Ibrahim and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2016] AATA 704
•12 September 2016
Ibrahim and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2016] AATA 704 (12 September 2016)
Division
GENERAL DIVISION
File Number
2016/0007
Re
Regab Ibrahim
APPLICANT
And
Secretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal Senior Member CR Walsh
Date 12 September 2016 Place Perth The Tribunal affirms the decision under review.
............[Sgd]............................................................
Senior Member CR Walsh
Catchwords
SOCIAL SECURITY – whether applicant is subject to a compensation preclusion period – whether there is a recoverable amount – whether “special circumstances” exist such that it is appropriate that part or all of the compensation payment received by the applicant be treated as not having been made – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Social Security Act 1991 – s 17(1)(a) – s 17(2) – s 17(2)(a) - s 17(3) – s 17(4) – s 17(8) –s 1169 – s 1169(1)(b) – s 1170 – s 1170(1) – s 1170(1)(a) – s 1170(4) – s 1170(5) – s 1184A – s 1184K
Cases
Angelakos and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 25
Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225
Davy and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1114
Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] 75 ALD 134
Fischer v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2010) 185 FCR 52
Groth and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Krzywak and Secretary, Department of Social Services (1988) 15 ALD 690
Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1
Re Ivocic and Director General of Social Services [1981] AATA 57
Re Watson v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 32
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member CR Walsh
12 September 2016
introduction
Mr Ibrahim seeks a review of the decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Social Services & Child Support Division) (the AAT1) on 15 December 2015, affirming the decision made by the Department of Human Services (the Department), precluding Mr Ibrahim from receiving disability support pension (DSP), being a “compensation affected payment”, during the “lump sum preclusion period” from 13 October 2000 to 24 July 2008.
facts
On 21 February 1998, Mr Ibrahim was injured at work. Mr Ibrahim was working for Aerospace Engineering Services Pty Ltd (Aerospace) as an aircraft engineer at Pearce Air Force Base when he fell from a moveable platform while working on the tail section of an aircraft. Mr Ibrahim suffered minor physical injuries and developed “abnormal illness behaviour”, for which there was no clinical cause.
Mr Ibrahim received periodic compensation payments, totalling $65,132.29, until 12 October 2000.
Between 18 May 2000 and 20 June 2007, Mr Ibrahim received DSP totalling $78,480.23.
On 12 July 2005, the District Court of Western Australia (the DCWA) awarded Mr Ibrahim damages in the amount of $414,240.24 (the DCWA Proceedings). The damages amount included $354,176.29 for economic loss, including the $65,132.29 which had been paid to Mr Ibrahim as periodic compensation until 12 October 2000.
Aerospace subsequently appealed the DCWA Proceedings to the Supreme Court of Western Australia and Mr Ibrahim cross-appealed.
By letter dated 1 December 2005, Aerospace wrote to Mr Ibrahim offering to settle the appeal and cross-appeal, “without prejudice to costs”, as follows:
(a)our client will pay you the judgment debt ($414,240.24) less statutory compensation paid to date ($86,485.24) and less amounts owing to the Health Insurance Commission and Centrelink (not known exactly but likely to exceed $60,000);
(b) …
(c)upon acceptance of our client’s offer…above, you will sign a consent notice agreeing to the appeal and your cross-appeal being dismissed with no order as to costs. (the Offer of Compromise)
Mr Ibrahim did not accept the Offer of Compromise.
On 12 February 2007, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia (the SCWA) dismissed an appeal by Aerospace to the DCWA Proceedings and a cross-appeal by Mr Ibrahim, with each party to bear their own costs (the SCWA Proceedings).
On 28 June 2007, an officer of the Department decided that Mr Ibrahim was precluded from receiving a compensation affected payment for the period 13 October 2000 to 22 April 2010 and that an amount of $78,480.23 in DSP paid to Mr Ibrahim was recoverable from Mr Ibrahim’s insurer, CGU Insurance Ltd (the Original Decision).
On 4 July 2007, Mr Ibrahim requested a review of the Original Decision.
On 4 July 2007, Centrelink wrote to Mr Ibrahim stating:
In order to review the decision, your financial circumstances have to be considered. Please find enclosed a Statement of Expenditure & Circumstances form, which you should complete and return to this office by 25/7/2007.
In addition, you should provide us with a written statement of your reasons for disagreeing with Centrelink’s decision. You should include in your statement any other factors which you think are relevant, and that you think should be taken into account by us.
On 8 August 2007, Mr Ibrahim submitted a Centrelink Compensation Recovery Team - Statement of Expenditure & Circumstances” form (the 2007 Statement of Expenditure & Circumstances), together with various documentary evidence in support of his review.
On 28 August 2007, a Centrelink Delegated Compensation Recovery Officer made the following decision:
After carefully considering your circumstances I have concluded the decision was correct and should not be changed. The amount to be recovered is now $78,480.23 and the preclusion period now starts on 13 October 2000 and ends on 22 April 2010. (the Further Decision)
On 2 October 2007, Mr Ibrahim requested a review of the Further Decision by a Centrelink Authorised Review Officer (ARO). Mr Ibrahim disputed the economic loss figure used to calculate the preclusion period and claimed “special circumstances” (legal costs and medical conditions and associated costs) which warranted treating the compensation payment as having not been made.
On 30 October 2007, Mr Ibrahim submitted a letter from Jackson McDonald lawyers, Aerospace’s solicitors, particularising the sums which had been deducted from the judgment sum in the DCWA Proceedings. That letter states:
We advise that the following amounts were deducted from the judgment sum payable to you:
1. Judgment sum $414,240.24
2. Less compensation paid to or on your behalf under the
Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act $86,485.24
3. Less the advance made to you on 26 June 2005 under
the order of His Honour Justice Pullin $75,484.4
4. Less payment made to SC Nigam & Co 25 June 2006 $54,515.59
5. Less Medicare Australia $1,458.90
6. Less Centrelink $78,480.23
7. Plus interest calculated to and including Wednesday,
4 July 2007 $30,538.62
TOTAL $78,354.49
On or around 26 October 2007, the ARO contacted Mr Ibrahim’s insurer, CGU Insurance Ltd (CGU), and confirmed that an amount of $65,132.29 had been withheld from Mr Ibrahim’s lump sum compensation payment, being the total amount of periodic compensation payments paid to the applicant to 12 October 2000.
On 2 November 2007, the ARO varied the Original Decision. In summary, the ARO found that the preclusion period was 13 October 2000 to 24 July 2008, correctly calculated on the sum of $289,044.00, being Mr Ibrahim’s compensation payment ($354,176.29) minus the periodic compensation payments paid to Mr Ibrahim until 12 October 2000 ($65,132.29). The ARO was not satisfied there were “special circumstances” which warranted treating Mr Ibrahim’s compensation payment as having not been made (the ARO Decision).
On 19 October 2015, Mr Ibrahim applied to the AAT1 for a review of the ARO Decision and, on 26 November 2015, provided a submission and documents in support of that review.
On 15 December 2015, the AAT1 affirmed the ARO Decision precluding Mr Ibrahim from receiving DSP from 13 October 2000 to 24 July 2008 (the AAT1 Decision).
On 4 January 2016, Mr Ibrahim applied to this Tribunal for a review of the AAT1 Decision.
issues
The issues for consideration by the Tribunal are:
(i)Whether Mr Ibrahim’s DSP is subject to a “compensation preclusion period”;
(ii) If so, whether there is a “recoverable amount”; and
(iii)Whether there are “special circumstances” such that it is appropriate that part or all of the compensation payment received by Mr Ibrahim be treated as not having been made.
Each of these issues is considered, in turn, below.
consideration
(i) Is Mr Ibrahim’s DSP subject to a “compensation preclusion period”?
Section 1169 of the Social Security Act 1991 (the SSA), provides that a “compensation affected payment” is not payable to a person during a “lump sum preclusion period”. Section 1169 of the SSA states:
s 1169Compensation affected payment not payable during lump sum preclusion period
(1) If:
(a) a person receives or claims a compensation affected payment; and
(b)the person receives a lump sum compensation payment:
the compensation affected payment is not payable to the person in relation to any day or days in the lump sum preclusion period.
(2) In this section:
“lump sum compensation payment” does not include a lump sum payment:
(a) to which section 1164 applies; or
(b) that relates only to arrears of periodic compensation payments. [Emphasis added]
A “compensation affected payment” is defined, in s 17(1)(a) of the SSA, to include DSP.
“Compensation” is defined in s 17(2) of the SSA as follows:
(2)Subject to subsection (2B), for the purposes of this Act, compensation mean:
(a)a payment of damages; or
(b)a payment under a scheme of insurance or compensation under a Commonwealth, State or Territory law, including a payment under a contract entered into under such a scheme; or
(c)a payment (with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim for damages or a claim under such an insurance scheme; or
(d)any other compensation or damages payment;
(whether the payment is in the form of a lump sum or in the form of a series of periodic payments and whether it is made within or outside Australia) that is made wholly or partly in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn resulting from personal injury.
The award of $354,176.29 in damages for economic loss to Mr Ibrahim in the DCWA Proceedings constitutes "compensation” for the purposes of s 17(2)(a) of the SSA and a lump sum compensation payment for the purposes of s 1169(1)(b) of the SSA. Accordingly, Mr Ibrahim is not entitled to DSP, being a “compensation affected payment”, for any day during the “lump sum preclusion period”: s 1169 of the Act.
Section 1170 of the SSA outlines the calculation of a “lump sum preclusion period”. Section 1170 of the SSA provides:
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if a person receives both periodic compensation payments and a lump sum compensation payment, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a) begins on the day following the last day of the periodic payments period or, where there is more than one periodic payments period, the day following the last day of the last periodic payments period; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
(2)If a person chooses to receive part of an entitlement to periodic compensation payments in the form of a lump sum, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a)begins on the first day on which the person's periodic compensation payment is a reduced payment because of that choice; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
(3)If neither of subsections (1) and (2) applies, the lump sum preclusion period is the period that:
(a) begins on the day on which the loss of earnings or loss of capacity to earn began; and
(b)ends at the end of the number of weeks worked out under subsections (4) and (5).
(4)The number of weeks in the lump sum preclusion period in relation to a person is the number worked out using the formula:
(5)If the number worked out under subsection (4) is not a whole number, the number is to be rounded down to the nearest whole number.
The expression “compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment” is defined in s 17(3) and of the SSA as follows:
(3)Subject to subsection (4), for the purposes of this Act, the compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment is:
(a) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment is made (either with or without admission of liability) in settlement of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(ii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(ab) 50% of the payment if the following circumstances apply:
(i)the payment represents that part of a person’s entitlement to periodic compensation payments that the person has chosen to receive in the form of a lump sum; and
(ii)the entitlement to periodic compensation payments arose from the settlement (either with or without admission of liability) of a claim that is, in whole or in part, related to a disease, injury or condition; and
(iii)the claim was settled, either by consent judgment being entered in respect of the settlement or otherwise; or
(b)if those circumstances do not apply – so much of the payment as is, in the Secretary’s opinion, in respect of lost earnings or lost capacity to earn, or both.
Where a person has received periodic compensation payments and, after receiving a lump sum compensation payment, becomes liable to repay the amount of the periodic compensation payments, the “compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment” for the purposes of s 17(3) of the SSA is the lump sum compensation payment minus the periodic compensation payments: s 17(4) of the SSA.
The “income cut-out amount” is calculated in accordance with the formula in s 17(8) of the SSA.
As Mr Ibrahim received periodic compensation payments prior to receiving his lump sum compensation payment the “lump sum preclusion period”, including its start date, is determined in accordance with s 1170(1) of the SSA, as set out above in paragraph 28.
Mr Ibrahim received $65,132.29 in periodic compensation payments up until 12 October 2000. Consequently, Mr Ibrahim’s the “lump sum preclusion period” commenced on 13 October 2000, being the day following the last day of his periodic compensation payment: s 1170(1)(a) of the SSA.
Mr Ibrahim’s “compensation part of a lump sum compensation payment” for the purposes of s 17(3) of the SSA is $289,044.00. This is calculated by deducting the periodic compensation payment from the lump sum compensation payment in accordance with s 17(4) of the SSA as follows:
$354,176.29 - $65,132.29 = $289,044.00
The “income cut-out amount” that was in force at the time the compensation was received by Mr Ibrahim on 12 February 2007 was $711.38: s 17(8) of the SSA.
Applying the formula is s 1170(4) of the SSA (rounding down to the nearest number in accordance with s 1170(5) of the Act) the result is 406 weeks, determined as follows:
$289.044.00 = 406.31 $711.38
Consequently, Mr Ibrahim’s “lump sum preclusion period” is 13 October 2000 to 24 July 2008 and he was not entitled to receive DSP during this period: s 1169 of the SSA.
(ii) Is there a “recoverable amount”?
Section 1184A of the SSA, titled “The section 1184 recoverable amount”, provides:
(1)If a person receives compensation affected payments in relation to a day or days in a lump sum preclusion period, the recoverable amount under this section is equal to the smallest of the following amounts:
(a)the sum of all compensation affected payments made to the person that relate to a day or days in a lump sum preclusion period;
(b) the compensation part of the lump sum payment;
…
In accordance with s 1184A of the SSA, the recoverable amount is equal to the smaller of the “compensation affected payments” received during the “lump sum preclusion period” and the “compensation part of the lump sum payment”.
Mr Ibrahim received $78,480.23 in DSP payments during his “lump sum preclusion period”. As this was smaller than the “compensation part of his lump sum payment” (being $354,176.29), the recoverable amount is $78,480.23.
(iii)Are there any “special circumstances” such that it is appropriate that part or all of the compensation payment received by Mr Ibrahim be treated as not having been made?
The ability of the Secretary (and in his shoes the Tribunal) to disregard all or part of a compensation payment is set out in s 1184K of the Act, relevantly, s 1184K provides:
s 1184K Secretary may disregard some payments
(1) For the purposes of this Part, the Secretary may treat the whole or part of a compensation payment as:
(a)not having been made; or
(b)not liable to be made;
If the Secretary thinks it is appropriate to do so in the special circumstances of the case.
The term “special circumstances" is not defined in the SSA. However, what constitute “special circumstances” has been considered extensively by the Federal Court and the Tribunal in the context of social security and family assistance law. In summary, it has been held that for circumstances to constitute “special circumstances” they must be circumstances which are “unusual, uncommon or exceptional,” “markedly different from the usual run of cases,” “special” or “out of the ordinary” and they include “events which would render the (strict application of the rule in question) unfair or inappropriate:” see for example, Re Ivocic and Director General of Social Services [1981] AATA 57 at [45]; Re Beadle and Director-General of Social Security (1984) 6 ALD 1 (Re Beadle) at 3 per Toohey J; Beadle and Director General of Social Security (1985) 60 ALR 225 at 228 as per Bowen CJ, Fisher and Lockhart JJ; Groth and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541 (Groth) at 545 per Kiefel J; Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] 75 ALD 134 at [66] per Hill J; Angelakos and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] FCA 25 (Angelakos) at [33] and Davy and Secretary Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1114; (2007) 94 ALD 693 (Davy) at [80]. Circumstances might be “special”, although they apply to more than one person or class of persons, provided they are not of universal application (for example, they are a common or universal characteristic of social security recipients: see Fischer v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (2010) 185 FCR 52 (Fischer) at [65]. Ultimately, whether circumstances answer any of these descriptions depends on the context in which they occur: Re Beadle; Groth; Angelakos; Davy.
Mr Ibrahim has advanced circumstances that he submits constitute “special circumstances”. These circumstances are considered, in turn, below.
Legal Costs
In the 2007 Statement of Expenditure & Circumstances, Mr Ibrahim claimed that he was required to pay $268,427.00 in legal fees, although the amount particularised is $180,430.47.
The Tribunal notes the following in relation to Mr Ibrahim’s legal costs:
· No amount for costs was contained in the court’s calculation of the judgment sum in the DCWA Proceedings;
· The defendant in the DCWA proceedings (Aerospace) was ordered to pay Mr Ibrahim’s costs in addition to the judgment;
· On 1 August 2005, the defendant in the DCWA proceedings (Aerospace) lodged an appeal to the SCWA and Mr Ibrahim cross-appealed;
· It is clear from the letter from Jackson McDonald Lawyers, Aerospace’s solicitor, to the Department, dated 26 May 2006, that $124,515.59 in costs were to be paid into SCWA for legal costs pending the outcome of the appeal ($54,515.59 for Mr Nigam and $70,000 for Mr Julian Johnson);
· On 1 December 2005, Mr Ibrahim was sent the Offer of Compromise, offering to settle the matter for the same judgment achieved in the DCWA Proceedings, with each party to bear their own costs: refer to paragraph 7 above;
· Mr Ibrahim did not accept the Offer of Compromise;
· On 12 February 2007, the appeal and cross appeal were dismissed by the SCWA with each party to bear their own costs of the appeal on account of Mr Ibrahim’s failure to accept the Offer of Compromise;
· When the judgment debt was paid to Mr Ibrahim, an amount of $54,515.59 was deducted from the judgment debt for legal fees paid to Mr Ibrahim’s solicitor (Mr Nigam), but no sum was deducted for Mr Johnson’s fees; and
· Although a charge $70,000.00 was registered by Mr Ibrahim’s former solicitor (Mr Johnson) it is not apparent from evidence before the Tribunal if he was ever paid and if so how he was paid.
As contended by the Secretary, the inference which can be drawn from the above is that the $70,000.00 in legal fees payable to Mr Ibrahim’s solicitor, Mr Johnson, was met by Aerospace, the defendant in the DCWA Proceedings, in accordance with the orders in those proceedings, not by Mr Ibrahim.
Further, as contended by the Secretary, it is apparent that the legal costs incurred by Mr Ibrahim were at least, in part, incurred on account of his failure to accept the Offer of Compromise, which was found by the SCWA to represent a “fair and reasonable offer of compromise". Had Mr Ibrahim accepted the Offer of Compromise, his legal costs would have been in the vicinity of $124,515.59 ($54,515.59 for Mr Nigam and $70,000 for Mr Johnson) and payable by Aerospace, the defendant in the DCWA Proceedings. However, this did not happen.
In any event, the Tribunal finds, as contended by the Secretary, the fact some legal costs were payable by Mr Ibrahim in bringing his compensation proceedings is not “unusual” or “out of the ordinary” such as to constitute “special circumstances”. Further, the fact that Mr Ibrahim was required to pay an increased amount of costs on account of his failure to accept an offer of compromise does not constitute “special circumstances”: refer to paragraph 42 above. On the contrary, such circumstances are common in compensation cases.
Moreover, as contended by the Secretary, Mr Ibrahim’s failure to accept the Offer of Compromise weighs against a finding that the discretion should be exercised in his case. The legal costs payable by him were increased on account of that action, one assumes a calculated risk taken by himself and his legal representatives. A finding that the payment of legal costs by Mr Ibrahim amount to “special circumstances” would allow Mr Ibrahim to benefit from his failure to accept the Offer of Compromise, which the SCWA found was a “fair and reasonable” offer of compromise, essentially transferring the risk (and subsequent cost) of refusing that offer to the Australian taxpayer.
Financial hardship
Mr Ibrahim claims that his financial circumstances “during the life of [his] claim (9 years), after, now and in the future” should be considered “special circumstances”.
During his “lump sum preclusion period”, Mr Ibrahim owned a home secured by a mortgage. Mr Ibrahim did not provide any details of the value of the property or the amount owing on the mortgage in the 2007 Statement of Expenditure & Circumstances. At the hearing of this application, Mr Ibrahim confirmed that he purchased his property in May 1998 for approximately $79,000, plus acquisition costs.
In his “Administrative Appeals Tribunal Statement of Financial Circumstances (Centrelink reviews), dated 26 November 2015 (the 2015 Statement of Financial Circumstances), Mr Ibrahim declared that his property is now unencumbered but again he did not provide any details on the value of the property. At the hearing of this application, Mr Ibrahim explained that following receipt of the lump sum compensation payment he paid off the mortgage on his property. Mr Ibrahim said that he had not had his property valued and had no idea of its current market value. This is despite the fact that its value would be apparent from the annual rates notices he receives from his local Council/Shire.
In circumstances where Mr Ibrahim owns a home unencumbered, but has failed to provide any details of the value of his property, the Tribunal is not satisfied there are “special circumstances”, as that expression has been interpreted to mean: refer to paragraph 42 above. Further, in circumstances where Mr Ibrahim has the ability to sell the house or borrow against it the Tribunal is not satisfied that there are “special circumstances”: Re Watson v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 32 at [21].
As contended by the Secretary, the sums declared in the 2007 Statement of Expenditure & Circumstances and 2015 Statement of Financial Circumstances indicate that Mr Ibrahim has had a high level of discretionary spending both during and after his “lump sum preclusion period”. In the 2007 Statement of Financial Expenditure & Circumstances, Mr Ibrahim includes $318.00 a month for telephone, $65.00 a month for internet and $40.00 a month for clothing. In the 2015 Statement of Financial Circumstances, Mr Ibrahim includes $20 a fortnight for books, $50 a fortnight for clothes, $50 per week for parking and $250 per week to pay off a $500 microwave and a $1000 mobile phone. Mr Ibrahim’s evidence, as provided in these statements, is entirely inconsistent with the evidence before the AAT1 that he could not even afford to buy food. To constitute “special circumstances”, financial circumstances must go beyond straitened circumstances and be truly exceptional: Krzywak and Secretary, Department of Social Services (1988) 15 ALD 690. Based on the evidence before the Tribunal, that is not the case here.
Consequently, the Tribunal finds that Mr Ibrahim’s financial circumstances do not represent “special circumstances” warranting an exercise of the discretion in s 1184K of the SSA: refer to paragraph 42 above. In any event, difficult financial circumstances are not “uncommon”, “unusual” or “put of the ordinary” amongst social security recipients generally so as to render them “special”: Fischer (see paragraph 42 above).
Medical condition & expenses
Mr Ibrahim also claims to have a number of large expenses for specialist "necessary” equipment and modifications he requires on account of his medical condition, which he will not be able to pay for if he is subject to the preclusion period. This includes a $9,000 mobility bed, modifications to his bathroom, renovation to his garage and driveway (so that they are level), a new car, an electric scooter, a recliner chair and so on.
The only medical evidence provided by Mr Ibrahim in support of his contention is a brief report from a GP and a community mental health worker, to whom he self-reported his need for the above items. This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that such items are a necessity based on his medical condition. Further, the Occupational Therapy Department, Community Aids and Equipment Programme at Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital do not particularise any of the above items as a necessity for Mr Ibrahim. In fact, those reports appear to indicate that some equipment had previously been provided to Mr Ibrahim by the hospital. The Tribunal also notes the judgment in the DCWA Proceedings, where a sum of $3,889 was included for Mr Ibrahim’s future medication and attendances upon his GP and the Court found a “significant degree of exaggeration" in Mr Ibrahim’s claims.
Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that Mr Ibrahim’s medical condition and associated medical expenses, do not constitute “special circumstances” justifying an exercise of the discretion in s 1184K of the SSA. Medical conditions and associated medical expenses are not “uncommon”, “unusual” or “out of the ordinary” amongst social security recipients so as to render them “special”: Fischer (see paragraph 42 above).
decision
For the above reasons, the Tribunal affirms the AAT1 Decision.
I certify that the preceding 59 (fifty-nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member CR Walsh ........[Sgd]...............................................................
Administrative Assistant
Dated 12 September 2016
Date of hearing 8 September 2016 Applicant Self-represented (by telephone) Representative for the
RespondentMs B Rayment Solicitors for the Respondent
Mills Oakley Lawyers
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
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Appeal
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Jurisdiction
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Statutory Construction
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Judicial Review
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