Hutchison and Australian Securities and Investments Commission - [2018] AATA 760

Hutchison and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 760 (4 April 2018)
Division:TAXATION & COMMERCIAL DIVISION
File Number: 2017/3652
Re:Robert Hutchison
APPLICANT

AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President S Boyle
Date:4 April 2018
Place:Perth

1.The Tribunal refuses the Applicant’s request to make the orders sought in the email dated 5 February 2018.
2.The Tribunal orders that on or before 11 April 2018 the Applicant file any submissions in reply to the Respondent’s closing submissions and serve a copy on the Respondent’s solicitors.

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Deputy President S Boyle
CATCHWORDS
Financial services – banning order – freedom of information request for further documents – request for leave to re-open hearing – whether the Respondent is required to identify all documents to admit in to evidence at the outset of the hearing – request refused
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975(Cth) – s 37
Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) – ss 12DA, 19
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – ss 920A, 920B, 1041G, 1041H
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) – ss 378, 409
CASES
Confidential and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 112
REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President S Boyle
4 April 2018
THE APPLICATION

By email dated 5 February 2018 addressed to the Perth Registry of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and copied to the lawyers for the Respondent, the Applicant seeks the following orders (verbatim):
1. Pursuant to s.37 of the AAT Act, within 14 days ASIC to Produce all documents, (sic) the subject of the FOI request, as set out in JX9 (original emphasis) and further copies of any commission reports or documents provided by ANZ/RI Advice:
2.    In the alternative to 1, within 14 days ASIC to permit the Applicant’s solicitors or their agents, to inspect the above documents at ASIC’s premises in Perth, and to obtain copies of the same, at ASIC’s expense;
3.    The time for the Applicant to file and serve his replying submissions, be extended from 5 February 2018, (sic) to a date to be fixed;
4.    The Applicant have leave to apply to re-open his case and further, (sic) have leave to apply to adduce into evidence any further documents relevant to this appeal;
5.    The question of costs be reserved;
6.    The parties have liberty to apply in respect of these orders, upon providing 7 days’ notice.
The Applicant’s application for the above orders was heard on 21 February 2018. The Applicant was represented by Mr Nugawela and the Respondent was represented by Ms Wong. In support of the application the Applicant filed:
(a)the affidavit of James Xenidis in support of application pursuant to section 37 of the AAT Act and seeking consequential orders, annexing documents JX1 to JX16, sworn 5 February 2018;
(b)JX1, an email from Dayle Hutchison to James Xenidis sent 20 June 2017;
(c)JX2, a letter from ASIC to James Xenidis dated 4 July 2017 in relation to a freedom of information request – notice to identify documents under s 24AB of the FOI Act;
(d)JX3, a letter from ASIC to James Xenidis dated 27 June 2017 in relation to Attachment B documents and hearing transcript;
(e)JX4, emails sent between James Xenidis and Nhan Chau sent 4 July 2017;
(f)JX5, the Respondent’s written closing submissions dated 29 January 2018;
(g)JX6, a document titled “Appendix – Review” (pages 1 -19);
(h)JX7, emails sent between James Xenidis and Nicholas Goodstone, Nhan Chau, Nicole Williamson and Gloria Wong;
(i)JX8, letter from LFS Lawyers to ASIC dated 13 December 2017 in relation to the freedom of information request;
(j)JX9, letter from ASIC to James Xenidis dated 1 February 2018 in relation to request for access to documents;
(k)JX10, letter from ASIC to James Xenidis dated 10 January 2018 in relation to freedom of information request – notice of liability for processing charges under s 29 of the Act;
(l)JX11, Affidavit of Brian Andrew Pascoe affirmed on 1 February 2018;
(m)JX12, an email from Tony Millard to James Xenidis sent 1 February 2018, attaching a letter from ASIC to Mr Millard and a Media Release;
(n)JX13, email from Tony Millard to James Xenidis sent 1 February 2018 attaching the statement of Anthony Millard;
(o)JX14, emails sent between Tony Millard and James Xenidis;
(p)JX15, email from Tony Millard to James Xenidis sent 1 February 2018, attaching a letter regarding FOI third party consultation and a telephone note; and
(q)JX16, an email from Tony Millard to James Xenidis sent 1 February 2018 forwarding earlier emails received by Mr Millard.
The Respondent filed submissions by way of its letter dated 6 February 2018 opposing the Applicant’s application.
BACKGROUND
The substantive application (T1) in this matter, lodged with the Tribunal on 22 June 2017, seeks the review of the Respondent’s decision dated 2 June 2017 under sections 920A and 920B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Corporations Act) to permanently prohibit the Applicant from providing any financial services (the Banning Order) (T2).
The substantive application was heard by Deputy President Boyle over five days from 4 to 8 December 2017. At that hearing the Applicant, the Applicant’s wife and Ms Dickson (the general manager, professional standards, of the Applicant’s current principal), gave evidence. The Respondent called one witness, Mr Nhan Chau, an employee of the Respondent working in what Mr Chau describes as the Respondent’s financial Services Enforcement Team. The Applicant was initially represented at the hearing by counsel from the West Australian independent bar. The Applicant, however, withdrew counsel’s instructions immediately following the luncheon adjournment on the first day of the hearing. Thereafter Mr Xenidis acted as counsel for the Applicant.
The following documents were admitted into evidence at the hearing:
(a)the Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (the Applicant’s SFIC) dated 6 November 2017 (Exhibit A1);
(b)bundle of documents referred to as "RH" in the Applicant's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, RH1–RH49 (pp 1–459) (Tribunal file: volume 1, pp 1–192, RH1–13.7; volume 2, pp 193–356, RH13.8–18; volume 3, pp 357–459, RH19–49) (Exhibit A2);
(c)affidavit of Robert Hutchison affirmed 15 November 2017 (Exhibit A3);
(d)affidavit of Robert Hutchison affirmed 15 August 2017 (Exhibit A4);
(e)ANZ Bank Access Advantage Cheque Statements of Robert and Dayle Hutchison from 3 December 2010 to 2 March 2012 (Exhibit A5);
(f)an explanation of XPlan and DMS, received 24 August 2017 (Exhibit A6);
(g)Westpac Business Flexi Bank Statements for WAWM Investment Holdings Pty Limited for period 20 May 2011 to 21 March 2012 (Exhibit A7);
(h)the Applicant's Final Submissions for Interlocutory Application received 18 August 2017 (Exhibit A8);
(i)spreadsheet entitled “Rob's Review/New Client Appts” for date span January 2011 to June 2012, received 18 August 2017 (Exhibit A9);
(j)the Applicant's Outline of Submissions for Interlocutory Application, received 11 August 2017 (Exhibit A10);
(k)affidavit of Sharon Braiding affirmed 30 November 2017 (Exhibit A11);
(l)T-documents, volumes 1 – 5 (Exhibit R1);
(m)the Respondent's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (the Respondent’s SFIC), dated 27 November 2017 (Exhibit R2);
(n)the transcripts of the stay application hearing (14 and 15 August 2017) (Exhibit R3);
(o)the Statement of Brian Pascoe with annexures (BP1 to BP4) dated 24 August 2017 (Exhibit R4);
(p)the Statement of Patricia Brehaut with annexures (PB1 to PB4) dated 25 August 2017 (Exhibit R5);
(q)the Statement of Richard Arthur Sanders with annexure (RS1) dated 30 September 2017 (Exhibit R6);
(r)the Statement of Nhan Kien Chau with annexures (NKC1 to NCK80) dated 27 November 2017 (Exhibit R7); and
(s)the cheque to Mr B Couch with "With Compliments" slip from May Green (Exhibit R8).
The Tribunal also notes that before the hearing in December 2017 there was:
(a)an examination of the Applicant on 29 November 2016 (the s 19 Examination) pursuant to s 19 of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (ASIC Act). The notice requiring the Applicant to attend at the s 19 Examination was issued on 14 November 2016 and, amongst other things, identified the purpose of the s 19 Examination to be to examine suspected contraventions by the Applicant of:
(i)ss 1041G and 1041H of the Corporations Act;
(ii)s 12DA of the ASIC Act; and/or
(iii)ss 378 or 409 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913(WA)
during the period 1 January 2011 to 30 November 2012;
(b)a hearing under s 920A of the Corporations Act on 26 May 2017 (the s 920A Hearing) which the Applicant attended and made submissions. The notice issued to the Applicant on 1 May 2017 advising of the s 920A Hearing included an explanation of the nature of the potential banning order, processes for access to documents and an outline of the hearing procedure. That notice also had an attachment (Attachment A) which set out in significant detail the facts, matters and evidence which gave rise to the Respondent’s concern that between 1 January 2011 and 30 November 2012 the Applicant;
(i)had not complied with financial services law (s 920A(1)(e) of the Corporations Act);
(ii)had contravened a financial services law (s 920A(1)(f) of the Corporations Act); and
(iii)was not of good fame or character (s 920A(1)(d) of the Corporations Act).
That notice also identified the transactions which caused the Respondent to have the identified concerns and also disclosed the 16 clients concerned. In respect of each of the 16 clients the documents that the Respondent relied on were identified (in Attachment B). That notice and the covering letter comprised 23 pages (T3).
Following the s 920A Hearing on 26 May 2017 the Respondent, on 2 June 2017, issued the Banning Order under s 920A and 920B of the Corporations Act (T2). The Banning Order was accompanied by 8 pages of reasons for the Respondent’s decision to make the Banning Order.
On 22 June 2017 the Applicant lodged the application with the Tribunal for review of the Banning Order;
(c)a stay application in this Tribunal before Deputy President Rayment heard on 14 and 15 August 2017. Mr Xenidis appeared for the Applicant in the stay application. That application resulted in Deputy President Rayment granting a stay on 7 September 2017 on conditions relating to the Applicant continuing to provide financial services. Amongst other things, Deputy President Rayment’s reasons for decision in granting that stay noted at [8] that:
The final submissions of the applicant as to the primary facts earlier admitted by the applicant suggest that in important respects, those primary facts themselves will be genuinely in issue to the extent set forth in those submissions.
The reason that the Tribunal sets out the history of and background to this matter is to put the timing and nature of the latest orders sought by the Applicant into context. The factual matters and transactions which gave rise to the Banning Order and which were covered in the s 19 Examination, the s 920A Hearing, the stay application before this Tribunal and the hearing of the application in December 2017, have been known to the Applicant for many years.
Even before the statutory examinations referred to in paragraph 7 above, there had been extensive correspondence between the Applicant and the Applicant’s company WAWM Investment Holdings Pty Ltd (WAWM) on the one hand and RI Advice Group Pty Ltd (RI) on the other. WAWM was the company through which the Applicant operated the financial advice business up to 2012 as the authorised representative of RI. The status of WAWM as the authorised representative of RI was established and governed by a number of agreements between WAWM and RI being:
(a)the Individual Representative Deed (IR Deed);
(b)the Principal Representative Deed; and
(c)the Principal Authorised Representative Agreement.
By undated letter delivered to the Applicant on 21 July 2012 (T3.15), RI advised that it had come to their attention that WAWM had engaged in conduct that was in breach of its obligations under the IR Deed, in breach of the Corporations Act and in breach of the policies and procedures issued by RI. The letter advised the Applicant of the suspension of the Applicant’s (WAWM’s) status as an authorised representative.
The letter also advised that RI was conducting investigations into the conduct of WAWM and the Applicant. It also identified, in general terms, breaches that had been identified to that time which included:
·double-charging certain clients;
·intentionally removing the section containing fee disclosures from records of advice;
·making misleading and deceptive statements to clients in relation to them being double-charged fees; and
·failing to report to RI complaints made by clients.
The letter included examples of these breaches with the relevant clients identified.
Following that letter there was a series of emails exchanged between the Applicant and RI which identified the affected clients and sought agreement on the form of a letter to be sent by RI to affected clients concerning the refund of fees double-charged.
On 20 August 2012 RI sent a further letter to the Applicant (T3.19) identifying clients who had, or potentially had, been double-charged and the amount involved in each case. All of the clients who the Respondent asserts in these proceedings were double charged (particularised in paragraphs 10 to 72 of Respondent’s SFIC and paragraph 6 of affidavit of Nhan Kien Chau (Exhibit R7)) were identified in the letter of 20 August 2012. That letter sought a written response to the matters raised within 4 days (by 24 August 2012).
The Applicant responded to that request by letter dated 22 August 2012 (T3.21).
Accordingly, the detail of the relevant conduct by the Applicant, the clients to which that conducted related and even the transactions involving those clients have been known by the Applicant since August 2012.
Documents submitted by the Applicant
In support of the stay application made by the Applicant in June 2017, the Applicant lodged extensive and detailed submissions, both before and after the hearing of the stay application. Those submissions dealt with the clients and the transactions which had been identified by the various means referred to above.
Standard programming orders were made on 14 July 2017 which required the Applicant to file his SFIC and any further evidence that the Applicant proposed to rely on at the hearing by 18 August 2017 with the Respondent to do likewise by 22 September 2017. Those orders were varied by orders made on 27 September 2017 which extended the time for the Applicant to lodge his SFIC and evidence until 20 October 2017 with the Respondent to do likewise by 24 November 2017.
The Applicant filed his SFIC on 6 November 2017 and the Respondent filed its SFIC on 27 November 2017. The Applicant’s SFIC had a large bundle of documents attached to it. These documents were individually (mostly) referred to in the Applicant’s SFIC.
The Applicant lodged two affidavits by the Applicant. One was affirmed 15 November 2017 and did no more than state that the deponent had read the Applicant’s SFIC that he had reviewed the documents identified as RH19 to RH49 attached to the SFIC and confirmed “that all are true and correct in every particular”. The second affidavit of the Applicant, affirmed 15 August 2017, referred to the documents “… submitted to the AAT for the above matter listed RH1–RH18…” and affirmed that they “… are true and correct in every particular”.
As can be seen from paragraph 6 above, the Applicant did not file any other affidavits or witness statements.
By notice dated 2 October 2017 the Tribunal listed this matter for hearing on 4 to 8 December 2017. On 29 November 2017 the Applicant's lawyers sent a letter to the Tribunal copied to the Respondent’s lawyers. That letter:
·advised that the Applicant’s solicitor had spoken to the Respondent’s lawyers who had confirmed that “… the majority if not all persons who had provided Affidavits to ASIC will be called to give evidence and be cross examined”;
·stated that the Applicant had four witnesses summonses issued for witnesses who would attend and be cross-examined by ASIC;
·advised that a “… key witness, … Peter Ornsby, CEO of RI Advice Pty Ltd, will not be able to produce the documents as these have been archived and he has sought an adjournment”;
·advised that the Applicant’s “… expert witness Mr Geoffory Rimmer is moving to the Gold Coast this weekend and may not be available to give evidence as he has relocated to an outer suburb of the Gold Coast”; and
·sought an adjournment of the hearing.
The adjournment was refused.
By requests dated 13, 14 and 15 November 2017 the Applicant sought the issue of five summonses for attendance to give evidence and/or produce documents. None of those summonses was addressed to clients or former clients of the Applicant. The forms of the summonses sought by the Applicant were defective and on 27 November 2017 the Applicant requested the issue of the same summonses in appropriate form.
The summonses were issued by the Tribunal on 27 November 2017 and 28 November 2017. The Tribunal does not know whether any of these summonses were served on the named parties.
On Friday 1 December 2017, the Friday before the commencement of the hearing on Monday 4 December 2017, the Applicant advised the Tribunal that he would not be calling any of the witnesses for whom summonses had been issued and requested “that all summonses be revoked.” The Tribunal also understands that the Applicant advised the Respondent’s counsel that he only required Mr Chau for cross-examination. The affidavits of Brian Pascoe (Exhibit R4), Patricia Brehaut (Exhibit R5) and Richard Sanders (Exhibit R6) were therefore admitted into evidence without the need to call the deponents.
The hearing took place over five days (from 4 – 8 December 2017). At the conclusion of the hearing on 8 December 2017 orders were made for the parties to provide written closing submissions with the Applicant to provide his closing submissions by 20 December 2017 and the Respondent to provide its closing submissions by 22 January 2018 and the Applicant having leave to provide any responsive submissions by 5 February 2018. At the Applicant’s request the time for him to lodge his closing submissions was extended to 8 January 2018, with the Respondent’s submissions to be filed by 29 January 2018 and any submissions in reply by the Applicant to be filed by 5 February 2018. The Applicant’s closing submissions were filed on 8 January (with an amendment on 9 January 2018) and the Respondent’s closing submissions were filed on 29 January 2018. Accordingly, the only outstanding matter is the filing of any responsive submissions by the Applicant.
THE HEARING
As set out above, the application was heard by the Tribunal between 4 and 8 December 2017. In cross-examination (Hearing Transcript, page 382) Mr Chau was asked a number of questions about whether he spoke to clients and former clients of the Applicant in preparing the Respondent’s case. In particular he was asked:
MR XENIDIS: Mr Nhan Chau, can I ask, in relation to the clients that you’ve identified in this statement, are there any clients that you spoke to outside of these clients? I apologise, I should say you or other support staff?   Yes. So, just to clarify, the clients you refer to?
The clients are in paragraph 62 and 65?   Yes, I did speak with other clients outside of those clients in paragraph 62 and 65.
And are any of those clients part of the original 15 or 16 clients?   Correct, yes.
Where’s that evidence in relation to those discussions with those clients?   That - that information was not produced as they were not relevant.
Not relevant to whom?   To the case before the tribunal.
The case before the tribunal. So, you spoke to Mr Dad? [sic]   I did, yes.
Yes, and he’s a client where an allegation’s made in relation to Mr Hutchison’s conduct?   Correct.
Where that’s evidence?   That evidence was not produced.

At that point counsel for the Respondent objected and there followed discussion between the respective counsel and the Tribunal (some in the absence of the witness) as to the purpose and appropriateness of the line of questioning. What emerged from that exchange was that the Applicant was seeking notes of Mr Chau’s conversations with former clients that may indicate that some double-charging which had previously been admitted by the Applicant may not have occurred. Counsel for the Applicant referred to the transaction involving “Mr Dadd as an example”. Up to that point it had not been disputed by the Applicant that Mr and Mrs Dadd had been double-charged. As noted above, the letter from RI on 20 August 2012 (T3.19) to the Applicant identified (amongst others) that Mr and Mrs Dadd had been double-charged $1200. That allegation is not denied in the Applicant’s response to that letter of 22 August 2012 (T3.21).
Similarly, although the Dadd transaction was not specifically put to the Applicant in either the s 19 Examination or the s 920A Hearing, the Applicant did not raise any claim in those proceedings, or in the stay application before Deputy President Raymant, that the double-charging identified by RI and by the Respondent had not occurred. Even the Applicant’s SFIC filed with the Tribunal on 6 November 2017 did not dispute the double-charging of Mr and Mrs Dadd. Paragraph 13(k) on page 10 of the Applicant’s SFIC concedes the double charging and paragraph 57(b)(vii) on page 22 of the Applicant’s SFIC claims that the Applicant “initiated the refund …[to the Dadds]…prior to RI’s investigation”.
CONSIDERATION
Mr Xenidis has filed an affidavit sworn 5 February 2018 and submitted further letters and emails in support of the present application for production of documents and leave to re-open the Applicant’s case. As with the submissions made at the hearing in the cross-examination of Mr Chau, it appears to the Tribunal that Mr Xenidis is trying to run an argument of some improper conduct on the part of Mr Chau (see Hearing Transcript, pages 382 at [39]), and presumably the Respondent, in not including notes of conversations that Mr Chau may have had with clients and former clients of the Applicant in preparing the Respondent’s case. Such a claim is unfounded. As Mr Chau explained when cross-examined, the documents produced by the Respondent under s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) were those that were relevant to the decision under review and which would be relevant to the Tribunal in reaching its preferred decision on the matters in issue.
On the basis of the Applicant’s conduct since August 2012, through the s 19 Examination, the s 920A Hearing, the stay application and right up to the filing of the Applicant’s SFIC a matter of weeks before the hearing in December 2017, the Respondent was entitled to assume that the Applicant agreed that the double-charging had occurred, including the double-charging of the Dadds. The document produced by the Respondent under s 37 of the AAT Act reflected that position.
Subsection 37(1) of the AAT Act provides:
(1) Subject to this section, a person who has made a decision that is the subject of an application for review (other than second review) by the Tribunal must, within 28 days after receiving notice of the application (or within such further period as the Tribunal allows), lodge with the Tribunal a copy of:
(a) a statement setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision; and
(b) subject to any directions given under section 18B, every other document that is in the person’s possession or under the person’s control and is relevant to the review of the decision by the Tribunal.
A very helpful summary of what is required of a decision-maker under s 37 of the AAT Act is set out in paragraphs [349] and [350] of Deputy President Forgie’s decision in Confidential and Commissioner of Taxation [2013] AATA 112 as follows:
349. Identification of the documents is undertaken on an objective basis. What is relevant to the “review of the decision” is not necessarily what was regarded as relevant in making the decision or even in the decision-maker’s possession or control at the time. Relevance is not determined by reference to what is ultimately determined to be relevant in making the decision on review. Documents that are relevant to the review of the decision are those that will be relevant in the act of examining or reviewing the decision. They may, or may not, ultimately prove relevant in the decision that is made but their relevance or otherwise will be determined in the process of review. If they prove to be relevant, their probative value will be determined in the same process.
350. The decision-maker must identify the documents at the time he or she lodges them. It may be the case that the applicant has yet to identify the arguments he or she will put to the Tribunal and the Tribunal itself is a long way from deciding what it considers relevant and irrelevant. As a result, the decision-maker’s task is not an easy one for he or she must gather together documents that are relevant to arguments that he or she might have rejected but which may be arguments that are put to the Tribunal or which it raises itself in the course of the hearing.
The exercise described in paragraph [350] of the above decision (in paragraph 34 above) appears to be the exercise undertaken by Mr Chau.
As far as the Tribunal can determine, the first time that the Applicant seems to have changed his position in relation to the previously admitted double-charging, was late on the fourth day of the hearing (at around 3.05 pm according to the Hearing Transcript, page 382). There was no mention by the Applicant’s original counsel in opening on the first day of the hearing, or even by Mr Xenidis in his opening on day two of the hearing (after the Applicant’s dismissal of the original counsel), that the Applicant had changed his position in relation to the previously admitted double-charges.
Also, significantly, the Applicant had known the basis of allegations that had been made against him and upon which the Banning Order was based for over five years leading up to the hearing in December 2017. The application seeking review of the Banning Order was lodged with the Tribunal in June 2017. Mr Xenidis’s firm has been acting for the Applicant since at least that time as they lodged the application on behalf of the Applicant. The Applicant has had ample opportunity to, firstly, consider the basis upon which he would run the application and then to gather and put on whatever evidence he or his legal advisers thought necessary to establish his case.
If it was going to be part of the Applicant’s case that there was no double-charge of the Dadds, or any of the other clients long-identified as having been double charged, then the Applicant had ample time to contact those clients and get statements from them. Not only does it appear that no effort was made to get statements from these clients, but it does not even seem to have been raised as an issue for determination in the application.
On the face of it, the Respondent complied with its obligation under s 37 of the AAT Act. The Applicant has been legally represented throughout these proceedings and has had ample opportunity to state his case and present evidence to support that case. The fact that there has been an apparent change of heart by the Applicant as to the basis upon which he seeks to run his case, manifested for the first time on the fourth day of the hearing, cannot, in the Tribunal’s view, justify the orders sought by the Applicant.
The Applicant’s application also appears to be based on the premise that Mr Chau’s notes of conversation with relevant clients disclose that they were in fact not double-charged fees. Even in the face of the Applicant’s admission of double-charging, if such notes existed they would have been producible under s 37 of the AAT Act. There were none so produced and there is no evidence to support the Applicant’s underlying premise that such documents exist.
DECISION
Accordingly, the Tribunal refuses the Applicant’s request to make the orders sought in the email dated 5 February 2018.
As the time for the Applicant to file any submissions in reply to the Respondent’s closing submissions has now passed, the Tribunal orders that the time for the Applicant to file any submissions in reply to the Respondent’s closing submissions be filed and served on the Respondent’s solicitors by 11 April 2018.

I certify that the preceding 42 (forty-two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President S Boyle

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Administrative Assistant - Legal
Dated: 4 April 2018

Date of hearing: 21 February 2018

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Nugawela

Solicitors for the Applicant: LFS Lawyers

Representative for the Respondent: Ms Wong

Date of hearing:	21 February 2018
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Nugawela
Solicitors for the Applicant:	LFS Lawyers
Representative for the Respondent:	Ms Wong