Hyder v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hyder v Commissioner of Taxation [2023] FCAFC 29

Appeal from: Hyder v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) [2022] FCA 421
File number: QUD 172 of 2022
Judgment of: LOGAN, BROMWICH AND HESPE JJ
Date of judgment: 8 March 2023
Catchwords: TAXATION – declarations and writ of prohibition sought against the Commissioner of Taxation pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) – Commissioner’s power to issue assessments to more than one taxpayer in respect of income from the same source – accrual of general interest charge (GIC) – whether Commissioner required to give credit for tax paid by different taxpayer when calculating GIC – whether due date for payment ought to be deferred – Commissioner’s power of recovery – where undertaking given not to commence recovery proceedings
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 13

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ss 97, 177F

Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) s 5-15

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ss 255-5, 255-10, 350-10, 350-12

Cases cited:

Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Limited [2008] HCA 32; (2008) 237 CLR 146

Commonwealth Agricultural Service Engineers Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxes (SA) [1926] HCA 30; (1926) 38 CLR 289

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Moorebank Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 29; (1988) 165 CLR 55

Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 23; (1995) 183 CLR 168

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v S Hoffnung & Co Ltd [1928] HCA 49; (1928) 42 CLR 39

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Stokes (1996) 72 FCR 160

Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 67; (1932) 48 CLR 192

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 86
Date of hearing: 24–25 November 2022
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Robertson KC with Mr P G Bickford
Solicitor for the Appellants: Small Myers Hughes
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms M Brennan KC with Ms F Chen
Solicitor for the Respondent: McInnes Wilson Lawyers

ORDERS

QUD 172 of 2022
BETWEEN:

ELTON MATTHEW HYDER IV

First Appellant

EMH IV PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR THE EMH IV FAMILY TRUST

Second Appellant

ACN 603 939 939 PTY LTD (ACN 603 939 939)

Third Appellant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

LOGAN, BROMWICH AND HESPE JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 MARCH 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. This appeal challenges a refusal in the original jurisdiction of declaratory and other relief claimed by the Appellants under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The underlying issue concerns the ability of the Commissioner of Taxation to recover tax, penalties and general interest charge (GIC) in respect of liabilities arising under…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCAFC 29
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hyder v Commissioner of Taxation involved an appeal by the Appellants against decisions of the primary judge concerning the legality of the Commissioner of Taxation's actions in issuing assessments and determining the accrual of interest. The Appellants argued that the Commissioner's conduct in issuing assessments to multiple taxpayers for the same income source was unlawful and that general interest charge (GIC) should not accrue on the assessments without crediting the tax already paid by another taxpayer. The Court was required to determine the validity of the Commissioner’s conduct in issuing the assessments, the legality of enforcing payment on these assessments, and whether GIC should accrue without considering the tax already paid by a different taxpayer.

The Court examined the principle established in Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, which emphasises that income should not be taxed more than once for the same period. However, the Court found that the principle did not apply rigidly in all circumstances and that the Commissioner was entitled to issue alternative assessments to different taxpayers for the same income. The Court also held that the Commissioner's conduct from 28 May 2021 to 27 July 2021 was oppressive and unlawful, as it sought to enforce payment from both the Appellant and the Trustee despite issuing alternative assessments. Nevertheless, the Court found no basis for granting an injunction or writ of prohibition since the Commissioner had undertaken not to commence recovery proceedings.

The Court further ruled that the decision to refuse to defer the due date for payment of the assessments was flawed for failing to consider relevant factors. The matter was remitted for reconsideration. The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Commissioner’s conduct in issuing the assessments was lawful, and that the Appellants' arguments regarding the accrual of GIC were not well-founded under the circumstances presented. The Appellants were ordered to pay the Respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The Appellants pay the Respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Before this Court, the Appellants contend that further relief ought to have been issued in the form of further declarations and a writ of prohibition.FACTS The facts were set out by the primary judge at PJ [12]–[133]. No issue was taken with how his Honour recited those facts. For present purposes, they may be summarised as follows. The “Screaming Eagle Partnership” was established by an agreement executed on 29 January 2015 between Mr Hyder (as the “Principal”) and SEPL (as the “Ordinary Partner”). Mr Hyder was to contribute 1% of the capital and be entitled to 1% of the profits of the partnership; SEPL was to contribute 99% of the capital and be entitled to 99% of the profits. On 29 June 2015, the Trustee distributed particular amounts of the net income of the EMH IV Family Trust for the year ended 30 June 2015 to six beneficiaries, with the balance of $18,028,722 distributed to the Screaming Eagle Partnership. This distribution was disclosed in the tax return of the EMH IV Family Trust for the 2015 income year as including net capital gains of $2,359,204 and other income of $15,669,518. The tax return for the Screaming Eagle Partnership for the year ended 30 June 2015 disclosed total net partnership income of $15,678,015, including a distribution of the net income of the EMH IV Family Trust in the amount of $15,669,518; that Mr Hyder’s share of partnership income was $156,780; and that the balance of $15,521,235 was SEPL’s share. SEPL’s income tax return for the year ended 30 June 2015 included its share of the net income of the Screaming Eagle Partnership and 99% of the net capital gain distributed by the EMH IV Family Trust to the Screaming Eagle Partnership. SEPL failed to pay the tax assessed on the basis of its return for the year ended 30 June 2015 by the due date for payment, being 16 May 2016. On 28 October 2016, SEPL was placed into voluntary liquidation and the Commissioner lodged a proof of debt for the tax due. On 3 October 2019, SEPL was reinstated by order of Supreme Court of Queensland. The orders included an order that SEPL pay the sum of $5,577,228.08 to the Commissioner, equal to the sum of the tax due to the Commissioner plus GIC. This sum was paid by SEPL on 7 November 2019. In his tax return for the year ended 30 June 2015, Mr Hyder included a share of the net income of the Screaming Eagle Partnership of $156,780 and a capital gain of $23,592, said to represent Mr Hyder’s 1% share of the net capital gain distributed by the Trustee to the Screaming Eagle Partnership. Following an audit of the tax affairs of the Screaming Eagle Partnership, in May 2020 the Commissioner issued Mr Hyder with:(1)a notice of amended assessment for the 2015 year for tax payable in the amount of $6,486,122.46;(2)a notice of liability to pay shortfall interest charge in respect of the 2015 year in the amount of $1,340,494.60;(3)a notice of amended assessment for the 2016 year for tax payable in the amount of $2,262,660.45; and(4)a notice of liability to pay shortfall interest charge in respect of the 2016 year in the amount of $331,428.50.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the course of the hearing before the primary judge, the Commissioner gave an undertaking that he was seeking only to recover tax as assessed to Mr Hyder and that no recovery action was proposed to be taken against Mr Hyder or the Trustee prior to the conclusion of the Pt IVC proceedings.DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The applications before the primary judge were:(1)An application pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act for declaratory relief and writs of prohibition.(2)An application for review under the ADJR Act of the decision by an officer authorised by the Respondent, refusing to defer the due date for payment of the assessments issued to the Trustee and the amended assessments issued to Mr Hyder. In relation to the application pursuant to s 39B of the Judiciary Act, the primary judge considered the issues before him to be:(1)The lawfulness or validity of the Commissioner’s conduct in issuing the amended assessments to Mr Hyder and the assessments to the Trustee.(2)The lawfulness of the Commissioner’s conduct in the period between the date of issue of the assessments to the Trustee and the amended assessments to Mr Hyder, and 27 July 2021 (when the Commissioner acknowledged that he would not and could not recover against both the Trustee and Mr Hyder in the 2015 year, and that he would only seek to recover against Mr Hyder). The primary judge concluded that:(1)The Commissioner’s conduct in issuing the amended assessments to Mr Hyder and the assessments to the Trustee, whilst at the same retaining the tax paid by SEPL on the assessment issued to SEPL, did not render the amended assessments or assessments invalid.(2)From 28 May 2021 to 27 July 2021, the Commissioner engaged in oppressive and, therefore, unlawful conduct in seeking to enforce payment of the full amount due by both Mr Hyder and the Trustee in circumstances in which the Commissioner had issued assessments on alternative bases to different taxpayers in respect of the same income. The amended assessments issued to Mr Hyder and the assessments issued to the Trustee were alternative assessments, and the Commissioner could not seek to recover before the final resolution of the correct position. The Commissioner could only ever be successful against one of Mr Hyder or the Trustee, but not both. Given that the Commissioner was no longer pressing for payment of both Mr Hyder’s amended assessments and the Trustee’s assessments, and had given an undertaking to the Court not to commence recovery proceedings, the primary judge considered that there was no basis for the grant of an injunction or writ of prohibition. His Honour did, however, consider it appropriate to make declarations as to the oppressive character of the Commissioner’s conduct until 27 July 2021. In relation to the application for review under the ADJR Act in respect of the decision to refuse to defer the due date for payment of the amended assessments to Mr Hyder and the assessments issued to the Trustee, the primary judge was of the view that the decision-maker had fallen into error by failing to take into account relevant considerations. Accordingly, the primary judge made orders setting that decision aside and remitting the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration.THE APPEAL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In addition to the propositions set out at [45] above, it became apparent during the course of oral submissions that a significant part of the Appellants’ concern related to the accrual of GIC. The essence of the Appellants’ contention was that GIC should not be taken to be accruing on the sum of Mr Hyder’s amended assessments or the Trustee’s assessments for the 2015 year with no regard to the tax that had been paid by SEPL. They contend that the total sum did not represent a tax‑related liability that was properly due and payable, and therefore was not a sum on which GIC ought to accrue.CONSIDERATIONScope of decision in Richardson The central tenet of the Appellants’ case is based on the following sentence from Evatt J’s reasons in Richardson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1932] HCA 67; (1932) 48 CLR 192 at 212, taken out of context: “‘One income, one taxpayer, one tax’ is the general scheme of the Act”. That sentence needs to be read in the context in which it was made. Richardson concerned a taxpayer, Mr Richardson, who had failed to include in his returns assessable income from operations by a person who was found to be a nominee of that taxpayer. The nominee had returned that income as his own and tax had been paid on that income, albeit at a rate much lower than if that income had been assessed to Mr Richardson. The Commissioner issued amended assessments to Mr Richardson and had neither cancelled nor amended the assessment issued to the nominee. Nor had the Commissioner refunded the tax paid on the nominee’s assessment. The Commissioner did not take into account any of the payments made to him in respect of the nominee’s assessment in calculating the taxable income of the taxpayer, or in determining the amount of tax to be paid by the taxpayer, or in determining the amount of additional tax (now called administrative penalty), or otherwise reducing the total amount payable by the taxpayer. At first instance, Starke J ordered a reduction in the total amount of each assessment by a sum equal to the tax already paid by the nominee on the ground that, having treated the person conducting the operations from which the income arose as a mere nominee or dummy for the taxpayer, the Commissioner was bound to act consistently and treat all of the nominee’s acts on the same basis. These acts included the payment of tax (which, as it happened, had been found on the facts to be payments funded by Mr Richardson). The consequence was that, on Starke J’s reasoning, in determining the amount due to be paid by Mr Richardson, credit was to be given for the amount paid by his nominee. In the course of his reasons, Starke J stated (as reproduced in Richardson at 201) that “[t]he Income Tax Acts do not authorize the Commissioner to take income tax twice over in respect of the same source for the same period of time”. On appeal to the Full High Court, the taxpayer contended that Starke J had given credit for the tax paid by Mr Richardson’s nominee at the wrong stage of computation — the credit should have been given in the process of calculating Mr Richardson’s income tax shortfall, with the consequence that the amount on which additional tax was payable should have been lower, rather than taking the payment into account in determining the total balance owing to the Commissioner. On appeal, the taxpayer also contended that the assessment to him was not authorised by the Income Tax Assessment Acts 1922–1930 (Cth) because the assessments against the nominee assessing the profits of the operations stood unamended.