SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Hudson v Rammas Pty Limited [2002] QSC 172
PARTIES:
RALPH JOSEPH HUDSON
(applicant plaintiff)
v
RAMMAS PTY LIMITED
(respondent defendant)FILE NO/s
SC No 911 of 2002
Application for Extension of Time
PROCEEDING:
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
12 June 2002
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
3 June 2002
JUDGE:
de Jersey CJ
ORDER:
The application is refused, with costs to be assessed.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – CONTRACTS, TORTS AND PERONAL ACTIONS - PERSONAL INJURY CASES where proceedings commenced after expiration of the limitations period – where proceedings under WorkCover Queensland Act initially commenced, then ceased – where applicant sought to extend the period within which he could sue for damages and re-open proceedings under the Act.
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 31
WorkCover Queensland Act 1996 (Qld) s 280, s 305
Ipswich City Council v Smith (1997) QCA 263, applied
Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Limited [1988] 2 Qd R 325, applied
Peabody Resources Limited v Norton (Appeal No 200 of 1994, judgment delivered 16 June 1995, applied
Taggart v Workers’ Compensation Board of Queensland [1983] 2 Qd R 19, appliedCOUNSEL:
K Boulton for the applicant
G Mullins for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Maurice Blackburn & Cashman for the applicant
Bradley & Co for the respondent
The applicant seeks an order under s 31 of the Limitations of Actions Act 1974 extending the period within which he might sue for damages for the alleged negligence of his former employer, the respondent, in respect of injuries he sustained on 4 December 1997 in the course of his employment. The applicant commenced the relevant proceedings on 29 January 2002. The statutory limitation period expired on 4 December 2000.
In para 43 of his affidavit filed on 29 January 2002, the applicant identified the “material fact of a decisive character” on which he relies under s 31(2) as “that (he) would not be able to return to truck driving” because of prescribed narcotic medication, the source of that advice, given in April 2001, being his general practitioner Dr Towner. The applicant consulted a solicitor in relation to a possible claim on 18 May 2001.
The applicant would contend that because that fact was not within his means of knowledge until a date “after the commencement of the year next preceding the expiration of the period of limitation for the action” (s 31(2)(a)), that is, after 4 December 1999, the court may order that the period of limitation be “extended so that it expires at the end of one year after that date”; in other words, in April 2002, which would authorise the proceedings in fact commenced on 29 January 2002.
The respondent conceded that if such an extension is granted, then the applicant should be granted leave, under s 305 of the WorkCover Queensland Act 1996, to start proceedings for damages despite non-compliance with s 280 of that Act. The respondent also conceded “there is evidence to establish the right of action…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Hudson v Rammas Pty Limited and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2002] QSC 172
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and case law to determine the applicability of the limitation period in this context. It held that the statutory provisions did not provide a mechanism for extending the limitation period once it had expired. The court further found that the recommencement of proceedings under the Act did not constitute a fresh cause of action that would allow Hudson to bypass the expired limitation period. The decision was based on the principle that the statutory provisions should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the common law rules regarding limitation periods in personal injury cases.
Given the statutory interpretation and the principle of limitation periods, the court refused Hudson's application. The court determined that the limitation period had expired, and the statutory provisions did not provide a mechanism to extend it. The application was dismissed with costs to be assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
The application is refused, with costs to be assessed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.