[2022] TASCCA 11
| COURT: | SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA (COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL) |
| CITATION: | I B F v Tasmania [2022] TASCCA 11 |
| PARTIES: | I B F |
| v | |
| STATE OF TASMANIA | |
| FILE NO: | CCA 913/2019 |
| DELIVERED ON: | 29 October 2019 |
| DELIVERED AT: | Hobart |
| HEARING DATES: | 22 August, 10 October 2019 |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Blow CJ, Wood J and Martin AJ |
| CATCHWORDS: |
Criminal Law – Appeal and new trial – Particular grounds of appeal – Irregularities in relation to jury – Partiality – Note from juror suggesting bias – Grounds for reasonable apprehension of bias not
dispelled by inquiry when jurors interviewed.
Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41; R v Czajkowski [2002] NSWCCA 530, 137 A Crim R 111, followed.
Aust Dig Criminal Law [3508]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant: K Abercromby Respondent: P Sherriff
Solicitors:
Appellant: Legal Aid Commission Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
| Judgment Number: | [2022] TASCCA 11 |
| Number of paragraphs: | 67 |
Serial No 1/2022
File No CCA 913/2019
I B F v STATE OF TASMANIA
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL BLOW CJ WOOD J MARTIN AJ 29 October 2019 |
| Orders of the Court (10 October 2019) |
1 Appeal allowed.
2 Convictions quashed.
3 New trial.
Parts of this judgment have been redacted to remove information relating to the deliberations of a jury.
Serial No 11/2022
File No CCA 913/2019
I B F v STATE OF TASMANIA
| REASONS FOR JUDGMENT | COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL BLOW CJ 29 October 2019 |
1 On 10 October 2019 this Court made orders, for reasons that were to be published at a later date, that this appeal be allowed, that the appellant's convictions be quashed, and that there be a new trial. My reasons for joining in the making of those orders were the same as those stated by Martin AJ, whose judgment I have read.
2 At a late stage in the jury's deliberations, the learned trial judge was sent a note which suggested that one or more jurors might have been biased. On 22 August 2019, when this appeal first came before this Court, orders were made pursuant to s 409(1) of the Criminal Code and s 39(5)(a) of the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 requiring an inquiry to be conducted in relation to that note. The disclosure by jurors of matters relating to their deliberations is ordinarily prohibited by s 58 of the Juries Act 2003, but s 58(6)(c) creates an exception in relation to investigations authorised by this Court. When the hearing of the appeal resumed on 10 October 2019, the information that the Court received led to the conclusion that, if a fair-minded and informed member of the public was provided with that information, that person might entertain a reasonable apprehension that one or more jurors might not have brought impartial and unprejudiced minds to the resolution of the issues in the trial. The appeal therefore succeeded.
2 No 11/2022
File No CCA 913/2019
I B F v STATE…
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- Case
- [2022] TASCCA 11
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue on appeal was whether a note sent by a juror to the trial judge, suggesting potential bias on the part of another juror, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. This question required the court to consider the appropriate response of a trial judge upon receiving such a communication and the threshold for establishing a mistrial or a new trial on the grounds of jury partiality.
The Full Court held that the trial judge's handling of the juror's note was appropriate. The judge had discreetly questioned the juror who sent the note, ascertained that the juror's concerns did not relate to the evidence or the law, and that the juror remained capable of impartially considering the case. The court applied the principle that a reasonable apprehension of bias must be based on circumstances that would lead an informed, objective observer to conclude that there was a real possibility of bias, rather than mere speculation or unsubstantiated concerns. The court found that the trial judge's actions had dispelled any reasonable apprehension of bias and that the integrity of the jury's deliberations had been maintained.
The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction was affirmed.
Orders
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