Huggins v the State of South Australia No. Scciv-02-637

[2004] SASC 16

HUGGINS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
[2004] SASC 16

Civil

1. VANSTONE J:     On 6 April 2001 Allan Richard Wylie, Sheriff’s Officer,[1] attended at the plaintiff’s then home at 152 Kelly Road, Modbury. He was accompanied by another sheriff’s officer and initially, two police officers. He had with him a document entitled “Order for Sale (Penalty Enforcement)”, issued pursuant to s 70G Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (“the Sentencing Act”). It was dated 3 April 2001 and referred to two pecuniary sums totalling $1,595 said to be owed by the plaintiff. There was nothing on the face of the document to suggest that it was other than accurate and valid.

   [1]pursuant to s 6(3) Sheriff’s Act 1978 and authorised officer pursuant to s 56A(1)(b) Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.

2. Access to the premises was given by the plaintiff’s father.  The Order for Sale was shown to the plaintiff.  He asserted that in respect of the second pecuniary sum, being the amount of $326, there was an error and that no such amount was owing.  He produced a document to verify his position, which was accepted by Mr Wylie.  In respect of the larger amount, the plaintiff asserted that he did not intend to make payment.  Mr Wylie told him that he proposed to seize goods to satisfy the larger debt unless Mr Huggins paid.  Several computers were located.  The plaintiff was asked if he wished to “back up the files” and he declined and he also declined to disconnect them.  When Mr Wylie started to pack the computers the plaintiff took hold of his hand.  At that point the police, who were standing by, intervened to arrest the plaintiff.  He was put to ground and handcuffed.  In the course of those processes he resisted and suffered some injury.  He was then taken to the Holden Hill Police Station where he was charged with hindering an authorised officer and resisting arrest.[2]  Several computers and some other items were then seized by Mr Wylie.

   [2] Contrary to s 72A Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 and s 6(2) Summary Offences Act 1953.

3. By letter dated 3 May 2001 on letterhead of the Courts Administration Authority (“the CAA”) and written by R.W. Speer, Manager Business Operations, Fines Payment Unit, the plaintiff was advised that both limbs of the Order for Sale were attended by error and that the order was wrongly issued.  On 15 May 2001 the plaintiff’s property was returned to him and on 17 May 2001 the police charges were withdrawn.

4. The plaintiff now claims that each of the CAA, Mr Wylie and the police were negligent in respect of their part in this course of events and he seeks damages arising from his injuries, from being deprived of his property and for embarrassment and mental anguish.  The plaintiff’s action lies against the Crown rather than the individuals concerned. [3]

   [3]Pursuant to s 28(2) Courts Administration Act 1993, s 72B Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, s 12(1) Sheriff’s Act 1978 and s 65(2) Police Act 1998.

5. At trial the plaintiff represented himself.  His Statement of Claim was apparently drawn without any or with only limited legal advice.

6. The stance taken at trial on behalf of the CAA did not reflect the terms of the letter of Mr Speer. Neither did it reflect the Defence as it stood at the commencement of the trial. Indeed, at the outset, counsel for the defendant sought to amend the Defence to strike out an admission to the effect that the “Order for Sale was issued in error and the plaintiff’s goods should not have been seized” and to substitute an assertion to the effect that the Order for Sale (insofar as that was concerned with the amount of $1,269 for unpaid costs) “was lawfully issued and served upon the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s goods were lawfully seized pursuant to s 70G of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988”.  For reasons related to case flow management principles and the prejudice which would have accrued to the plaintiff had the amendment been allowed, I declined the application to amend.  However I did not prevent the defendant’s counsel from putting argument to me in relation to the correct enforcement procedure.  In any event it seems to me that, at least arguably, the admission made in the defence amounted to a conclusion of law which is not binding on the Court.[4]  Furthermore, since I have determined that the admission made in the Defence was an appropriate one, nothing turns on the matter of the application to amend.

   [4]        See Rule 48.04(1)(b) Supreme Court Rules.

7. It is necessary however to examine in a little more detail the background leading to the issue of the Order for Sale.  It is convenient to set out part of its terms.[5] 

   [5]        The identity of the person who served the order has not been proved.

   Form No. 62

   Fines Payment Unit – Courts Administration Authority

   Post Office Box 6589, Halifax Street, Adelaide SA 5000

   Page 1 of 2

   Order for Sale (Penalty Enforcement)

   Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act – Section 70G

   DETAILS OF THE PERSON AGAINST WHOM THIS ORDER IS MADE:

   Debtor’s name            Paul Donovan HUGGINS

   Date of birth               13/03/1956

   Address  152 Kelly Rd, MODBURY NORTH, SA 5092

   DETAILS OF THE PECUNIARY SUM TO WHICH THIS ORDER RELATES:

Penalty No	Date Penalty Imposed	Offence	Offence Date	Total Amount Due ($) (including costs etc)
MCHHL-00-1602/1	31/08/00	Order for Costs	31/08/00	1,269.00
AMC-00-9485/1	16/01/01	Unlawfully on Premises	25/07/00	326.00
Total pecuniary sum to which this order relates: ($)				1,595.00

DETAILS OF THIS ORDER

I, the undersigned, am satisfied that you, the abovenamed debtor –

*      have failed to pay the amount due shown above within 14 days of being given a reminder notice, or to enter into an arrangement to pay it,

*      entered into an arrangement to pay the above pecuniary sum(s) which has terminated, that you have not entered into any further arrangement and that the amount due shown above is now enforceable against you.

I hereby make this order to authorise the sale of your property.  You are advised that this order is sufficient authority for any authorised officer to search for, seize and sell such of your property as is necessary to pay or substantially reduce the amount due.

*Delete whichever is inapplicable

Date of Order   3/4/01

Registry of issue:       HOLDEN HILL REGISTRY

(signature)

(Authorised Officer)

1. The identity of the person who signed the Order has not been proved. 

2. The following account of events is based on the plaintiff’s evidence which, in relation to these matters, I accept.  I commence with events relevant to the first sum mentioned on the Order.

3. For a period of time terminating in December 2000 the plaintiff was the sole proprietor of a business which traded as Video Game Warehouse.  It was situated at 560 North East Road, Holden Hill.  The success of the business was markedly undermined by a series of robberies which were committed upon the plaintiff at the premises.  It appears that detection and prosecution of those responsible only occurred to a limited extent and, not surprisingly, over a period the plaintiff became very frustrated at the interruptions to his business.  It was against this background that an incident of another type occurred on 11 October 1998 at the shop premises.  On that day a customer by the name of Campbell sought to return a video game which he had previously purchased from the plaintiff.  There was nothing wrong with the game;  the customer’s reason was simply that he was dissatisfied with it.  The plaintiff explained that his policy was not to give a refund in these circumstances and that led to a physical confrontation between them in the shop.  The plaintiff’s mother, who was present in the store, called the police and Campbell was then charged with an offence, probably assault.  Later that charge was withdrawn by the police contrary to the plaintiff’s wishes.  The plaintiff then determined to mount a private prosecution for assault against Campbell. 

4. A trial of that matter took place before Mr Millard SM on 31 August 2000.  Mr Millard was not satisfied that the charge was made out and acquitted Campbell.  Mr Koehn, of the Legal Services Commission, appeared for Campbell and sought costs.  Mr Millard acceded to that request and granted costs in the sum of $1,200.  His Honour allowed three months in which they were to be paid to the court “for and on behalf of the Legal Services Commission”.  The plaintiff gave evidence before me that notwithstanding Mr Millard’s order he considered that the $1,200 was “not morally owed” and he had no intention of paying it.  The plaintiff claimed that between the time when the order for payment was made and 6 April 2001 the only communication he could remember in relation to the matter was a reminder notice referring to the addition of a $69 fee for “late payment”.  That accounted for the increased total amount of the first sum.

5. I turn to the second pecuniary sum mentioned.  The plaintiff was unsure of the date of the incident which lay behind the assertion in the Order for Sale that he had been fined the sum of $326 for being unlawfully on premises.  In any event, the chain of events commenced when a person called Centophanti and another person came into the plaintiff’s shop and committed a robbery.  Centophanti was later identified, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced.  Not satisfied with that result, the plaintiff determined to sue him civilly.  He took proceedings in the Holden Hill Court of Summary Jurisdiction.  When the defendant failed to appear the plaintiff signed judgment.  He further took steps to enforce the judgment but there was a series of non-appearances by Centophanti – who by this time was in gaol – and the plaintiff became very frustrated at the inaction and inconvenience to himself.  Accordingly he decided to take the matter up with Centophanti’s solicitor, Mr Stephen Ey.  Receiving no satisfaction, he determined to take revenge on Mr Ey and he went to the offices of Mangan Ey & Associates in Adelaide and smashed a number of external windows in those offices.  The police attended and arrested the plaintiff and he was charged with damaging property and being unlawfully on premises.

6. It appears that on one of the occasions when those charges were due to be mentioned in court the plaintiff was unable to attend as he was the victim of a further robbery at his shop premises.  During that robbery he was stabbed in the leg.  However, two days later when he was able to, he attended at the court to explain his absence.  It seems that instead of recording his non-appearance accurately, it was translated in the computer records of the court as a conviction for being unlawfully on premises (although not for damaging property) and it was further recorded that a fine and associated costs totalling $326 had been imposed.   

7. Later in January 2001, the plaintiff received from the Fines Payment Unit of the CAA a Notice of Fine referring to the offence of being unlawfully on premises and asserting that the amount of $326 was due to be paid by 16 February 2001.  It further gave a series of “penalty deadlines”, the last of which was 20 June 2001, by which time it warned that a warrant for seizure and sale of personal property might be issued in the absence of payment.  In all likelihood it was this document which the plaintiff produced to Mr Wylie on 6 April in support of his argument to him that the $326 amount was not owing at that time, if at all.  (It is interesting to note from the Certificate of Record relating to these two summary charges that in September 2001 the charge of being unlawfully on premises was withdrawn and in December of that year the plaintiff was convicted of damaging property and sentenced to three days imprisonment.)

8. Attempts to recover the amount ordered by way of costs and the lesser amount erroneously recorded as a penalty purported to be taken pursuant to Part 9 of the Sentencing Act. That Part is entitled “Enforcement of Sentence”. Proceedings for enforcement of a “sentence” may only be taken in accordance with that Act: s 56. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that:

   “sentence” means –

   (a)     the imposition of a penalty;  or

   (b)    the decision of a court to offer a defendant an opportunity to enter into a bond;  or

   (c)    the fixing or extending of a non-parole period;  or

   (d)    the making of any other order or direction affecting penalty;”

9. Part 9 comprises several divisions including Division 1 – General, Division 2 – Enforcement of Bonds, and Division 3 – Enforcement of Pecuniary Sums. Section 3(1) provides that:

   “pecuniary sum” means –

   (a)     a fine;  or

   (b)     compensation;  or

   (c)     costs;  or

   (d)    a sum payable pursuant to a bond or to a guarantee ancillary to a bond;  or

   (e)    any other amount payable pursuant to an order or direction of a court,

   and includes a VIC levy;

10. As already noted, the order for payment of the sum of $1,200 was made in relation to costs of the defendant’s counsel, Campbell having been acquitted, and was to be paid to the Magistrates Court on behalf of the Legal Services Commission. The question arises whether that order could be considered to be in the nature of a “sentence”. It seems, on the basis of Mr Speer’s letter on behalf of the CAA and indeed on the basis of the Defence, as filed, that at some earlier time it was the view of the CAA that it could not. Unfortunately the process of reasoning underlying that view was not put to me in argument because, as noted, counsel for the defendant sought to argue the contrary position. But it is plain that in relation to the matter before Mr Millard SM there was no conviction and therefore no sentence. The costs order was against the informant rather than the defendant. If a costs order were imposed upon a defendant as part of a sentence, or in association with a sentence, then fairly clearly it would be properly characterised as a “pecuniary sum” as defined in s 3 of the Sentencing Act and would fall to be enforced under Division 3 of Part 9 of that Act. Section 60(3) and s 62(2) and parts of s 70I seem to confirm that interpretation. But the situation here is different. In my view it is implicit in the notion of “sentence” both in its ordinary sense and as defined in the Sentencing Act that what is contemplated in Part 9 is enforcement of a sanction arising out of a finding of guilt of an offence.

11. It may seem an odd result that a costs order against a losing defendant should be enforced under one Act - being a pecuniary sum amounting to a penalty - whereas a costs order made against an unsuccessful informant should be dealt with under separate legislation, being the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991, but that seems to flow from the ambit and structure of the Sentencing Act provisions. I reach this position having noted that in Hurley v Shore (1992) 58 SASR 181 Perry J appears to have taken a different view. There his Honour found that the scheme available under the then provisions of the Sentencing Act,[6] dealing with a court remitting or reducing pecuniary sums, applied to a costs order made against a private complainant who had launched an unsuccessful prosecution under the Dog Control Act 1979. Emphasis was there placed on the definition of “pecuniary sum” in the Sentencing Act, which was then in similar terms. Certainly, the terms of that definition, viewed in isolation, would encompass costs orders against either party. Had the definitions of “pecuniary sum” and “sentence” in the Sentencing Act been explicitly linked, the situation would be clearer.

    [6]        The present section, which is s 70I, is in different terms.

12. Accordingly, I find that the Order for Sale was issued on the basis of incorrect information in respect of both “penalties” to which it purported to relate.  In my view that does not deprive Mr Wylie of the protection he enjoys under the legislation.[7] But it does raise the question of whether the issuing officer owed a duty of care to Mr Huggins in relation to his actions in issuing the Order and whether, if he did, that duty was breached.  Before addressing those questions I turn to examine in more detail the events which occurred when the Order was executed.  As to these events, I heard evidence from the plaintiff, his mother, Mr Wylie and the three police officers who entered the house.  The plaintiff called all those witnesses as part of his case.

    [7]        See footnote no. 3.

13. In most respects the evidence of all these witnesses was quite similar.  The essential difference related to the manner of the police intervention and in particular of the arrest of Mr Huggins.  Mr Wylie said that having removed the cords of one of the computers – the plaintiff having declined to unplug them – he started to lift one of the hard drive boxes.  He said at that point the plaintiff “grabbed” him on the hand.  Senior Constable Hill described the plaintiff as having said at this point:  “You’re not taking my property.”  By this stage a third police officer, Acting Sergeant West, had joined the group inside the house.  His role on that day was as patrol sergeant and he entered the house when one of the constables within informed him by radio that there was argument over the Order.  I found West’s evidence to be particularly impressive and I accept both his account of the events and his opinion as to what actions by police were called for in the circumstances presented to them. 

14. West said that as soon as the plaintiff grabbed Mr Wylie, Hill took hold of the plaintiff, telling him he was under arrest.  West and Hill then moved the plaintiff to a more open area of the room and told him to put his hands behind his back.  The plaintiff stiffened his arms and tried to pull away.  As a result, the officers put the plaintiff to ground, face down, and then handcuffed him.  West said that this movement was not “overly hard, but … there was enough force to get him down on the floor straight away without any other struggle”.  When the plaintiff stood up there was some blood on his shirt and nostrils.  It appears that the plaintiff’s nose made firm contact with the floor, which was carpet over cement.  It was put to West and the other police that excessive force was used and that the plaintiff could have been restrained and handcuffed without suffering injury.  Whilst the plaintiff’s concern can be understood, I consider that the police actions were reasonable.  The method employed was, I accept, in accordance with training and practice and was designed to end the incident quickly and to ensure safety to the officers.  The plaintiff was outnumbered by the police, but in such situations where there is a threat of violence it is not, in my view, appropriate to weigh too finely the required response.  I accept on the basis of the plaintiff’s evidence and the medical evidence he tendered by consent, that he suffered an injury to his nostril – probably a blood nose – and that he had pain and swelling to the right wrist later that day, no doubt caused by the handcuffs.  I accept that the plaintiff complained that the handcuffs were too tight during the journey to the police station, but was told, I find with justification, that they had to remain as they were until arrival at the cells.

15. The plaintiff also complains of police conduct towards him at the Holden Hill Police Station.  I heard evidence from Senior Constable McManus who was officer in charge of the cells at Holden Hill on 6 April 2001.  He took the plaintiff into custody.  The plaintiff was charged at 10.32 in the morning.  He complained of injuries and McManus questioned him about them and was shown them.  McManus gave evidence that in his view the plaintiff was not in need of medical attention.  The plaintiff was not granted bail until later in the day as he declined to fill out the required application for police bail.  He was released in the afternoon by the court rather than the police.  I find that the decision not to afford medical attention to the plaintiff was justifiable.  In summary, I find that the conduct of all police officers was unexceptional and in accordance with their duties and responsibilities.  I find that neither the claim in negligence nor any other claim arising out of their conduct is made out. 

1. I make a similar finding in relation to Mr Wylie’s conduct.  In my view he was entitled to rely on the assertions in the Order for Sale.  He accepted, on the basis of the plaintiff’s representations to him, that there may well be an error in respect of the matter concerning the $326, but no argument was put to him in respect of the greater amount.  In these circumstances I find that Mr Wylie was entitled to proceed as he did and any claim against the Crown arising out of his particular conduct in executing the Order must fail. 

2. I return to the claim of negligence against the Courts Administration Authority. 

3. I find that the CAA owed a duty of care to Mr Huggins at the point when consideration was given to the issue of an Order for Sale.  Counsel for the defendant did not clearly argue to the contrary, effectively putting that even if the Order was invalid the plaintiff could not succeed unless he showed misfeasance.  In that regard he purported to rely on Northern Territory of Australia v Mengel & Ors (1995) 185 CLR 307. I consider that reliance on that case was misplaced since that decision turned on the question of misfeasance. Misfeasance, breach of statutory duty and common law negligence are to be distinguished: Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 at 459 and Mengel’s case at 343-349. In Mengel’s case the trial judge had not found in the plaintiff’s favour on the issue of negligence and the issue was not pursued in the Court of Appeal.  In those circumstances the High Court was not prepared to entertain an argument that the finding of the trial judge was wrong.[8]  That decision does not preclude a suit of negligence in those or other comparable circumstances.

   [8]        Mengel’s case per joint judgment at p.349, and per Deane J at p.373.

4. Whilst I have not found any authority directly in point, statements of general principle seem to me to suggest that a duty of care would arise in these circumstances.[9] A sufficient proximity between the officer issuing the Order for Sale and the person named within it would appear to exist,[10] and the type of injury or loss sustained was foreseeable.

   [9]Selway, B., The Constitution of South Australia, The Federation Press, 1997, at paras. 14.1, 14.2 and 14.3.1 to 14.3.3.  Aronson & Whitmore, Public Torts and Contracts, 1982, pp.34-36.  Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751-752; Peabody Donation Fund Governors Trust v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210, 240; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 440-443 per Gibbs CJ; 484-485 per Brennan J and 495-498 per Deane J.

   [10]      Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609, 617.

5. I should think that duty would amount to an obligation to take reasonable care that the facts relied upon in justification of the Order were accurate, that any steps required to be taken before issue of an Order were taken and that the person against whom the Order was issued was accurately described. 

6. In his Statement of Claim the plaintiff specifically complained of negligence in issuing the Order “when no pecuniary sum was payable by the plaintiff pursuant to s 70G of the Act”. The defendant admitted that the “order for sale was issued in error” although negligence was denied. Despite this, no attempt was made at trial to call evidence to explain either of the errors – which, as has been seen, were quite different in nature – or to ward off the allegation of negligence.[11]  The plaintiff, of course, bears the onus of proof in the matter.  But it seems to me that having come to trial with the admission by the defendant that not one but both limbs of the Order were flawed and bearing in mind that the defendant chose not to call the witness or witnesses who could have explained how that occurred - who were, I expect, at least in 2001, employees of the CAA - the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in his claim of negligence. 

   [11]In Mr Speer’s letter to the plaintiff of 3 May 2001 the reference in the Order for Sale to a penalty for unlawfully being on premises imposed on 16 January 2001 is referred to as having resulted from a “clerical error”.  I see that as a proffered explanation rather than as evidence of the fact.

7. The compensable loss which accrued as a result of the CAA’s negligence is not easy to assess, partly as a result of the way in which the Statement of Claim is expressed, but also as a result of deficiencies in the evidence consequent upon the plaintiff not being represented by counsel. 

8. Certain of the heads of loss claimed are not, in my mind, made out.  Whilst it can be said that but for the issue of the Order for Sale the plaintiff would not have been arrested or have sustained injury, I consider that the substantial cause of those events was the plaintiff’s hindering of Mr Wylie and that his arrest is referable to that, rather than to the negligence of the CAA.  The same can be said of the claimed damage to the plaintiff’s glasses and watch at the time of arrest and to other claims arising from that arrest and his injuries. 

9. The plaintiff also claims for loss caused by the seizure of the covers of about 20 computer games which were seized.  He said in evidence that at the time of seizure he was negotiating to sell the games and had a purchaser at hand prepared to pay $30 for each game.  He said that amount would have yielded profit in the amount of $25 per game.  Because the covers were seized, the plaintiff said those sales were lost.  I consider that this aspect of the claim is not proved.  The prospective purchaser was not called to give evidence.  Nor was any supporting documentation produced.  The covers were returned to the plaintiff in May and it is not clear to me that the deal could not then have gone ahead.

10. The loss of the plaintiff’s computers (and the data stored within them) for the period 6 April 2001 to 15 May 2001 stands somewhat differently.  Whilst the plaintiff’s business had closed in December 2000, he was still attempting to sell equipment and finalise his business affairs, including his taxation returns, some of which were overdue.  The seizures constituted an interruption to those processes.  Part of the plaintiff’s claim is for the cost of renting computers to replace those which were seized.  Since the plaintiff did not rent any replacements, that claim must fail.  The plaintiff claims that upon the return of the computers he did not reconnect them, considering, he said, that it was up to Mr Wylie or the CAA to do so.  That tends to undermine his claim for damages for the deprivation of those computers and for their depreciation whilst they were out of his hands, because the period of about six weeks he was without them is, in effect, swamped by the long subsequent period when they have apparently stood idle.  Nevertheless I consider that some amount of damages must be fixed on account of the plaintiff being deprived of his property.  It is also necessary to compensate the plaintiff for the understandable distress which this chain of events caused to him and for the embarrassment he suffered in front of his parents and perhaps neighbours in having the sheriff’s officers and police attend at his home and in having property removed.  Having said that, I also take into account that the amount of $1,200 odd was indeed owed by the plaintiff and that in the face of his unjustified refusal to meet that debt it was likely, and it must have been obvious to the plaintiff that it was likely, that some sort of confrontation would in due course take place.  Further, I note that the amount of $1,200 odd has been “written off” by the CAA, effectively to appease the plaintiff, and apparently also by the Legal Services Commission.

11. Fixing an amount of damages in these circumstances is extremely difficult.  During his evidence and in the course of the trial generally the plaintiff demonstrated that his distress at these events was indeed genuine, but he also demonstrated a disinclination to be at all flexible or to mitigate his losses or to let go of any issue and move on.  In the end I have determined upon the sum of $6,000 as being adequate compensation for the plaintiff’s losses and stress.  That sum is at the higher end of the range I have contemplated as being appropriate.

12. Accordingly there will be judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $6,000.  I shall hear the parties as to costs.

    JUDGMENT CITATIONS
    LISTED IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE IN JUDGMENT

    1.pursuant to s 6(3) Sheriff’s Act 1978 and authorised officer pursuant to s 56A(1)(b) Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988.

    2.Contrary to s 72A Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 and s 6(2) Summary Offences Act 1953.

    3.Pursuant to s 28(2) Courts Administration Act 1993, s 72B Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988, s 12(1) Sheriff’s Act 1978 and s 65(2) Police Act 1998.

    4.     See Rule 48.04(1)(b) Supreme Court Rules.

    5.     The identity of the person who served the order has not been proved.

    6.     The present section, which is s 70I, is in different terms.

    7.     See footnote no. 3.

    8.     Mengel’s case per joint judgment at p.349, and per Deane J at p.373.

    9.Selway, B., The Constitution of South Australia, The Federation Press, 1997, at paras. 14.1, 14.2 and 14.3.1 to 14.3.3.  Aronson & Whitmore, Public Torts and Contracts, 1982, pp.34-36.  Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 751-752; Peabody Donation Fund Governors Trust v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210, 240; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 440-443 per Gibbs CJ; 484-485 per Brennan J and 495-498 per Deane J.

    10.    Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609, 617.

    11.In Mr Speer’s letter to the plaintiff of 3 May 2001 the reference in the Order for Sale to a penalty for unlawfully being on premises imposed on 16 January 2001 is referred to as having resulted from a “clerical error”.  I see that as a proffered explanation rather than as evidence of the fact.