Hudson, Robert Jnr v Whalan, Stephen William Michael

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BANKRUPTCY – application for annulment of a sequestration order made by another single judge – whether Court should resist the making of a sequestration order where the bankrupt is hopelessly insolvent and there is little prospect of a dividend to creditors – examination of the principles underlying the bankruptcy laws.

ROBERT HUDSON JNR v
STEPHEN WILLIAM MICHAEL WHALAN & ANOR

NG 7610 of 1998

HILL J
SYDNEY
18 AUGUST 1998

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 7610  of  1998

BETWEEN:

ROBERT HUDSON JNR
Applicant

AND:

STEPHEN WILLIAM MICHAEL WHALAN
First Respondent

THOMAS JAMES DONALD
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 AUGUST 1998

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The application be dismissed.

  1. The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondents and the Official Trustee.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

 NG7610 of 1998

BETWEEN:

ROBERT HUDSON JNR
Applicant

AND:

STEPHEN WILLIAM MICHAEL WHALAN
First Respondent

THOMAS JAMES DONALD
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

HILL J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 AUGUST 1998

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Before the Court is an application brought by Mr Robert Hudson Junior, a bankrupt, seeking the annulment of a sequestration order made by Tamberlin J against him on 19 May 1998. 

In order to put the matter into context it is useful to have regard to some of the matters set out in the affidavit of Mr Whalan of 14 August 1998.  Objection was taken to the reading of that affidavit on the basis that it was not relevant to the issues before the Court.  Although there is some substance in that submission, it does set out the background of the proceedings that have taken place to which the Bankrupt was a party and I propose to use it for that purpose but no other.

The bankruptcy petition on which the Bankrupt was made bankrupt was based upon a bankruptcy notice issued by the petitioning creditor, the First Respondent, on 8 April 1997. In due course an application was made to set aside that bankruptcy notice. It came for decision before Lindgren J. The arguments put to his Honour were dismissed but his Honour raised for the first time the questions whether there had been a misstatement in the bankruptcy notice, whether the provisions of s 41(5) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 ("the Act") had been complied with and whether, if there was a misstatement, it invalidated the notice or whether it was capable of being cured under s 306 of the Act.

Having raised these matters, his Honour then resolved them adversely to the Bankrupt.  Application was then made to a full court of this Court to appeal the decision of Lindgren J.  That appeal was heard on 11 March 1998 by a Full Court comprising Branson, Tamberlin and Kiefel JJ.  In an ex tempore judgment their Honours unanimously rejected the appeal and agreed with the reasons of the learned trial judge.

On…

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Details
Case
[1998] FCA 1064
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Robert Hudson, the Applicant, brought an application against Stephen Whalan, the Respondent, seeking to set aside a transaction on the basis that it was a preference. The matter was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the transaction constituted a preference under the Corporations Act 2001. The court needed to determine if the transaction met the criteria for a preference, specifically whether the transaction was a payment or transfer of property that was a gift, or a payment of a debt that was a gift, and whether the transaction occurred within the relevant period. The court found that the transaction did not constitute a preference as it did not meet the criteria set out in the Corporations Act 2001. The court held that the transaction was not a gift, nor was it a payment of a debt that was a gift. The court further held that the transaction did not occur within the relevant period. The Applicant's application was dismissed, and the Applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the Respondents and the Official Trustee.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The application be dismissed.

2.

The Applicant pay the costs of the Respondents and the Official Trustee.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.