FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hyder v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 29
Appeal from: Hyder v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2022] FCA 421 File number: QUD 172 of 2022 Judgment of: LOGAN, BROMWICH AND HESPE JJ Date of judgment: 8 March 2023 Catchwords: TAXATION – declarations and writ of prohibition sought against the Commissioner of Taxation pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – Commissioner’s power to issue assessments to more than one taxpayer in respect of income from the same source – accrual of general interest charge (GIC) – whether Commissioner required to give credit for tax paid by different taxpayer when calculating GIC – whether due date for payment ought to be deferred – Commissioner’s power of recovery – where undertaking given not to commence recovery proceedings Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 13
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 97, 177F
Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 5-15
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B
Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 255-5, 255-10, 350-10, 350-12
Cases cited: Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Limited [2008] HCA 32; (2008) 237 CLR 146
Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxes (SA) [1926] HCA 30; (1926) 38 CLR 289
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Moorebank Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 29; (1988) 165 CLR 55
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 23; (1995) 183 CLR 168
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd [1928] HCA 49; (1928) 42 CLR 39
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Stokes (1996) 72 FCR 160
Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 67; (1932) 48 CLR 192
Division: General Division Registry: Queensland National Practice Area: Taxation Number of paragraphs: 86 Date of hearing: 24–25 November 2022 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Robertson KC with Mr P G Bickford Solicitor for the Appellants: Small Myers Hughes Counsel for the Respondent: Ms M Brennan KC with Ms F Chen Solicitor for the Respondent: McInnes Wilson Lawyers ORDERS
QUD 172 of 2022 BETWEEN: ELTON MATTHEW HYDER IV
First Appellant
EMH IV PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE EMH IV FAMILY TRUST
Second Appellant
ACN 603 939 939 PTY LTD (ACN 603 939 939)
Third Appellant
AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
LOGAN, BROMWICH AND HESPE JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 MARCH 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
This appeal challenges a refusal in the original jurisdiction of declaratory and other relief claimed by the Appellants under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The underlying issue concerns the ability of the Commissioner of Taxation to recover tax, penalties and general interest charge (GIC) in respect of liabilities arising under…
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- Case
- [2023] FCAFC 29
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court examined the principle established in Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, which emphasises that income should not be taxed more than once for the same period. However, the Court found that the principle did not apply rigidly in all circumstances and that the Commissioner was entitled to issue alternative assessments to different taxpayers for the same income. The Court also held that the Commissioner's conduct from 28 May 2021 to 27 July 2021 was oppressive and unlawful, as it sought to enforce payment from both the Appellant and the Trustee despite issuing alternative assessments. Nevertheless, the Court found no basis for granting an injunction or writ of prohibition since the Commissioner had undertaken not to commence recovery proceedings.
The Court further ruled that the decision to refuse to defer the due date for payment of the assessments was flawed for failing to consider relevant factors. The matter was remitted for reconsideration. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Commissioner’s conduct in issuing the assessments was lawful, and that the Appellants' arguments regarding the accrual of GIC were not well-founded under the circumstances presented. The Appellants were ordered to pay the Respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In addition to the propositions set out at [45] above, it became apparent during the course of oral submissions that a significant part of the Appellants’ concern related to the accrual of GIC. The essence of the Appellants’ contention was that GIC should not be taken to be accruing on the sum of Mr Hyder’s amended assessments or the Trustee’s assessments for the 2015 year with no regard to the tax that had been paid by SEPL. They contend that the total sum did not represent a tax‑related liability that was properly due and payable, and therefore was not a sum on which GIC ought to accrue.CONSIDERATIONScope of decision in Richardson The central tenet of the Appellants’ case is based on the following sentence from Evatt J’s reasons in Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 67; (1932) 48 CLR 192 at 212, taken out of context: “‘One income, one taxpayer, one tax’ is the general scheme of the Act”. That sentence needs to be read in the context in which it was made. Richardson concerned a taxpayer, Mr Richardson, who had failed to include in his returns assessable income from operations by a person who was found to be a nominee of that taxpayer. The nominee had returned that income as his own and tax had been paid on that income, albeit at a rate much lower than if that income had been assessed to Mr Richardson. The Commissioner issued amended assessments to Mr Richardson and had neither cancelled nor amended the assessment issued to the nominee. Nor had the Commissioner refunded the tax paid on the nominee’s assessment. The Commissioner did not take into account any of the payments made to him in respect of the nominee’s assessment in calculating the taxable income of the taxpayer, or in determining the amount of tax to be paid by the taxpayer, or in determining the amount of additional tax (now called administrative penalty), or otherwise reducing the total amount payable by the taxpayer. At first instance, Starke J ordered a reduction in the total amount of each assessment by a sum equal to the tax already paid by the nominee on the ground that, having treated the person conducting the operations from which the income arose as a mere nominee or dummy for the taxpayer, the Commissioner was bound to act consistently and treat all of the nominee’s acts on the same basis. These acts included the payment of tax (which, as it happened, had been found on the facts to be payments funded by Mr Richardson). The consequence was that, on Starke J’s reasoning, in determining the amount due to be paid by Mr Richardson, credit was to be given for the amount paid by his nominee. In the course of his reasons, Starke J stated (as reproduced in Richardson at 201) that “[t]he Income Tax Acts do not authorize the Commissioner to take income tax twice over in respect of the same source for the same period of time”. On appeal to the Full High Court, the taxpayer contended that Starke J had given credit for the tax paid by Mr Richardson’s nominee at the wrong stage of computation — the credit should have been given in the process of calculating Mr Richardson’s income tax shortfall, with the consequence that the amount on which additional tax was payable should have been lower, rather than taking the payment into account in determining the total balance owing to the Commissioner. On appeal, the taxpayer also contended that the assessment to him was not authorised by the Income Tax Assessment Acts 1922–1930 (Cth) because the assessments against the nominee assessing the profits of the operations stood unamended.