Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth (A Firm)
[2013] WASC 156
•2 MAY 2013
HUNTINGDALE VILLAGE PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) -v- CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH (A FIRM) [2013] WASC 156
| SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA | Citation No: | [2013] WASC 156 | |
| Case No: | LPA:4/2010 | 18 APRIL 2013 | |
| Coram: | MASTER SANDERSON | 2/05/13 | |
| 15 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Appeal dismissed Order made staying action | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | HUNTINGDALE VILLAGE PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 085 048 531) SILKCHIME PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 006 849 429) VANNIN PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 067 610 271) WARWICK ENTERTAINMENT CENTRE PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 054 246 918) PARAGON APARTMENTS LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 087 200 413) CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH (A FIRM) |
Catchwords: | Case management Appeal from orders of the Registrar Turns on own facts |
Legislation: | Nil |
Case References: | Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd v Receiver & Manager of the Balneum Joint Venture [2007] WASCA 152 Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth (a firm) [2010] WASC 341 |
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
- IN CHAMBERS
- First Appellant
SILKCHIME PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 006 849 429)
Second Appellant
VANNIN PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 067 610 271)
Third Appellant
WARWICK ENTERTAINMENT CENTRE PTY LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 054 246 918)
Fourth Appellant
PARAGON APARTMENTS LTD (RECEIVERS & MANAGERS APPOINTED) (ACN 087 200 413)
Fifth Appellant
AND
CORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH (A FIRM)
Respondent
Catchwords:
Case management - Appeal from orders of the Registrar - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Nil
Result:
Appeal dismissed
Order made staying action
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
First Appellant : Mr A Metaxas
Second Appellant : Mr A Metaxas
Third Appellant : Mr A Metaxas
Fourth Appellant : Mr A Metaxas
Fifth Appellant : Mr A Metaxas
Respondent : Mr M Leeming SC & Ms J Taylor
Solicitors:
First Appellant : Metaxas & Hager
Second Appellant : Metaxas & Hager
Third Appellant : Metaxas & Hager
Fourth Appellant : Metaxas & Hager
Fifth Appellant : Metaxas & Hager
Respondent : Corrs Chambers Westgarth
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd v Receiver & Manager of the Balneum Joint Venture [2007] WASCA 152
Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth (a firm) [2010] WASC 341
(Page 4)
1 MASTER SANDERSON: This is an appeal in relation to case management orders made by Registrar S Boyle. The appeal was brought out of time and an extension of time was required. This was not opposed by the respondent and the extension of time should be granted. Before detailing the orders made by the learned Registrar and the nature of the appeal it is necessary to provide some background facts.
2 On 1 February 2010 Consult Solicitors (the appellants' then solicitors, but not the appellants' present solicitors) wrote to the Principal Registrar. The letter commenced as follows:
We are instructed to act on behalf of the Parties Charged (listed below) in relation to an Application for an extension of time within which to tax costs ('the Application') rendered by the law practice, Corrs Chambers Westgarth ('the Practitioner').
3 The letter proceeded to state the application sought orders compelling the respondent to provide itemised bills pursuant to s 231(3) of the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) or alternatively pursuant to O 66 r 44(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (the Rules). The letter also sought an extension of time for the parties charged to request taxation of those itemised bills pursuant to s 232(3) of the Legal Practice Act. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Norman Phillip Carey on 29 January 2010.
4 The application was brought in the following context. The appellants were companies which borrowed money from a financier. On default, the firm of Korda Mentha were appointed as Receivers and Managers (the Receivers) of the appellants and other entities on 24 January 2006. The respondent acted as solicitors on instructions from the Receivers and by January 2008 had charged in excess of $5.8 million. The respondent was paid with monies the property of the appellants and other borrowers/guarantors as required by the various security documents executed when the loan was made.
5 The application first came before Registrar S Boyle for directions on 17 March 2010. At that hearing the Registrar indicated she was of the view there was a threshold issue as to whether or not the appellants were 'parties charged' within the meaning of s 228 of the Legal Practice Act. Counsel for the appellants referred the registrar to the Court of Appeal decision in Andrew Koh Nominees Pty Ltd v Receiver & Manager of the Balneum Joint Venture [2007] WASCA 152. That would appear to cover the position and as an issue it can be put to one side.
(Page 5)
6 The Registrar then referred to a possible overlap with another matter being COR 223 of 2009. The Registrar expressed the view that in those proceedings the appellants could undertake a detailed assessment of the legal fees charged by the respondent. The Registrar said she was concerned as to the duplication of issues between this action and the corporations application. On that basis she declined to make any directions and said the matter would be relisted for directions early in 2010.
7 It is convenient at this point to say something about COR 223 of 2009. There are five plaintiffs in that action, the same five plaintiffs who are the present appellants. There are presently five defendants who are, broadly speaking, the lenders. A statement of claim has been filed. An application has been made to add the present respondent as a sixth defendant in the action. With that in mind, the plaintiffs have produced what is described as a re-amended statement of claim. That is not yet the statement of claim in the proceedings but it does disclose the nature of the action the plaintiffs intend to advance against the present respondent/proposed sixth defendant. The pleading is very long. It runs to 82 pages and 308 paragraphs. Without going through the pleading in detail it is enough to refer to par 308. It is in the following terms:
The plaintiffs claim against CCW [the respondent in this appeal]:
308.1 Equitable compensation;
308.2 An order that CCW's costs in each receivership be taxed in accordance with the WA Solicitors Scales and the WA Contentious Business Determinations or the Federal Court Scale as is applicable;
308.3 An order that CCW do repay to the borrowers and the guarantors the costs paid to CCW to an extent that the amounts paid exceed the allowances on taxation;
308.4 Interest on any monies ordered to be paid by CCW to the borrowers and the guarantors at 6% per annum from the dates as the Court thinks fit to the date of judgment pursuant to s 32 of the Supreme Court Act; and
308.5 Costs.
8 As no defence has yet been filed the full extent of the present respondent's defence is unknown. But it seems clear one of the arguments the respondent will raise is the retainer they entered into with the Receivers was governed by New South Wales law. This has already been
(Page 6)
- raised in other proceedings between these two parties: CIV 1940 of 2010. The matter is in Justice Le Miere's CMC List. An issue arose as to jurisdiction. His Honour resolved the dispute and published written reasons: Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd (Receivers & Managers Appointed) v Corrs Chambers Westgarth (a firm) [2010] WASC 341. In the course of his reasons his Honour had this to say:
On 22 June 2010 the plaintiffs filed an originating summons claiming that the costs agreements (Costs Agreements) made on about 10 February 2006 between the defendants and the receivers and the managers of each of the plaintiffs as agents for the plaintiffs be set aside pursuant to s 317(3) and s 328 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). The Costs Agreements sought to be set aside were made in New South Wales. On 16 July 2010 the defendant filed a chamber summons for an order that the originating summons be set aside on the ground that this court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the plaintiffs' claim. The defendants' chamber summons came on for hearing before me on 31 August 2010. In the meantime on 26 August 2010 the plaintiffs filed a minute of proposed amended originating summons. The effect of the proposed amendment is to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of New South Wales rather than relying upon s 317(3) and s 328 of the Legal Profession Act. On the hearing of the summons the defendant conceded that with the amendment the application by originating summons would be within the jurisdiction of this court. The defendant did not proceed with its application that the originating summons be set aside but sought an order that the plaintiffs pay the defendant's costs of its application to set aside the originating summons. I made directions for the filing of affidavits and submissions in relation to the issue of costs. These are my reasons for determining the issue of costs of the defendant's application to set aside the originating summons [2].
10 At the hearing on 17 March 2010 the Registrar indicated the application would be relisted for directions in the first two weeks of April 2010. In fact it was not so listed. On 27 April 2012 (some 25 months after the first direction hearing) the appellants' solicitors wrote to the
(Page 7)
- Associate to the Registrar asking for a date to be fixed for hearing of submissions as to any objections from the respondent and if there were no objections then for an appointment to be fixed to hear the application to extend time and tax the respondent's bills. An appointment before the Registrar was set for 25 July 2012. At that appointment the Registrar was informed by counsel for the respondent of orders made by Justice Le Miere on 24 April 2012 for various actions including LPA 4 of 2010 to be referred to mediation. On that basis counsel for the respondent sought an adjournment. That application was opposed but was granted by the Registrar.
11 On 1 August 2012 the appellants filed a minute of proposed amended application and a consent by Norman Phillip Carey to be joined as an appellant. The appellants' minute of amended application relevantly sought orders as follows:
1 within 14 days after the date of this order the [respondent] file itemised bills of costs pursuant to section 237(1) of the Legal Practice Act 2003 in respect of all costs rendered to any of the [appellants] or any receivers and managers of any of the [appellants] from 24 January 2006 to date ('Bills');
2 in the alternative to 1 above, the time within which the [appellants] are entitled to request taxation of the [respondent's] costs pursuant to section 232(3) of the Legal Practice Act 2003 be extended to the date of this order and consequent thereon there be orders as sought in 1 above;
3 within 14 days after the date of this order the [respondent] file and serve a copy of any costs agreement relevant to the Bills;
4 within 21 days after the date of this order the [respondent] shall file and serve any affidavits in answer to the affidavit of Norman Phillip Carey sworn 29 January 2010;
5 within 35 days after the date of this order the [appellants] shall file and serve any affidavits in reply.
12 By the proposed amended application the appellants were seeking to advance the proposition no extension of time was required to tax the bills because the bills had never been served on the appellants. The affidavit of Norman Phillip Carey sworn 29 January 2010 set out that the bills had been requested in 2009 and that they had not been provided.
13 On 2 August 2012 the respondent filed and served submissions in the following terms. The appropriate orders they said were the application be adjourned until the conclusion of mediation scheduled for 17 August 2012
(Page 8)
- and the matter be referred to Le Miere J for management in conjunction with the proceedings commenced by the purported parties charged (presumably meaning COR 223 of 2009 and CIV 1940 of 2010). It was also submitted 'threshold legal questions must be addressed before orders can be made'. These were said to be questions as to the relevant legislation; are the applicants 'parties charged' within the meaning of s 228(2) of the Legal Practice Act or a 'third party payer' under s 253 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA); and is an extension of time required to bring the application out of time. The respondent also indicated it would seek security for costs in the proceedings and wished to have the matters referred to the CMC List judge.
14 The Registrar wrote to the parties on 3 August 2012. The Registrar referred to the hearing on 25 July 2012 and said:
The insistence of the lawyers for the Party Charged by letter on 27 April, that the application before me should proceed really surprised me. The lawyers had consented to the mediation orders made by Justice Le Miere and I consider that such insistence on this application proceeding was inappropriate.
It would be wrong of me to proceed in any way with this application while the order for mediation stands.
I will not deal in any way with this application under LPA 4 of 2010 in its current, or proposed amended form, until the Judge's order for mediation is fulfilled.
15 It might be observed in passing the learned Registrar's position was both understandable and obviously correct. It would have been entirely inappropriate for her to deal with the matters in any way while there was a pending mediation based upon an order of a judge.
16 On 23 August 2012 the appellants' solicitors wrote to the Associate to the Registrar informing her that mediation had been convened and there had been no result. There was no response to that letter. The appellants' solicitors then wrote to the Principal Registrar on 21 September 2012 requesting the matter be allocated to another registrar. It had become apparent Registrar S Boyle was on extended leave. By that letter the appellants' requested the application be relisted for half a day to hear oral submissions as regards the following issues identified in the respondent's written submissions dated 2 August 2012. Those issues were said to be:
(1) whether the application ought be amended in accordance with a minute of amended application dated 31 July 2012;
(Page 9)
- (2) what relevant legislation governed the application;
(3) were the appellants 'parties charged' within the meaning of s 228(2) of the Legal Practice Act or a 'third party payer' under s 253 of the Legal Profession Act;
(4) is an extension of time required to bring the application;
(5) to deal with any application by the respondent for security for costs; and
(6) whether any or all of the matters can or should be heard by Justice Le Miere.
17 The application came on before Registrar Dixon on 9 October 2012. He made orders as follows:
(1) within 28 days the respondent to file and serve any affidavits and submissions in relation to the application;
(2) within 14 days after service of the respondent's affidavits and submissions the appellants file and serve any affidavits and submissions in response;
(3) the application be listed for hearing on a date to be fixed for three hours; and
(4) the parties have liberty to apply including with respect to the vacation of these orders.
18 On 29 October 2012 the respondent applied by letter to the Central Office that the application be admitted to the CMC List to be managed by Justice Le Miere. The respondent went on to state that it was intended to make an application to vacate the orders made by Registrar Dixon and list the matter for further directions at the next return date of COR 223 of 2009 (and other proceedings) on 8 November 2012. On 31 October 2012 Justice Le Miere ordered the application be admitted to his CMC List.
19 By email sent to the Associate to Registrar Dixon on 2 November 2012 the respondent requested the Registrar vacate the orders made on 9 October 2012 'in light of the matter's admission to the CMC List and the directions hearing scheduled before Le Miere J on 8 November 2012'.
20 On 8 November 2012 Justice Le Miere after hearing the parties ordered the matter be removed from the CMC List. His Honour was of
(Page 10)
- the view he did not have the power to extend time to tax the bill of costs and so the application was properly before the registrar. On the same date the respondent wrote to the Associate to Registrar Dixon requesting that their application to vacate orders made on 9 October 2012 be heard by a registrar other than Registrar Dixon. The appellants disputed Registrar Dixon was in any way disqualified. On 6 December 2012 the appellants wrote to the Principal Registrar requesting the application be listed for hearing as ordered by Registrar Dixon on 9 October 2012. On 31 January 2013 the appellants again wrote to the Principal Registrar requesting the application by the respondent to set aside orders made on 9 October 2012 should be heard with the application made by the appellants seeking orders the respondent submit their accounts for taxation. They asked the matter be relisted for hearing without delay.
21 By letter dated 18 February 2013 Registrar S Boyle wrote back to the parties. This letter is central to this appeal and I will quote it in full:
This letter is written in response to Mr Metaxas' letter of the 31st January 2013. This LPA matter is only part of the series of complex, interrelated actions which in one way or the other have been moving steadily through this Court at a pace dictated by the parties involved.
In this letter, I wish to deal with a very specific threshold issue that is the jurisdictional hurdle that has to be overcome before the question of an enlargement of time to bring in bills for taxation can even be addressed. This is the threshold issue I made clear on 17th March 2010.
Registrar Dixon made some general directions on 9 October 2012. They have not been complied with. I now vacate these directions. I require both the parties at this point, to address only the two matters I set out below.
The questions that have not been adequately addressed by the applicants (parties charged) are: First, how do each of Huntingdale Village Pty Ltd, Silkchime Pty Ltd, Vannin Pty Ltd, Warwick Entertainment Centre Pty Ltd, Paragon Apartments Ltd and Norman Philip Carey say they are the party charged and entitled to seek taxation in the terms of s228 of the Legal Practice Act 2003.
I do not accept that I am obliged to respond to a broad brush claim that 'all or any' bills should be subject to this enlargement of time.
I require identification of the particular limb of S228 upon which each applicant relies. I require this information in respect to every bill of which taxation, or the enlargement of time to tax, is sought.
I require a detailed demonstration of the entitlement to call for taxation by reference to the specific bill in question, showing to whom the bill was rendered, illustrating the chain of payment from that entity, and the
(Page 11)
- reimbursement of payment, or the clear liability to reimburse that bill, by the individual applicant.
I require this information to be provided in a diagram as well as in appropriate affidavit form (in accordance with the Directions I make).
If a document supports the alleged liability to pay, or reimburse, I wish to sight it, and to be referred to the precise provisions of the document that support the alleged liability.
Secondly, the fact that each of the corporate applicants is still in receivership, as I understand it, requires me to establish that as a matter of law, the applicants, in each instance, are still able to exercise a right to compel taxation of a bill of costs that has been rendered in the course of the receivership, to the receivers and paid by the receiver.
This entitlement must be addressed by demonstrating where each applicant company, and Mr Carey, derive their rights. Not by mere assertion of them, but by clear statutory provision, or other legal authority. This must be established specifically, not by general assertion, in respect to every applicant.
In addition, I did require notice of this application to the Court for an enlargement of time to be given to the Receivers themselves-not just the Practitioner. I require it to be established by the lawyer for the applicants that this has been done. The Receivers may well be entitled to join in this application. I say this is the case because they may have their own views on the companies' ability to call for taxation and Mr Carey's entitlement as a director of a company in receivership, to exercise any claimed residual powers.
There is also the possibility that calling for taxation in these circumstances is a breach of the security arrangements between the various companies, Mr Carey and the secured creditor. I raise the question as to whether the secured creditor(s) should also be given similar notice of this application to seek an enlargement of time to tax the bills.
The Directions I now substitute for those vacated, are attached. These Directions provide the time frame for compliance and must be address my very specific requirements set out in detail above.
I have fixed the date for hearing of this matter in those directions.
22 The learned Registrar also made the following case management directions. Again it is appropriate to quote these directions in full:
1. By not later than 18 March 2013 the lawyers for the Clients (Applicants) file and serve affidavits and submissions that support the contention that the Clients (the Applicants) and Mr Norman
- Phillip Carey have standing to bring this application for an enlargement of time.
- 2. By not later than 18 March 2013 the lawyers for the clients (Applicants) serve notice on the Receivers, the recipients of the bills in question. Proof of service to be filed not later than 20 March 2013.
3. By not later than 18 April 2013 the Solicitor (Practitioners) file any responsive affidavits and submissions.
4. This application to deal with the jurisdictional question of standing to request an enlargement of time is set down for 24 April 2013 at 2.15 for not more than 2 hours in duration.
5. The question of liability for costs in relation to compliance with these directions is reserved.
- It is against these directions the appellant appeals.
23 Before dealing with the merits of the appeal I should say something generally about case management by a registrar. The system was introduced in 1996. By any measure it has proved to be an outstanding success. The introduction of the Commercial and Managed Cases List (CMC List) has meant a significant number of actions are no longer managed by registrars. The result is what might be called a hybrid docket system. It was always intended case management by a registrar would have about it flexibility. That is why parties can and do write direct to the registrar and why matters are often determined on the papers. Save with respect to certain default judgments with respect to actions for possession of land where no appearance has been entered, registrars do not finally determine any issue. They make determination on interlocutory matters and generally do so after hearing from the parties. But in my view it is proper and appropriate a degree of informality be maintained and that the paramount consideration should always be the most cost effective and timely resolution of procedural aspects of the cases falling with a registrar's control.
24 There are five grounds of appeal. Grounds 1 and 2 really develop the same issue. It is enough then if I quote ground 1:
The Registrar erred in law in purporting to vacate orders made by Registrar Dixon on 9 October 2012 when she had no power to make such an order and particularly no power to make such an order without notice to the appellants and without affording the appellants an opportunity to be heard.
(Page 13)
25 In my view the Registrar had power to make case management directions in accordance with O 4A of the Rules. This included powers to give directions, direct the parties to comply with a timetable for procedural steps, and to make any ancillary directions needed: see O 4A r 2(2)(a) - (b), and O 4A r 2(3)(a) of the Rules. Order 4A r 2(3)(b) empowered the Registrar to amend or cancel any case management direction of a registrar. Order 4A r 6(3)(a) permitted the Registrar to 'amend the timetable, whether on his or her own initiative or on a party's application'.
26 The order makes it plain that it is not anticipated in every case that the parties will be heard before an interlocutory order is made. Order 4A r 17 is in the following terms:
17. Requesting interlocutory orders and case management directions
(1) A party to a case may at any time ask a case manager for any or all of the following -
(a) for any interlocutory order that the case manager has jurisdiction to make;
(b) for a case management direction to be made under this Order;
(c) to have a case management direction amended or cancelled.
(2) The request must be made by giving a letter that details the order or direction wanted to the associate to the case manager, or if the case manager is not known, the Principal Registrar.
(3) A case manager, on receipt of the request -
(a) if the manager has jurisdiction to make the order or direction -
(i) may deal with the request without requiring the parties to attend a hearing; or
(ii) may deal with the request at any conference required by this Order or at the hearing of any other matter in the case and for that purpose may relist such a conference or matter;
or
(b) otherwise, may refer the request to a judge or master who has jurisdiction to make the order or direction.
(Page 14)
27 In my view there is no merit in the matters raised in either ground 1 or ground 2. Ground 3 is in the following terms:
The Registrar erred in law in purporting to make orders directed to the 'lawyers for the appellants' who are not parties and against whom no orders could properly be made.
28 With respect it is clear what was intended by the Registrar. The order may have been unhappily worded but there is no appealable error.
29 Ground 4 reads as follows:
The Registrar erred in law in making orders for hearing the 'jurisdictional question of standing to request an enlargement of time' when there [sic] the appellants' proposed amended application is based on the premise that no extension of time is required.
30 Clearly what the learned Registrar was attempting to do was to get to the real issue between the parties. As I have indicated above there is no doubt there is a threshold issue for the application and the proposed amended application - is an extension of time needed by the appellants to bring the application. The learned Registrar was doing nothing more than crystallising what are the proper issues. This ground of appeal is without merit.
31 Ground 5 reads as follows:
The Registrar erred in law in purporting to make any orders when there is a reasonable apprehension that she is biased against the appellants and should, in the circumstances, have disqualified herself.
32 At the hearing of the application counsel for the appellants clarified this ground of appeal. He said it was based on apprehended bias. Be that as it may there is nothing whatever in the available material which suggests the learned Registrar is in any way biased. She has attempted at all times to deal with the matter in the most timely and cost effective fashion. The concern she has in relation to jurisdiction and possible overlap between this and other applications is in my view well founded. Where she has expressed reservations she has been entirely justified in doing so.
33 That is enough to deal with the grounds of appeal. There is no merit in the appeal and it should be dismissed. However on any view the timetable proposed by the learned Registrar needs to be revised. In addition the respondent now says the matter should be stayed pending determination of the issues raised in COR 223 of 2009.
(Page 15)
34 By chamber summons dated 12 April 2013 the respondent sought a number of orders. At the commencement of the hearing counsel for the appellants objected to that chamber summons being heard at the same time as the appeal. He correctly pointed out there was short service and no application for an abridgement of time. Counsel for the respondent indicated he would not press anything other than order 1 of the chamber summons. Effectively it was his submission in determining the appeal I should amend the orders of the case management registrar in the way proposed in par 1 of the chamber summons.
35 The power of a Master on appeal is covered by O 60A r 6 of the Rules. That rule is in the following terms:
(1) An appeal from a registrar shall be by way of rehearing.
(2) The judge or master hearing an appeal has the powers and duties of the Court of Appeal on an appeal and may cancel or amend any interlocutory order or case management direction made by the registrar.
36 The order sought by the respondent in par 1 of its chamber summons is as follows:
Order that proceeding LPA 4 of 2010 be stayed until final determination of Supreme Court of Western Australia proceedings COR 223 of 2009 and CIV 1940 of 2010, or further order of the Court.
37 In my view that order ought be made. It is clear the issues raised in this matter are also raised in COR 223 of 2009 and CIV 1940 of 2010. While the issues may not be identical there is a large degree of overlap. If this matter were to proceed the Registrar would have to determine what she has referred to as the jurisdiction question. The same question is to be determined in the other two proceedings. It is surely appropriate the judge having conduct of those two proceedings determine the matter before the Registrar takes the issue any further. The only way to ensure that occurs is to stay this action.
38 Accordingly I intend to make orders in terms of par 1 of the respondent's chamber summons. I would dismiss the appeal. I will hear the parties as to costs.
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