IAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE ICF SPRY TRUST
v
HELEN MARIE MOYLAN & ORSIAN CHARLES FOWELL SPRY
v
HELEN MARIE MOYLAN (FORMERLY SPRY)
[2011] HCASL 148
M137/2010
M148/2010
The applicant applies for special leave to appeal to this Court from two decisions of the Full Court of the Family Court. Since 2002, the applicant and his former wife, the first respondent to both applications for special leave to appeal, have been involved in a series of proceedings which were commenced by the first respondent to obtain final orders from the Family Court for property settlement and spousal maintenance under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
The first application for special leave to appeal (M137 of 2010) concerns a decision of the Full Court of the Family Court (May, Boland and O'Ryan JJ), which dismissed an appeal by the applicant from a decision of Coleman J disposing of the first respondent's application for final property settlement orders. This decision of the Full Court has previously been the subject of an application by the applicant for special leave to appeal to this Court. On 30 July 2010, following an oral hearing at which the applicant was represented by senior counsel, the Court dismissed the application[1]. In the present application, the applicant requires an extension of time for the filing of his application. That extension should not be granted. The applicant has not advanced any reason for re‑opening the application for special leave. Special leave to appeal in matter M137 of 2010 is refused with costs.
The second application for special leave to appeal (M148 of 2010) concerns a disqualification application sought by the applicant against Strickland J of the Family Court. On 21 June 2010, Strickland J had refused to disqualify himself from hearing any further proceedings between the applicant and the first respondent. The Full Court of the Family Court (Finn, Coleman and Thackray JJ) dismissed an appeal by the applicant from the decision of Strickland J. Their Honours noted that in oral submissions counsel for the applicant had confirmed that his client relied upon reasonable apprehension of bias rather than actual bias, and referred to what was said in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy[2]. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the Full Court's decision. Special leave to appeal in matter M148 of 2010 is refused with costs.
[2](2000) 205 CLR 337 at 345 [8]; [2000] HCA 63.
Pursuant to r 41.11.1 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing each application with costs.
W.M.C. Gummow
8 September 2011S.M. Kiefel
- AGLC
- Ian Charles Fowell Spry in His Personal Capacity and in His Capacity as trustee of the ICF Spry Trust v Helen Marie Moylan & Ors Ian Charles Fowell Spry v Helen Marie Moylan (Formerly Spry) [2011] HCASL 148
- Case
- [2011] HCASL 148
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court involved the correctness of the Full Court's decisions in both appeals. In the first matter, the applicant, Ian Charles Fowell Spry, sought to challenge the Full Court's dismissal of his appeal from Coleman J's decision. In the second matter, Spry sought to appeal the Full Court's dismissal of his appeal against the refusal of Strickland J to disqualify himself from further proceedings. The Court had to determine whether there were grounds to grant special leave to appeal and whether the Full Court's decisions were correct.
The Court found that there were no compelling reasons to grant special leave to appeal in either matter. Regarding the first application, the Court noted that the applicant had not provided any new reasons to reopen the matter, and it dismissed the application for special leave with costs. In the second application, the Court upheld the Full Court's decision that there was no basis to doubt its correctness, also dismissing the application for special leave with costs. The High Court's reasoning was grounded in the lack of new evidence or arguments presented by Spry and the consistency of the Full Court's decisions with established legal principles.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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