IN THE ESTATE OF NASH

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction)

IN THE ESTATE OF NASH

[2022] SASC 110

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Stanley  

4 October 2022

COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - CONDUCT, INCLUDING PUBLISHED STATEMENTS

COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - PREJUDGMENT

Jade Cheree Bromilow has brought an application for the passing over of Peter Philip Nash as the executor of the estate of John David Nash.  This is an application by Peter Philip Nash for disqualification of the judge from hearing the passing over application on the ground of bias.   The foundation for this application concerns the refusal to grant stay orders in relation to an order for possession of property at 8 Tilley Court, Marion and a charging order over property at 455-463 South Road, Keswick.

Held:

1. The applicant has not established that the judge approached the task of deciding whether to make the stay orders with a closed mind or would approach the passing over application with a closed mind.

2. The applicant has not established that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge will not decide the passing over application impartially and in accordance with the merits of the application.

3. The application for disqualification is dismissed.

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Mentink v Queensland Police Commissioner (No 2) (2020) 279 FCR 212; Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls (2011) 244 CLR 427; Nash v Corporation of the City of Marion [2022] SASCA 95; South Australia v Nash [2022] SASC 105; Sun v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71; Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, considered.

IN THE ESTATE OF NASH
[2022] SASC 110

STANLEY J:

Introduction

  1. Peter Philip Nash (Mr Nash) is the sole executor of the estate of his late brother, John David Nash (the deceased).  The deceased died on 23 February 2016 leaving a will dated 15 February 2013 (the will).  Mr Nash has not yet filed an application for a grant of probate to be made to him. 

  2. Jade Cheree Bromilow is the granddaughter of the deceased and the residuary legatee named in the will, although her interest in the estate is expressed to be conditional. 

  3. Clause 8(a) of the will provides:

    I GIVE a 100% share unto my nephew [sic] Jade Bromilow upon obtaining the age of thirty, but in particular, not in the case, of her becoming either a drug addict, and or alcoholic, and or by gambler, verified by her complete medical records [a copy to be cited, in affidavit form]. 

  4. It appears that the deceased’s estate included, at the time of his death, real estate at 8 Tilley Court, Marion.  On 23 September 2022 a warrant of sale was executed by the Sheriff over the property at 8 Tilley Court, Marion due to the non-payment of…

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Details
Case
[2022] SASC 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved Mr Nash, who had lodged a complaint against the registrar for allegedly preventing him from accessing certain information on a probate file. Specifically, Mr Nash sought access to internal correspondence between the registry and chambers, which he did not already have access to via the court's online portal. The court was tasked with determining whether the registrar's refusal to grant Mr Nash access to this information was justified and whether it warranted the registrar's disqualification.

The legal issues at hand centred on the scope of Mr Nash's rights to inspect documents on the probate file and the extent to which the registrar was obliged to provide access to internal correspondence. The registrar argued that since Mr Nash already had access to the filed documents and was included in the correspondence, he had no legitimate basis for requesting access to internal communications. The court needed to balance Mr Nash's right to access information pertinent to the estate against the need to protect internal communications that might not be suitable for public disclosure.

In delivering the decision, the court found that Mr Nash had not provided a valid reason for requiring access to the internal correspondence. Given that he already had access to all relevant filed documents and was included in the correspondence between the court and the parties, the registrar's decision to withhold the internal correspondence was deemed reasonable. The court concluded that the refusal did not constitute grounds for disqualification. Consequently, the application for disqualification was dismissed. The court further indicated that it would hear the parties regarding the costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Nash complained about me preventing him access to court file information that confirms corrupt insider information. This appears to relate to a request by Mr Nash to inspect all documents on the probate file relating to the deceased’s estate including correspondence and notes. In circumstances where Mr Nash already had access to the filed documents uploaded on the Court’s online portal and had been included in correspondence between the Court and the parties, the only documents to which he did not have access were internal correspondence between the registry and chambers. Mr Nash did not provide any basis upon which he should be granted access to inspect the court’s internal correspondence and therefore, I refused the request. Accordingly, this does not establish a basis for disqualification. Conclusion I dismiss the application for disqualification. I will hear the parties as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established