Igaki Australia P/L v Coastmine P/L

[1994] FCA 872

872 ,CjY

JUDGMENT NO. .. . .a - . . ,......m.

No. QG 103 of 1991

THE FEDERAL COURT OF )

REGISTRY 1

- 1

BETWEEN:  JGAKI m I A PTY. LTD.

First Applicant

AND l BSI. GAYKUEN

Second Applicant

AND I -

First Respondent

AND I

Second Respondent

AND :  -

Third Respondent

AND I -

Fourth Respondent

AND I

Fifth Respondent

AND :  -

Cross-Claimant

AND I E PTY. LTP,

Brisbane

First Cross-Respondent

AND l -

Second Cross-Respondent

AND :  P

Third Cross-Respondent

Drummond J

10 November, 1994

1.         The applicants' proceedings against the first, second and third respondents are dismissed without any order in respect of the costs of those respondents of or incidental to those proceedings.

2.         The applicants' proceedings against the fifth respondent are dismissed;

3 .         The applicants pay the fifth respondent's costs, including reserved costs, of and incidental to those proceedings to be taxed.

K?n: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in

Order 36 of the - 1 Court Rula.

FEDERAL COURT OF A U S T R U ) NO. QG 103 of 1991

1

)

BETWEEN: JGAKI - A PTY. LTD.

Pirst Applicant

AND :

Second Applicant

AND :

Pirst Respondent

AND :  -

Second Respondent

AND :  p

Third Respondent

AND :  -

Fourth Respondent

AND :

Fifth Respondent

AND I -

Crosa-Claimant

AND :

Pirst Cross-Respondent

AND: v

Second Cross-Respondent

AND :  p

Third Cross-Respondent

GsUml~ Drunmond J

s?&Qg	10 November, 1994
Z b S :	Brisbane

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

On 2 November I published my reasons for deciding to dismiss the applicants' claims against the first, second, third and fifth respondents and also for my refusal to make any order that the first to third respondents recover their costs of the action from the applicants. An to the entitlement of the fifth respondent to his costs of the action against the applicants, I then said:

"Irrespective of any findings that might be made concerning Steer's conduct, he did not cause the applicants any of the loss they suffered. This consideration, together with the absence of any justification for implicating Steer in the 'black money' discussions seems to me at the moment to make it inappropriate to deprive him of his costa of the proceedings. I will, however, give the applicants an opportunity, if they wish, to contend for a contrary outcome on these costs."

The applicants have now submitted that I should deprive the fifth respondent of all or, alternatively, of part of his costs even though he has been succeaaful in resisting	the applicants' claims against him. They advanced three	reasons why one or other of these orders should be made:
firstly, to reflect disapproval of Steer's conduct in involving himself in the attempt by Burgess and Karlos to dupe Igaki into parting with the $4 million he ultimately caused the first applicant to pay to the first respondent; secondly, to reflect the time taken up in litigating Steer's untruthful assertion of minimal involvement in the preparation of the
"private sale" document and, thirdly, to reflect my findings as to the lack of credence in his evidence.
I have been referred to a number of authorities, including retazzo v umbara (1975) 13 S.A.S.R. 4 where
Jacobs J at page 16 sounded what he called *a note of cautious disapproval", designed to disabuse litigants of the expectation that where they have ultimately failed in an action but have succeeded on some of the issues litigated, costs will be apportioned according to the success and failure of each party in respect of those issues. This caution, appropriate though it may have been back in 1975 and even 10 years later when Toohey J mentioned it in his judgment in
IiWu v Wecrtern (1986)
A.T.P.R. 40-748 at 48,136, may now have lost aome of it8 force. There i such concern at containing the costs of resolving disputes by litigation that the courts are, I think, now readier than before to depart from the prima facie rule that the successful party recovers all his costs, as an
determinations only of, issues of critical significance to the encouragement for litigants to focus on, and to seek resolution of the dispute between them.
In my view the discretion with respect to costs is a broad one, to be exercised judicially, i.e., for reasons connected with the case. It is not circumscribed by rigid rules. The most that can be said ia that the conduct of a respondent that gives rise to the dispute will rarely be relevant to whether a successful respondent should be deprived of any of his costs, but the conduct of a successful respondent at, or in connection with, the running of the litigation itself is relevant to the exercise of the discretion to deprive him of some or all of his costs. I refer to the decision I gave in The Trout Ptv. Ltd, v
bav Ptv. Ltd, on 8 February, 1994, a decision on costs recently affirmed by the Pull Court in a judgment given on 7 November, 1994, and also to Tela Ptv. LtQ, v & n ~ o l Ltd. (1986) A.T.P.R. 40-746.
In my view this is not a case in which I should deprive the fifth respondent of his costs of the proceedings against the applicant#, for a number of reasons. Firstly, points 1 and 3 relied on by the applicants are really founded on conduct by the fifth respondent that, at its highest for the applicants, can be said to be conduct that gave rise to the dispute rather than conduct at the trial or conduct in connection with the way the fifth respondent ran his case at
the trial.
Secondly, given this, since I have concluded that Steer's conduct did not cause the applicants any loss because Mr. Igaki did not rely on anything he said, did, or failed to do, it would not be appropriate to treat this as one of those rare cases in which the discretion with respect to costs should be exercised, in a sense to punish a litigant for

S

conduct not connected with the running of litigation but with
the events out of which the litigation itself arose.

Thirdly, as to the applicants' second point, it is true that Steer did, in his written statement, seek to distance himself from anything other than very limited involvement in the preparation of the "private sale" agreement. In paragraph 12 of his written statement, to which counsel for the applicants directed me, Steer said:

"The projections prepared by me were mathematical calculations and were the result of a mechanical derivation from information provided or approved by my client."

However, he did, from the outset, make it clear that he had an extensive association with the first, second, and third respondents and an extensive involvement in the provision of accounting services to them. See, by way of example, what he says in paragraph 2 of that same statement.

document was responsible for extending, to any significant	his involvement in the preparation of the private sale	I do not think the time taken to illulninate the full extent of
extent, the lengthy trial of this action.

I will therefore make the following orders:

(1)	That the applicants' proceedings against the first, second and third respondents are dismissed without any order in respect of the costs of those respondents of or incidental to those proceedings;
( 2	That the applicants' proceedings against the fifth respondent are dismissed;

( 3 ) That the applicants pay the fifth

respondent's costs, including reserved costs, of and incidental to those proceedings to be taxed.

I certify that this and the preceding

five pages are a true copy of the
reasons for judgment herein of the

Honourable Mr. Justice Drummond.

Associate:

Date :	10 November, 1994
Counsel for the applicants:	R.R. Douglas Q.C.
Solicitors for the applicants:	Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher
Counsel for the first, second

and third respondents:  N.E. Ulrick

Solicitors for the first,

eecond and third respondents:  Steindls

Couneel for the fifth respondent:	E.M. O'Reilly
Solicitor for the fifth respondent:	Feez Ruthning
Date of Hearing:	10 November, 1994