Huggins v The State of South Australia (No 3)
[2005] SASC 225
•24 June 2005
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
HUGGINS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (NO 3)
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Anderson
24 June 2005
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - BY LEAVE OF COURT - INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
Application for leave to appeal to the Full Court from a decision of Anderson J refusing applications for extension of time to institute appeal and to set down the appeal - Held: appeal itself lacking in merit - no questions of general principle or importance - no substantial injustice to the applicant - application refused.
Supreme Court Rules 1986 R95.11(3), R94.01, referred to.
HUGGINS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (NO 3)
[2005] SASC 225Civil
ANDERSON J In this matter Mr Huggins has applied for leave to appeal to the Full Court from a judgment I gave on 13 May 2005, namely, Huggins v The State of South Australia [2005] SASC 169, dismissing his application for an extension of time both to set down his appeal, and to institute the appeal.
The history of Mr Huggins’s appeal is a long one, which I set out in some detail in my previous judgment. In summary, Vanstone J delivered judgment in this matter on 22 January 2004, and Mr Huggins sought a waiver of filing fees and an extension of time in which to appeal on 5 February 2004. The fee waiver was eventually granted and Mr Huggins filed a notice of appeal out of time on 13 April 2004. Unfortunately, the application for an extension of time in which to institute the appeal was not dealt with at that time. Mr Huggins has, however, been granted a number of extensions of time in which to set down his appeal, but does not appear to have made any progress whatsoever. He has often mentioned the fact that he intends getting legal assistance but nothing has eventuated for about 16 months.
On 13 May 2005 I held that pursuant to Rule 95.11(3), the appeal not having been set down within six months of being filed, it should lapse because no special circumstances were demonstrated. Therefore I dismissed the application for an extension of time to set down the appeal.
In the alternative, I ordered that the original application made by Mr Huggins for an extension of time in which to institute the appeal should also be dismissed. Mr Huggins now seeks leave to appeal against my decision to the Full Court pursuant to Rule 94.01 of the Supreme Court Rules.
In addition to the notice for specific directions seeking leave to appeal there are two relevant documents in relation to this application. The first is an amended notice of appeal to the Full Court which is a long and complicated document filed 13 April 2004. The second is an affidavit of Mr Huggins sworn on 25 May 2005. The affidavit is to some extent argumentative and unhelpful, and does not advance Mr Huggins’ cause for leave to appeal.
However, the proposed amended notice of appeal beggars description. It is also unhelpful and likewise does not advance his cause. It contains statements and bald assertions which are in some cases nonsensical; in other cases vexatious and frivolous, and in other cases, irrelevant to the proposed appeal. The document is a combination of a narrative of irrelevant events mixed with some unnecessary and offensive remarks. It would be impossible to summarise the document and adequately describe it and therefore all I can do is let the document speak for itself. It is for that reason that I have included it in these reasons. The proposed amended notice of appeal states:
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 The plaintiff is satisfied with attention to the Legal Acts and the final decision distinguishing between sentences and in this case third party civil debts. However he is surprised and unhappy with the amount of compensation and the decision clearing the Police and Sheriff Wylie.
1.2 The plaintiff refutes any suggestion he owed $1200.00 to the Legal Aid.
The offending party was found guilty civilly in the same Holden Hill Court that later determined he was not guilty criminally. The plaintiff was present in his shop when the customer attacked him over a refund Justice Vanstone was not. This case is a civil case and the level of proof needed for a civil case was proved against Campbell. The plaintiff reminds the court that court decisions aren't always correct so why did Justice Vanstone start off assuming $1200.00 was owed just because Magistrate Millard decided so in a criminal case? A not guilty verdict doesn't always mean criminals didn't do it!
Justice Vanstone suggested the plaintiff is partly to blame for resisting his property being stolen and resisting unlawful arrest. The plaintiff strongly refutes that this was either unlawful or unwise. The court should take particular note that when the plaintiff was arrested he was silent and standing still in the lounge of his fathers house. He was arrested by being attacked by the police and injured for nothing using excessive force as defined as more than the minimum necessary.
1.3 The plaintiff states he has every right to defend his property from illegal theft providing lethal force isn't applied. He gets this from a leaflet issued by the Attorney Generals Office regarding Home Invasions.
1.4 The plaintiff assumes he has every right to resist unlawful arrest.
1.5 Justice Vanstones judgment concluded the Courts Administration Authority (CAA) broke the law, a law they apparently didn't understand despite the fact they were the ones responsible for administering it.
It follows the Sheriff and Police shouldn’t have raided the plaintiff.
1.6 It's interesting to note the CAA was aware it's "inappropriate" to use legislation designed for criminals on civil defaulters. But "not inappropriate" to change an earlier admission in the letter of 3rd May 2001 regarding liability only 2 business days before trial after 2 ½ years. The plaintiff had to rethink his entire case and get more legal advice on issues previously not in contention. Why didn't Justice Vanstone criticise the CAA?
1.7 The plaintiff expected not to be out of pocket at all for events he didn't start. The costs order didn't make the CAA pay his legal bills and he wants this changed. If any criticism of his actions is to be made why wasn't he trained at school on how to act when government agencies raid him by accident?
2 4-DAY TRIAL
2.1 When the trial began Justice Vanstone made it clear to both parties she wouldn't sit on Friday the 5th trial day and so there were 4 days and 4 days only to squash the trial into. This put pressure on the plaintiff to limit evidence and be brief. The onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case any limitation though applicable to both parties is more prejudicial to the plaintiff than the defence surely this time limiting is wrong!
2.2 The plaintiff prepared typed notes to address the court but was constantly stopped and chopped I.e. told to raise some issues later and some were dismissed without debate. For example the list of errors and departures from the Fines Payment Leaflets was never aired. The plaintiff wonders why the errors could not be put on the public record in at least the hope future activity by the FPU would comply with stated leaflet practices.
What is the point of leaflets if they don’t mean anything? If the government puts out leaflets and the public rely on them they shouldn’t be prejudiced later in court.
2.3 The plaintiff and indeed the defence have a right to any length of trial so long as relevant issues are discussed. At a preliminary (interlocutory) hearing master Bowen Pain asked the parties how long they estimated the trial would take and the defence and master determined 4 days.
2.4 The Plaintiff isn't a lawyer and has no real experience in these matters. He had no idea what the defence might say especially as they keep u turning. So he largely kept out of the "length of trial debate" and he would be largely ignored anyway.
2.5 Now master Bowen Pain didn't say if 4 days is estimated the trial is limited to 4 days! So why did justice Vanstone threaten the 4 day time limit? Surely the parties are entitled to take whatever time is necessary and must be prepared to pay costs for any time used. Doctors presumably estimate surgery times would they walk away from patients taking to long to deliver a baby or half way through an operation? I think not. Do maintenance engineers stop working on repairing an Aeroplane when the time they scheduled is up? What difference is there where court trials are concerned?
3 INADEQUATE COMPENSATION
3.1 The compensation is inadequate and should be increased. It barely covers losses and outgoing unnecessarily taxed to the plaintiff. Considering the plaintiff was arrested, injured, publicly disgraced, slandered and put in jail one expects more than $6000.00 for stress and aggravation alone.
3.2 The 4 computers seized by the sheriff contained most of his business taxation data and there was severe disruption to processing his taxation, which on a nightly basis was being done. In fact thousands of hours of work was in the computer files. The value of this data and software far outweighs that of the computers. It's the plaintiffs understanding that intellectual property such as client files can't be sold for fines so why can it be held hostage? The FPU should be ashamed of its policy of hostaging personal items and made to desist from using this tactic.
3.3 The hiatus will mean the plaintiff is unfamiliar with the taxation files and it will take much longer to again get going with them. To expand upon this he had to double check the accounts for everything because an employee forged a cheque and this were only discovered in the final months of trading. It is possible other irregularities might come to light. It was discovered the employee abused the credit cards as well.
3.4 The plaintiff had spreadsheets of every account and was also checking up on protection he suspected was never paid. [Protection is paid by wholesalers on behalf of distributor's when prices of in this case video games is cut drastically because of slowdown in sales or release of updated versions. It encourages retailers to stock items they might otherwise refuse.] He doesn't know where he was up to and will have to start over because of the interruption caused by the theft of his property. The checking involves calling out numbers from spreadsheets with family members who for obvious reasons don't like this activity.
3.5 The Statement of Claim appears to be ignored when compensation was awarded to the plaintiff. Some elements were not accepted or given credence. Every element of claim should be listed as either compensated or otherwise, and preferably to what measure.
3.6 The Statement of claim was not discussed properly and the plaintiff was made to detail his losses verbally without reading the prepared schedule that he relied on. Justice Vanstone failed to compensate for many items. She also didn't elucidate amounts for each head of damage.
3.7 It seems Justice Vanstone blames the plaintiff for some of his losses. These losses would never be losses if the CAA knew the law it was administering and if the Police and Sheriff stayed home. It seems a bit rich to expect the plaintiff to act in an exemplary fashion after the snafu by the CAA, FPU, Sheriff and Police. If the public who aren't trained in law are expected to act exemplary then how about teaching at least basic law in school? The plaintiff was never advised how to act when being home invaded. So why complain about his actions? Actions he should never have to take?
4 RE-ENACTMENT OF ARREST PROCEDURE AND EXCESSIVE FORCE
4.1 The plaintiff feels the issue of police using excessive force was not conducted properly. It was the second of only 2 issues determined by the court. I.e. (A) was the raid legal (answer no) and (B) was excessive force used, defined as more than the minimum necessary.
4.2 The amount of court time spent on issue (B) was about only an hour or so with the officer in question Mr West in the witness box.
The plaintiff feels the issue is simple. The police should support their assertions they acted properly with some evidence. More than just the opinion of the officer in the hot seat (West).
4.3 Clearly if it’s in the manual lets see the manual (Police General Duties Manual). If it’s in the training where is the corroborating evidence from the instructor? Or from a superior?
The lack of witnesses supporting Officer West’s assertion leads the plaintiff to conclude any testimony would be prejudicial to the defence.
4.4 The plaintiff suggested a re‑enactment to compare the level of threat posed by the slight of build non‑struggling plaintiff to the 3 police in the room (with 2 more police outside in reserve). This was refused for unaccounted reasons. It would only take about 5 minutes. Discussion of the re‑enactment would not take long so why could this evidence not be presented?
4.5 Is it usual court practice to hide and ignore evidence? The onus of proof is on the plaintiff to make his case but he can't do that if he isn't given some leeway to explore in this case more fully what the police point of view is. He had no idea what the defence to using excessive force would be at trial as the paper defence was just complete denial.
4.6 If the re-enactment took place it would show what transpired! It should exonerate the police of they and Justice Vanstone are correct so why hide the truth?
The plaintiff feels the 4 day time problem wasn't the cause of no re-enactment but that Justice Vanstone looked upon the police as victims of the wrongly issued warrant and wasn't interested in getting to the bottom of the excessive force issue. But that's her job to either exonerate or convict the police, that is what the plaintiff paid for. What is the reason for not following up with a re‑enactment? Because Justice Vanstone already made her mind up?
4.7 One reason attention is drawn to the time devoted to exploring this issue is to suggest it wasn't explored properly. Another is that it appears the plaintiff wasn't awarded his legal costs because the excessive force issue wasn't proved beyond reasonable doubt. Yet the legal costs were mostly incurred establishing if the raid was legal and what losses should be compensated. The costing should be pro‑rated to the efforts expended on each issue. No legal costs were awarded to the plaintiff only some "outgoings."
Through no fault of his own the plaintiff is several thousand dollars out of pocket.
4.8 The plaintiff made serious allegations about the police who shouldn't have even been there in the first instance who used more force than the minimum necessary to arrest the plaintiff. So why wasn't this explored seriously? How could an innocent member of the public become injured and put in jail to suffer passive smoking for nothing?
4.9 Justice Vanstone appeared to the plaintiff to have made her mind up right at the start that the police acted in "good faith" and had "reasonable suspicion" and did what they had to. She assumed they are professional and acted accordingly. But she wasn't present at the arrest, she is presumably not an ex police officer and presumably knew nothing of police methods. Justice Vanstone assumed the police actions were correct and just took the word of the officer in charge (West).
All direct witnesses could be assumed to have bias because of vested interest so what should be looked for is evidence.
4.10 The issue of professionalism by the police was disallowed debate as evidenced by not discussing the custodial conditions at the police holding cells in relation to occupational health and safety as evidenced by the passive smoking regime. If the police can't get health and safety right as a force one can't expect an individual officer to act in an exemplary manner!
4.11 Because the plaintiff wasn't a lawyer he should be allowed to follow a plan of attack, which he thought prudent and if irrelevant then that testimony could be ignored.
4.12 If it could be established the Police Department has illegal management practices then any assumption along the lines "if it's in the training, if its procedure" its right, is clearly dubious. Yet this was the line of reasoning for the defence. West also said he wanted to get the arrest over with quick to avoid risk to himself and his officers.
4.13 West could have just shot the plaintiff to reduce his risk. Had he done that most people would think he used excessive force. Considering he was aware Sheriff Wylie had a defective Warrant and as it turned out he shouldn't be there he used poor judgement and to say the least was expedient. The plaintiff should not get injured by being arrested (for nothing) by 3 big fat police with guns. He did, it isn't right! He wants justice!
4.14 The onus of proof is for the plaintiff to prove in this case that the force applied was excessive. That's to say more than needed to accomplish the task. The Police should be required to apologise and pay compensation for using excessive force for injuring a silent non‑struggling stationary victim the plaintiff. Whom did the police struggle with??
4.15 There is a distinction between being struggled with and doing the struggling. Justice Vanstone refused to allow a re‑enactment of the arrest procedure to balance the alleged threat to the 3 officers whom weren't even supposed to be there in the first instance and the level of damage that could result in their tripping procedure to the plaintiff.
4.16 Instead she relied upon the flawed ideology that "if its Police procedure the police are trained in then it's ok to use training methods ad hock without regard to the circumstances." The operations manual states arrest is the last resort yet it was the first option attempted by the police.
4.17 Only a re‑enactment could give insight to the respective balance of risk of risk posed to the police and the plaintiff.
4.18 Justice Vanstone took off the cuff word of Police Officer West without him providing any corroborating evidence. Such as quoting the relevant section of the police procedures manual or calling even one witness to support his assertion he was changed in the tripping manoeuvre used on the plaintiff.
5 SPEED OF RELIEF
5.1 The Courts Administration Authority (CAA) was aware only 4 days after the raid of 6th April 2001 on the 10th April 2001 that problems existed. As evidenced by the revoking and subsequent invoking of one of the fines. Only 2 weeks later the Sheriff was warned to make computer notes of his activities it's tardy and shameful for the CAA to give fine defaulters 14 days to appeal but take 4 weeks to process the plaintiff's appeal especially knowing their was substance to the complaint.
5.2 The Fines Payment Unit (FPU) should have urgently investigated the validity of the Warrant of Seizure once even one error is detected. Then the plaintiff should be advised immediately via phone that he was in the clear.
5.3 When Sheriff Wylie attended the plaintiff he was made aware of the date's problem and was informed the plaintiff had other paperwork indicating other errors. However it seemed to the plaintiff he took the view that it's for him to execute the order and for the plaintiff to appeal to the FPU staff to regain his property. Sheriff Wylie seemed uninterested in discussing the issue with the plaintiff.
5.4 Sheriff Wylie didn't make it clear that he was only taking $1200.00 worth of goods instead of the $1595.00 that he originally wanted.
Had the sheriff made an adjustment the plaintiff expects at least an initialled change on the plaintiff’s copy of the order. The plaintiff is staggered the court isn’t up in arms at this splitting of defective warrants! At the ease to which erroneous paperwork is used.
5.5 Because the plaintiff had already raised the issue of treating an Order for Costs as a Fine with the apparent manager of the FPU he sees no point in accepting the sheriff taking his property, none.
5.6 The CAA presumably got legal advice and eventually wrote a letter some 4 weeks after the raid that the plaintiff didn't get for a week. Effectively the CAA failed to mitigate the obvious stress anxiety that would be felt by anyone in the plaintiff's position. That's to say expecting a prison sentence for resisting arrest and hindering the Sheriffs officer and fearing the loss of his computers and computer records.
5.7 The Home Invasion by the Sheriff and Police at the behest of the FPU was serious but not serious enough to warrant informing the plaintiff immediately of his pending reversal of fortune. Where is the criticism of this negligence?
6 DENIED WITNESSES
6.1 The plaintiff was denied (by Justice Vanstone) calling several witnesses. He suggests they could have been called and if the evidence wasn't relevant it could be ignored. The plaintiff feels prejudiced because evidence he thought relevant was denied.
6.2 For example Mr Hegarty the plaintiff’s father's lawyer used the charges of Hindering the Sheriff and Resisting Arrest to slander the plaintiff despite the fact he already knew they were withdrawn. Obviously this was damaging and hurtful to the plaintiff. Despite protest by the plaintiff Justice Vanstone sent Mr Hegarty packing without any explanation.
The plaintiff would very much like to know why it apparently isn’t slander to accuse someone in a public place of being charged with a criminal offence when the orator is already aware the charges were wrongly drawn and were revoked?
6.3 The Holden Hill Courts Bail Magistrate refused even being summonsed however the plaintiff wanted to discuss why the bail conditions he wanted were initially refused. Surely he has the right to negotiate bail conditions affecting him. How fair is it for the plaintiff to never be able to get to the bottom of an issue? The Courts Charter says the courts are fair, how so if everyone has immunity and witnesses are constantly denied?
6.4 The plaintiff wanted to call the Police Occupational Health and Safety Officer in relation to illegal Jail conditions this was denied. Obviously the plaintiff was compensated on the basis that police holding cells and fingerprinting process was textbook correct. He is unsure if Justice Vanstone is familiar with jail conditions and would prefer to give insight as to these. He wanted to get to the bottom of the Passive Smoking debate and why his shoelaces and spectacles were forcibly removed for safety reasons and then he was told to run down the corridor to the cells flip flopping without his glasses.
6.5 The Plaintiff wrote to the Police Complaints Authority about this issue but it was ignored. The Authority refused to respond after additional complaints Justice Vanstone refused to hear this witness (Anthony Wainwright).
What is the point of a Police Complaints Authority that selectively responds to complaints?
7 SPLITTING WARRANTS
7.1 The issue of defective Warrants was still unresolved in Justice Vanstones Judgement. Warrants being "truncated" or "split", that's to say split whereby apparent erroneous bits are ignored and apparent good bits are enforced should be resolved.
The plaintiff is of the opinion this practice is unlawful and he is entitled to a fully valid Warrant without obvious errors of material consequence such as amounts and dates, at least after pointing out serious defects to FPU staff such as Sheriff Wylie.
8 SHERIFF WYLIE EXCEEDING AUTHORITY
8.1 The issue of whether the sheriff exceeded his authority in proceeding with a defective warrant was not specifically elucidated in Justice Vanstones Judgement. It was a central complaint of the plaintiff. Again the plaintiff was unable to determine policy from the FPU regarding this issue. Will the Full Court comment?
9 EXCLUDED EVIDENCE OF ERRORS BY FPU
9.1 The exclusion of evidence offered by the plaintiff of errors made by the FPU should be incorporated into evidence (and into the historical record) as it relates to the issue of malfeasance, negligence, and unprofessional conduct. During trial this was refused. The fines Payment Unit made about 20 errors.
9.2 It seems Justice Vanstone is set on berating the plaintiff over his apparent attitude and lack of preparedness to mitigate his losses yet unwilling to castigate the injuring party who should have the proper grasp of the laws they are administrating. The FPU failed to mitigate stress and anxiety felt by the plaintiff at being unlawfully arrested, injured and put in jail by simply phoning him as soon as it was realised the raid was an error.
9.3 If the plaintiff is to be criticised for not allowing his property to be seized and then debating the point later it's appropriate to look at why he formed the attitude of refusing this strategy. Looking at the large number of errors by the FPU he would be foolish to hope he could get things sorted in the mistake machine called the FPU. Especially after he spoke to an apparent manager of that section prior to the raid about the treating of Orders for Costs as fines. Just whom should he talk to? Given the CAA, their lawyers and their insurers lawyers got it wrong what would this have accomplished?
9.4 The plaintiff wished to question the currant manager of the FPU Mr Marc Marshal in relation to the many errors (approximately 20 odd) of the FPU but this was denied.
10 IGNORING LEAFLETS AND CHARTERS
10.1 The plaintiff collected and studied several Leaflets from the FPU and the Courts Charter, which claimed the courts are consistent and fair.
The FPU was inconsistently attempting to make a precedent and targeting the plaintiff treating him differently to other apparent fine defaulters in difference to the spirit and wording of the charter.
10.2 Justice Vanstone surprised the plaintiff by saying only law will determine her verdict and Leaflets, Charters and verbal admissions or letters such as the one from the previous manager of the CAA’s FPU Robert Speer which said the plaintiffs property was seized in error were ignored.
10.3 Clearly the CAA the FPU staff and the public should abide by the leaflets handed out at the FPU. Otherwise the plaintiff would like to know why print them if what they say isn't correct or to be followed?
If the Supreme Court, the CAA and FPU won’t abide by Letters and Leaflets why should the public?
10.4 The CAA and FPU should especially after several doses of legal advice know it's own policy and act in accord with the Acts they apply, they did not.
10.5 Although it made no difference to the final outcome the sole reliance on Acts of law is inappropriate as other reasons might apply to determine the appropriateness of policy application. There can be no justice if laws are absolute. Laws can't anticipate every situation so common sense must prevail in the manner of their application.
11 ISSUE OF REVERSING ADMISSIONS AD HOC
11.1 Once the CAA put in writing an admission of error it's an inappropriate stunt to seek to unwind that omission. Justice Vanstone refused to allow the change of defence only on the basis of prejudicing the plaintiff because it was done 2 business days before trial when 2 ½ years had passed.
11.2 The issue of reversing policy ad hoc should be resolved. The government is in a privileged position because of the many reasons listed below and should act in a more responsible and ethical manner than demonstrated by recent events. Such as (A) not understanding Acts it wrote and administers, (B) home invading the plaintiff in error, (C) failing to mitigate his stress as early as possible, (D) by revoking previous admissions 2 business days before trial.
PRIVILEGED GOVERNMENT
(1) The government makes the laws.
(2) The government administers and implements policy regarding laws.
(3) The government can change laws and their application and interpretation by either Parliament or its (independent) Courts.
(4) The government has armies of legal experts who have access to details documents and advice that the public don't.
(5) The government could avoid litigation by being more willing to admit liability and be more candid about issues of policy as distinct from law and be more flexible in making its officers apologise for errors and be accountable ending the immunities.
(6) The government could admit more readily it broke the law where clearly government handouts conflict with the Insurance (SAICORP) advice.
(7) The government has nothing to loose by comparison with members of the public who may become bankrupted because of government negligence but the reverse won't happen. That's to say the balance of risk reward is biased against the public.
12 “DON’T ATTEND APPEAL HEARING”
12.1 The plaintiff' was advised by the CAA in the letter of 3rd May 2001 not to attend the Appeal hearing at which time maybe if he did this whole sorry episode would have been sorted years earlier.
13 THE PLAINTIFF FOLLOWED APPROPRIATE CHANNELS
13.1 The plaintiff followed procedures by debating the appropriateness of enforcing the order for costs as a fine with the FPU counter staff and the apparent manager of that unit. He collected, kept and read court Leaflets issued by the FPU.
13.2 He challenged the warrant at the door on the day of the illegal home invasion by the Sheriff and Police. He was able to demonstrate significant problems with the warrant but instead of going away and returning with a corrected warrant the raiders continued anyway and weren't interested in listening.
13.3 The plaintiff complained to The Police Complaints Authority but was fobbed off. He complained to his MP Francis Bedford and to the Adelaide Magistrates Court via a section 70G. He thought things would be fixed and didn't go to the hearing, as the manager of the FPU deemed this unnecessary. The plaintiff went to Legal Aid who weren't much help.
13.4 He went to lawyers who advised him to obtain a Barristers opinion on the amount of compensation to seek. A year went by and the first Barrister failed to form any opinion. The brief was sent to a second who again failed to give any opinion. The plaintiff then ran‑out of money and never got any advice on the amount of compensation he should request.
13.5 He was advised in the Adelaide Magistrates Court to pay $10.00 for a Final Notice of Claim, which he did before he put in the summons, the summons cost $503.00 was awarded so why didn’t he get the $10.00 awarded as well?
13.6 Begrudgingly $5000.00 compensation was offered by the CAA to settle the dispute but without an admission they broke the law or any admission the police did anything wrong.
13.7 For reasons unknown to the plaintiff Justice Vanstone refused costs of the $10.00 or the costs of Discovery in the District Court on the apparent basis they were in other courts. The plaintiff feels he acted properly and should get his costs to include all expenses including his lawyer's fees. Which did Justice Vanstone refuse.
14 EPA RAID TO BE READMITTED
14.1 In earlier hearings the issue of a mistaken raid by the EPA was dismissed and the plaintiff requests it be readmitted to trial.
15 HEADS OF DAMAGE NOT OUTLINED
15.1 Justice Vanstones verdict is not specific the separate heads of damages should be delineated so the plaintiff is aware which are compensated and which aren’t and to what measure.
16 FAILURE TO DISCLOSE COMPUTER RECORDS
16.1 The CAA failed to disclose computer records of the Fines Payment Unit prior to trial. The plaintiff assumes this should be done in "DISCLOSURE". These were only brought in after accidentally raising comment of their existence. Discussion of these was stopped short after errors previously unknown to the plaintiff kept cropping up indicating Mr Mark Marshal the current Manager of the FPU had no idea what was going on with the running of his department or treatment of the plaintiff.
16.2 For example revocation of one of the fines on the 10th April 2001 without written complaint by the plaintiff at that stage and the mysterious change of heart by invoking it later in the day. No mention was made as to whom or why this occurred but it was acknowledged this was an error. The plaintiff wonders why there isn't a protocol requiring staff record who and why entries are made.
17 MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS ON JUDGMENT
17.1 In reference to paragraph 2 the plaintiff couldn't back up 4 computers with data let alone include the software as this would take a couple of days.
17.2 Again in reference to paragraph 2 the plaintiffs efforts at resisting arrest was only to refuse to put his hands behind his back. As he was innocent surely he has every right to choose this course of action.
17.3 Comment is made of confidence in Police Officer West in paragraph 20 yet he and 2 other officers all testified the same "the plaintiff pushed Sheriff Wylie yet Sheriff Wylie denied this and was adamant. The plaintiff finds this collusion between officers undermines their reliability as witnesses yet Justice Vanstone seemed to overlook this and seemed to the plaintiff to regard the CAA, Sheriff and Police, as victims.
17.4 In paragraph 6 the court claims the letter from Mr Speer isn't binding on the court, which the plaintiff understands, but he thinks it should be binding on the CAA. No discussion or explanation of this was made.
17.5 The plaintiffs name and DOB are incorrect it should be 31 March 1956 and Paul Donavon Huggins.
17.6 In paragraph 10 Justice Vanstone understands the frustration of interruptions to business but not frustration of wasting effort on this trial as evidenced by not compensating for the plaintiffs loss time preparing legal papers and attending trial.
17.6 In fairness to Mr Justin Centophanti who did an armed robbery of the plaintiffs shop. The plaintiff wishes to clarify he was charged with armed robbery of several shops and picked out of photos shown to the plaintiff.
17.7 However later the police separated the plaintiffs shop robbery and declined to prosecute, as it would make no difference to Centophanti's sentence and questions were raised over the plaintiffs credibility as a witness after he attacked Centaphanti's lawyer's windows.
17.8 The plaintiff did this because Ey refused to pay compensation for his staff making representations to the Magistrates Court that caused another non‑appearance by Centaphanti. Apparently they got mixed up and thought it was a police hearing (criminal). The plaintiff went to several lawyers to sue Mr Ey but they said legally nothing could be done, as there was no contract between with the plaintiff.
17.9 Centophanti was sentenced to 6 years for other shop robberies. Centophanti was convicted civilly of the plaintiffs shop and had a habit of not attending hearings.
17.8 Paragraph 31 indicates certain heads of loss were not made out but the plaintiff doesn't know which ones. The plaintiff understands the difficulty in making payments for losses of this kind but feels the damages bit was rushed through and tacked on the end.
17.9 Paragraph 31 incredibly blames the plaintiff for resisting arrest and hindering the sheriff even though those involved shouldn't be there. The plaintiff refutes the logic of Justice Vanstone who assumes the following.
(A) The plaintiff is trained in how to act in such a situation.
(B) The plaintiff has stores of spare cash just in case the police EPA or whomever wants to mess with his stuff.
(C)If he followed her presumed advice to allow the seizure unhindered all would be sorted out in the appeal hearing. No such confidence of this and if you want to know why look at the long list of errors and departures made by the CAA from the procedures they mandate they should follow but didn't.
17.10 The plaintiff didn't start this mess and was proved right in the end so how about proper compensation? If the CAA or Justice Vanstone don't like the way he responds when stirred up don't stir him up.
17.11 In paragraph 32 Justice Vanstone apparently refused to pay compensation for the lost sales of the games. After the plaintiff closed his business he wanted to get rid of unsold games and sold fittings to a couple of businesses starting up that agreed to sell the remaining stock on consignment. During the raid one of these persons phoned up the plaintiff about the stock and the deals were never consummated.
17.12 Had the raid never happened the stock would be consigned away and instead of filling up a filing cabinet in a spare room the plaintiff would have gotten say $30.00 per game of which say $5.00 would go to the shop keeper who was chasing the plaintiff for stock he didn't have to pay for to make his undercapitalised shop look good. The distress caused to the plaintiff and the expectation it would get sorted in a couple more months is the reason these deals were never done.
17.13 Paragraph 34 misses the point the plaintiff feels the CAA rented his computers and the data and the software. He thinks the value at say historical cost could be applied and rented at say 7% PA pro‑rata for 6 weeks?
17.14 Paragraph 34 intimates but this is a guess Justice Vanstone thinks the $1200.00 was owed. The plaintiff refutes this.
The plaintiff did not owe $1200.00 to Legal Aid!!!
17.15 In any case the dispute is with Legal Aid not Justice Vanstone. The plaintiff is worried his compensation was ameliorated by $1200.00.
18 INADEQUATE COSTS ORDER
18.1 Costs were awarded on the 20th February 2004 in the amount of $1020.00 in relation to out of pocket expenses.
18.2 One out of pocket expense was the plaintiffs time in attending hearings meeting with lawyers discussing issues with the defendant's council and preparing documents. Not to mention the 4‑day trial. If the plaintiff who was self representing at court posted a letter it isn't considered if the defendant's secretary posts a letter it's a valid expense. In each case neither is a lawyer.
18.3 For some reason a self represented plaintiff is prejudiced by the rules of the court. This contrasts with the Courts Charter, which quotes the courts, will be "consistent and fair." How fair is this and why does it conflict with the charter?
18.4 Today social justice is at the forefront in recognising the value of unpaid work by for instance mother's, wives and people who aren't paid wages but contribute to family assets and GDP. When people are divorced in the Family Court this unpaid work is valued. So why isn't the plaintiff's time valued in another Court the Supreme Court?
18.5 Authorities given to the plaintiff by the defendant's council suggest the problem of measuring work by non‑lawyers and assessing it qualitatively is one issue. Well the plaintiff sees the point. However points out courts pay witness fees without regard to individual effort or qualification by setting an arbitrary schedule of fees. Why isn't this done in his case?
18.6 This is to cover in some measure loss of work time or even unemployed time.
The work of non-lawyers has some value higher than zero, which should be paid by a schedule of some sort, rather than ignoring self represented efforts without which no one would have a job.
18.7 The options are to settle disputes in the courts or the streets and the latter is frowned upon as it leads to anarchy. If victims are still out of pocket even after they win why should they bother with going to court?
18.8 The other reason self represented parties are despised appears that cases would take longer and rely more heavily on court staff.
18.9 The extra work by court staff isn't unpaid so what's the fuss about? Court have ruled for centuries that self‑representation is permissible if for no other reason than parties can't always afford representation. If the rule of law is becoming so complex that only lawyers and justices can understand it how is the public expected to obey it? Isn't the real problem the every increasing complexity of the law rather than ever increasing numbers of self-representing litigants.
18.10 What has the number of self represented people in other cases got to do with this plaintiff's case and his right to expect compensation for his wasted time? In his case the law was not understood by the CAA their lawyers or their insurance lawyers yet the principle that civil debts shouldn't be enforced using punitive legislation designed for criminal fine defaulters was the basis of opinion by the plaintiff and was upheld by Justice Vanstone.
19 RECORDS OF INTERVIEW
19.1 The Police and courts Administration Authority illegally arrested the plaintiff and subsequently collected records concerning the plaintiff that they presumably aren't going to use. They both refused to destroy these records apart from the Police Photographs despite both written and oral requests from the plaintiff. The plaintiff wants the court to order the destruction of these records.
19.2 The apparent reason the documents and computer records can't be destroyed is no act specifically mandates it. Photographs are mentioned in the Police Act and that's why they were deleted. Out of common courtesy one expects especially after a specific request the police and CAA would get rid of records collected illegally by mistake, but no.
The appellant seeks the following orders on the appeal:
1 The compensation is inadequate and should be increased.
2 The issue of defective Warrants wasn't resolved in Justice Vanstones Judgement and the plaintiff requests a decision on this (splitting warrants concept).
3 The issue of whether the sheriff exceeded his authority in proceeding with a defective warrant was not stated in Justice Vanstones Judgement. It was a central complaint of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was unable to determine policy from the FPU regarding this issue.
4 Sheriff Wylie should apologise and tasked for enforcing an obviously flawed warrant.
5 The excluded evidence offered by the plaintiff of errors made by the Fines Payment Unit should be incorporated into evidence as it relates to the issue of malfeasance, negligence, and unprofessional conduct of the FPU. During trial this was refused.
6 The excluded witnesses should be called to give evidence on issues the plaintiff wanted to raise with the court in particular Mr Hegarty in relation to slandering the plaintiff. The Police Occupational Health and Safety officer in relation to the police custodial policies being breached. The Bail Magistrate for refusing to vary bail as was eventually done.
7 The Police should be required to apologise and pay compensation for using excessive force in injuring a silent non‑struggling stationary victim the plaintiff. The plaintiff suggests a re‑inactment. He also wants proof or evidence other than a verbal by Officer West.
7 The issue of the erroneous raid by the EPA to be readmitted to trial.
8 Heads of damages to be outlined so the plaintiff is aware which are compensated and which aren't and to what measure.
9 The erroneously collected files collected by the police should be removed and given to the plaintiff for destruction.
10 All costs be awarded to the plaintiff.
Dated the 31st day of March 2004
[signed by Mr Huggins]
Appellant /
Respondent
In this document Mr Huggins fails to distil any meaningful grounds of appeal and, in my view, it serves to illustrate that any proposed appeal is entirely without merit. There are on the face of it no questions of general principle or importance involved, and no substantial injustice to Mr Huggins if the decision stands. Accordingly, leave is refused.
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