Hunter v Commissioner of Police

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   HUNTER -v- COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2003] WASC 10

CORAM:   PULLIN J

HEARD:   13 DECEMBER 2002

DELIVERED          :   17 JANUARY 2003

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2646 of 2002

CIV 2647 of 2002
CIV 2648 of 2002

BETWEEN:   LINDSAY HUNTER

Plaintiff

AND

COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
Defendant

Catchwords:

Vexatious proceedings - Application for leave to commence proceedings

Legislation:

Justices Act 1902, s 136A, s 185(1) and s 187(1)

Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930, s 3

Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002, s 3, s 4, s 5, s 6 and s 12

Result:

Leave to commence proceedings refused

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     In person

Defendant:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     In person

Defendant:     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Dempster v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 215

Lancaster v R [1989] WAR 83

May v O'Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654

North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595

Case(s) also cited:

Nil

  1. PULLIN J: I have before me three applications under s 6 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002, whereby the applicant seeks leave to commence the proceedings described below.

  2. On 2 August 2002, the Honourable Justice Hasluck made an order in accordance with s 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930  ("1930 Act") that no legal proceedings should be instituted by the plaintiff in the Supreme Court, or in any inferior court, unless the plaintiff should first obtain the leave of the Supreme Court, or of a Judge thereof, after satisfying it or the Judge that the proposed proceeding will not be an abuse of the process of the court in which it is intended to be instituted and that there is prima facie ground for such proceeding.

  3. Notice of this order was published in the Government Gazette on 16 August 2002.

  4. On 28 September 2002, the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 ("2002 Act") came into operation and repealed the 1930 Act. However, s 12 of the 2002 Act provides:

    "Where, before the day on which this Act comes into operation, an order has been made under section 3 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 1930 that no legal proceedings shall, without the leave of the Supreme Court, be instituted by a person in the Supreme Court or in any inferior court, the provisions of this Act apply, with all necessary modifications, to and in relation to that order and that person as if an order had been made under section 4(1)(d) of this Act."

  5. Section 4 of the 2002 Act authorises the court to make an order prohibiting a person from instituting proceedings without the leave of a court. Section 5 of the 2002 Act provides that proceedings are not to be instituted in contravention of an order under s 4(1)(d), and by reason of the transitional provision, that section has to be read as stating that proceedings…

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Details
Case
[2003] WASC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hunter v Commissioner of Police, the applicant sought leave to commence proceedings under the Justices Act 1902. The applicant's proposed proceedings were in relation to a decision made under the Act, which was subject to appeal. The Commissioner of Police opposed the application for leave to commence proceedings, arguing that the applicant had failed to meet the necessary criteria for such an application.

The court was required to determine whether there were prima facie grounds for the applicant's proposed proceedings, and whether the application for an extension of time to file the application for leave was justified. The court also needed to consider whether the applicant's proposed proceedings were frivolous or vexatious, and whether they disclosed an arguable case.

In its decision, the court held that the application for leave to commence proceedings would only be granted if there were prima facie grounds for the proposed application for leave to appeal, which grounds were not frivolous or vexatious and which disclosed an arguable case. The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances or a substantial miscarriage of justice which would warrant an extension of time to file the application for leave. The court also held that the applicant's proposed proceedings were vexatious and disclosed no arguable case.

The court dismissed the application for leave to commence proceedings, and made no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

To succeed on this application, s 6(5) of the 2002 Act requires me to dismiss the application if there are no prima facie grounds for the proposed proceedings. The ordinary meaning of the words prima facie is "at first sight; on the face of it; as appears at first sight without investigation": North Ganalanja Aboriginal Corporation v Queensland (1996) 185 CLR 595 at 615‑616; Macquarie Dictionary. In the present context, the phrase "prima facie grounds" means, in my opinion, that there is a legal basis for the claim and that there is some evidence referred to in the affidavit in support of the application which, if accepted, would be capable of sustaining the proceedings: cf North Ganalanga (supra) at 639; May v O'Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658. It is necessary for me to bear in mind in relation to the proceedings which the applicant seeks leave to institute under s 185(1) of the Justices Act 1902 that in such proceedings, by reason of s 187(1), the court must grant leave to appeal unless the court considers that the appeal is frivolous or vexatious or that the grounds of appeal advanced do not disclose an arguable case. An arguable case is not merely one which is capable of being argued, but one which has some prospect of success: Dempster v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993) 9 WAR 215 at 261. If prima facie grounds exist, then they will be "arguable". The result is that I would grant leave to institute proceedings under s 6 of the 2002 Act if I were satisfied that there were prima facie grounds for the proposed application for leave to appeal, which grounds were not frivolous or vexatious and which are "arguable". The grounds must be supported by an affidavit disclosing sufficient facts to reveal the "prima facie" grounds. However, before considering whether there are prima facie grounds for an application for leave to appeal, it is necessary to consider whether there are prima facie grounds for an extension of time in which to file the application for leave. This is necessary because there is a time limit for appealing against a decision made under the Justices Act. Order 65A of the Supreme Court Rules requires that an application for leave to appeal to be filed and served on the Clerk of Petty Sessions within 21 days after the day on which the decision to which the application relates was given. Where delay is substantial, an extension of time will only be granted where exceptional circumstances are shown or where there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice which would remain uncorrected if the extension were not granted: Lancaster v R[1989] WAR 83 at 85 and 91. A court will ordinarily be satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice if a person has suffered an adverse order in circumstances where his or her failure to appear is adequately explained, unless it also appears that no different result would be reached on a re‑hearing or that a re‑hearing would work an irremediable injustice to the other side: Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [28].