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IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S26 of 1991 B e t w e e n -
IBM AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Applicant
and
ROTHMANS DISTRIBUTION SERVICES
LIMITED
Respondent
Application for special leave
to appeal
MASON CJ
DEANE J
McHUGH J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 5 AUGUST 1991, AT 12.51 PM
Copyright irt the High Court of Australia
| IBM | 1 | 5/8/91 |
| MR C.R. EINSTEIN, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear |
with MR R.J.POWELL, for the applicant. (instructed
by Freehill Hollingdale & Page)
MR T.F. BATHURST, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with
my learned friend, MR R.M. SMITH, for the
respondent. (instructed by Clayton Utz)
MASON CJ: Yes, Mr Bathurst. Mr Einstein.
| MR EINSTEIN: | Your Honours, earlier today, in an attempt to |
shorten the amount of time we may need to take on
this application, we furnished to my learned friend
a copy of some short written submissions and we
would be grateful if Your Honours would receive
them, because it will save me some time.
MASON CJ: Yes, certainly we will receive them.
| MR EINSTEIN: | Thank you. | I have four copies. | Your Honours, |
we would seek to deal firstly with why it is that the instant proceedings raise questions of law of public importance, because of their general
application. A question arises as to whether or
not this Court in Government Insurance Office of
New South Wales v Atkinson-Leighton Joint Venture,
146 CLR 206, which I think Your Honours have been
given by my learned friends as an authority and which we have four copies of if that is not the
case. I will pass them up, thank you.
The question arises as to whether or not this
Court in that case held that in the case of every submission to arbitration expressed in general
terms, such as to determine any controversy or
claim related to this agreement, the parties must
be taken to have impliedly agreed to confer upon
the arbitrator authority to exercise the powers
conferred upon courts of law by statute. That that
was the holding appears to have been the
understanding of the learned President of the
Court of Appeal as appears from the application papers at page 51 point 8, to page 52.
Alternatively, it is our submission that the
true principle is not that which we have set out in
l(a) of our written document but is, in fact, that
notwithstanding the framing of submissions to
arbitration in such general terms, it is proper to
look at the terms of individual agreements and at
the factual matrix in order to determine whether,
for example, parties may be taken to have impliedly
agreed to have withheld from conferring upon the
arbitrator authority to exercise some or all of the
powers conferred upon courts of law by particular
statutes.
| IBM | 2 | 5/8/91 |
The approach which the court below appears to
have taken, in other words, appears to have been
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- Case
- [1991] HCATrans 187
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the decision in *Government Insurance Office of New South Wales v Atkinson-Leighton Joint Venture* (1986) 146 CLR 206 established that a general submission to arbitration, such as one to determine "any controversy or claim related to this agreement," necessarily implies an agreement to confer upon the arbitrator the authority to exercise statutory powers available to courts of law. Alternatively, the applicant argued that the correct principle requires an examination of the individual agreement and the factual matrix to determine if parties have impliedly withheld such statutory powers from an arbitrator, even with a general submission clause.
The applicant contended that the Court of Appeal had erred by adopting an overly rigid interpretation of *Atkinson-Leighton*, suggesting that the mere presence of a general submission clause concluded the matter and automatically conferred statutory powers on the arbitrator, irrespective of other indicia of the parties' intentions. The applicant submitted that the true principle should allow for a more nuanced approach, considering the specific terms of the arbitration agreement and the surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether the parties intended to grant the arbitrator the power to exercise statutory remedies. The Court of Appeal, in the applicant's submission, had failed to properly consider these factors, relying instead on a perceived binding precedent from *Atkinson-Leighton*.
Orders
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Background
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Evidence
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
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