Ibrahim v Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd

DETERMINATION OF APPEAL PANEL
CITATION:	Ibrahim v Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd [2024] NSWPICMP 620
APPELLANT:	Ahmed Ali Ibrahim
RESPONDENT:	Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd
APPEAL PANEL
MEMBER:	Marshal Douglas
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	Christopher Grainge
MEDICAL ASSESSOR:	David Crocker
DATE OF DECISION:	3 September 2024
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998; whether deduction Medical Assessor (MA) made under section 323(1) of 3/10^th was correct; Held – deduction incorrect because MA made the deduction on the appellant’s genetic susceptibility, as at the time of injury, to develop a subsequent condition; Medical Assessment Certificate revoked.

BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION TO APPEAL

Ahmed Ali Ibrahim, the appellant, has appealed against the medical assessment Dr Mark Burns conducted of various medical disputes between the appellant and his employer Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd, the respondent, relating to the degree of permanent impairment the appellant has from an injury he suffered on 15 January 2009.
It is necessary to set out at some length the background to the appellant’s appeal so as to make clear the issues with which the Appeal Panel is dealing in this matter and, consequently, make clear the Appeal Panel’s reasons for its decision.
On 15 January 2009 the appellant suffered an injury during the course of his employment with the respondent while stacking rolls of cotton on a conveyor belt. On 25 August 2010 a Medical Appeal Panel constituted by the Workers Compensation Commission, being the predecessor of the Personal Injury Commission (Commission), issued a Medical Assessment Certificate pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) certifying that the appellant then had a degree of permanent impairment from that injury of the order of 2% whole person impairment (WPI), comprising 0% WPI relating to his lumbar spine and 2% WPI relating to his right upper extremity.
Following the issue of that certificate the Workers Compensation Commission on
16 September 2010 made an order that the respondent pay the appellant compensation of $2,750 for 2% permanent impairment from his injury on 15 January 2009 pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act1987 (the 1987 Act).
On 13 July 2021 the appellant’s solicitors wrote to the respondent’s solicitors advising them that the appellant was making claims for compensation under the 1987 Act including a claim for compensation for further permanent impairment from his injury. The appellant’s solicitors also advised the respondent’s solicitors that the appellant intended to make a claim for work injury damages. The appellant’s solicitors in their correspondence described the injuries the appellant suffered on 15 January 2009 as comprising an injury to his cervical spine, an injury to his lumbar spine, an injury to his right upper extremity, an injury to his right lower extremity and type 2 diabetes mellitus.
The appellant’s solicitors also provided the respondent’s solicitors with their correspondence reports of orthopaedic surgeon Dr Eugene Gehr dated 6 March and 8 July 2021 and a report of endocrinologist Dr Stephen Thornley dated 9 June 2021 to support the appellant’s claims.
In his report of 9 March 2020 Dr Gehr advised that he had assessed the appellant had 35% WPI from his injury insofar as it related to his cervical spine, lumbar spine, right upper extremity and lower extremity. Dr Thornley in his report of 9 June 2021 advised he had assessed the appellant had an overall permanent impairment of 8% WPI relating to the appellant’s type 2 diabetes mellitus but in assessing the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from his injury he made a “reduction by 30% due to genetic factors”, such that he assessed the appellant had 6% WPI relating to diabetes mellitus from the appellant’s injury.
In his report of 8 July 2021 Dr Gehr advised the appellant’s solicitors that when his assessment, as advised in his report of 9 March 2020, is combined with the assessment
Dr Thornley had made, the appellant has a degree of permanent impairment from his injury of 39% WPI.
On 8 October 2021 the respondent’s insurer issued a declinature notice to the appellant under s 78 of the 1998 Act advising the appellant it disputed the claim he made for compensation for permanent impairment. It described his injury within that noticed as “lumbar spine, cervical spine, right upper extremity and right lower extremity; and diabetes”. It advised him that it accepted he had injured his back, right shoulder and right knee in the incident of 15 January 2009 but it disputed that he had injured his neck.
Preceding the respondent’s insurer issuing the declinature notice to the appellant, the respondent’s solicitors had arranged for the appellant to be examined by orthopaedic surgeon Dr Frank Machart, who in a report dated 29 July 2020 advised that he had assessed the appellant had 2% WPI from his injury comprising 0% lumbar spine, 0% cervical spine, 0% right lower extremity and 2% WPI for the right upper extremity. Further, the respondent’s solicitors had also earlier organised for the appellant to be examined by endocrinologist Professor John Carter who in a report of 16 August 2021 advised he had assessed the appellant had 6% WPI due to type 2 diabetes of which he considered 4% WPI was due to a pre-existing condition such that he assessed the appellant had 2% WPI from his injury on
15 January 2009. The insurer in its s 78 declinature notice advised the appellant that with respect to the injuries it agreed he had suffered from the incident on 15 January 2009, it considered his permanent impairment did not exceed 10% WPI, as required by s 66(1) of the 1987 Act for him to be entitled to compensation for permanent impairment. Hence its reason to dispute the respondent was liable to pay him the compensation he claimed.
It is apt to note at this juncture that the appellant’s claim insofar as it relates to diabetes mellitus is that this is a condition that resulted from the injuries he suffered in the incident on 15 January 2009. Specifically, the appellant claims that his injury in 2009 caused a reduction in his physical activity which in turn brought forward the onset of his illness.
On 25 October 2021 the appellant’s solicitors lodged with the Commission on behalf of the appellant an Application to Resolve a Dispute seeking the Commission to determine his claim for compensation for permanent impairment and also a claim he had made for weekly payments of compensation. The matter was referred to one of the Commission’s Members, namely Mr John Wynyard, who with the consent of the parties made several directions on
29 November 2021, that were recorded in a Certificate of Determination, and which included the following:
“I remit this matter to the President for referral to a Medical Assessor for a whole person impairment assessment on the following bases:
(a) Date of injury: 15 January 2009
(b) Matters for assessment: Lumbar spine
Right upper extremity (shoulder)
Right lower extremity (knee)
Endocrine system
(c) Evidence: (i) ARD and attached documents
(ii) Reply and attached documents
(iii) Such further documents as are lodged pursuant to my following direction.”
A delegate of the President of the Commission duly abided that direction, choosing, in accordance with s 321(2) of the 1998 Act, Medical Assessor Mark Burns (the Medical Assessor) to assess the medical disputes between the parties regarding the appellant’s claim for compensation for permanent impairment from his injury.
On 27 July 2022 the Medical Assessor conducted an examination of the appellant so as to assess the referred medical disputes. On 31 August 2022 he issued a Medical Assessment Certificate in response to the recording his certification of the assessments he made (the MAC).
The Medical Assessor certified that he had assessed the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from his injury of 15 January 2009 is 13% WPI. That comprised 7% WPI relating to the appellant’s lumbar spine, 2% WPI relating to the appellant’s right upper extremity, 0% WPI relating to the appellant’s right lower extremity and 4% WPI relating to diabetes, that is the appellant’s endocrine system. With respect to the appellant’s permanent impairment relating to diabetes the Medical Assessor stated in the MAC that he assessed the appellant had an overall degree of permanent impairment of 6% but he had assessed a proportion of that permanent impairment was due to a pre-existing condition and the extent of that proportion was three-tenths which he deducted in accordance with s 323(1) of the 1998 Act, and hence his assessment and certification that the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from his injury insofar as it related to diabetes was 4% WPI.
No issue has been raised in the appellant’s appeal against the Medical Assessor’s assessment of the referred medical disputes regarding the Medical Assessor’s assessment of the appellant’s permanent impairment relating to his lumbar spine, right upper extremity, right lower extremity and the appellant’s overall permanent impairment relating to his diabetes. The issue that has been raised by the appellant in his appeal relates to the Medical Assessor finding that he had a pre-existing condition that contributed a proportion of that part of his permanent impairment from his injuries that related to his diabetes.
The Medical Assessor provided the following explanation in the MAC for making that finding and deduction:
“With respect to his diabetes I note that his lack of exercise over a number of years would be seen as a contributing factor to the early development of type 2 diabetes. By far the largest contributor to the development of diabetes is in fact genetic factors. From Table 10-8 from AMA 5 he would fall into Class 2 as he has diabetes with no end organ damage and only requires a very low dose of medication. He would be at the lower end of this class, which is 6% whole person impairment. Considering the genetic component I believe that a 3 tenths deduction would be appropriate and he therefore would have 4% rounded whole person impairment for diabetes.”
The Medical Assessor also noted that Dr Thornley in his report of 9 June 2021 had assessed the overall degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment from diabetes was 8% and made a three-tenth deduction from that due to genetics. The Medical Assessor commented that he agreed with the three-tenth deduction but had rated the appellant’s overall impairment as 6%. The Medical Assessor also noted that Professor Carter had assessed the appellant’s overall impairment due to his diabetes was 6%, with which the Medical Assessor noted he agreed, but he also observed that Professor Carter considered that two-thirds was genetic such that he assessed the appellant’s permanent impairment from his diabetes was 2% WPI. With respect to that the Medical Assessor said that he believes “a three-tenth deduction is probably more appropriate as he did have significant decrease in activity and exercise over many years, which would have sped up his development of diabetes”.
On 24 August 2022 the appellant lodged an appeal against the Medical Assessor’s assessment of the referred medical disputes. He relied on the ground of appeal provided in s 327(3)(d) of the 1998 Act, namely that the MAC contains a demonstrable error. On
[1] Ibrahim v Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd [2022] NSWPICMP 471.
5 October 2022 a delegate of the President constituted an Appeal Panel pursuant to s 328(1) of the 1998 Act to hear the appeal. On 18 November 2022 that Appeal Panel confirmed the MAC.[1]
The appellant then instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales seeking judicial review of the first Appeal Panel’s decision. That matter was heard by her Honour Harrison AsJ who on 3 November 2023 made orders setting aside the decision of the first Appeal Panel and referring the matter back to the President of the Commission to be dealt with in accordance with law. Her Honour found that the first Appeal Panel made an error by failing “to distinguish between genetics causing an increase in susceptibility to type 2 diabetes and genetics causing a discernible level of impairment”.[2]
[2] Ibrahim v Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 1320 at [44]. See also [43].
A delegate of the President has appointed under s 328(1) this Appeal Panel to deal with the appellant’s Appeal against the medical assessment that the Medical Assessor made of the referred medical disputes.

PRELIMINARY REVIEW

The Appeal Panel conducted a preliminary review of the original medical assessment in the absence of the parties and in accordance with the Procedural Direction PIC7.
As a result of that preliminary review, the Appeal Panel determined that it was not necessary for the appellant to undergo a further medical examination. This is because the material before the Appeal Panel is sufficient for the Appeal Panel to deal with the issues raised in the appeal.
The Appeal Panel notes that on 12 August 2024 the appellant’s solicitors wrote to the Commission submitting that “an opportunity” should be given to both parties “to file and serve additional submissions on the issues crystallised before and after the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Personal Injury Commission”. The appellant’s solicitors did not detail what those issues were that they said had crystallised before and after the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the Commission nor did they state why the parties should be provided an opportunity to make further submissions on the unspecified further issues that had arisen.
The appellant’s solicitors also said in their letter of 12 August 2024 that “in particular, we will be making submissions as to why a 0% deduction should be made relating to our client’s susceptibility to diabetes prior to his injury”. That is the issue that the appellant raised in his submissions attached to the appeal he filed with the Commission on 22 August 2022.
Without having any idea as to what “issues had crystallised”, that is what further issues have arisen, the Appeal Panel is not prepared to prolong this matter or to increase the cost of the matter, which would be a consequence of directing the parties to provide further submissions, by indulging the appellant’s solicitors’ request to make further submissions.
The Appeal Panel notes that the issue of the deduction to be made with respect to the appellant’s impairment from his diabetes was, as has been noted earlier, the issue that he raised in the appeal he lodged with the Commission on 24 August 2022. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of Practice Direction 7 obligated the appellant to detail the grounds of his appeal and provide clear and succinct submissions relating to those grounds. Those submissions were required to be provided on 24 August 2022. The appellant’s solicitors in their letter of
12 August 2024 did not indicate why the appellant should be permitted to provide further submissions on an issue which he has already addressed. In other words, the appellant’s solicitors did not indicate why, in the event that the appellant sought to make further submissions, the appellant had not provided the requirements of paragraph 15 of Practice Direction 7.
Certainly, in the Appeal Panel’s view, the fact that the Supreme Court referred the matter back to the President of the Commission does not involve any implicit permission that a party can make further submissions or forgives a party for not abiding Practice Direction 7 or allows a party not to abide that practice direction.
Further, to allow the appellant to make further submissions with respect to the ground for appeal on which he relied, that is the MAC contains a demonstrable error, potentially could expand the ambit of the appellant’s appeal,[3] which in the Appeal Panel’s view would cause unfairness to the respondent. The respondent would in that circumstance be forced to further expense by having its lawyers draft submissions in response. In a circumstance where the appellant has not detailed why he should be able to make further submissions on the issues he raised in the appeal or what further issues between the parties had “crystalised”, the Appeal Panel considered it would not be in the interest of justice to allow the parties to make further submissions.
[3] New South Wales Police Force v Registrar of the Personal Injury Commission of New South Wales [2013] NSWSC 1792 at [49], Queanbeyan Racing Club Ltd v Burton [2021] NSWCA 304 at [26]-[35] and Coca ColaEuro Pacific Partners API Pty Ltd v Pombinho [2024] NSWCA 191 [50].
The Appeal Panel further notes that on 29 August 2024 the appellant’s solicitors wrote again to the Commission referring to three cases[4] to support their request to be given the opportunity to be able to provide further written submissions. None of those cases dealt with the issue of whether a party is able to make further written submissions following the Supreme Court, on judicial review of an Appeal Panel decision, quashing the decision and remitting the appeal against the medical assessment to the President so that it can be dealt with in accordance with law. These cases certainly do not support what the appellant’s solicitors seem to be contending that the appellant somehow has an implicit right to make further submissions following judicial review of the first Appeal Panel’s decision. The appellant has not identified any further issues that have “crystallised” between the parties. The appellant has not explained why he should be able to make further written submissions. The Appeal Panel does not identify any issue on which it would benefit from the parties making further written submissions.
[4] Scott v Ivy Contractors Pty Ltd [2022] NSWPICMP 525; Scott v Ivy Contractors Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 891; Scott v Ivy Contractors Pty Ltd [2023] NSWPICMP.
The Appeal Panel also notes that on 16 August 2024, the appellant’s solicitors wrote to the Commission seeking leave to make oral submissions. They did not detail any reason why they sought that leave. The Appeal Panel declines the request, as it considers the submissions and the material before it are sufficient for it to deal with the appeal.
The Appeal Panel also considered at its preliminary review two applications the appellant made for the Appeal Panel to receive further documents into evidence. The first application was made by way of his solicitors’ letter of 12 August 2024 and sought that the Appeal Panel accept into evidence a report of the Australian Law Reform Commission dated
14 March 2003 relating to the protection of human genetic information, which comprised 1,164 pages, a report of Dr Stephen Thornley dated 15 September 2022, a report on a MRI of the appellant’s cervical spine dated 30 November 2022, the clinical notes of RD Sports Physiotherapy Clinic, a report on a CT nerve root injection dated 1 May 2023, and a discharge referral issued by Canterbury Hospital on 19 March 2024. The second application was made by email on 26 August 2024 from a clerk in the employ of the appellant’s solicitors to the Commission, which sought the Appeal Panel receive into evidence a CT of the appellant’s lumbar spine done on 14 April 2010 and a CT scan done of the appellant’s lumbar spine done on 21 August 2024.
Section 328(3) of the 1998 Act provides that evidence that is fresh evidence or evidence in additional to or in substitution for the evidence received in relation to a medical assessment appealed against may not be given on an appeal by a party unless the evidence was not available to the party before the medical assessment and could not reasonably have been obtained by the party before that medical assessment.
In a letter the appellant’s solicitors sent to the Commission dated 14 August 2024 the appellant’s solicitors submitted that the documents identified in their letter of 12 August 2024 were not available at the time the appeal was filed and that the admission of the documents would cause no prejudice to the respondent. The appellant’s solicitors submitted the admission of the documents would allow the most up-to-date and accurate medical information to be put before the Appeal Panel.

All the documents identified in the letter of 12 August 2024, other than the Australian Law Commission report, were created after the medical assessment. However, with respect to all of those documents that came into existence after the medical assessment, other than the report of Dr Stephen Thornley of 15 September 2022, all are irrelevant to the issues that have been raised in the appellant’s appeal. The Appeal Panel accordingly declines to accept that into evidence.[5]
[5] Lukacevic v Coates Hire Operations Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA 112 at [102].
With respect to the report of Dr Stephen Thornley it contained a further assessment he had made of the appellant’s permanent impairment relating to the appellant’s diabetes.
Dr Thornley’s assessment regarding the appellant’s overall permanent impairment remained the same at 8% WPI, however he revised his opinion regarding the reduction to be made due to genetic factors, which he said should be 10%. He did not provide any explanation for that further opinion.
That opinion of Dr Thornley could have been obtained before the Medical Assessor made his assessment of the matters that had been referred to him. Given that, the Appeal Panel cannot receive it into evidence pursuant to s 328(3) of the 1998 Act. Further, and in any event, without Dr Thornley explaining why he revised his opinion, his opinion can be given little weight.
The report of the Australian Law Commission is also a document that is evidence that was available to the appellant before the medical assessment. Consequently, for that reason alone, the Appeal Panel cannot accept it under s 328(3) of the 1998 Act into evidence. Further, and notwithstanding that the appellant did refer to it in his submissions in support of his Appeal, its content is not of insignificant relevance to the issue the Appeal Panel has to consider in deciding the appellant’s Appeal.
The documents identified in the email of 26 August 2024 are also not relevant to ground of appeal on which the appellant has relied, that is s 327(3)(d), or the issue the appellant with respect to that ground. Relevantly, the appellant did not make his appeal relying on the ground for appeal provided in s 327(3)(a) of the 1998 Act. Accordingly, the Appeal Panel does not receive those documents into evidence.

EVIDENCE

The Appeal Panel has before it all the documents that were sent to the Medical Assessor for the original medical assessment and has taken them into account in making this determination.

SUBMISSIONS

Both parties made written submissions. They are not repeated in full, but have been considered by the Appeal Panel.
Paraphrasing the appellant’s submissions so as to provide a summary of them, they are, in substance, that there is no evidence that the appellant had a genetic condition at the time he suffered injury such that the Medical Assessor could make a deduction under s 323(1) of the 1998 Act for a proportion of his permanent impairment that was due to a pre-existing condition. The appellant submitted that there needed to be some information regarding his genetic condition such that a deduction could be made under s 323(1) but there was no information regarding that before the Medical Assessor.
The appellant submitted that the evidence before the Medical Assessor revealed he did not have diabetes prior to his work injury.
The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor, by making a deduction under s 323(1) for genetic factors that contributed to his permanent impairment, effectively made a deduction for him having an increased susceptibility due to genetics to develop type 2 diabetes. The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor was wrong to make a deduction under s 323(1) for any pre-disposition he had to develop diabetes.
In the alternative, the appellant submitted that if a deduction were to be made under s 323(1) then in accordance with s 323(2) the Medical Assessor should have assumed the deductible proportion is 10% because it is difficult and costly to determine what the deductible proportion is and to make that assumption is not at odds with the evidence.
The appellant submitted that the Medical Assessor was a specialist in occupational medicine and did not have the qualifications, training and experience relevant to the assessment he made.
Paraphrasing the respondent’s submission in reply, again to provide a summary of them, they are that Dr Thornley in his report of 9 June 2021 advised that he had made a deduction of 30% when assessing the degree of the appellant’s permanent impairment relating to his diabetes mellitus. The respondent also highlighted that Professor Carter made a similar deduction. The respondent noted that the Medical Assessor, Dr Thornley and Professor Carter all referred to the genetic component of the appellant’s diabetes. The respondent noted that the appellant’s injury was not the direct cause of his diabetes but rather it was his lack of exercise that contributed to the early onset of his diabetes.
The respondent submitted that it does not matter that the appellant’s pre-existing condition was asymptomatic at the time he suffered injury and what is required is that it was a contributing factor to the impairment that was caused by his injury. The respondent submitted that a deduction of less than 30% for the appellant’s pre-existing condition would be at odds with the evidence, noting the deductions that the Medical Assessor, Dr Thornley and Professor Carter made.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

The procedures on appeal are contained in s 328 of the 1998 Act. The appeal is to be by way of review of the original medical assessment but the review is limited to the grounds of appeal on which the appeal is made.
In Campbelltown City Council v Vegan [2006] NSWCA 284 the Court of Appeal held that the Appeal Panel is obliged to give reasons.
Section 323(1) of the 1998 Act requires a Medical Assessor when assessing the degree of permanent impairment that a worker has from an injury to make a deduction for any proportion of impairment that is due to any previous injury or that is due to any pre-existing condition or abnormality. Hence, insofar as is relevant to this case, in order that s 323(1) can be engaged the appellant must have had an existing condition at the relevant date, which is immediately before he suffered his injury on 15 January 2009, and that that condition now makes up a proportion of the permanent impairment he has from that injury. It is not sufficient for s 323(1) to be engaged, that at the time the appellant suffered injury he had a pre-disposition or a susceptibility to developing a condition subsequent to his injury. To repeat, the condition must have been existing at the time he suffered his injury.[6]
[6] Cullen v Woodbrae Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1416 at [46].
The evidence in this case does not demonstrate that as at 15 January 2009 the appellant had diabetes mellitus. He was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus in 2020. In all likelihood, the onset of that illness occurred years after he suffered his injury. Indeed, that is implicit in the case that the appellant has brought to the Commission, in regards to which the respondent has not demurred, being that it was his lack of exercise due to the injury to his lumbar spine that resulted in his developing diabetes.
Whatever genetic factor played a role in the appellant developing diabetes after his injury those genetic factors were not at the time the appellant suffered his injury a genetic condition. They had not manifested or produced any disease or condition in the appellant. Those genetic factors, as at the date the appellant suffered injury, rendered the appellant susceptible to developing diabetes mellitus, but to repeat, they do not amount to a condition that existed before the appellant suffered injury.
That being the case, the Medical Assessor did make an error in finding that the appellant did have a pre-existing condition and, consequently, also made an error by making a deduction under s323(1) of the 1998 Act. Those errors amount to a demonstrable error. The Appeal Panel corrects those errors by making no deduction under s323(1) of the 1998 Act.
For these reasons, the Appeal Panel has determined that the MAC issued on 3 August 2022 should be revoked, and a new MAC should be issued. The new certificate is attached to this statement of reasons.

PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION

APPEAL PANEL

MEDICAL ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATE

Injuries received after 1 January 2002

Matter number:	W5341/21
Applicant:	Ahmed Ali Ibrahim
Respondent:	Sellers Fabrics Pty Ltd

This Certificate is issued pursuant to s 328(5) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act1998.

The Appeal Panel revokes the Medical Assessment Certificate of Medical Assessor Mark Burns and issues this new Medical Assessment Certificate as to the matters set out in the Table below:

Table - whole person impairment (WPI)

Body Part or system	Date of Injury	Chapter, page and paragraph number in WorkCover Guides	Chapter, page, paragraph, figure and table numbers in AMA 5 Guides	% WPI	Proportion of permanent impairment due to pre-existing injury, abnormality or condition	Sub-total/s % WPI (after any deductions in column 6)
Lumbar spine	15/01/2009	Chapter 4	Chapter 15	7%	-	7%
Right upper extremity		Chapter 1 paragraph 1.36 Chapter 2 paragraph 2.16	Chapter 16	2%	-	2%
Right lower extremity		Chapter 3	Chapter 17	0%	-	0%
Endocrine/ Diabetes		Chapter 13	Chapter 10	6%	-	6%
Total % WPI (the Combined Table values of all sub-totals)					15%

[2024] NSWPICMP 620

3 September 2024