IN THE ESTATE OF MUNCHENBERG (DECEASED)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

IN THE ESTATE OF MUNCHENBERG (DECEASED)

[2021] SASC 15

Decision of the Honourable Justice Bampton  

SUCCESSION - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS - CONSTRUCTION GENERALLY - PRINCIPLES OR RULES OF CONSTRUCTION - READING WILL AS A WHOLE

Application for judicial advice or direction regarding the proper construction of a will —  where the will gifts real property to be divided equally between four named beneficiaries — where one of the named beneficiaries predeceased the testator —  whether the deceased named beneficiary’s children are entitled to the gift pursuant to the substitutional provision in the will.

HELD: Upon reading the will as a whole, the children of the deceased named beneficiary are entitled to the gift their father would have taken had he survived the survivorship period specified in the will.

Fell v Fell (1922) CLR 268; King v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1955) 94 CLR 70; Marley v Rawlings [2014] 2 WLR 213; Boyes v Cook (1880) 14 Ch 53, applied.

Farrelly v Phillips & Ors (2017) 128 SASR 502; Perrin v Morgan [1943] AC 399, discussed.

IN THE ESTATE OF MUNCHENBERG (DECEASED)
[2021] SASC 15

Civil: Application

  1. BAMPTON J: Brian Frederick Munchenberg (“Brian”) died on 21 July 2019, having never married or had children, leaving a will dated 25 September 2002.  Brian appointed his de facto, Audrey Joyce Reichstein (“Audrey”), and the applicant, Kevin Raymond Madden (“Kevin”), the executors of his will.  As Audrey died on 18 October 2011 probate was granted to Kevin, who was Brian’s accountant and advisor for many years, on 12 December 2019.

  2. Kevin has deposed in an affidavit affirmed on 26 October 2020 (“the affidavit”) that he prepared mirror wills for Brian and Audrey and does not hold any records pertaining to the preparation of the wills.  Kevin also deposed that as at the date Brian and Audrey made their wills they owned a house property at 11 Petch Street, Loxton (“the Loxton property”) as tenants in common.

  3. Following Audrey’s death, her half-share in the Loxton property was, in accordance with her will, transferred to her children Alan Douglas Reichstein (“Alan”), Lloyd Frederick Reichstein (“Lloyd”), Terence Leo Reichstein (“Terence”) and Judith Leonie Pfitzer (“Judith”) in equal shares.  Brian remained a registered proprietor of a half share and Alan, Lloyd, Terence and Judith were each recorded as registered proprietors of a one-eighth share in the Loxton property.

    The application for advice or direction

  4. Kevin has made application for advice or direction regarding the proper construction of Brian’s will (“the will”) supported by the affidavit.

  5. By the will, Brian left his estate to his step-children Alan, Lloyd, Terence, and Judith. 

  6. Lloyd died on 28 December 2016, predeceasing Brian.  The interested parties to the application are Lloyd’s three children, who are Brian’s step-grandchildren.

    The Will

  7. By clause 6 of the will, Brian gifted his share in the Loxton property as follows:

    AS TO my share of the houses situated at 11 Petch Street…

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Details
Case
[2021] SASC 15
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of the estate of Munchenberg, the deceased, the court was tasked with interpreting the terms of Brian Munchenberg's will. The dispute arose between his children and other beneficiaries regarding the distribution of property, particularly the Loxton property, and the application of survivorship provisions within the will. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia, where the primary judge was tasked with determining the intentions of Brian as expressed in the will and the legal effect of its provisions.

The court was required to decide whether the will's language was clear and unambiguous, and if so, what the legal effect of the survivorship provisions was in the event that a named beneficiary predeceased Brian. The court had to ascertain whether the children of a predeceased beneficiary were entitled to inherit under the will, and if so, how the property should be valued for the purposes of distribution. The court also needed to determine the amount each beneficiary was required to pay for their share of the Loxton property, considering the pre-existing shares owned by some beneficiaries.

The court, after examining the language of the will as a whole, concluded that there was no ambiguity in Brian's intentions. The court emphasised that the interpretation of a will must be based on the language used and the context provided by the will's terms, rather than subjective evidence of the testator's intentions. The court found that the scheme of the will was to distribute Brian's estate equally among the named beneficiaries and their children if they predeceased Brian. The court also ruled that the children of a predeceased beneficiary were entitled to the gift their parent would have received had they survived Brian, and that the value of the Loxton property was to be determined by considering the payments made by Judith to the other beneficiaries.

The court's interpretation of the will led to the conclusion that the children of the deceased named beneficiary were entitled to the gift their parent would have taken had they survived the survivorship period specified in the will. The court further determined the specific amounts to be paid by Judith to the other beneficiaries for their shares in the Loxton property. These findings were made without the need to consider extrinsic evidence due to the clarity of the will's language.

Orders

Orders of the court

HELD: Upon reading the will as a whole, the children of the deceased named beneficiary are entitled to the gift their father would have taken had he survived the survivorship period specified in the will.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It appears that Judith bought the Loxton property for $315,000 less her pre‑existing one-eighth share valued at $39,375 and less her one third share in the clause 6 gift (according to Kevin’s construction) valued at $52,500. Accordingly, I infer that Judith paid:·The sum of $91,875 (comprising $39,375 for their one-eighth share and $52,500 for their one-third share of the clause 6 gift) to each of Alan and Terence; and·The sum of $39,375 to Mingay as the executor of Lloyd’s estate in respect of the one-eighth share owned by Lloyd’s estate.Consideration In construing the will, it is my task to discover the intentions of Brian and the scheme he conceived for the will. Brian’s intentions and the scheme are to be ascertained from an examination of the language of the will viewed as a whole.[2] This involves identifying the natural and ordinary meaning of words and sentences used in the will in the context of all provisions in the will. In this task, I can be aided only by “such facts as existed and were known to the testator at the date of the will” which are admissible in interpreting the language of the will, but subjective evidence of Brian’s intentions cannot be taken into account.[3][2] Fell v Fell (1922) CLR 268.[3] King v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd (1955) 94 CLR 70 at 78 and Marley v Rawlings [2014] 2 WLR 213 at [18]-[19]. In Perrin v Morgan, Lord Romer said:[4]I take it to be a cardinal rule of construction that a will should be so construed as to give effect to the intention of the testator, such intention being gathered from the language of the will read in the light of the circumstances in which the will was made.Viscount Simon said:[5]… [t]he fundamental rule in construing the language of a will is to put on the words used the meaning which, having regard to the terms of the will, the testator intended. The question is not, of course, what the testator meant to do when he made his will, but what the written words he uses mean in the particular case – what are the “expressed intentions” of the testator.[4] [1943] AC 399 at 420.[5] [1943] AC 399 at 406. In my view, reading the will as whole, there is no ambiguity or lack of clarity in Brian’s expressed intentions and the scheme of the will. As such, it is not necessary to consider the admission of extrinsic evidence under the “armchair principle”.[6] I point out that Kevin’s evidence regarding his recollection of Brian’s wishes is inadmissible because it is subjective evidence of Brian’s testamentary intention.[6] Boyes v Cook (1880) 14 Ch 53 at 56 (James LJ). On my examination of the will, its scheme is to distribute Brian’s real and personal estate in equal shares between those of Alan, Lloyd, Terence, and Judith (“the named beneficiaries”) who survive Brian, and in the event any of them predecease him to the children of the predeceased named beneficiary. Clause 6 gifts the Loxton property to the named beneficiaries in equal shares. It contains a survivorship provision requiring that the named beneficiaries must survive Brian by 30 days for their gift to accrue. It also provides that the named beneficiaries have first option to buy the Loxton property at council value.