SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction)
In the Estate of MARILYN SHIRLEY GRAHAM (DECEASED)
[2009] SASC 278
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
4 September 2009
SUCCESSION - WILLS, PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION - CONSTRUCTION AND EFFECT OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS - GENERALLY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION - ASCERTAINMENT OF TESTATOR'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED BY WORDS OF WILL
Application for advice and directions pursuant to section 69 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA) - construction of will of Marilyn Shirley Graham - clause 5 created testamentary trust for the benefit of husband of deceased - whether trust fund comprised both the remaining liquid assets and the home property - construction of phrase "cessation of independent living" - construction of "no longer requiring financial support" - duty on Public Trustee to ascertain these matters - factors to be considered by Public Trustee - powers of Public Trustee to sell home property under will and pursuant to statute.
Held: trust fund comprises both liquid assets and the home property - clause 5 of will provides Public Trustee with power to sell home and purchase alternative accommodation - sections 12 and 28 of the Trustee Act authorise Public Trustee to sell home and purchase alternative accommodation - entitlement of husband of deceased ceases at his death, the cessation of independent living, when no longer requiring financial support or on his written declaration - Public Trustee obliged to assess from time to time whether husband of deceased capable of independent living and his financial situation.
In the Estate of MARILYN SHIRLEY GRAHAM (DECEASED)
[2009] SASC 278Testamentary Causes Jurisdiction
GRAY J.
This is an application for advice and directions pursuant to section 69 of the Administration and Probate Act 1919 (SA).
Introduction
Marilyn Shirley Graham died on 25 February 2004. She was survived by her husband Jack Richard Graham and her three adult children, Deborah Kay Browne, Karen Lisa O’Connell and Paul John Bethune. All were children of earlier marriages.
The deceased died leaving a Will dated 29 May 2003, appointing Peter Vardon Fairweather and Karen Lisa O’Connell as executors and trustees. Clause 5 of the Will constitutes a testamentary trust for the benefit of Mr Graham.
Probate was granted to Mr Fairweather on 15 July 2004 with leave reserved for Ms O’Connell to apply for probate as the alternate executor named in the Will. On 2 August 2006, Mr Fairweather retired from his position as trustee of the testamentary trust and appointed Ms O’Connell as the new trustee, pursuant to Part 5 of the Trustee Act 1936 (SA). On 4 January 2008, Public Trustee was appointed the new trustee of the testamentary trust by Ms O’Connell.
The difficulties leading to the application for directions relate to the proper construction of the Will, the terms of the testamentary trust created by the Will and Public Trustee’s obligations and powers as trustee.
The Testamentary Instrument
As noted, the Will established a testamentary trust for the benefit of Mr Graham. Clause…
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- AGLC
- In the Estate of MARILYN SHIRLEY GRAHAM (DECEASED) [2009] SASC 278
- Case
- [2009] SASC 278
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court ruled that the phrase "no longer requiring financial support" signifies the cessation of the husband's entitlement under clause 5 if financial support is no longer necessary. The trustee must periodically assess the husband's financial situation to determine if he still requires support. If the husband has separate assets and income sufficient for adequate accommodation and maintenance, his entitlement under clause 5 would likely terminate. Clause 5 of the will grants the Public Trustee the authority to sell the home property and purchase alternative accommodation or enter into a suitable maintenance arrangement for the husband while he is capable of independent living. Furthermore, sections 12 and 28 of the Trustee Act empower the Trustee to sell the home property and acquire an alternative "dwelling-house" or establish an appropriate maintenance arrangement.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GRAY J
In relation to the phrase “no longer requiring financial support”, counsel agreed that Mr Graham’s entitlement under clause 5 ceases if financial support is no longer required. Counsel suggested that whether such support is required is a matter to be judged by the trustee as a matter of objective fact to be determined in the reasonable opinion of the trustee. The trustee would have a duty to make enquiries of Mr Graham from time to time to ascertain his financial position so as to satisfy itself whether or not Mr Graham requires financial support. It was accepted that if Mr Graham had separate assets, and income from those assets such that he could accommodate and maintain himself adequately at his own expense, this would arguably terminate any entitlement under clause 5. Consideration of the matter – the construction of clause 5 Clause 5 of the Will is poorly drafted. However it appears clear that the testator’s intention was to benefit Mr Graham during his lifetime, particularly by the provision of accommodation. The construction of clause 5 is to be considered having regard to this intent. The trust fund the subject of clause 5 comprises both the liquid assets and the home property. As excerpted above, the introductory words of clause 5 provide:I GIVE AND BEQUEATH an amount equal to my remaining liquid assets other than my home property and furnishings situated at 16 Empire Avenue Salisbury Downs in the State of South Australia which may be occupied by my husband on the basis described hereunder: (hereinafter referred to as “the Trust Fund” which expression includes all accumulations and accretions) unto my Trustees UPON TRUST… Arguably, the words “other than my home property” exclude the home property from the definition of the trust fund because those words operate by way of exception or qualification to the words which appear immediately before. However, when reading clause 5 as a whole, the home property clearly appears to form part of the trust fund in addition to the “remaining liquid assets”. The qualifying words “other than my home property…which may be occupied by my husband on the basis described hereunder” appear to be an expression of the testamentary intention to provide Mr Graham with the right of occupation of the home property, and that the trustee holds the home property as part of the trust fund subject to that right of occupation, which is more fully described later in clause 5. If the home property did not form part of the trust fund, it would form part of the “rest residue and remainder” of the estate of the deceased pursuant to clause 6 of the Will, and consequently be held by the trustees upon the trusts declared in clause 6 immediately for the three named adult children of the deceased. Having regard to the intention of the testator, as expressed in clause 5, to provide a right of occupation to Mr Graham in respect of the home property, the suggested construction should be rejected. Accordingly, it is only when Mr Graham’s right of occupation ends “upon his death or cessation of independent living or no longer requiring financial support or upon his written declaration that he no longer requires the benefit of the trust fund”, that “the balance of the Trust Fund…shall form part of [the] residuary estate”. Until the home property forms part of the residuary estate to be applied in accordance with clause 6, the home property forms part of the trust fund, which under clause 5 is conveyed to the trustees to hold on the trusts declared therein.