Huntley McArdle & Glass & Anor v Henderson, Russell Fraser & Ors Ford, Nevett v Henderson, Russell Fraser & Ors Gray & Winter & Anor v Henderson, Russell Fraser
[1996] FCA 1063
•29 Nov 1996
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VG 250 of 1996
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: NEVETT FORD
(Appellant)
AND: RUSSELL FRASER HENDERSON AND OTHERS
(Respondents)
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Ryan J
DATE OF ORDER: 29 November 1996
WHERE MADE: Melbourne
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the motion on notice dated 21 May 1996 be dismissed.
That the costs of the appellant and Metzke & Allan of and incidental to the said motion on notice be those parties' costs in the appeal.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VG 252 of 1996
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: GRAY & WINTER AND JAMES GRAY
(Appellants)
AND: RUSSELL FRASER HENDERSON AND OTHERS
(Respondents)
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Ryan J
DATE OF ORDER: 29 November 1996
WHERE MADE: Melbourne
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the motion on notice by Metzke & Allan dated 21 May 1996 be dismissed.
That the costs of the appellants and Metzke & Allan of the said motion on notice dated 21 May 1996 be the costs of those parties in the appeal.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY ) No. VG 248 of 1996
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
BETWEEN: HUNTLEY McARDLE & GLASS AND ROBERT HUGH GLASS
(Appellants)
AND: RUSSELL FRASER HENDERSON AND OTHERS
(Respondents)
JUDGE MAKING ORDER: Ryan J
DATE OF ORDER: 29 November 1996
WHERE MADE: Melbourne
MINUTES OF ORDER
THE COURT ORDERS:
That the motion on notice dated 9 May 1996 be dismissed.
That the costs of the first to thirty-ninth respondents and of the appellants of and incidental to the said motion on notice dated 9 May 1996 be the costs of those parties in the appeal.
That the motion on notice dated 21 May 1996 be dismissed.
That the costs of Metzke & Allan and of the appellants of and incidental to the said motion on notice dated 21 May 1996 be the costs of those parties in the appeal.
NOTE: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
)
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY )
)
GENERAL DIVISION )
No. VG 248 of 1996
BETWEEN: HUNTLEY McARDLE & GLASS AND ROBERT HUGH GLASS
(Appellants)
AND: RUSSELL FRASER HENDERSON AND OTHERS
(Respondents)
No. VG 250 of 1996
BETWEEN: NEVETT FORD
(Appellant)
AND: RUSSELL FRASER HENDERSON AND OTHERS
(Respondents)
No. VG 252 of 1996
BETWEEN: GRAY & WINTER AND JAMES GRAY
(Appellants)
AND: RUSSELL FRASER HENDERSON AND OTHERS
(Respondents)
CORAM: Ryan J
DATE: 29 November 1996
PLACE: Melbourne
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RYAN J: There are pending before the Court various appeals against orders made by Heerey J in the application which for the sake of convenience has been referred to under the abbreviated title Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd reported as Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd (No 1) and (No 2) (1995) 62 FCR 1 and 221.
One of those notices of appeal has been filed as proceedings numbered VG 248 of 1996 on behalf of Huntley McArdle & Glass, a firm of chartered accountants and Robert Hugh Glass (hereinafter collectively called "Huntley McArdle"). Another appeal (VG 250 of 1996) has been lodged on behalf of Nevett Ford, a firm of solicitors. A third has been designated VG 252 of 1996 and has been filed on behalf of Gray & Winter, a firm of solicitors and James Gray (hereinafter collectively called "Gray & Winter").
As appears from the reasons of the learned trial judge at p. 203 he apportioned liability for the loss suffered by the applicants Turner, Gordon and Dean as to 31% to Gray & Winter and as to a further 31% to Huntley McArdle. Liability for the remaining loss suffered by those applicants was apportioned as to 15% to Hudson Conway, as to 8% to Nevett Ford and as to 15% to Richard Ellis (Victoria) Pty Ltd ("Richard Ellis") which carried on business as an estate agent.
As against a further seven applicants, liability was apportioned as to 44.4% each to Bird Cameron, a firm of chartered accountants, and Gray & Winter, and as to the remaining 11.2% to Nevett Ford. Liability to two other applicants was apportioned 80% to Gray & Winter and 20% to Nevett Ford. In respect of the last applicant, his Honour apportioned liability 58% to Gray & Winter, 28% to Bird Cameron, Geelong and 14% to Nevett Ford.
By their notice of appeal Huntley McArdle mount a number of attacks on his Honour's findings that they were liable to the applicants, Turner, Gordon and Dean. As well, they attack the exercise of discretion in ordering that the applicants' costs from 1 June 1995 should be paid on an indemnity basis, in refusing to order that Richard Ellis pay part of those costs either directly to the applicants or by way of contribution between respondents. They also complain that the individual, Glass, should have recovered by way of restitution or damages the sum of $76,495 plus interest of $24,272 against one or more of Amadio Pty Ltd, Hudson Conway, Gray & Winter, Nevett Ford and Richard Ellis. As well, Huntley McArdle attack the dismissal of their cross-claim against another firm of accountants, Metzke & Allan, and contend that his Honour erred in ordering that Metzke & Allan's costs from and including 2 March 1995 be paid on an indemnity basis.
By motions on notice respectively dated 9 May 1996 and 21 May 1996, the first to thirty-ninth respondents and Metzke & Allan have sought orders that Huntley McArdle provide security for their respective costs of Huntley McArdle's appeal. The first to thirty-ninth respondents also sought security for their costs of the appeal by Gray & Winter. However, I ordered by consent on 23 May 1996 that Gray & Winter provide that security in a form acceptable to the Registrar in the sum of $20,000. By further motions on notice also dated 21 May 1996, Metzke & Allan sought an order that Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter provide security for Metzke & Allan's costs of the respective appeals by Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter.
Richard Ellis has also appealed against all of the orders of the learned trial judge which were adverse to it. Those orders were those in favour of the applicants Dean, Turner and Gordon, orders for the recovery of contribution as between respondents to the application at first instance in respect of liability to specified applicants, orders on various cross-claims as between the respondents at first instance, an order for payment to Amadio Pty Ltd of the sum of $371,827.01 out of the Coles Myer Building Partnership Account, judgment for Metzke & Allan on the cross-claim by Richard Ellis against Metzke & Allan, an order that Richard Ellis pay the costs thereof to be taxed as between party and party up to and including 1 March 1995 and as between solicitor and client from and including 2 March 1995, and an order for contribution in respect of those costs as between six cross-claimants including Huntley McArdle, Amadio Pty Ltd and Hudson Conway, Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter.
Another appeal (No VG 245 of 1996) has been lodged on behalf of Amadio Pty Ltd and Hudson Conway. The notice of appeal in that matter discloses that an appeal is brought by those appellants against all orders, including orders as to costs, which were adverse to them and made in favour of the first to thirty-ninth applicants, the order which dismissed with costs the cross-claim by Hudson Conway and Amadio Pty Ltd, the order for contribution as between respondents at first instance, the order for judgment in favour of Metzke & Allan on its cross-claim against Hudson Conway and Amadio Pty Ltd, the orders for costs in favour of Metzke & Allan on its cross-claim and the cross-claims against it and the orders for contribution in respect of those costs as between six sets of respondents including Huntley McArdle, Amadio Pty Ltd and Hudson Conway, Richard Ellis, Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter.
It is accepted on all sides that Huntley McArdle is impecunious. Indeed, since the motions for security were heard, its solicitors have filed a notice of withdrawal of practitioner because, as I infer, they have not been provided with or assured of sufficient funds for the prosecution of the appeal.
The solicitor for the first to thirty-ninth respondents has deposed to a belief that "the appeals raise issues which will involve a review of vast portions of the evidence and exhibits and the preparation of lengthy written submissions in relation to them". A legal costs consultant retained on behalf of those respondents has estimated their costs of the appeals, assuming a total hearing time of 20 days, at $611,620.
The costs consultant retained by Metzke & Allan has estimated that firm's party and party costs of resisting all five appeals at $209,000, of which approximately $90,000 will comprise the costs up to and including the first day of hearing. The same costs consultant has deposed:
Whilst in my opinion Metzke & Allan's costs of each of the individual appeals would be considerably greater than the figure representing a simple division by five of the above figures the most appropriate amount of security for costs which would fairly protect Metzke & Allan in respect of this appeal is in the sum of $20,000.00 up to and including the first day or $42,000.00 for the full 20 day hearing. In my opinion, the latter figure of $42,000.00 is the most appropriate.
Identical evidence from the same costs consultant is relied on as supporting Metzke & Allan's application for security for its costs of the respective appeals by Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter.
Whether or not to make an order for security for costs, including the costs of an appeal, involves the exercise of an unfettered discretion which requires all relevant circumstances to be taken into account. The conceded impecuniosity of an appellant is one such factor but it is by no means determinative in all cases; see Ciappina v Ciappina (1983) 70 FLR 287 at 290. There is no suggestion in the present case that the impecuniosity of Huntley Mcardle has been caused to any extent by the conduct of the first to thirty-ninth respondents or of Metzke & Allan.
Ordinarily, the fact that a respondent to an appeal has the benefit of the presumed correctness of the judgment at first instance, may weigh in favour of an order for security. However that presumption does not relieve a court exercising the discretion of the need to form its own impression of the merits of the appeal. Thus in J. & M. O'Brien Enterprises Pty Ltd v The Shell Co. of Australia Ltd (No 2) (1983) 70 FLR 261, Bowen CJ observed, at 264:
One matter which is generally considered in relation to applications for security for costs in relation to proceedings at first instance is what prospects of success the plaintiff has in the proceedings. If the plaintiff has a strong and apparently meritorious case the court is reluctant to make an order which may have the effect of shutting the plaintiff out. In the case of an appeal the position is slightly different. For one thing the plaintiff has had his day in court. In the present case the questions of law raised on the appeal are, in my opinion, raised bona fide and are questions of substance ... I do not consider it is necessary for me to express any view about the prospects of success in the appeal. It is sufficient to state my opinion that O'Brien Enterprises has a bona fide and genuine interest in having the question determined and the question of law involved is substantial.
I am assisted in concluding that the appeal by Huntley McArdle cannot be characterized as hopeless by the indication of Heerey J when he stayed the enforcement of his judgment against that appellant. In Henderson v Amadio Pty Ltd [No 4] (unreported 2 May 1996) his Honour noted at 528:
Another relevant consideration is whether the proposed appeal is genuine and based on reasonably arguable grounds: Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1979] 2 NSWLR 184 at 188-189. In the present case, the time for appeal was extended to 28 days. At the time argument was heard no notices of appeal had been filed. However this case was an extremely complex one and, while I think my decision was correct, it would be verging on hubris to suggest there were not reasonably arguable grounds of appeal. The applicants did not argue the contrary.
A related consideration is the fact that the appeal by Huntley McArdle is, at least in several respects, inextricably
intertwined with the appeals by Hudson Conway and Amadio Pty Ltd, Richard Ellis, Gray & Winter and Nevett Ford. Hudson Conway is accepted by the respondents as having ample assets from which to satisfy any order for costs against itself and Amadio Pty Ltd, while Richard Ellis has provided a form of security in the sum of $60,000 which has been accepted on behalf of the first to thirty-ninth respondents. A motion by those respondents seeking security from Nevett Ford was compromised on 7 June 1996 on terms not disclosed to the Court.
In those circumstances, some of the observations of Connolly J as a member of the Full Court in Harpur v Ariadne [1984] 2 Qd.R. 523 can be paraphrased to apply the present case. His Honour there said at 531:
Against this background, what is the rule where there is more than one plaintiff? In such a case, all plaintiffs suing in the same interest and by the same solicitors and counsel, there is but one set of costs. If the defendants have an opponent who is worth powder and shot they have as much as any litigant is fairly entitled to. The court cannot by its orders guarantee a successful outcome in a practical sense to any party. It is thus no answer when security for costs is sought to say that a person of apparent substance may be able to make away with his assets within the jurisdiction before a judgment for costs can be executed: Re Apollinaris Company's Trade marks [1891] 1 Ch. 1 per Lord Halsbury L.C. at p. 3 sitting in the Court of Appeal. The "two plaintiff" cases start with the situation in which one is out of the jurisdiction. Prima facie he ought to be ordered to provide security but his co-plaintiff is within the jurisdiction. In such a case it was considered that there was no ground for ordering security. See Sykes v. Sykes (1869) L.R. 4 C.P. 645 at p. 648 per Byles J. and Montague Smith J. This principle was held to apply even where the plaintiff within the jurisdiction was insolvent. I take the underlying reason to be that the defendant was really in no worse position than if he had been sued by a single plaintiff resident within the jurisdiction and insolvent. As Brett J. remarked at p. 650, the cases show that, unless there is ground for making an order for security against all the plaintiffs, it cannot be made against any. One of the earlier cases was McConnell v. Johnston [1801] 1 East 431; 102 E.R. 167 where it was held that if one of the plaintiffs reside within reach of the process of the court, security will not be required for the costs although the other plaintiff be a foreigner residing abroad and though the first mentioned plaintiff be a bankrupt in execution for debt. In D'Hormusgee v. Grey (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 13 the same result was reached
by Denman and Manisty JJ. affirming Cave J. in an action brought against a defendant as a common carrier by two plaintiffs, one resident abroad. The statement of claim alleged a contract by the defendant with the plaintiffs jointly and in the alternative with each of the plaintiffs separately. Although their Lordships cited no authority both referred to the practice in relation to security for costs before the Judicature Act. The critical point was that each plaintiff was liable for the whole of the defendant's costs. Now in John Bishop (Caterers) Ltd. v. National Union Bank Ltd. [1973] 1 All E.R. 707 Plowman J. made an order for security against a company although there was a co-plaintiff within the jurisdiction who was a natural person. His Lordship distinguished the earlier cases on the footing that there was in those cases a complete overlap as he put it of the causes of action. Accordingly, as he was not satisfied that the natural person would necessarily be ordered to pay all of the defendant's costs he ordered security. That is concededly not this case. In Pearson v. Naydler (supra) Megarry V-C., when it came to the exercise of his discretion saw some force in the submission that the true plaintiff was the corporation and it was not in reality a case of a plaintiff company which had a natural person as a true co-plaintiff. That decision is therefore also distinguishable.
In relation to the appeal by Huntley McArdle the first to thirty-ninth respondents will be required to resist at least three other appeals, one of which is by an appellant with concededly adequate resources and the others are by appellants who have provided acceptable security. Although there is not a complete overlap between all four appeals, the continuation of the appeal by Huntley McArdle is not likely to add significantly to the time required for the combined appeals. On the other hand, if I were to stay Huntley McArdle's appeal because of its inability to provide security and one or more of the remaining appellants were to succeed on a ground also available to Huntley McArdle, an injustice would be worked to Huntley McArdle as a result of its appeal having been stultified solely by its impecuniosity. That would infringe the principle restated by Connolly J in Harpur v Ariadne (supra) at 530 "that the door of the court should not be barred to a prospective plaintiff, resident within the realm, because he is impecunious".
Huntley McArdle has a separate interest in participating in the combined appeals arising from the attack made by Hudson Conway, at least on the orders for contribution as between that company and the other respondents at first instance. It is true that an order staying the prosecution of Huntley McArdle's appeal pending the provision of security would not prevent Huntley McArdle from resisting any adjustment unfavourable to itself of the contribution orders. However, its entitlement to defend itself in that way provides a slight additional reason for allowing it to prosecute its own appeal despite its impecuniosity provided that it can do so without significantly increasing a liability for costs which the respondents to the appeal cannot discharge by recourse to some other party.
I have also been influenced to decline, at least before the commencement of the appeals, to stay Huntley McArdle's appeal pending provision of security by its special concern to argue the "secret commission" point. As I understand it, Huntley McArdle was regarded throughout the trial as entitled to be indemnified against both liability and costs by its professional indemnity insurer. However, after the learned trial judge found (62 FCR at 169-170) that Huntley McArdle had received commissions from Gray & Winter without disclosing them to its clients, that indemnity was withdrawn. Accordingly, if Huntley McArdle succeeds in its attack on that finding, it can resurrect their insurer's indemnity against both liability under any other head and any other costs which it has, or may have, incurred itself or is ordered to pay to any other party. It is true, as was pointed out in both oral and written submissions by Mr Percy of Counsel for the first to thirty-ninth respondents, that Huntley McArdle could have commenced separate proceedings to compel its insurer to provide the indemnity to which it claims to be entitled. However, that course has probably been precluded by Huntley McArdle's impecuniosity. Moreover, I uphold the submission of Mr Elliott of Counsel for Huntley McArdle that it would be fruitless for his client to pursue separate litigation against its insurer unless it can overturn the adverse findings, at least on the "secret commission" point, which were made at first instance.
Similar considerations have inclined me, on balance, to make no order for security for costs in favour of Metzke & Allan against either Huntley McArdle, Nevett Ford or Gray & Winter. The primary target of all appeals against Metzke & Allan seems to be the orders for costs which the learned primary Judge made in favour of that firm. As was pointed out in the course of argument, it is notoriously difficult to attack successfully on appeal an exercise of discretion as to costs. However, Huntley McArdle's notice of appeal does make the substantive contention that his Honour ought to have found that Metzke & Allan had been in breach of a duty of care owed to the applicants, Dean, Gordon and Turner, and had engaged in conduct which was misleading or deceptive in contravention of s. 11 of the Fair Trading Act. The notice of appeal by Nevett Ford seeks to set aside, amongst others, his Honour's order that judgment be entered for Metzke & Allan on the cross-claims against that firm by Nevett Ford. In the grounds of appeal it is relevantly contended:
His Honour erred in holding or finding that Metzke & Allan did not owe a duty to potential investors. He should have found:
(a)that Metzke & Allan knew or ought to have known that the financial data they prepared would be relied on by potential investors in deciding whether to enter into the scheme;
(b)that Metzke & Allan should have articulated and explained the assumptions underlying the cash flow and verified the data in the cash flow.
He should not have found or held that any duty Metzke & Allan owed was limited by the terms of their express arrangement with Gray & Winter.
His Honour erred in holding or finding that Metzke & Allan did not breach any duty it owed and was not guilty of misleading and deceptive conduct. He should have found that Metzke & Allan breached its duty and was guilty of misleading and deceptive conduct and was liable to the Applicants.
He should have found that since Metzke & Allan was liable to the Applicants then insofar as Nevett Ford was also liable to the Applicants it was entitled to contribution from Metzke & Allan under Part IV of the Wrongs Act 1958.
Similarly, Gray & Winter's notice of appeal, by Schedule O, raises substantive issues against Metzke & Allan which go beyond an entitlement to costs. The notice of appeal by Hudson Conway and Amadio Pty Ltd also contends that Metzke & Allan, amongst others, were liable to Amadio Pty Ltd by reason of involvement within the meaning of s. 38 of the Companies and Securities (Interpretation and Miscellaneous Provisions) Code and otherwise, and should have been found liable on Amadio Pty Ltd's cross-claim by reason of a breach of a duty of care owed to the applicants or some of them or misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s. 11 of the Fair Trading Act. The amended notice of appeal filed on behalf of Richard Ellis discloses that it has abandoned its substantive grounds of appeal related to Metzke & Allan but has persisted in its attack on the exercise of discretion in relation to costs on the cross-claim against Metzke & Allan.
The summary which I have just undertaken suggests that the overlap between the issues raised against Metzke & Allan by Huntley McArdle, Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter and the issues raised by the other appeals is probably not as extensive as that already noted between the issues raised by Huntley McArdle against the first to thirty-ninth respondents and the issues involved in the remaining appeals. However, I cannot conclude, at this stage, that the issues related to Metzke & Allan are so clearly discrete that potential liability for the costs of those parts of their appeals will necessarily be confined to one or more of Huntley McArdle, Nevett Ford and Gray & Winter. I am not unmindful of the submission advanced by Mr Robins of Counsel for Metzke & Allan that the principal potential beneficiary of the appeal by Nevett Ford is the Solicitors Liability Committee which has contributed $1M to discharging Nevett Ford's liabilities for its own costs and under the orders of Heerey J, that amount being the full extent of the cover which the Committee was obliged to provide to Nevett Ford. However, I accept that the Committee has declined to underwrite the appeal and, if Nevett Ford is to salvage anything from the action, it must pursue the appeal using whatever resources it can muster itself.
I do not regard the consensual provision of security in the sum of $20,000 by Gray & Winter to the first to thirty-ninth respondents as entailing the consequence that similar or any security should necessarily be provided to Metzke & Allan. If Gray & Winter alone incur liability for the whole or part of Metzke & Allan's costs of the appeal which, because of insolvency, they are unable to discharge, the security already provided should be available for rateable distribution amongst Gray & Winter's creditors, including Metzke & Allan.
For these reasons, I regard it as an appropriate exercise of discretion, at least for the time being, to refuse each of the applications for security for costs which is presently before the Court. Should it appear after detailed directions have been given for the conduct of the appeals, or in the course of the hearing, that the appeal by one or more of Huntley McArdle, Nevett Ford or Gray & Winter is likely to result in increased costs for the first to thirty-ninth respondents or Metzke & Allan for which Huntley McArdle, Nevett Ford or Gray & Winter alone will be liable, an application for security or further security as the case may be can be revived before the Full Court. The costs of all parties affected by the present motions for security should be the costs of those parties in the appeals.
I certify that this and the preceding thirteen (13) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Ryan.
Associate:
Date
Counsel for First to Thirty-
ninth Respondents (Russell
Fraser Henderson & Ors): Mr I.H. Percy
Solicitors for First Thirty-
ninth Respondents (Russell
Fraser Henderson & Ors): Anthony Kelly & Associates
Counsel for Fifty-fifth
Respondent (Metzke & Allan): Mr M.A. Robins
Solicitors for Fifty-
fifth Respondent
(Metzke & Allan): Maddock Lonie & Chisholm
Counsel for Huntley McArdle
& Glass and Robert Hugh Glass: Mr J.D. Elliott
Solicitors for Huntley McArdle
& Glass and Robert Hugh Glass: Byrne Jones & Torney
Counsel for Forty-forth
Respondent (Nevett Ford): Mr P.G. Cawthorn
Solicitors for Forty-forth
Respondent (Nevett Ford): Middletons Moore & Bevins
Counsel for Gray & Winter
and James Gray: Mr A.N. Bristow
Solicitors for Gray & Winter
and James Gray: Garrick Gray & Co
Date of Hearing: 23 May 1996
Date of Judgment: 29 November 1996
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr J.D. Elliott
Solicitors for the Appellants: Byrne Jones & Torney
Counsel for Fortieth and
Forty-first Respondents:
Solicitors for Fortieth and
Forty-first Respondents: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for Forty-sixth to
Fifty-fourth Respondents:
Solicitors for Forty-sixth to
Fifty-fourth Respondents: Barker Gosling
Counsel for Fifty-sixth
Respondent:
Solicitors for Fifty-
sixth Respondent: Minter Ellison
Date of Hearing: 23 May 1996
Date of Judgment: 29 November 1996
VG 252 of 1996
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr A. Bristow
Solicitors for the Appellants: Garrick Gray & Co
Counsel for First to Forty-first
Respondents: Mr Smith
Solicitors for First to
Forty-First Respondents: Anthony Kelly & Associates
Counsel for Forty-second and
Forty-third Respondents:
Solicitors for Forty-second and
Forty-third Respondents: Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Counsel for Forty-Forth Mr P. Cawthorn
Respondent:
Solicitors for Forty-forth
Respondent: Middletons Moore & Bevins
Counsel for Forty-fifth to
forty-seventh; Forty-ninth to
Fifty-third and fifty-seventh
Respondents:
Solicitors for Forty-fifth to
Forty-seventh; Forty-ninth to
Fifty-third and Fifty-seventh
Respondents: Barker Gosling
Counsel for Fifty-fifth
Respondent: Mr M. Robbins
Solicitors for Fifty-fifth
Respondent: Maddock Lonie & Chisholm
Counsel for Fifty-sixth
Respondent
Solicitors for Fifty-sixth
respondent:Minter Ellison
Date of Hearing : 23 May 1996
Date of Judgment : 29 November 1996
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