FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:
OKUNGBOWA HUBERT IGBINOBA
Applicant
AND:
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NSW POLICE FORCE
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE D HUMPHREYS
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JANUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The First Respondent’s claim for public interest immunity (PII), as identified in the confidential schedule of the First Respondent’s PII claims (MFI-1) (Categories 1 – 6) in respect of documents to be tendered in evidence, produced pursuant to the Notices to Produce issued by the Applicant on 26 March 2023 and 26 August 2023 (Notices to Produce) and discovered pursuant to the orders made on 1 March 2024 (Discovery Orders), is upheld.
2.The information identified in MFI-1 (Categories 7 and 8) in respect of documents to be tendered in evidence, produced pursuant to the Notices to Produce and discovered pursuant to the Discovery Orders is subject to the statutory prohibitions on disclosure claimed by the First Respondent and is not to be disclosed.
3.Pursuant to s 230 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2010 (Cth), until 11:59 pm on 23 January 2032 or further order, information concerning cyber risk as identified in MFI-1 (Category 9) in respect of documents to be tendered in evidence by the First Respondent is not to be disclosed (whether by publication or otherwise) other than to the Applicant and his legal representatives in these proceedings, necessary staff of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia and transcription service providers for the purposes of this proceeding.
4.There shall be no inspection of the documents produced pursuant to the Notices to Produce or discovered pursuant to the Discovery Orders that are contained in:
(a)Confidential Exhibit JC2 to the Confidential Closed Affidavit of Jeffrey John Carige sworn on 1 August 2024, and reproduced as Confidential Exhibit KL-1 to the Affidavit of Kathryn Lockery sworn 2 December…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Igbinoba v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) and more:
In the matter of Igbinoba v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3), the Court was tasked with deciding public interest immunity (PII) claims made by the Commonwealth regarding documents subpoenaed by Mr Igbinoba. This decision follows a separate judgement concerning PII claims on documents subpoenaed from NSW Police (Igbinoba v Commonwealth of Australia (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 1352). Mr Igbinoba, an Australian citizen born in Nigeria, has alleged unlawful discrimination by the Commonwealth and Australian Border Force (ABF) officials, claiming systemic targeting and extensive searches and interrogations on multiple re-entries into Australia over two decades. He seeks orders for compensation, costs, and an injunction against continued discrimination.
The legal issues before the Court involved the balancing of the public interest in withholding certain information against the public interest in ensuring the Court has access to relevant evidence for justice. The Court considered whether the documents were material to the proceedings, the legitimacy of the PII claim, and the risk of harm to the public interest from disclosure. The Court referred to various authorities, including Hu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 86, and Parkin v O'Sullivan [2009] FCA 1096, to guide its decision.
The Court held that the Commonwealth's PII claims were valid, primarily due to the significant risk of inadvertent disclosure compromising national security and intelligence operations. The Court emphasised that even providing a gist of the material or appointing a special advocate would not sufficiently mitigate this risk. The Court concluded that the documents could be provided to Mr Igbinoba in a redacted form to ensure any sensitive information was protected while still allowing the Court to perform its judicial function.
The Court upheld all claims for PII, allowing the documents to be provided to Mr Igbinoba in a redacted form to balance the interests of national security and open justice. This decision ensures that the Court can proceed with the case while protecting sensitive information that could harm the public interest if disclosed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
This judgement concerns public interest immunity (PII) claims made by the Commonwealth in respect of documentation subject to subpoena by the applicant Mr Igbinoba. A separate judgement has been delivered in relation to claims for PII as to documents subject to subpoena from NSW Police; (see: Igbinoba v Commonwealth of Australia(No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 1352).BACKGROUND The applicant has commenced proceedings in the Court alleging unlawful discrimination under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The applicant was born in May 1973 in Nigeria and is of central African/ Nigerian ethnicity. Between February 1998 and September 2004, the applicant was an immigrant and the holder of valid Australian visas. He became an Australian citizen in 2004. The applicant has worked in the freight, shipping and cargo industry for the past 14 years and has travelled internationally frequently during the period 1998 to 2020. The applicant claims that on 32 occasions during the period February 1998 to January 2020, upon seeking re-entry into Australia, he was temporarily detained by Australian Border Force (ABF) officials, had his luggage emptied, searched and inspected at the ABF search area, was further questioned and interrogated, was the subject of a pat down search on occasions, had his laptop and mobile phone confiscated from him, inspected and searched, on one occasion had his body searched, swabbed and patted down including being asked to sign a consent form to be transferred to St George Hospital further examination. On each occasion he claims he was detained for a minimum of two hours and up to, on occasions four hours, prior to being cleared to leave the airport. The applicant alleges he has been subjected to unlawful discrimination by the first respondent and the ABF for a period exceeding 20 years. This discrimination is in relation to his race/colour, and his ethnicity and origin. The applicant alleges that since 1998, the first respondent has consistently engaged in a pattern of conduct towards the applicant whereby on each and every re-entry of the applicant into Australia he has been systemically targeted at the arrival gates of the airport. He claims he has been stopped and detained for lengthy periods of time, including on occasions for several hours, repeatedly asked questions together with searches of the applicant and his possessions. He alleges the first respondent has behaved in a manner that has caused him significant embarrassment, hurt and distress, together with nuisance and delay. He alleges he has been treated in a manner materially distinct to and adversely from the way other travellers and citizens are treated who re-enter Australia. Mr Igbinoba alleges the actions of the first respondent denied him the freedom to leave the airport within a reasonable timeframe. The applicant seeks orders restraining the Commonwealth from continuing to subject the applicant to racial discrimination within the meaning of s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) together with compensation and costs.THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In Hu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 86, at [22] – [31], I set out the relevant law in relation to claims for PII as follows:[22] The respondent opposes any material to which the public interest immunity is claimed, including the confidential affidavits of Mr Quinn being made available to the applicants even on a restricted basis to their legal representatives. It was submitted in determining whether or not to allow a claim of public interest immunity, a Court must balance the public interest in withholding the disclosure of information or the production of a document as against the public interest in ensuring that the Courts perform the functions of justice should have access to the relevant evidence, Sankey v Whitlam 1978] HCA 43 at 44, approved of in MacAlister v The Queen [1990] HCA 15 at 412. In Attorney General of New South Wales v Stuart at 675 and 676, Hunt CJ at Common Law, as he was then, stated:It is necessary for a party seeking to overcome a claim of public interest immunity to demonstrate if legitimate forensic purpose for seeking the documents before the judge proceeds to the balancing process. [23] A three stage process is to be followed: first, determining whether the evidence sought to be obtained is material in the sense that there are concrete grounds to believe the disclosure of the documents or information would materially assist in the nature of the issues in the proceeds; second, whether or not there is a sound basis for the claim of immunity; and third, the balancing exercise. As to the first of these steps, as was said in New South Wales Commissioner of Police v Attorney General at New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 595 ("Commissioner") at paragraph 59:The essential enquiry is the extent to which the documents and information will, or are likely to, materially assist the identified issue in the proceedings, not merely potential or conceivable relevance assessed with or without reference to the issues in the proceedings.[24] The issues must be identified with some degree of particularity having regard to the nature of the proceedings in question, see Commissioner at paragraph 60. If the documents are not material in the sense described, the Court will not proceed to conduct the balancing exercise. As to the second step, consideration should be given as to whether the harm to the public interest could arise from the disclosure depends upon there being "a real possibility as opposed to a probability of harm" and "incurring the identified risk (of harm) is of itself injurious to the public interest", Commissioner at [58]. If a claim for public interest immunity is upheld, the documents or information need not be produced to the Court and the documents or information are not available to be and cannot be adduced in evidence or relied upon by the Court, (see; Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Limited [2013] 252 CLR 38 at 41. [25] Now, it is right to say that effective law enforcement is a proper basis for the claiming of public interest immunity. This includes material which might disclose law enforcement or intelligence gathering methodologies as well as preventing prejudice to the prosecution of offences both current and into the future. The Court was taken to a significant number of cases and, in particular, the ones that the Court has regard to are El Ossman v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] 636 FCA at paragraph 30, Jaffarie v Director-General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102 at paragraphs 25 to 27, and particularly Parkin v O'Sullivan [2009] FCA 1096 at paragraphs 23 to 30. [26] I have regard particularly in Parkin v O'Sullivan which is a judgment of Sundberg J of the Federal Court in Melbourne on 30 September 2009. He sets out at paragraphs 23 and onwards the appropriate course to be followed by reference to a significant number of cases including Regina v Bebic (NSWCA, Samuels JA, Nagle CJ and Cantor J, 27 May 1982) and Haj-Ismail v Minister for Immigration Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1982) ALR 45. At paragraph 29, Sundberg J said:In some cases considered above, reference has been made to disclosure of confidential information to legal advisers subject to appropriate undertakings. Such undertakings were offered in the present case.I note that they have been offered in this particular case as well:There are many cases in which access has been denied to legal advisers who have offered undertakings on the ground that the risk to national security flowing from inadvertent disclosure is simply too high. There is an elaborate discussion of risk in Regina v Khazaal [2006] NSWSC at 31 to 39, and Traljesic v The Attorney-General Commonwealth [2006] 150 FCR 199 at paragraphs 22 to 23.[27] His Honour goes on to say at paragraph 30:Having carefully studied the redacted parts of the respondent’s Affidavit I have concluded that they should not be made available to the applicants’ legal advisers, even on the giving of appropriate undertakings. There are many cases that establish that courts should attach a very considerable weight to the view of what national security requires as is expressed by the responsible officer.[28] In this particular case the material has been provided to me and I have studied it with some closeness. I have also been taken to the case of SDCV v The Director-General of Security ("SDVC") which was a decision of the High Court of Australia reported at [2022] HCA 32. I have considered first of all in terms of the material that is in the Affidavit itself is simply incapable, that being the second Affidavit of Mr Quinn which is the confidential Affidavit, it is simply unable to be redacted or otherwise altered in such a way as would not allow the disclosure of further information which would compromise the actual information contained within the redacted documents which I have seen in unredacted form. [29] At SDVC at [287] and [302] a number of courses were set out. They include the disclosure of the gist of the material. In my view, having read the material itself, even to disclose the gist of the material would be likely to compromise the Commonwealth's intelligence gathering opportunities or methodologies and/or gaps in intelligence gathering as well as it would provide information which would alert the applicants in relation to any ongoing inquiries that may or may not be applicable to them. The second course was the appointment of a special advocate. I have not been asked to do that and in light of what I have said above, I am not satisfied that the appointment of a special advocate would in any way assist in relation to the disposition of these issues one way or the other. [30] The third issue would be the disclosure to the applicants' legal representatives of Mr Quinn's Affidavit on the basis of confidentiality. I have considered this course very carefully as to whether or not it could be disclosed to the applicants' legal representatives. I have studied the material of itself. It would seem to me that there would be grave danger if that course was adopted that there could well be inadvertent disclosure, and in saying that I make no aspersion against the applicants' legal representatives. It is simply a case that the material itself and the nature of it is such that it would be almost impossible to discuss that information without being in a position with the applicants without actually disclosing the nature of it. In my view, whilst that is a course that might well be available in some cases, it is inappropriate in this particular matter. [31] There is also the fourth and final option which would be to reject the confidential evidence at all. I have had regard to what I consider to be the overriding requirements for open justice and procedural fairness.THE EVIDENCE
Decision
Reasons for decision
Finally, I am not satisfied that provision of the information on a confidential basis to the applicant’s legal representatives is a viable course of action due to the risk of inadvertent disclosure.CONCLUSION Each of the claims for PII is upheld. The documents may be provided to the applicant in a redacted form.