Ilyas, M. v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs

[1987] FCA 72

111 THE MATTER of the Adminlstratlve

Declslons (Juslcial Revlew! Act 1977

BETWEEN: MUHAMMED ILYAS

Applicant

.WD

-	:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION
.WD ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

COPAM: Evatt J

: 26 February 1987

FLACE : Sydney

MINUTES OF ORDER

THE COURT DECLARES THAT:

l! The letter of ’L0 September 1985 from the applicant Muhammed

Ilyas addressed to the Minlster for Immlgratlon and referred

to therein as an application for permanent residence was an

application for an entry permlt other than a temporary entry

permlt pursuant to the Misration Act 1958.

THE C0UT.T ORDERS THAT:

l! The respondent, the Minister for Immlgratlon and Ethnic

Affairs, or his Delegate duly appointed under the Migration

Act 1958, be directed to furnish to Muhammed Ilyas (the

applicant) wlthin one calendar month of the date of this

order, a statement ’pursuant to 5-13 of the Administrative

Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 settlnq out the findings

on material questions of fact, referrlnq to the evidence or

other materlal on whlch those flndinqs were based and glving

the reasons for the decision,

a )	to refuse the applicant’s appllcation dated 2 0 September
198: for permanent resldence; or
b)	not to conslder the applicant’s said appllcatlon for

permanent residence.

7 ) The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of and incidental to

the motion hereln dated 11 Aprll 10%.

3 ) The matter stand over for dlrections on Thursday, 2 April

1987.

4) The interim order made by the Court on 26 February 1986 in

the matter be contlnued until 4.15pm Thursday, 2 Aprll 1987.

Note: Eettlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36

of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEZERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

HEW SOUTH 14ALE.5 DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

ICJ THE MATTER of the Administrative

Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977

BETWEEN: MUHAMMED ILYAS

Applicant

m:	MINISTER FOR IMMIGPATION
AND ETHNIC AFFAIRS

Respondent

CORAM: Evatt J

: 26 February 1987

FLACE: Sydney

REXSONS FOR JUDGMENT

Before the Court is a notlce of motion dated 11 April 1986

xherein the abovenamed applicant, Muhammed Ilyas, eeks

declaratlons and consequential orders and directions under the

Idminlstratlve Declsions (Judlclal Revlew) Act 1977 (the AD(JR) Act), in respect of an appllcation made by him on 20 September

1985 for permanent residence under the Mlgratlon Act 1952 (the

Act).

Omittmg formal parts, the motlon seeks the following

declarations, orders and dlrections:

I.

1. That the applicant's letter of 2 0 September 19P5 to the

respondent was an application for a permanent entry

permit pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 as amended and

the Migration Regulations, as amended.

1

_. That the respondent made a decision to refuse the

applicant's 2 0 September 1985 applicatlon for a

permanent entry permit and that declsion is a reviewable

Zecision under 5.5 of The Admlnistratlve Decisions

(Judicial Review) Act 1977 as amended; and

_I. , That the respondent be required to supply to the

applicant a statement of reasons pursuant to s.1: of the

rald Act concerning that	decision withln fourteen	(14)
days.

Further or in the alternative to Orders 2 and 3 above:

$.	That the respondent refused or failed to make a decision cn the applicant's 20 September, 1385 application for a permanent permlt and that failure or refusal to make a
Zecislon is reviewable under s.5 of the sald Act; and,
5 .	That the respondent be required to supply to the
applicant a statement of reasons pursuant to s.13 of the
:aid Act concerning that fallure or refusal to make a
ieclsion within fourteen (14) days.
G.	That the respondent be dlrected to make a decision on
the said application.
7 ,.	Such further or other orders as the Court thinks fit.

Affidavits In support of the motion were affidavits of Faul Henry Nheeler sh-orn 11 April l386 and 21 April 1986, the latter being

an affidavit in reply to that of Gregory Mark Fhillipson sworn 18

April l9ei. M r Phllllpson was the Departmental officer who

handled the purported appllcatlon for an entry permit.

Throughout the hearlng of this motion and indeed in the motion

itself anC the affidavits filed and in certain correspondence

annexed to those affidavits, witnesses when glvlng oral evidence,

counsel, the Court and perhaps the Court in these reasons for

...

judgment have used terms such as entry permit, temporary entry

permit, permanent entry permit, permanent residence, resident

status, illegal immigrant and prohibited non-citizen loosely and

not strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act. At

times durlng the hearing this led to some confusion. It is

assumed that the term "permanent residence", which is not now

used in the Act, has been used to mean "an entry permit not

limited In time." (Cf. Tans v Minister for Immisration (1986) 67

ALR 177 at 181) or "an entry permit other than a temporary entry

permlt " . It is noted that the term "permanent resident" is

defined in s.l4A(2) for the purposes of 5.12 and s.14(1) which

sections are not relevant to the present appllcation.

Further, it is assumed that the term "entry permlt" other than a

temporary entry permit issued pursuant to ss . 7 ( 2 ) and 10 of the

Act or *'a permanent entry permit" has been used to mean "an entry

permit other than a temporary entry permit". (Cf. s.6A(8) in

respect to s.6A and s.5(1) In respect of a permit issued under S.

6 of the Act).

Frior to the filing of the sald motion, the respondent had, on l?

February 1986, ordered pursuant to 5.18 of the Act that the

applicant be deported from Australia. Thereafter the applicant

had filed an application dated 24 February 1986 in the Court

under 5 . 5 of the AD(JR) Act for an order of renew In respect of

the decision to deport hlm and sought Interim orders restraining

the respondent from carrying into effect that order pending the

4.

hearing of his application. Such interim orders were granted on

26 February 1986 by the Court as presently constituted when the

matter was stood over to 25 March 1986 for further directions.

The applicant had, on 25 February 1986, sought 5.13 particulars in respect of the deportation order. Later on 4 March 1986, the appllcant also sought 5.13 particulars in respect of the refusal

by the respondent to grant hlm permanent residence pursuant to

his application therefor lodged by him on 20 September 1985.

Nhen the matter was called on on 25 March 1986, Mr Kimber of

counsel, for the applicant, indicated that Mr Plebisek, Solicitor

of the Australian Government Solicitor’s Office, who appeared for

the respondent, had informed him that he had available draft 5.13

particulars in respect of the deportation order which, at that

stage, were unsigned and as there were some seven days to run

before the time within which the respondent had been asked to

furnish 5.13 particulars in respect of the refusal to grant

permanent residence he requested that the matter be stood over

for some period to await the outcome of that request.

Accordingly the matter	was stood over	for further mentlon on	7
April 19EE.

On 25 March, the applicant also asked that leave be granted to the applicant to amend his appllcation filed on 17 February so that the applicant might seek an order of review in respect of the respondent’s refusal to grant permanent resldence pursuant to

5 .

the applicatlon lodged by the applicant on 20 September 1985.

Such amendment was granted by consent.

Idhen the matter was relisted on 7 April 1986, Mr Kimber informed

the Court that s.13 particulars in respect of the deportation

orders had been recelved by the applicant's solicitors but the respondent had informed the appllcant's legal advisors that no

particulars would be forthcoming in respect of the alleged

refusal to grant permanent residence, it belng claimed by the

respondent that there was no application before the Minister for

an entry permit, the departmental officer in Sydney, Mr

Fhlllipson havlng treated the purported applicatlon of 20

September 1985 merely as representations to the Mlnlster for

Immlgration in respect of the questlon whether the applicant

should or should not	be deported, which questlon was then before
the Minister.

Mr Kimber informed the Court that the applicant was then

preparing a notice of motion wherein orders and directlons would

be sought relative to what the applicant claimed was an

application for a permanent entry permlt lodged on 2 0 September

1985 and asked that the matter be further adjourned. That motion

was filed on 11 April 1986 and is as set out above.

A brief history leading up to the deportation order is set out.

In 1977 the applicant left Indonesia on a Qantas flight to NGUmea

6.

via Sydney. On arriving in Sydney the applicant was granted a transit visa because the connecting flight was not due to leave Australia for one or two days. He did not catch that connecting

flight, nor, as he swears in his affidavit, did he intend to. Mr

Ilyas has remalned in Australia since that time.

The applicant is married with seven children - though two of those chlldren have now been adopted by his sister-m-law. His

wife and unmarrled children still reside in Indonesia. His

mother has been a permanent resident of Australia since July

1979, whilst a married daughter, the wife of an Australian

resident is a permanent resident In Australia	w th an Australian
born chlld.

The applicant has been and still is employed full-time in his own

name at a city restaurant in Sydney. He has been there since

soon after his arrival in Sydney, rislng from an inexperlenced kitchen-hand to the status of second chef. He remains at that employment and has submitted taxation returns In his own name

since commencing work.

In August 1980. in response to an offer of amnesty to prohibited

immigrants by the Australian Government, an application was made

to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs for

resident status by Mr Ilyas.	This application was refused by
letter dated 7 June 1982.
This letter reads:

I refer to your application for resident status in the

Regularisation of Status Program (ROSF).

Your application has been glven careful and lengthy

consideration. Reports irum our offices in Sydney and

Jakarta have been considered and the questlon of your chlld Rosdiana's medlcal condltion was referred to the Department

of Health in Canberra. I must advise that the Minister for

Immigration and Ethnic Affairs has decided that he

application is not one for approval, as your family have been

unable to meet health requlrements	for	mlgration	to
Australia.

A s your application for permanent residence has been

unsuccessful, you are now required to leave Australia. You

should purchase air or sea tlckets for your early departure

from Australla, and bring them to this office with your

passport within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Please

ask to see Miss Barton (2nd floor. room 141.

Representations were then made to certain members of Federal

Parliament seeking further reconsideration of this application.

Further, the appllcant submitted a request for renew to the

Department in November 1982 in relation to the refusal of

resident status.

By letter dated 4 January 1983, the Immigration Review Fanel

informed the applicant that he was not eligible for such renew

as hls appeal related to a decision made by the Minister, such a

decislon not belng eligible for review under the Review Panel

guidelines. A week later the Department returned all documents

relatmg to Mr Ilyas' appllcation	for resident status to his
sollcitor.

It 1s apparent from a reading of those letters, dated 4 January and 11 January 1983 respectively, that no request was made by the

Department that Mr Ilyas leave the country. Thereafter, the

e.

matter apparently lay in abeyance for some 2 years and 8 months until a telegram was sent to the applicant‘s daughter requesting

Mr Ilyas to attend an interview at the Department in Sydney.

This interview took place on 6 September 1985, the day after the

telegram was received. St was attended by the applicant, his

interpreter Mr Wheeler and Mr Phlllipson. It is agreed that the

discussion at that intervlew centred around whether applicant

should be deported. But some discussion, (at l eas t By the

51+1iCaiHr’5 Interpreter to Mr Fhillipson) wa5 made concerning a

further application by Mr Ilyas to the Department for permanent

residence.

A dispute has been raised in respect of this intervlew. The

applicant alleges that Mr Phillipson invited the applicant to

make a further application, through him, for permanent residence.

Mr Phillipson admitted that Mr Ilyas, through his interpreter,

mentioned that he wished to stay in Australia and not be

deported, but	Mr	Phillipson	denles	ever	inviting	such	an
application.

Mr h%eeler alleges that Mr Phillipson said words to the effect:

“You should put the changed circumstances in writing and make a

further application for permanent residence and send it to the

Minister direct through me”.

9 .

Mr Phillipson denies this and particularly the use of the word

"application". He stated that the interview centred around the

deportatlon of Mr Ilyas and whether this could then be averted by

representations made to the Minister through his office.

It is apparent from the evidence that both parties left the

interview wlth different impressions. It is clear from the

evidence that when Mr Ilyas and Mr Wheeler handed the documents

set out hereunder to Mr Phillipson on or about 2 0 September 1985,

the applicant had the clear understanding that thls was a further

application for permanent residence whilst Mr Phillipson thought

that it was only further representations to the Minister against

the posslbllity of his ordering deportatlon.

The documents then handed to Mr Fhilllpson were a letter to the

Minister, a support letter to Mr Philllpson, a copy of Indonesian

adoption papers relating to the applicant's youngest daughter,

Rosdiana, and a further letter from the applicant's employer.

The letter to the Minister reads:

The Minister for Immigration

Canberra ACT

Dear Sir

In support of my application for permanent residence on

compasslonate grounds I wish to advise that at the tlme of

the Amnesty Act I did surrender myself to the Immigration

authorities in the genulne belief and understanding that by

50 surrending I would be granted amnesty under the provisions

of that Act and subsequent Australian permanent residence,

subject to certain conditions and here I refer specifically

10.

to the Medical clauses of that Act.

My application was refused on the grounds that my youngest

child could not meet those criteria required under that

abovementioned medical clause. This child in question,

ROSDIRNA. I s admitedely (sic) retarded, ie Downes Syndrome,

but is not in any way physically handicapped or suffering

from any infectious or contagious disease, she is, like most

downes syndrome children, of an extremely placid and happy

disposition and in my opinion would not in any way ever

become a danger or burden to other people or the Government

of Australla.

Slnce my original application under the Amnesty Act certain

events have completely changed the circumstances, one of my

children is deceased, my eldest daughter has married an

Australian resident and now permanently resides in Sydney and

they have a child born in Australia and my youngest child,

ROSDIANA, is now legally adopted out and therefore the very

circumstances which were the basis of the protection of the

Amnesty Act being refused to me are now no longer exlsting

and I respectfully request that you view this further

application in your most compassionate manner.

As another matter of compassion I would like to point out

that my mother, who is very elderly and frail, is also a

permanent resident of Australia and due to this age and

fragility is most unlikely to ever travel again and has no

immediate relatives in Indonesia (sic) who are suitable or

even in a position to maintain and look after her. It is my

earnest wish that I may be close to her to glve the required

support and malntainence during the short balance of life

that God may see fit to grant her.

Since coming to Australia in 1977 I have always been in

secure and permanent employment, managing to fully maintain

my family in Indonesia and at the same time to accumulate

considerable savings here in Australla. I have small amount

of property in Indonesia and together with my assets here

this would be sufficient to purchase a suitable home in

Sydney for my family and therefore provide my chlldren with a

higher standard of life and education and the prospects of a better future and at the same time be closer to my Mother, my eldest daughter with our first and only grandchild and also

my eldest brother and hls large family. I therefore present

for extra consideration that I now have a much smaller family

to bring to Australia and many more of my family are already

here as permanent residents living in Sydney.

Thanking you in anticlpatlon of your most lenient and

compassionate consideration in thls my application for

permanent residence in Australia. (Emphasis added).

11.

The support letter to Mr Fhilllpson reads:

Dear Mr G Philllpson

Please find enclosed,

1. A letter to the Minister for Immigratlon in support of

mv applicatlon for permanent residence on compasslonate

grounds together with changed circumstances.

7

I . A letter of reference/explanation from my employers also

in support of the above referred application.

7 Copy of legal adoption papers in respect of youngest

child, ROSDIANA.

It 1 s my intention to request the support, advice and

asslstance of my local member of parliament Mr Lionel Bowen, however parliament is currently sitting in Canberra and Mr

Bowen is not available for interview in Sydney for another

couple of weeks.	I will arrange to take my case to hlm	as
soon as possible.

Thanking you for your tolerance in the meantlme. (Emphasis

added) .

Mr Fhillipson says that he glanced at these documents when they

were handed to him on 20 September 1985 and being then of the

belief that they were merely representations dlrected to the

Minister concerning the issue of deportation, forwarded them to

Canberra for the attention of the Xinlster. Hls stated belief,

as expressed in his evldence, was based on three reasons.

First, there was no formal document among these letters settmg

out that it was an application for permanent resldence; secondly,

the prescrlbed fee of $200 pursuant to r.Z9A(l)(b) had not been

paid and thirdly, such an applicatlon had not been mentioned at

the interview on 6 September 1985 between Mr Ilyas and himself.

12.

On the present motion the respondent has argued that he should

not be required to supply a s.13 statement of reasons in respect of the application for an entry permit for the following reasons:

1. The respondent had not made or falled to make a "decision"

within the meaning of the AD(JR) Act in respect of an

applicatlon for permanent resldence because no applicatlon

for an entry permlt was in fact lodged, thus	no decislon was
called for.

&. That if the Court determines that the letters dated 20

September 1985 or any of them was an application for a permanent entry permit, then any processing of such letters by Mr Phillipson or other departmental officers in Sydney was

not a "decision" within the meaning of the AD(JR) Act.

3.  By the combined operation of ss.7(2) and 6A of the Act an

order of deportation effectively excluded an appllcstion for
permanent residence. The form of the Act, particularly those
two sections, so It was argued, would necessarily prohlbit
any such application as a matter of law In the circumstances of this case.
4.	If a "decision" under that Act had been made, then pursuant

to sub-sections 13(5)(b) and ( 6 ) of the Act, a reasonable time having expired since the making of that declsion, a refusal by the respondent to glve reasons was proper and the

13.

Court should not, in its discretion, declare that the request

for particulars had been made within a reasonable time after

the decision was made.

The Court rejects the respondent's first submission. It had been

contented by Mr Phillipson in evidence, that the documents lodged

by the applicant on 20 September did not constitute an

application for permanent resldence as:

a)	the documents were not in the "prescrlbed forrr";
bl	no fee of $200 had been handed over on that day as
required by Regulation 29A(l)(b) made under the

Migration Act 1958; and

c)	At no stage dld Mr Phlllipson consider the letter of 20
September 1985 as an application for a permanent entry
permit as he had not invlted any such application. He
says he merely processed them as representations to the

Mlnister in respect of deportation and caused them to be and forwarded to Canberra as such.

A5 to a), the regulations made under the Act do not prescribe any

form for making an application for permanent residence. Mr

Phillipson, in cross-examination, conceded that no such form was

prescribed nor was there any departmental pro-forma. Perhaps

when he first claimed that there was a prescribed form he was

14

confused with the requirement of r.29AA(8) which provides for a

form approved by the Secretary of the Department in respect of an

application for an unconditional temporary entry permit by the

holder of a conditional temporary entry permit.

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the documents that the

applicant lodged with Mr Philllpson on 20 September 1985, were

not in the prescribed form as was claimed by Mr Fhlllipson.

As to b), r.29A(l)(b) did at that time provide that a fee of $200

be paid on lodging an appllcation for a further entry permit

other than a temporary entry permlt.

But that regulation is not mandatory. Nor does the regulatlon

provide that the payment of the prescribed fee be a condition

precedent to the processing of an application. In the present

case, no request was made for such fees. Nor has there been a

refusal by the applicant to pay this amount. In all the

clrcumstances the Court re~ects this argument, it being of the

view that any failure to pay a prescribed lodgment fee should not

prevent the Court from directing the respondent to furnish 5.13

statement of reasons for failing to consider or refusing to grant

an application such as this.

As to c), a perusal of the documents of 20 September 1985 makes it clear, in the Court's view, that those documents constitute an

application for an entry permit and should have been dealt with

15.

accordingly, even though the fee of $200 was not lodged. The

vords "my appllcation for permanent residence" appear in both

letters. The fact that Mr Phillipson, who obviously could not

have read either letter in detail, did not then understand them

to be such an application is not to the point.

A s to the respondent's second submission, Mr Fleblsek has argued

that assuming the documents were in fact an application for an

entry permit, it cannot be said in this case that there had been

a decision which amounted to a reviewable decision under the

AD(JR) Act. In support, he relied on the decisions of Director

General of Social Services v Chaney (1980) 3 ALD 161 per Deane J at 178; Rloardon v Parole Board (1980) 3 ALD 144 at 150; and

Egans v Friemann (1980) 3 ALD 326 at 329.

The Court understands Mr Plebisek's argument to run thus: Mr

Phillipson dld not make any decision withln the meaning of the

AD(JR) Act because he had merely passed the documents onto

Canberra; the applicant alleges that the decislon complained of

was made by officials in Sydney; the only Sydney decision in this

regard was to forward those documents to Canberra; accordingly

there is no reviewable declslon under the AD(JR) Act.

I reject this submission. Accepting, for the purposes of the

argument. that the action by Mr Phillipson was slmply to

rubber-stamp the documents as "representatlons" rather than as an

application for an entry permit then that action effectively put

16.

the ultimate determination, that of whether an entry permit may be granted in respect of the application, outside or beyond the power of any decision maker. The application, as an application

under the Migration Act, from that point of time was effectively stopped by his action. In my view, in the circumstances of this

case, it could be argued that Mr Phillipson's action in so

stopplng the application was tantamount to a failure to make a

decision on the application. (See s.3(2) and s.7 of the AD(JR)

Act). But no definitive decision by the Court in this regard is

required at this stage of the proceedmgs. The Court is

presently only determining whether an order should be made

directing the respondent to furnish a statement of reasons under s.13 of the AD(JR) Act, the respondent having, in the Court's view, a duty so to do.

Mr Pleblsek's third submission deals wlth the comblned effect of ss.7(2), 6(5) and 6A of the Act. Faraphrasmg those sub-sectlons

and sectlon, an entry permit (defined by s.5(1) to mean a permlt

issued under 5 . 6 of the Act) may be granted while a temporary

entry permit is in force or after a temporary entry permit has

expired or been cancelled. But s . 6 ( 5 ) of the Act provides that

an entry permlt may only be granted to a non-citizen after he has

entered Australia sub~ect to the provisions of s.6A of the Act.

Sectlon 6A(S) provides that a reference to an entry permit in

s.6A shall be read as a reference to an entry permit other than a

temporary entry permlt. A "non-citizen" is defined in s.5 as	"a
person who is not an Australlan citizen".

17.

Section 6A of the Act provides that an entry permit shall not be granted to a non-citizen unless one or more of certain conditions

are fulfllled. But the Court draws the attentlon of the parties

to the observations of Davies J, with whom Evatt J agreed, in

Tans’s case (supra) at p 182 where HIS Honour said:

It is not necessary for ne in this case to examine the

circumstances in which it may be proper for the Minister to

grant a temporary entry permit with a vlew to permitting

conslderation of compassionate or humanitarian grounds. That

matter may be left for a case in which it is of importance.

It is sufflcient for me to emphaslse that proof of those grounds does not bring para (e) (that is, of s.6A(1) of the Act) Into operation o r require the grant of a temporary entry

permit so as to satisfy one of the crlteria of para (e).

Perhaps the present case IS the case in which it is of importance

and consideration should be given to seeking, pursuant o 5 . 7 ( 2 )

of the Act, such a temporary entry permit by the applicant in

order that the Minister might, if a temporary entry permlt be

granted, consider pu suant s.GA(l)(e), to the strong

compassionate and humanitarian grounds prevailing In this matter.

Mr Ilyas is and always has been, at relevant times, a non-citizen as defined. It may be that, as a matter of law, the respondent‘s

arguments in this respect are correct. But whether or not this

is so is not presently the issue. Here, the applicant seeks

orders directing the respondent to furnish s.12 particulars of reasons In respect of his application of 20 September 1985 for permanent residence. In my view, he is entitled to such a statement even if those reasons are simply to the effect that an

18.

entry permit is not granted because he is a non-citizen and that

a deportation order ha5 been granted under s.18 of the Act. An

argument that it is futile to process the application does not

relieve the decision maker of his obligation to furnish s.13

statement of reasons if requested. There is nothing in the Act

and in particular ss.7(2) or 6A giving either expreszljr or impliedly the Minister or his Delegate, the right to refuse the furnishing of such partlculars.

The final submission of the respondent is that the applicant has

applied too late to seek reasons. This is based on s.l3(5)(b) of

the AD(JR) Act.

Effectively, the only decision made by the respondent or any

Delegate in respect of the appllcation for permanent residence

dated 20 September 1986 was the decision of Mr Phillipson made on or about that date to treat the application merely as a further

representation to the Minister in respect of deportation. Such

decision was not conveyed to the applicant, and then only by

inference, until at the earliest, 17 February 1986 when he	was
served with a deportation notice under 5.18 of the Act.

What is a reasonable tlme within the meaning of the Act varies

according to the circumstances. The applicant has not acted

slowly in requesting s.13 reasons in respect of his application dated 20 September 1985 because he did not know of its apFarent refusal, or more correctly, its non appraisal, until 17 February

1986. The applicant, by letter of 25 February 1986 from his solicitors, inferentially requested such reasons. The Court, pursuant to s.13(6) of the AD(JR) Act, declares that the request

was made within reasonable time.

For these reasons and in all the circumstances of this particular

case, the Court is of the view that the respondent should be

directed to furnish a 5-13 statement of reasons to the applicant for refusing or failing to consider his application for an entry permlt dated 20 September 1985, the respondent or his Delegate having, in the Court's mew, a duty so to do. (See Llovd v Costisan (1985) 62 ALR 284 at 293).

The respondent is to pay the applicant his costs of and incidental to the motion herein dated 11 April 1986.

I certlfy that this and the e; &@en

preceding pages are a true CO d y of the

Reasons for Judgment herein of his

Honour Mr Justice Evatt

Associate

Counsel for the Applicant : Mr M. Kimber

Solicitors for the Applicant :

Heaney Richardson & Heaney,

Sydney

Sollcitors for the Respondent :

Australian Government

Solicltor, Sydney.