SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
ILEE v POLICE
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Gray
18 February 2005
CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT AND PUNISHMENT - SENTENCE - FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE
Appeal against sentence imposed by magistrate - appellant pleaded guilty to charges of damage property, unlawfully on premises, theft, unlawful possession and breach of bond - the charge of damage property related to an incident involving the appellant kicking a gate of premises he previously leased - other charges related to the appellant attempting to remove electrical cabling from a carpark - the appellant was sentenced pursuant to section 18A to three months' imprisonment.
On appeal appellant submitted that the magistrate misdirected himself as to the facts, incorrectly understood the appellant's prior criminal record and ought to have suspended the sentence of imprisonment.
Consideration of circumstances of offending - consideration of appellant's criminal antecedents - held magistrate erred in treatment of the circumstances of the offending, the appellant's prior convictions and failure to suspend sentence - appeal allowed.
Appellant re-sentenced - consideration of personal circumstances of appellant - consideration of section 38(1) Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) - appellant sentenced to three months' imprisonment suspended on the entry into a two year supervised bond to be of good behaviour with conditions.
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 85(3), s 134 and s 270C(1); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 17(1); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 18A, s 38(1), referred to.
Anderson v R (1993) 177 CLR 520; Weaver v Samuels [1971] SASR 116; R v Wacyk (1996) 66 SASR 530; Stephens v Police [2002] SASC 187, considered.
ILEE v POLICE
[2005] SASC 54Magistrates Appeal
GRAY J
Introduction
This is an appeal against sentence.
On 3 December 2004 Phillip John Ilee, the appellant, pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to charges that:
-on 3 May 2002 he damaged property such damage amounting to not more than $2000;[1]
-on 29 March 2004:
. he was unlawfully on premises at 176-186 Wakefield Street;[2]
. he attempted to commit theft;[3]
. he was in possession of articles in suspicious circumstances intending to use them to commit an offence of theft.[4]
[1] Section 85(3) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)
[2] Section 17(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA)
[3] Section 134 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)
[4] Section 270C(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA)
Mr Ilee also admitted a breach of a good behaviour bond entered into on 17 July 2003 with respect to offending on 6 March 2003. The offences to which that bond related were property damage, larceny and unlawful possession. Mr Ilee was released on an unsupervised good behaviour bond. No term of imprisonment was fixed. It was a term…
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- Ilee v Police [2005] SASC 54
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- [2005] SASC 54
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the magistrate misdirected himself as to the facts, and if there was any error in the exercise of discretion when sentencing. The court examined whether the magistrate erred in finding the facts and whether he appropriately considered Mr Ilee's criminal antecedents and personal circumstances. The appeal hinged on whether the magistrate's approach to sentencing was legally sound and whether the sentence was appropriate given the circumstances.
The court found that the magistrate misdirected himself as to the facts of the case. The court highlighted that the magistrate was bound to take the view of the offences most favourable to the accused and resolve any disputes by calling evidence. The court noted that the magistrate's language seemed to suggest a more serious set of facts than those presented in the evidence. The court also found that the magistrate did not appropriately consider Mr Ilee's criminal antecedents and personal circumstances. The court concluded that the magistrate's treatment of these factors was insufficient and that the sentence imposed was inappropriate.
The appeal was allowed, the sentence was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the magistrate for re-sentencing.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel also submitted that Mr Ilee’s difficult personal circumstances called for a compassionate approach. It was said that he needed support and supervision. These matters, it was contended, were given insufficient weight by the magistrate.Consideration of the IssuesDid the magistrate misdirect himself as to the facts? The magistrate was bound to take the view of the offences most favourable to the accused or otherwise resolve any dispute by the calling of evidence. In Anderson v The Queen, Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ observed:[5] If, on a sentencing hearing after a plea of guilty, the Crown wishes to rely on some alleged, but disputed, factual circumstance as aggravating the offence, the ordinary rule is that the onus lies upon the Crown to establish the existence of that circumstance. It is common ground, and rightly so, that the standard of proof which rests upon the Crown in such a case in South Australia is the ordinary criminal standard, namely beyond reasonable doubt. If the Crown fails to establish the disputed circumstance of aggravation to that standard of proof, the offender must be sentenced on the basis that the circumstance of aggravation has not been shown to exist.[5] (1993) 177 CLR 520 at 536 In Weaver v Samuels, Bray CJ said:[6]The rule is that if the defendant desires to dispute circumstances of aggravation alleged in sworn evidence for the prosecution, he must do so by sworn evidence from himself or someone else; but if the aggravating matter is not sworn to, but is only alleged on the one hand and denied on the other in an unsworn form, then it is the duty of the court “to act upon the version of the facts which, within the bounds of reasonable possibility, is most favourable to the accused” [Maitland’s Case [1963] SASR 332 at 335].[6] [1971] SASR 116 at 119 On the one hand, the court should be slow to dismiss any plausible explanation for the magistrate’s choice of language. The references to “substantial inconvenience” and “damage” may have related to the offences in respect of which Mr Ilee was being re-sentenced. The word “again” in the sentence “In March you were in commercial premises again trying to take electrical cable for money” may possibly refer to Mr Ilee’s presence on commercial premises for unlawful purposes rather than the taking of electrical cable. The reference to the taking of electrical cabling and “substantial inconvenience and expense” in the same sentence, the use of the word “again” in the second paragraph of the magistrate’s remarks and the magistrate’s comment as to “the relative seriousness of these offences involving damage to other’s property” give considerable force to counsel’s contention that the magistrate proceeded mistakenly as alleged. In the circumstances, the magistrate misdirected himself as to the circumstances of the offences. Magistrate’s treatment of Mr Ilee’s Criminal Antecedents The case for concluding that the magistrate has erred in the exercise of his discretion is made compelling by his treatment of the accused’s record.