IDI Enterprises Pty Ltd v Classified Transport Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Full Court)

IDI ENTERPRISES PTY LTD & ANOR v CLASSIFIED TRANSPORT PTY LTD

[2011] SASCFC 123

Judgment of The Full Court

(The Honourable Chief Justice Doyle, The Honourable Justice Vanstone and The Honourable Justice Peek)

3 November 2011

TRADE AND COMMERCE - TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) AND RELATED LEGISLATION - CONSUMER PROTECTION - MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT OR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS - CHARACTER OR ATTRIBUTES OF CONDUCT OR REPRESENTATION - STATEMENTS AS TO FUTURE MATTERS AND PROMISES

TRADE AND COMMERCE - TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) AND RELATED LEGISLATION - CONSUMER PROTECTION - MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE CONDUCT OR FALSE REPRESENTATIONS - PARTICULAR CASES - REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

The appellant agreed to pay a total of $280,000 for a hotel business - the parties signed a written contract reciting a price of $201,000 on the basis of the appellant’s representations that a further $79,000 by way of a vendor loan would be repaid in instalments and that if the respondent had that loan agreement drawn up by her solicitor the appellant would sign it - settlement was executed on the basis of the written contract but the appellant later refused to pay the outstanding $79,000 or to sign the loan agreement drawn up by the appellant’s solicitor - whether representations made as to future conduct may constitute misleading or deceptive conduct for the purposes of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA).

Held: A specific representation made by a person who, at the time of making it, has a positive intention of acting in a way contrary to that representation, may constitute false or misleading conduct within the meaning of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) irrespective of the non-inclusion of that representation in the written contract executed by the representor and representee.

Whether the trial Judge erred in assessing damages for misleading or deceptive conduct as the loss of the benefit of the appellants’ representation and promise that the respondent would be paid a total amount of $280,000 – whether the trial Judge erred in finding that the value of the hotel business was established to be $280,000.

Held: The trial Judge was correct in finding the value of the hotel business to be $280,000 – the trial Judge was correct in awarding $79,000 as damages for the false or misleading conduct.

Appeal dismissed.

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 52, 87; Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) s 56; Misrepresentation Act 1972 (SA) s 7, referred to.
Cohen v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 57, applied.
Maybury v Atlantic Union Oil Company Ltd (1953) 89 CLR 507; Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd (2004) 218 CLR 471; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165; Nassif v Fahd [2007] NSWCA 269; Marks v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd (1998) 196 CLR 494; Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society…

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Details
Case
[2011] SASCFC 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

IDI Enterprises Pty Ltd (the appellant) and Classified Transport Pty Ltd (the respondent) entered into a contract for the sale of a hotel business. The dispute arose because the written contract recited a purchase price of $201,000, whereas the appellant represented that a further $79,000 would be provided by way of a vendor loan, to be repaid in instalments and documented by a separate loan agreement. Following settlement based on the written contract, the appellant refused to pay the outstanding $79,000 or sign the loan agreement. The appeal concerned whether representations made as to future conduct could constitute misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA).

The court was required to determine whether the representations made by the appellant regarding the vendor loan constituted misleading or deceptive conduct. Specifically, the court had to consider if statements about future conduct, such as the intention to repay a loan and sign a loan agreement, could be actionable under consumer protection legislation. The court also considered the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility of witnesses, as well as the potential issue of illegality, although this was not raised by the parties.

The court upheld the trial judge's findings, which were based on a detailed and logical scrutiny of the evidence. The trial judge found the respondent's witnesses to be credible and their evidence to be overwhelming, particularly in corroborating the existence of the oral agreement for vendor finance and the subsequent loan. Conversely, the trial judge found the appellant's witnesses, Glenda and Wayne, to be lacking in credibility. The court noted that the appellant's actions, such as preparing loan agreements at considerable expense and presenting them for execution, supported the respondent's account. The court also agreed with the trial judge's assessment that the evidence did not establish illegality to a degree that would defeat the respondent's claim, particularly given the appellant's requirement for a documented loan agreement.

The appeal was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

IDI Enterprises Pty Ltd (the appellant) entered into a written contract with Classified Transport Pty Ltd (the respondent) for the sale of a hotel business. The written contract stated a sale price of $201,000, but the appellant represented that a further $79,000 would be repaid in instalments by way of a vendor loan. The appellant further represented that if the respondent had the loan agreement drawn up by her solicitor, the appellant would sign it. Settlement was executed based on the terms of the written contract, but the appellant later refused to pay the outstanding $79,000 or to sign the loan agreement drawn up by the appellant's solicitor.

The respondent called several witnesses who gave evidence that the appellant made various statements during conversations which were consistent with the respondent's position at trial. The appellant attempted to discredit these witnesses but the trial judge found their evidence to be credible and accepted it. The trial judge also found the evidence of an independent witness, the Hotel Broker, to be reliable and accepted it over that of the appellant. The trial judge found the appellant's evidence to be unconvincing and had no confidence in the credibility of the respondent's representatives, Glenda and Wayne.

The trial judge found that the appellant and the respondent had orally agreed to the sale and purchase of the hotel for $280,000, of which $201,000 would be formally recorded as the contract sum and the balance of $79,000 would be vendor finance to be recorded by way of a separate agreement. The trial judge also found that the appellant had prepared and given to the respondent any one or all of the statutory declaration and the two loan agreements to which she referred and that the respondent took them and said she would refer them to her solicitor for advice. The trial judge found that the appellant had personally approached the respondent on various occasions asking for repayment of loan moneys and that the respondent never denied the asserted debt. The trial judge also found that the appellant had asked the respondent's representative, Wayne, when the loan was going to be repaid and that Wayne did not dispute the debt but refused to make any payments to the appellant.

The matter of IDI Enterprises Pty Ltd v Classified Transport Pty Ltd came before the court following a trial in the South Australian Supreme Court, where the respondent, IDI Enterprises, sought to enforce an alleged oral agreement for the sale of a hotel business, including a vendor loan of $79,000. The appellant, Classified Transport, refused to honour the loan agreement, leading to the respondent initiating proceedings. The trial judge's detailed scrutiny of the evidence, including witness testimonies and documentary materials, resulted in findings that supported the respondent's position. The trial judge accepted the credibility of several witnesses who corroborated the respondent's account and rejected the appellant's attempts to discredit these testimonies. The judge also found the appellants' evidence unconvincing, particularly regarding their claims of lack of involvement and memory lapses. The appeal against the trial judge's decision was subsequently dismissed, with the appellate court affirming the trial judge's approach and findings on the evidence.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The matter of possible illegality is not raised on appeal and I do not consider that in the circumstances it is necessary to consider the matter further.The trial Judge’s approach to the evidence The learned trial Judge scrutinised the evidence of the numerous witnesses called by both sides at depth. His approach was logical and painstaking. He carefully considered the opposing arguments of the parties and gave full reasons for his resolutions of the various conflicts in the evidence. I do not disagree in any significant way with his Honour’s approach to the evidence.The trial Judge’s findings as to the credibility of the witnesses The respondent called a number of witnesses who gave evidence of being present at various conversations during which the Carters made statements which were entirely consistent with their position at trial and confirmatory of the respondent’s position. The appellants at trial attempted to attack this evidence but its cumulative effect was overwhelming. His Honour accepted those witnesses and it would be futile to contend that such acceptance is to be overturned on appeal. After considering the evidence of each of the witnesses in considerable detail his Honour stated:[216]Attempts were made by the defence to discredit all those parties, either because of their closeness to Kerrie or because of bad blood between them and the Carters, or both, but individually, and in a collective way too, I found myself satisfied they were witnesses of truth. His Honour also considered carefully the evidence of the Hotel Broker, Saponari who was an independent witness and whose evidence was at odds with the Carters in a number of areas. His Honour stated:[217]Of particular significance was the evidence of Saponari, who spoke of a level and frequency of dealing with the Carters and of detail that cannot sit with their respective claims to have had virtually nothing to do with him. I very much prefer and accept his evidence over that of the Carters and he was truly independent. His claimed level of dealing with them cannot be reconciled with their account of things, but it does mesh with Kerrie’s claim, which I accept, that Glenda told her she did not like him and did not want to deal with him. I found him to be a reliable witness who had no axe to grind and, with the single reservation as to the accuracy of his unaided recollection of actual figures negotiated, I accept everything he said. As to the parties and the major witnesses, his Honour found as follows:[218]Whilst the steps taken by Kerrie, at some considerable expense, to have the loan agreements prepared might be regarded as self-serving acts and not truly corroborative of her account, the fact, as I find it, that she gave them to Glenda and that Glenda took them without disputing a liability is pertinent because Glenda’s own account was a firm denial that she ever received either and, indeed, she said she first heard of any claim by Kerrie about a debt at about the time of the letter of demand. There is no doubt that Kerrie had had those documents prepared at that earlier time and at some considerable cost, and I find it inconceivable (whatever of Glenda’s denial of indebtedness) that they were not then presented to her for execution.[219]Conversely, I had no confidence whatsoever in the credibility of either Glenda or Wayne. For reasons already discussed, each presented unconvincingly in the witness box and, in particular, Glenda’s claimed lack of recall about certain matters, her continued requests for repetition of questions asked and her rote responses to any propositions which either troubled her or with which she did not agree, led me to conclude that she could not be relied upon at all. By way of contrast, Wayne was over-confident, glib and dismissive.

Decision

Reasons for decision

PEEK J
In my view, it is clear that his Honour’s award may be supported on the basis referred to above and, accordingly, it is unnecessary to deal with the other grounds of appeal. Conclusion I would dismiss the appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PEEK J

His Honour distilled the essential factual issues as follows:[206]There were a number of minor disputes but the significant factual issues raised by the plaintiff’s case were as follows:(1) Did the Carters negotiate with Kerrie from an asking price for the hotel of $400,000 down to $320,000 and then to $280,000 as Kerrie said, or was there only one offer of $200,000?(2) Did Kerrie and Glenda orally agree, on 14 August 2006, to the sale and purchase of the hotel for $280,000, of which $201,000 would be formally recorded as the contract sum and the balance of $79,000 would be vendor finance to be recorded by way of a separate agreement?(3) If yes, did they then agree that the defendants or one of them would pay that balance of $79,000 to the plaintiff by eight monthly instalments of $9,000 and one of $7,000, that if for some reason the hotel or their property in New South Wales was sold in the meantime, the balance owing to Kerrie would be paid from the proceeds and that they would have a separate agreement drawn up to record that loan?(4) If yes, was Kylie Dawson present when those terms were confirmed between Kerrie and Glenda?(5) Did Kerrie prepare and give to Glenda any one or all of the statutory declaration and the two loan agreements to which she referred and did Glenda take them and say she would refer them to her solicitor for advice?(6) Did either Glenda or Wayne speak to particular persons at or near the hotel at various times before or after settlement, confirming their indebtedness to Kerrie for vendor finance of $79,000 or $80,000? (7) Did Kerrie personally approach Glenda in November and December 2006 and on various occasions up to March 2007 asking for repayment of loan moneys and did Glenda never, on any such occasion, deny the asserted debt?(8) During a telephone conversation with Wayne after the Carters had returned to New South Wales, did Kerrie ask Wayne when the loan was going to be repaid and did Wayne not then dispute the debt but otherwise refuse to make any payments to Kerrie?The resolution of those factual questions falls to be determined not merely by an evaluation of the credibility or the reliability of the principal parties, but also having regard to the credibility of the accounts of those witnesses who tended to corroborate the plaintiff’s account and, as well, the documentary materials tendered in evidence. The trial Judge’s consideration of the possibility of illegality Although never asserted or pleaded by either party, his Honour was right to address the matter. His Honour decided that the plaintiff’s claim should not be defeated on the basis of illegality and stated: … the issue was never pleaded by the defendants (refer Harry Goudias v Akakios[1]) so it does not appear I should decide it and, in the event, the evidence did not ultimately reach the height of establishing any level of mutuality about a possible attempt to defraud the revenue. Whilst, accepting the plaintiff’s case, there may have been grounds for suspicion about such a plan on the part of the defendants, Glenda and Wayne denied the existence of the suggested arrangement. Kerrie’s evidence was to the effect that they were seeking an off-the-record arrangement for their own reasons, that she then believed that unless it was put into effect there would be no sale and that she was prepared to go along with it, albeit that she required it to be documented. Her latter requirement and indeed the steps she subsequently took to have a formal loan agreement prepared and signed, argue against her complicity in any such scheme.[1] (2007) 97 SASR 93.