless, the task remains one of statutory construction. Although a provision of the Act must be given a liberal and beneficial construction, a court or tribunal is not at liberty to give it a construction that is unreasonable or unnatural. [Citations omitted].[2] (2011) 7 ASTLR 572 at 577. The Court must consider the circumstances of each particular case when deciding whether or not s 12(2) applies.[3][3] In the Estate of Smith, Deceased (1985) 38 SASR 30 at 33; In Estate of Clayton, Deceased (1982) 31 SASR 153 at 157. Further, considering the dual criteria in s 12(2), Besanko J in In the Estate of Torr said:[4]The question whether the documents express the testamentary intentions of the deceased involves a consideration of whether they contain a statement of her intentions as to what was to happen to the property described in the documents upon her death. In other words, is it clear that the documents express her intentions as to the disposition of the property upon her death? The question whether the documents were intended by the deceased to constitute a codicil to her will involves a consideration of whether the deceased intended the documents to be operative at her death to dispose of the property referred to therein in the manner described. There is obviously a significant overlap between the two requirements.[4] (2005) 91 SASR 17 at 25.