HULME and SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Case

[2010] AATA 414

7 June 2010

No judgment structure available for this case.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2010] AATA 414

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL      )

)       No 2009/3034 & 2009/3035

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION )
Re DELLA HULME

Applicant

And

SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILIES, HOUSING, COMMUNITY SERVICES AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND WORKPLACE RELATIONS

Respondent

DECISION

Tribunal Mr S. Webb, Member

Date7 June 2010

PlaceCanberra

Decision The decisions under review are set aside. In place thereof the Tribunal decides that Ms Hulme was not a member of a couple in the period from 6 April 2000 to 18 September 2001. The matters are remitted to the Respondents to calculate Ms Hulme's entitlements during this period.

.......................[Sgd].......................

Mr S. Webb, Member

CATCHWORDS

SOCIAL SECURITY - parenting payment - member of a couple – marriage - living separately and apart on an indefinite basis - decision set aside

FAMILY TAX BENEFIT - member of a couple - living separately and apart - indicia of a marriage-like relationship are not made out - decision set aside

Social Security Act 1991 s 4

A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999

REASONS FOR DECISION

7 June 2010 Mr S. Webb, Member         

1.      Della Hulme married Stephen Eddy in 1994. They had two children, but the marriage did not endure. Later, Mr Eddy died. The dispute in these applications concerns, primarily, whether Ms Hulme was a member of a couple with Mr Eddy during the period from 6 April 2000 to 18 September 2001. Ms Hulme claimed and was paid parenting payment and family tax benefit at the single rate during this period. Centrelink received a tip-off that she and Mr Eddy were living together as a family, however, and decided that she had been paid amounts in excess of her entitled on that basis. Debts were raised against her and she was prosecuted for fraud. The prosecution failed at the first hurdle and was dismissed. Ms Hulme sought review of the decisions to raise and recover debts from her, with some success before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT). What remains in dispute are the alleged overpayment debts during the period to which I have referred.

2.      There are two issues, therefore, to be determined:

(a)was Ms Hulme a member of a couple within the meaning of that term for the purposes of subsection 4(2) of the Social Security Act 1991 (the Social Security Act), and if so

(b)is it appropriate to waive all or part of the result overpayment debts?

3.      I was informed at the outset of the hearing that if it is found that Ms Hulme was a member of a couple, the quantum of the overpayments and the resulting debts are not in dispute. Furthermore, I was informed that the only ground on which waiver would be pressed concerned ‘special circumstances’.

4.      The relevant facts are as follows:

(a)Ms Hulme was legally married to Mr Eddy in the period from 6 April 2000 to 18 September 2001 (the relevant period);

(b)there were two children of this marriage, born in 1995 and 1999;

(c)Ms Hulme has a daughter, Charlene Mellor (now adult), from a previous relationship;

(d)Ms Hulme claimed parenting payment and FTB at the single rate from 4 November 1999[1] and during the relevant period;

[1] T5.

(e)on 11 November 1999 Centrelink wrote to Ms Hulme, informing her of her notification obligations[2];

[2] T6.

(f)at this time Ms Hulme was residing at 7 Roe Street, Moss Vale (Roe Street)[3];

[3] T14 folio 183.

(g)on or about 10 April 2000 she moved into 53 Watson Road, Moss Vale (Watson Road)[4];

[4] T14 folio 184; T68 folios 726, 743 and 745 refer.

(h)on or about 21 December 2000 Ms Hulme moved into 15 Wilson Street, Moss Vale (Wilson Street)[5];

[5] T14 folios 185 and 188.

(i)on or about 8 August 2001 she moved into 23 Campbell Crescent, Moss Vale (Campbell Crescent)[6];

[6]  T13 folio 169.

(j)Mr Eddy is named on the lease documentation for each of these properties[7];

[7]  T13 and T14.

(k)on 18 September 2001 Mr Eddy wrote to Century 21 real Estate and advised that he no longer lived at 23 Campbell Crescent, Moss Vale and asked for the lease to be transferred into his wife’s name[8];

[8]  T13 folio 179.

(l)on 26 September 2001 Centrelink received a tip-off that Ms Hulme had been living in a marriage-like relationship with Mr Eddy for more than one year while claiming parenting payment at the single rate without declaring Mr Eddy’s income[9];

[9]  T7.

(m)on 3 October 2001 Ms Hulme gave a statement to Centrelink in which she rejected the assertion that she and Mr Eddy lived together[10];

(n)Centrelink obtained information from third parties about Ms Hulme’s and Mr Eddy’s relationship and circumstances[11];

(o)on 6 December 2001 Centrelink decided that Ms Hulme was not living separately and apart from Mr Eddy and raised an overpayment debt against her[12];

(p)on 19 December 2001 an authorised review officer decided to affirm the decision[13];

(q)on 18 March 2002 Ms Hulme made a statutory declaration concerning her living arrangements[14];

(r)on 8 September 2003 Ms Hulme was acquitted of criminal charges arising from these matters[15];

(s)on 25 December 2008 Ms Mellor signed a statement concerning her mother’s circumstances during the relevant period[16];

(t)on 5 March 2009 Ms Hulme applied for review by the SSAT and filed a number of documents[17];

(u)on 18 May 2009 the SSAT decided to vary the decision[18]; and

(v)on 3 July 2009 Ms Hulme applied for review.[19]

[10] T9.

[11] See T21, T27, T30, T33 and T46, for example.

[12] T34; T35 and T36 refer.

[13] T41.

[14] T45.

[15] T53.

[16] T60.

[17] T61 to T63G inclusive.

[18] T2.

[19] T1.

5.      In the Respondents’ submission Ms Hulme was not living separately and apart from Mr Eddy in the period from 6 April 2000 to 18 September 2001. The Respondents say that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy did not separate on a permanent or indefinite basis until at least 18 September 2001. Evidence to support this proposition is in the form of documents concerning leases over particular properties that referred to Mr Eddy and were signed by him. Furthermore, the Respondents rely on evidence from third parties and inconsistencies in Ms Hulme’s statements over time. These elements, taken together, in the Respondent Secretaries’ submission, indicate that Ms Hulme was living with Mr Eddy and was a member of a couple with him during the specified period, and her evidence to the contrary cannot be relied upon.

6.      As will appear, I do not agree.

7. For the purposes of the Social Security Act, in respect of parenting payment, and the A New Tax System (Family Assistance) Act 1999, in respect of family tax benefit, a person who is a ‘member of a couple’ is not entitled to payment at the single rate under either Act. The phrase ‘member of a couple’ is given meaning by subsection 4(2) of the Social Security Act. When forming an opinion about such matters, regard must be had to all the relevant circumstances, including the factors set out at subsection 4(3). The overall picture of the relationship must be considered.[20]  Each factor must be considered in the context of the evidence as a whole and a determination made concerning the relationship thus revealed.  These are matters on which reasonable minds may differ on the same facts.  Nevertheless, they must be decided to the reasonable satisfaction standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities.  Mere suspicion or possibility is not sufficient.  Furthermore, in the case of a person who is legally married to another person, the person is not a member of a couple with the other person if they are living separately and apart from each other on a permanent or indefinite basis.[21]

[20] Pelka v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2008) 102 ALD 22 at 27; Lambe v Director‑General of Social Services (1981) 57 FLR 262 at 271.

[21] Subsection 4(2), Social Security Act 1991.

8.      Very little probative evidence concerning the circumstances of Ms Hulme’s relationship with Mr Eddy during the particular period was adduced. This is, perhaps, because the circumstances in dispute occurred more than 10 years ago. Much of the evidence adduced by the Respondents is in the form of documents concerning properties that were rented in Mr Eddy’s name in which Ms Hulme lived during this period. This evidence is brief in nature and content.  Mr Eddy died and only scant evidence remains as to these rental arrangements and his account of his relationship with Ms Hulme at the relevant time. I note that Ms Hulme hotly disputes the evidence of Mr Eddy that does remain. Evidence of other parties, real estate agency employees and neighbours for example, is either extremely limited in scope or in general terms that are not particularly helpful.

9.      At this point it is appropriate to note that Ms Hulme was prosecuted on criminal charges, but the charges were not made out prima facie and she was acquitted. Even though those proceedings failed for want of evidence sufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof, Centrelink’s decision to raise and recover overpayment debts from Ms Hulme remained on foot. The failure of the criminal prosecution does not mean that these proceedings must resolve in Ms Hulme’s favour; the case is to be determined on the evidence that is before me, applying the civil standard of proof.

10. There is a large number of documents in the bundles filed under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, extending to more than 850 pages (T documents). Mr Parker, appearing for the Respondents, and Mr Emerson-Elliot, appearing for Ms Hulme, referred me to particular documents that would be relied upon. Even so, it is apparent that at least one key document that was before the SSAT, and on which the SSAT based its decision, is not included in the bundle of T documents. The particular document was handed up by Mr Emerson-Elliot and is in Exhibit A4. Why the document was not filed with other documents under section 37, as required, has not been adequately explained. Mr Parker informed me that he had not previously seen the document, as it was not provided to him in the compiled T documents and, as a result, he did not intend to rely on it. This is a rather surprising revelation for two reasons. Firstly, the document is referred to in the SSAT decision. It contains a statement by Ms Hulme to Police in June 2002 in which she stated “About 2 years ago we started having problems in our marriage, finally separating for good mid October 2001”.[22] This evidence, if correct, suggests that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy separated in or about October 2001, contrary to her oral evidence and other statements she has provided from time to time. The document is clearly relevant and it cannot simply be by-passed or ignored. Secondly, it is clear enough that all relevant documents that were before the SSAT were not filed in compliance with section 37. It is possible that the omission of the particular document is simply an isolated administrative error, or an error of judgement; equally, it is possible that it is symptomatic of a systemic failure. Whatever the answer may be, it is clear enough that the error was not identified by Mr Parker, or by his instructors, or by any process in the course of these proceedings prior to hearing. This is a matter of concern that should be addressed by the Respondents, Centrelink and the SSAT to prevent any similar omissions in future.

[22] Exhibit A4, p1.

issues of credit

11.     At this point it is necessary to say something about issues of credit.

12.     With regard to the contents of Exhibit A4, Ms Hulme provided an explanation that was not seriously challenged: her evidence is that she gave the statement after being assaulted by Mr Eddy; she was upset and the statement does not accurately reflect what she said – the statement was typed by a Police officer and she did not check every detail before signing it. Ms Hulme’s evidence on this point is difficult to accept, even though it was not seriously challenged.

13.     The fundamental allegation underlying the Respondents’ case is that Ms Hulme has dishonestly misrepresented her domestic circumstances and has lied about her relationship with Mr Eddy. That being so, one might reasonably expect her evidence to be thoroughly tested and inconsistencies in her statements over time to be exposed and squarely put to her during cross-examination. Furthermore, one may reasonably expect probative evidence to be adduced and, to the extent that it contradicts her account, for that evidence, too, to be put to her in cross-examination. While she was cross-examined on certain documents, it was not squarely put to her that she was lying about her relationship with Mr Eddy or that she was deliberately and dishonestly misrepresenting her domestic circumstances during the period in issue. She was not cross-examined about inconsistencies in her evidence before the SSAT and in her oral evidence before me. I put this to her and gave her the opportunity to explain inconsistencies in her oral evidence and what the SSAT reported she had said. Her responses were not seriously challenged.

14.     Nevertheless, I am concerned about the reliability of Ms Hulme’s evidence. Her explanations concerning apparent inconsistencies in statements and evidence she has given over time are not supported by other reliable evidence and are difficult to accept. It does not follow, however, that the inconsistencies are necessarily self-serving or should be attributed to a nefarious purpose, although that cannot be ruled out. The events in issue occurred 10 years ago. It is reasonable to accept that memories fade or may otherwise be affected by the effluxion of time. For this reason it may be preferable to give greater weight to evidence that is more contemporaneous with the subject events. Her assertion that medications may have affected her concentration or her memory from time to time cannot be ruled out. Nevertheless, absent independent corroboration, Ms Hulme’s evidence must be treated with caution.

the financial aspects of the relationship

15.     There is no evidence that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy jointly owned any major assets or were jointly liable for any liabilities.

16.     It appears that during the relevant period Ms Hulme took out a joint personal loan account in the name of DD and M Eddy.[23] She identified ‘M Eddy’ as Mr Eddy’s mother and explained that Mrs Eddy assisted her in the joint loan account to purchase a motor vehicle. Ms Hulme’s evidence is that she required a motor vehicle to transport the children as Mr Eddy had taken the vehicle she had been using.

[23] T12.

17.     It appears that two joint bank accounts in the names of SJ and DD Eddy were in operation during the relevant period.[24] Ms Hulme’s evidence is that she did not have access to these accounts and they were operated solely by Mr Eddy following their separation in November 1999. I note that the addresses for each account are the same: 7 Station Street, Marulan. Ms Hulme’s evidence is that this address was that of Mr Eddy’s mother at the time.

[24] T11 and T22.

18.     There is no evidence from Mrs Eddy or Mr Eddy concerning these accounts and arrangements.

19.     There is clear evidence that Mr Eddy signed documents in relation to leases taken out in his name over properties at Roe Street, Watson Road, Wilson Street and Campbell Crescent in Moss Vale during the relevant period.

20.     Ms Hulme’s evidence is that Mr Eddy did not reside with her at these properties after January 1999, with the exception of one short period in which they attempted reconciliation in or about October 1999. Her evidence is that Mr Eddy stayed with his mother, or with friends, or at a local hotel after November 1999. She asserted that Mr Eddy signed the lease documents and rental applications for these properties because, by agreement, he paid amounts of rent in lieu of child support and he agreed to transfer the bond from property to property as Ms Hulme did not have the means to pay the bond monies herself.

21.     If Ms Hulme’s evidence is accepted, this points to some pooling of financial resources in the context of a child support agreement, in expression of Mr Eddy’s legal obligation to support his children.

22.     There is no evidence of Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy sharing household expenses during the relevant period. Ms Hulme’s evidence is that she struggled financially and Mr Eddy was very unreliable and he did not financially support her or the children other than by paying rent. Her evidence is that she was often forced to meet Mr Eddy at an automatic teller machine in order to obtain money.

the nature of the household

23.     There is no evidence of a shared care arrangement between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy in respect of the children.

24.     There is some evidence that points to Mr Eddy continuing to reside with Ms Hulme at Roe Street, Watson Road, Wilson Street and Campbell Crescent in Moss Vale during the relevant period.[25] This evidence is not conclusive or strong, however, and there is evidence that points to a contrary conclusion.[26] Evidence from Mr Eddy suggests that he “was regularly told to leave or locked out of the various houses we rented”[27] and that he left the residence at Campbell Crescent on 18 September 2001[28]. The evidence of Ms Sandry[29], Mrs Eddy[30] and Tonia Krebs[31] also suggests that the relationship between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy during the relevant period was difficult and involved a number of separations. On 16 June 2002 Ms Hulme gave a statement to Police in which she stated “About 2 years ago we started having problems in our marriage, finally separating for good mid October 2001”.[32] What Ms Hulme meant by ‘separating for good’ is not clear; she denies the accuracy of this statement. Nevertheless, it is tolerably clear that she and Mr Eddy experienced serious difficulties in their relationship from late in 1999. The content of Exhibit A4 supports this finding.

[25] See T7, T13 folio 161, T15, T24, T27 and T29 for example.

[26] See T23 and T30 for example.

[27] T51 folio 454 and T52 folio 456.

[28] T13 folio 179.

[29] T21.

[30] T37.

[31] T50.

[32] Exhibit A4, p1.

25.     Ms Hulme’s oral evidence is that Mr Eddy did not reside with her during the relevant period: they separated in January 1999 (she drove herself to hospital for the birth of her son), there was an attempt at reconciliation in or about October 1999, but this was not successful and they separated again, finally, in November 1999. On her evidence Mr Eddy did not keep any clothes or personal possessions in any of the rented properties after November 1999. Although on Ms Hulme’s evidence Mr Eddy would visit in order to retrieve items from sheds at one or more of these properties.

26.     The evidence of Ms Hulme’s daughter Charlene Mellor is that to the best of her knowledge and understanding Mr Eddy did not reside with her mother during the relevant period.[33]

[33] T60 and Exhibit A2.

27.     There is no evidence that Mr Eddy assisted with domestic chores or shopping during the relevant period, although Ms Hulme gave evidence that he assisted her with a lawn mower and some gardening on one occasion. On her evidence and the evidence of Ms Mellor, Mr Eddy visited the houses in which Ms Hulme lived with the children from time to time, but that such visits were often not agreed and were attended by difficulty.

the social aspects of the relationship

28.     It appears likely that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy held themselves out as a married couple during the relevant period, especially in respect of rental arrangements and leases. It is also clear, however, that Ms Hulme informed Ms Krebs that she and Mr Eddy separated and later reconciled while she was living at Wilson Street. It appears that Ms Sandry and Mrs Eddy may have been aware of such occurrences.

29.     There is very scant evidence from third parties who knew Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy during the relevant period. Mrs Eddy’s evidence suggests that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy attempted reconciliation in or about September 2001, but this was not successful. Mr Cooper’s evidence from December 2001 is that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy were separated and he had not seen them together at his club “for about four months”.[34] Ms Mellor’s evidence is that her mother and Mr Eddy were not residing together and they were not functioning as a couple during the relevant period; Mr Eddy was frequently intoxicated and he was violent and abusive to Ms Hulme when he visited. Ms Sandry’s evidence in December 1999 is that she thought Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy may have reconciled at that time, but she could not be positive they lived together.[35]

[34] T38 folio 358.

[35] T21.

30.     Similarly there is very scant evidence concerning any social activities that Ms Hulme undertook with Mr Eddy during this period. There is evidence, for example, that they attended a club together[36] and there is evidence that they attended a Christmas party at Mr Eddy’s employment.[37]

[36] T38 folio 358.

[37] T21.

31.     Ms Hulme gave evidence that she did not attend that Christmas party because she was attending her daughter who had been admitted to the Bulli District Hospital for an adenoidectomy, a tonsillectomy and testing for sleep apnoea, and was still unwell at the time.[38] By Ms Hulme’s account, Mr Eddy had a girlfriend at the time and, in all likelihood, Mr Eddy attended the Christmas party with her. Ms Hulme gave evidence that Mr Eddy’s girlfriend had a similar build and hair colour to her own and she may have been mistakenly identified as Ms Hulme.

[38] Exhibit A3.

any sexual relationship

32.     Ms Hulme denied any sexual relationship with Mr Eddy during the relevant period.

the nature of their commitment to each other

33.     There is very scant evidence concerning any commitment between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy during the relevant period.

34.     It appears that the relationship between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy commenced in 1993. They married in 1994. There are two children from the marriage.

35.     Ms Hulme asserts that the relationship was fraught and difficult; it was a mistake. The evidence of Ms Mellor, Mrs Eddy and Ms Krebs supports the existence of difficulties in the relationship, including separations from at least November 1999.

36.     Ms Hulme gave evidence that Mr Eddy wanted the relationship to continue, but she did not as he was often drunk, abusive and violent towards her and the children – she rejected his requests to return. Nevertheless, the evidence of Ms Krebs and Mrs Eddy, for example, suggests that Ms Hulme acceded to such requests on a number of occasions and they were seen together in a social setting by Ms Sandry and Mr Cooper. This indicates a degree of commitment between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy despite other difficulties in their relationship.

37.     Ms Hulme says that she was simply trying to do the best for her children with Mr Eddy in very difficult circumstances; she was not committed to Mr Eddy. On her evidence and the evidence of Ms Mellor months would pass in which she would not see or hear from Mr Eddy and he would have no contact with the children.

living separately and apart

38. There are many examples of married couples who spend periods of time living in different places without disturbing the marriage-like nature of their relationship. Physical separation, alone, is not sufficient to establish that two people who are married are no longer members of a couple for the purposes of subsection 4(2) of the Social Security Act.

39.     I am satisfied that Hulme and Mr Eddy spent substantial periods of time living separately and apart during the relevant period - the evidence suggests that their relationship was fragmented and difficult during this period. I accept that Mr Eddy did not reside with Ms Hulme continuously during this period. It appears that he was frequently absent, having left or been asked to leave, and that he spend periods living with Mrs Eddy or with friends or in a local hotel.

40.     The concept of ‘separately and apart’ was discussed by the High Court in Main v Main[39] and by the Federal Court in Staunton-Smith v Secretary, Department of Social Security.[40]  What must be considered is not only whether the parties live separately, in physical terms, but also, and perhaps more importantly, whether the marital relationship (the consortium vitae) has broken down.  These are matters of fact and degree. 

[39] (1949) 78 CLR 636 at 641.

[40] (1991) 32 FCR 164 at 175.

41.     When all of the indicia of the relationship between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy are considered, the overall character of the relationship during the relevant period can be seen.  I am reasonably satisfied that the vital relationship between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy was substantially broken during this period.

42.     Even though Mr Eddy may have visited Ms Hulme at the various rental properties leased in his name, I accept that those visits were of short duration and were often unwanted and attended by abusive behaviour, being more consistent with a broken relationship than one that is marriage-like. It appears that Ms Hulme made an arrangement with Mr Eddy in respect of child support, whereby he paid the rent and the bond on properties in which she and the children lived. It also appears that she and Mr Eddy may have attempted to reconcile their differences and resume the marriage at various points during the relevant period. These arrangements and attempts at reconciliation are consistent with a broken marriage relationship and efforts to repair it, which ultimately failed.

43.     In all such cases it is difficult to determine when the marital relationship broke down to the point that those involved can be said to have commenced living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis; in many such cases there is a period in which one or both parties consider or attempt reconciliation, especially when children are involved. Aspirations for a family life and the hope of reconciliation should not be confused with a continuing relationship that is marital, other than in name alone. One must look to all of the circumstances of the relationship, in so far as the evidence allows, and the indicia to which regard must be had when deciding such matters.

44.     Evidence of occasional cohabitation and financial cooperation in the context of a child support agreement may, in some cases, lead to a conclusion that a relationship is marriage-like. But this is not such a case. Even though there is doubt about the reliability of Ms Hulme’s evidence, it is tolerably clear that the interpersonal relationship between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy during the relevant period was difficult and, in all likelihood, broken. The present evidence does not establish or indicate the presence of a marital relationship between them that was domestic, caring, supportive, social, intimate or committed. Rather, the evidence indicates a relationship characterised by abuse, absence and difficulty. On balance, even though these are matters attended by uncertainty and ambiguity about which minds may differ, I am reasonably satisfied that the marital relationship between Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy broke down by degrees over a long period prior to and during the relevant period.

45.     The real question is whether that relationship break-down occurred to the extent that Ms Hulme and Mr Eddy were living separately and apart on a permanent or indefinite basis during the relevant period.  Doing the best with the present evidence, which is deficient in important regards, I am reasonably satisfied that they were. From this distance there is much that cannot be seen about the circumstances pertaining at the time. It is perhaps true that Ms Hulme did not finally give up any hope of reconciliation until September or October 2001, but that does not disturb my conclusion that she and Mr Eddy were living separately and apart on an indefinite basis during the relevant period. The evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion is insubstantial and insufficient to support a contrary finding.

46. It follows that Ms Hulme was not a member of a couple in the period from 6 April 2000 to 18 September 2001 for the purposes of subsection 4(2) of the Social Security Act. In consequence, she was not overpaid parenting payment and FTB during this period, and she is not liable to repay an overpayment debt.

47.     The decisions under review are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Respondents to determine Ms Hulme’s entitlements on the basis that she was not a member of a couple in the period from 6 April 2000 to 18 September 2001.

I certify that the 47 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr S. Webb, Member

Signed:         ......................[Sgd]..........................................................
  T. Amos, Associate

Date/s of Hearing  20 May 2010
Date of Decision  7 June 2010
Solicitor for the Applicant          Mr Derek Emerson-Elliot
Solicitor for the Respondent     Mr Anthony Parker