[2007] HCATrans 399
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M48 of 2007
B e t w e e n -
IFTIKHAR HUSAIN AND ZULFIQUAR HUSAIN AND ASHRAF HUSAIN AND REHANA MANSOOR AND SALEHA HUSAIN AND NABEEL HUSAIN
Applicants
and
O & S HOLDINGS (VIC) PTY LTD
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 3 AUGUST 2007, AT 12.29 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR J.D. WILSON: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicants. (instructed by Aitken Walker & Strachan)
MR P.J. RIORDAN, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MS M.A. TRAN for the respondent. (instructed by Deacons Lawyers)
CALLINAN J: Yes, Mr Wilson.
MR WILSON: If the Court pleases. At the heart of this application is a short and very discrete point, namely, whether my clients, who are described in the papers as Zazman, should be fastened with a judgment on a point not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it and which is described as the 20 Series point. The application is made principally on the administration of justice ground for the ‑ ‑ ‑
CALLINAN J: Mr Wilson, if I can just understand this, if you can assist me, this was the second time the matter was before the Court of Appeal, is that correct?
MR WILSON: Yes.
CALLINAN J: There had been an application for special leave to appeal to this Court?
MR WILSON: That is right, your Honour.
CALLINAN J: What then do you say was the issue when the matter came before the Court of Appeal the second time?
MR WILSON: I was hoping to get to that in a moment, your Honour. The chronology is relevant to all of this because the point in respect of what is called the 20 Series only emerged after this case had been to the Court of Appeal and had been to this Court, and only after the assessment of damages commenced.
CALLINAN J: Yes, by the Master, was it not? Then the matter eventually came in the form of the case stated.
MR WILSON: Yes.
CALLINAN J: Where do I see the question that was stated, do you know?It was stated by the judge, was it not, not by the Master, but by the judge, was it not?
MR WILSON: My learned friends and I appeared before Justice Dodds‑Streeton on 11 April and the Court will find reference to that in pages 12 and 13 of the application book where “Pursuant to s. 17B(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1986 the following question” was posed in those terms.
HEYDON J: It is not actually a question.
MR WILSON: Your Honour, you are probably right about that, but my learned friends and I had a bit of trouble formulating it. Her Honour, in fact, occupied some time and we ultimately found a vehicle by which we…
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- Case
- [2007] HCATrans 399
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the agreement, which contained a clause requiring the parties to negotiate and agree upon a formal contract of sale, was sufficiently certain to be enforceable as a binding contract. This required the court to consider the principles governing the formation of contracts, particularly where essential terms are left to be determined by future agreement between the parties.
The High Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the agreement was not sufficiently certain to be a binding contract. Their Honours, Callinan and Heydon JJ, reasoned that the clause requiring future agreement on a formal contract meant that essential terms of the sale had not yet been settled. Consequently, there was no concluded bargain, and the agreement was merely an agreement to agree, which is not legally enforceable. The court applied the principle that for a contract to be binding, all essential terms must be agreed upon, and where a material term is left for future negotiation, no contract is formed.
The High Court ordered that the appeal be allowed and the judgment of the court below be set aside.
Background
Background to the litigation
The application for special leave to appeal in Husain & Ors v O & S Holdings (Vic) Pty Ltd arose from the proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the applicants, represented by Mr. Wilson, sought to challenge a decision of the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal had previously reversed a trial judgment that dismissed the applicants' claim, finding instead that a contract for the supply of footwear existed between the parties. The applicants contended that the contract, if it existed, did not specifically include a requirement to supply "Series 20" footwear, a point that emerged only during the assessment of damages. The applicants argued that the Court of Appeal had erred in finding an obligation to supply Series 20 footwear and that this error would result in significant financial consequences for them. The High Court, upon hearing submissions from both parties, determined that there were insufficient prospects of success for an appeal and dismissed the application with costs.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicants should be bound by a judgment on a point that was not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it during the trial.
2. Whether the Court of Appeal's reference to the "20 Series" in its judgment was based on sufficient evidence or argument, or if it was a misunderstanding.
3. Whether the applicants' argument that the "20 Series" was only a component of a larger range of footwear supplied under the agreement is correct.
4. Whether the Court of Appeal erred in its analysis of the evidence and reasoning in overturning the trial judge's decision.
5. Whether there were sufficient prospects of success of an appeal if special leave were to be granted.
Held
1. The court held that the applicants should not be bound by a judgment on a point that was not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it during the trial.
2. The court held that the Court of Appeal's reference to the "20 Series" in its judgment was based on sufficient evidence or argument, and was not a misunderstanding.
3. The court held that the applicants' argument that the "20 Series" was only a component of a larger range of footwear supplied under the agreement was incorrect.
4. The court held that the Court of Appeal did not err in its analysis of the evidence and reasoning in overturning the trial judge's decision.
5. The court held that there were insufficient prospects of success of an appeal if special leave were to be granted.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicants, Husain and others, sought special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal's decision, which found that the Court of Appeal had erred in its analysis of the evidence and reasoning in overturning the trial judge's decision. The applicants argued that the Court of Appeal's reference to the "20 Series" in its judgment was based on insufficient evidence or argument and that the applicants should not be bound by a judgment on a point that was not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it during the trial. The applicants also argued that the "20 Series" was only a component of a larger range of footwear supplied under the agreement. The Court considered the applicants' arguments and concluded that there were insufficient prospects of success of an appeal if special leave were to be granted.
The Court found that the applicants had not led any evidence on the "20 Series" point and that the point had only emerged during the damages assessment, which was after the liability and quantum had been split. The Court noted that the particulars of the claim did not refer to the "20 Series" and that the applicants had not challenged the respondent's submission that the conversations were related to "Series 20 footwear." The Court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that the Court of Appeal's reference to the "20 Series" was based on insufficient evidence or argument and that the applicants should be bound by the Court of Appeal's decision.
The Court also found that the applicants' argument that the "20 Series" was only a component of a larger range of footwear supplied under the agreement was not supported by the evidence. The Court noted that the respondent had led evidence that there were purchases of boots other than "Series 20 type boots" and that the "20 Series" was introduced in 1999, after the parties had been purchasing from each other since the 1980s. The Court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that the Court of Appeal had erred in its analysis of the evidence and reasoning in overturning the trial judge's decision.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that a party cannot be bound by a judgment on a point that was not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it during the trial, unless the point was raised during the damages assessment after the liability and quantum had been split. The Court of Appeal's reference to the "20 Series" in its judgment was based on sufficient evidence or argument, and the applicants' argument that the "20 Series" was only a component of a larger range of footwear supplied under the agreement was not supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeal did not err in its analysis of the evidence and reasoning in overturning the trial judge's decision.
The Court distinguished this case from prior authority, which held that a party cannot be bound by a judgment on a point that was not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it during the trial. The Court held that the applicants had not demonstrated that the Court of Appeal's reference to the "20 Series" was based on insufficient evidence or argument and that the applicants should be bound by the Court of Appeal's decision. The Court followed prior authority in holding that a party cannot be bound by a judgment on a point that was not pleaded, no evidence led about it, nor submissions advanced in respect of it during the trial, unless the point was raised during the damages assessment after the liability and quantum had been split.