Hughes & Hughes
[2014] FamCA 12
•17 January 2014
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HUGHES & HUGHES | [2014] FamCA 12 |
| FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Where the husband has instituted proceedings in Croatia and the wife has instituted proceedings in Australia – where the wife seeks a declaration that the Family Court of Australia is the appropriate forum and an anti-suit injunction preventing the husband from taking further steps in the Croatian proceedings – where the husband has not sought a stay of the Australian proceedings. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55 |
| APPLICANT: | Ms Hughes |
| RESPONDENT: | Mr Hughes |
| FILE NUMBER: | DGC | 2378 | of | 2013 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 17 January 2014 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Macmillan J |
| HEARING DATE: | 18 December 2013 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr Kirkham QC with Ms McCreadie |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Reale Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Hall |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | White Cleland Pty Ltd |
ORDERS
IT IS ORDERED THAT
Until further order the husband is restrained from taking any further step in the legal proceedings instituted by the husband in Croatia on 15 July 2013.
The wife’s application in a case filed 10 October 2013 and the husband’s response to an application in a case filed 26 November 2013 be otherwise adjourned for hearing in the Judicial Duty List at 10.00 am on 5 February 2014.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Hughes & Hughes has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: DGC 2378 of 2013
| Ms Hughes |
Applicant
And
| Mr Hughes |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The application listed before me in the judicial duty list is the wife’s application in a case filed 10 October 2013 in which she seeks a declaration that the Family Court of Australia is the appropriate forum for the hearing of her application for property settlement and spousal maintenance and an order that the husband be restrained from taking any further step in the proceedings instituted by him in Croatia on or about 15 July 2013.
The husband has filed a response to that application in a case in which he seeks that the wife’s application in a case be dismissed, that she sign all documents necessary to remove the caveats encumbering the two properties registered in his name or the names of entities in which he holds an interest, and that the wife pay his costs of these proceedings.
At the commencement of the hearing before me the husband sought an adjournment of the wife’s application pending the outcome of proceedings in Croatia as to whether the Croatian court has jurisdiction to deal with the proceedings he instituted in Croatia. Significantly for the purposes of the application before me, the husband did not seek a stay of the proceedings instituted by the wife in this Court.
Background
The husband was born in Croatia in 1945 and is 68 years of age. The wife was also born in Croatia in 1959 and is 54 years of age.
The parties were married in Croatia in June 2002 and separated in Australia in or about May 2013.
The husband emigrated from Croatia to Australia in about 1965 and the wife migrated to Australia following the parties’ marriage in March 2003. Both parties have Croatian and Australian citizenship. It is the wife’s case that they are resident in Australia and have returned to Croatia for family reunions and holidays, whereas the husband says that he and the wife divide their time between Australia and Croatia. The wife in her affidavit sworn 8 October 2013 deposed to the specific periods she says the husband spent in Croatia.
The wife relied upon her affidavits filed 23 August 2013 and 10 October 2013 and her financial statement filed 23 August 2013.
The wife’s most recent affidavit was sworn and filed on 16 December 2013. Counsel for the husband objected to the filing of that affidavit on the grounds that the wife had not complied with the directions made by Registrar Mestrovic on 23 October 2013 that the husband file and serve a response and affidavit in support by 20 November 2013 and that the wife have until 4.00 pm on 4 December 2013 in which to reply.
Whilst it is correct that the wife’s affidavit was filed 12 days after the relevant date, the husband also failed to comply with Registrar Mestrovic’s orders by filing his response and his affidavit on 26 November 2013 and also a further affidavit on 4 December 2013. Counsel for the husband pointed out that although the husband had filed a second affidavit it was filed solely for the purpose of annexing translations of documents annexed in their untranslated form to his earlier affidavit.
It was further submitted by counsel for the husband that the wife’s affidavit was of wider scope and was not simply a reply to the husband’s affidavit. I am satisfied that I should permit the wife to rely upon her most recent affidavit, subject to striking out by agreement annexure “MH 3”, a letter from the husband’s solicitor to the wife’s solicitor dated 25 June 2013, on the grounds that it is privileged. Although there may be parts of that affidavit which are not strictly speaking a direct reply to the husband’s affidavit, I am satisfied that the material is primarily directed to responding to the husband’s case and is relevant for the purposes of the matters I must determine.
The husband relied upon his affidavits filed 30 September 2013, 25 November 2013, 4 December 2013 and his financial statement filed 30 August 2013.
The wife deposed in her most recent affidavit that on 5 June 2013, her solicitors forwarded a letter to the husband in which they advised him that they were acting on the wife’s behalf, that the wife wished to enter into property settlement negotiations, and that they had lodged caveats over the property at B Street, Town C, to protect her interests.
On 20 June 2013, having received no response to their letter, the wife’s solicitors sent a further letter to the husband by way of express post, referring to their earlier letter, requesting that the husband pay the sum of $600 per week into a bank account nominated by the wife for her support, and that in the event that they did not receive a response from the husband by 4.00 pm on Tuesday 25 June 2013, they would have no option but to advise their client to make an urgent application to the Court for the payment of spousal maintenance.
On 25 June 2013, the wife’s solicitor received a letter from White Cleland, solicitors acting on behalf of the husband. Although, as previously referred to, the copy of that letter annexed to the wife’s affidavit (“MH3”) was struck out, the husband did not dispute having received the letter sent to him by the wife’s solicitors nor that his solicitors had forwarded a letter to the wife’s solicitors on 25 June 2013, in which they made no mention of the husband’s intention to institute proceedings in Croatia. The wife says that the husband left Australia to travel to Croatia on 27 June 2013, and this is consistent with the husband’s evidence that it was in late June 2013. In any event, I am satisfied in those circumstances that when the husband left Australia he was aware that:
a)the wife had solicitors acting on her behalf;
b)she wished to enter into discussions for the purposes of reaching a property settlement; and
c)caveats had been lodged on her behalf over the Town C property to protect her interests.
There is no dispute that on or about 15 July 2013 the husband commenced proceedings in Croatia. The proceedings in Croatia involve the husband’s application for dissolution of marriage and property settlement. There is a dispute as to whether the wife was properly served with the documents in relation to the Croatian proceedings and, accordingly, when exactly she became aware of those proceedings. Counsel for the husband referred me to a postal receipt which was signed by the wife’s son and it was his submission that I should infer on the basis of that evidence that the wife had knowledge of the Croatian proceedings prior to her initiating the proceedings in this Court. The evidence in relation to this issue is disputed and has not been tested and in those circumstances I cannot make findings as to the evidence of either the husband or the wife.
On 23 August 2013 the wife issued proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia seeking orders for property settlement and spousal maintenance. On 26 September 2013 the husband filed a response to the wife’s initiating application seeking that that application be dismissed and filed a detailed affidavit in support. On 30 September 2013 the matter was transferred to this Court.
On 4 October 2013 the wife’s solicitors instructed a solicitor in Croatia to act on behalf of the wife and to object to the jurisdiction of the Croatian court and seek a stay of the proceedings in Croatia on the basis that the laws of Australia should apply.
Legal Principles
Section 39(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Family Law Act’) provides that proceedings between the parties to a marriage may be instituted if either party to the marriage is an Australian citizen, is ordinarily resident in Australia, or is present in Australia at the relevant date, that date being the date on which the application is filed. The wife’s application, as was ultimately conceded and properly so by counsel for the husband, was properly instituted in this Court. The issue in this case, as counsel for the husband also conceded, is one of forum not of jurisdiction. In those circumstances, little purpose would be served by an adjournment of the proceedings, particularly, if as submitted by counsel for the husband, the question of jurisdiction in Croatia relates only to the divorce proceedings and not the property proceedings. On that basis, I did not accede to the husband’s application for an adjournment.
In Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55 (‘Voth’), the High Court confirmed that a party who has properly instituted proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction in Australia has a prima facie right to have the proceedings determined by that Australian court. The principles governing whether the court will grant or refuse an application for a stay of those proceedings being the “clearly inappropriate forum” test. The High Court said further that the mere fact that a court in some other country would be a more appropriate or convenient forum for the particular proceeding does not necessarily mean that the Australian court is a “clearly inappropriate forum”. The High Court said at [36] as follows:
The "clearly inappropriate forum" test is similar and, for that reason, is likely to yield the same result as the "more appropriate forum" test in the majority of cases. The difference between the two tests will be of critical significance only in those cases - probably rare - in which it is held that an available foreign tribunal is the natural or more appropriate forum but in which it cannot be said that the local tribunal is a clearly inappropriate one. But the question which the former test presents is slightly different in that it focuses on the advantages and disadvantages arising from a continuation of the proceedings in the selected forum rather than on the need to make a comparative judgment between the two forums. That is not to deny that considerations relating to the suitability of the alternative forum are relevant to the examination of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of the selected forum. The important point is that, in those cases in which the ascertainment of the natural forum is a complex and finely balanced question, the court may more readily conclude that it is not a clearly inappropriate forum.
In Henry v Henry [1996] HCA 51 (‘Henry’), the High Court held that the “clearly inappropriate forum” test in Voth is the test the court should apply in proceedings in this Court for a stay of proceedings. The High Court in Henry identified the following principles:
(a)the party seeking a stay of Australian proceedings bears the onus of establishing that the Australian jurisdiction is “clearly inappropriate”; and
(b)the determination of whether Australia is a “clearly inappropriate forum” is based upon the general circumstances of the case, taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved.
The matters to be taken into account include, inter alia:
(a)whether, if both courts have jurisdiction, each will recognise the other’s orders and decrees;
(b)which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties’ controversy;
(c)the order in which the proceedings were instituted, the stage which they have reached, and the costs that have been incurred;
(d)the connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and the issues on which relief may depend in those jurisdictions; and
(e)whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language, the parties are able to participate in respective proceedings on an equal footing.
Although whether an overseas proceeding or a proceeding in Australia was commenced first is a relevant matter to be taken into account, it is not determinative of the question of whether Australia is a “clearly inappropriate forum” (Henry per Brennan CJ, [18]-[19]). Cases in which the Family Court of Australia has held that Australia is not a clearly inappropriate forum in circumstances where proceedings in a foreign court have been instituted first in time include: Cashel & Carr [2005] FLC 93-232 at 79,868; Porto & Porto [2007] FamCA 454 at 31,47; Garrett & Cowell [2007] FamCA 778; and Khademollah & Khademollah [2000] FLC 93-050 (‘Khademollah’).
In the matter of Steen v Black (2000) FLC 93-005 O’Ryan J referred to the learned author P.E Nygh’s Conflict of Laws in Australia, 6th ed. 1995 at pp 107-108 discussion of the relevant factors the court must consider in determining whether the forum is “clearly inappropriate”. The learned author, having said that the relevant factors are to be balanced against each other and that no one factor is conclusive by itself, identified the following matters to be considered:
(a)any significant connection between the forums selected and the subject matter of the action and/or the parties, such as the domiciles of the parties, their places of business and the place where the relevant transaction occurred or the subject matter of the suit is situated;
(b)any legitimate substantial juridical advantage to the plaintiff, such as: greater recovery, more favourable limitation period, better ancillary procedures, or assets within the jurisdiction against which any judgement can be enforced;
(c)the availability of an old alternative forum and whether it will give the plaintiff adequate relief; and
(d)whether the law of the forum will supply the substantive law to be applied in the resolution of the subject case.
Discussion
Although as previously discussed, counsel for the husband commenced his case by seeking an adjournment to await the Croatian court’s decision as to jurisdiction, during the course of submissions counsel submitted that the question of the jurisdiction of the Croatian court related only to the divorce and not the property proceedings, and that the Croatian court was now seized of the property proceedings, had made orders, and that the property proceedings in Croatia were progressing in an orderly fashion.
In this case, the husband concedes that this Court has jurisdiction. Assuming, for the purposes of the hearing before me, that the Croatian court also has jurisdiction, the onus would then be on the husband, assuming he had made an application to stay the proceedings instituted by the wife, to establish that this Court is a “clearly inappropriate forum”. Even if the husband had applied for a stay of the wife’s proceedings, or if I were to treat his application seeking to dismiss the wife’s application as an application for a stay, as was submitted by senior counsel for the wife, the husband has in any event failed to demonstrate that this Court is a clearly inappropriate forum. Nor has the husband pointed to any evidence which would lead this Court to conclude that the continuation of these proceedings would be oppressive or vexatious as envisaged in Henry.
In essence, the husband’s case was that he had properly instituted proceedings in Croatia and that the wife, he says, having been served with the documents in relation to those proceedings, then instituted proceedings in this Court, and that the issuing of proceedings by the wife in those circumstances was vexatious and oppressive. Counsel for the husband referred me to paragraph 35 of Henry per Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ, as follows:
It is prima facie vexatious and oppressive, in the strict sense of those terms, to commence a second or subsequent action in the courts of this country if an action is already pending with respect to the matter in issue (48). And although there are cases in which it has been held that it is not prima facie vexatious, in the strict sense of that word, to bring proceedings in different countries (49), the problems which arise if the identical issue or the same controversy is to be litigated in different countries which have jurisdiction with respect to the matter are such, in our view, that, prima facie continuation of one or the other should be seen as vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words.
It is clear that their Honours were not saying that it necessarily follows that the proceeding issued second in time, albeit that it may be prima facie vexatious and oppressive, should be stayed or that the forum in which those proceedings were commenced is necessarily a “clearly inappropriate forum”. Their Honours said as much in the following paragraph of their judgment in Henry:
It does not follow that, because one or other of the proceedings is prima facie vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words, the local proceedings should be stayed. However, it does follow that the fact that there are or, even, that there may be simultaneous proceedings in different countries with respect to the same controversy is highly relevant to the question whether the local proceedings are oppressive in the sense of “seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging”, or vexatious, in the sense of “productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment”. And it also follows that courts should strive, to the extent that Voth permits, to avoid that situation.
Ultimately, the fact that the husband issued the proceedings in Croatia before the wife issued proceedings in Australia, irrespective of whether she knew or did not know that the husband had issued proceedings in Croatia, or that he did so because he was aware that the wife was intending to issue proceedings in Australia, is only one of a number of considerations and is not determinative of whether this Court is a “clearly inappropriate forum”.
The parties in this case have a clear connection to Australia. It is not disputed that the husband immigrated to Australia on or about 1968 and has two children from a previous relationship, both of whom live in Australia The husband deposes that he is a director and shareholder of two companies incorporated in Australia, one of which is the trustee of the Hughes Family Trust, and the registered proprietor of the Town C property. The wife immigrated to Australia with her two children following her marriage to the husband and is, as is the husband, an Australian citizen. At the very least, based upon the husband’s evidence and the submissions of counsel on his behalf, during the marriage he and the wife spent their time between Australia and Croatia.
On the husband’s case, the property in Croatia includes a caravan, a house and parcels of land which he asserts are owned by the wife, and a property they purchased together in or about 2008/2009 which is yet to be valued but which the husband says was purchased for approximately $220,000 – 230,000. He also deposes that they borrowed the whole of the purchase price from the Bendigo Bank, although there is no reference to this loan in his financial statement filed 27 September 2013. The wife deposes that the husband owns or controls property in Australia of about $5 million. Even accepting the husband’s estimate of the value of his property in Australia, to which the wife claims to have contributed since their marriage in 2003, and which he says has a total value of $1,402,882, it is clear that there is a substantial connection to Australia and the value of the property in Australia exceeds the value of their joint or separately owned property in Croatia.
Although the wife’s first language is Croatian, doing the best I can on the evidence I have before me with respect to her financial circumstances, I am satisfied that, notwithstanding the husband’s offer to allow the wife the use of the holiday property in Croatia, she would be unlikely to have the necessary financial resources to enable her to engage in the proceedings in Croatia. Although the husband deposes that he has spent approximately $7,500 on the proceedings in Croatia thus far, that is a matter that this Court could take into account in the proceedings in this Court if it considered it appropriate to do so.
Counsel for the husband also submitted that prior to the marriage, the wife had agreed to be bound by Croatian law with respect to any division of property. The husband deposed in paragraph 26 of his affidavit filed 27 September 2013 as follows:
At the marriage ceremony a government official came and read from a document before we exchanged our marriage vows.. (sic) From what he told us I believe that in Croatia property is divided as follows:
a.Any property owned prior to cohabitation remains property of the party who owned it;
b.Any joint property acquired during the marriage will be divided 50/50;
If a party does not agree with the Croatian law on property settlement as read out to them by the government official they have the opportunity to not enter into marriage and walk away. By signing the marriage certificate both parties agree to be bound by Croatian law with respect to property settlement.
Senior counsel for the wife objected to this evidence on two bases. Firstly, he submitted it was hearsay and, secondly, it was an opinion given by the husband about a matter which he was manifestly unqualified to give. Senior counsel submitted that there was no demonstrated nexus between the government official’s unspecified comments and the marriage itself which could found a basis for the husband’s belief of what he said was the implied agreement underlying the parties’ marriage.
The husband deposed in his affidavit sworn 25 November 2013 that in or about 1999 or 2000 his sister came to visit him in Australia and brought a video of his niece’s recent wedding ceremony in Croatia. The husband says that whilst he was watching that video he “listened with interest” as a government official read out the agreement with respect to property division between married couples in Croatia. In that affidavit the husband further purports to set out in detail an English translation of what he says he heard the marriage celebrant say to he and the wife prior to their signing the marriage Registry on the day of their wedding in 2002.
This evidence does not remedy the shortcomings of the husband’s earlier affidavit. The source of the document, which he says was read to the parties in Croatian “from a large book”, is not clear. Even on his own evidence the husband says it was when watching the video of his niece’s wedding in or about 1999 or 2000 that he saw a government official read out what he now says is the same agreement read out at his wedding with respect to property division. It is reasonable to infer given his evidence that the husband does not recall word-for-word what was said at his marriage ceremony to the wife, and there is still no clear nexus between the document that is annexed to the husband’s affidavit and what he now says was said by the government official at the parties’ wedding or for that matter what he says was said at his niece’s wedding.
Even if I did accept that the annexed document is an accurate translation of what was read to the parties on the day of their wedding, it does not say, as asserted by the husband in his earlier affidavit, that the parties agreed to be bound by Croatian law with respect to property settlement.
As submitted by senior counsel for the wife, if the husband’s assertions were taken to their logical conclusion, then parties who had married in Croatia but spent their whole lives living in Australia would have to return to Croatia to have their property proceedings determined by a Croatian court, irrespective of where that property is located.
In any event, even if there were such an agreement between the parties, that agreement would not exclude the jurisdiction of this Court or necessarily lead this Court to conclude that it is a “clearly inappropriate forum”(Khademollah).
Assuming that both this Court and the Croatian court have jurisdiction, this Court must consider whether the Australian and Croatian courts will recognise each other’s orders and decrees. Senior counsel for the wife referred me to a paper titled ‘International Recognition and Enforcement of Property Orders and Maintenance and Child Support Obligations’ presented by Amanda Humphreys at the 7th Family Law Conference in Melbourne on 22 March 2011. In that paper, Ms Humphreys points out that “Australia in not a party to any international agreement or convention governing the recognition and enforcement of orders in relation to the alteration of property interests between spouses”, and that although judgments made in specified jurisdictions may be enforced in Australia pursuant to the Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth), s 3 of that Act specifically excludes “a matrimonial cause or proceedings in connection with matrimonial matters”. Ms Humphreys went on to say that although orders made in a foreign court of competent jurisdiction might be recognised, given weight or even replicated by an Australian court, they would not be enforceable in their own right.
Although counsel for the husband conceded that any orders made by the Croatian court would not be enforceable in their own right in this Court, he also submitted that the same would apply with respect to orders made by this Court in Croatia. Although there is no evidence before me in relation to whether the Croatian court would recognise or enforce the orders of this Court, even if they would not as was submitted by counsel for the husband, this Court could make orders binding the parties who, even on the husband’s case, live at least half of the time in Australia. Even on the husband’s case the value of the assets in this country are significantly greater than the value of the assets in Croatia and provision could be made in orders adjusting the parties’ interests in the property in Australia to take into account the value of the assets in Croatia.
As was submitted by senior counsel for the wife, there would appear to be a substantial juridical advantage to the wife to proceed in this Court pursuant to the provisions of the Family Law Act, both with respect to property settlement and the provision of spousal maintenance. The husband deposes that it is his belief that pursuant to Croatian law any property owned by the parties prior to cohabitation remains the property of the party who owned it and that any property acquired jointly by the parties during the marriage is divided 50/50. On that basis, the wife would be significantly disadvantaged if the proceedings were to be dealt with in the Croatian court and not in this Court.
The wife deposed that she does not own any property in Australia. At best pursuant to Croatian law she would be entitled to retain her interest, if any, in any property she owns in Croatia and a half-interest in what I assume would be the equity she and the husband have in the property that they have purchased in Croatia, although the basis of that division is unclear. Even if the gross value of the property were to be divided, the wife would still be at a significant disadvantage, particularly in circumstances where it is her case that the husband has significant property in Australia and that she has made a substantial contribution to that property during their marriage of some 11 years. It is also the wife’s case that due to her age, lack of English language skills and lack of work skills, she will require either periodic or lump sum spousal maintenance, a remedy which it is submitted would not be available to her in the Croatian proceedings which would appear, at least on the husband’s evidence, to be the case.
The wife having properly instituted the proceedings in this Court and, in the absence of an application by the husband to stay those proceedings, there is no reason why this Court should not exercise its jurisdiction to hear the matter. Even if the husband had sought a stay of the proceedings instituted by the wife in this Court, I am in all of the circumstances not satisfied that Australia, and this Court in particular, is a “clearly inappropriate forum”. To the contrary, I am satisfied that in all of the circumstances it is a clearly appropriate forum. Although the wife sought a declaration to that effect, I am of the view that in circumstances where the husband has not sought a stay of the proceedings such a declaration is unnecessary.
The wife in her application in a case filed 10 October 2013 also sought an anti-suit injunction against the husband from continuing the proceedings in Croatia.
This Court has the inherent power to make orders to protect its own processes being abused and an implied power to make orders necessary and appropriate to avoid an injustice (CSR Ltd v Cigna Insurance Australia Ltd [1997] HCA 33 (‘CSR v Cigna’) and Lederer & Hunt [2007] FamCA 55 at [33]). As the majority of the High Court said in CSR v Cigna, “[o]ne well established category of case in which an injunction may be granted in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction is that involving proceedings in another court, including in a foreign court, which are, according to the principles of equity, vexatious or oppressive”.
Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Henry said at [34] as follows:
Parallel proceedings in another country with respect to the same issue may be compared with multiple proceedings with respect to the same subject matter in different courts in Australia. In Union Steamship Co New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale (47), Dixon J observed of that latter situation that “(t)he inconvenience and embarrassment of allowing two independent actions involving the same question of liability to proceed contemporaneously in different courts needs no elaboration.” From the parties’ point of view, there is no less – perhaps, considerably more – inconvenience and embarrassment if the same issue is to be fought in the courts of different countries according to different regimes, very likely permitting of entirely different outcomes.
This is an apposite observation in all of the circumstances of this case, save that in this case it is more than simply inconvenience and embarrassment, as it may well be that the wife is not in a financial position to participate in the proceedings in Croatia as well as proceedings in this Court or that she would be at a significant disadvantage, including financial disadvantage, if she were to do so.
As Brennan CJ said in CSR v Cigna, “the existence of parallel proceedings necessarily established that one of them was, in the strict sense, vexatious and oppressive.” I have already determined that this Court is an appropriate forum and, in the absence of an application by the husband to stay the proceedings in this Court, it would be, in my view, both vexatious and oppressive for the husband to continue the proceedings in Croatia. In all of the circumstances of this case it is therefore proper that I make the anti-suit injunction sought by the wife in her application in a case.
I will otherwise adjourn the matter to the Judicial Duty List on 5 February 2014.
I certify that the preceding forty nine (49) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Macmillan delivered on 17 January 2014
Associate:
Date: 17 January 2014
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