CITATION: Huckel v Norris [2001] NSWCA 301 FILE NUMBER(S): CA 40541/00 HEARING DATE(S): 30 August 2001 JUDGMENT DATE:
11 September 2001PARTIES :
Jaycen Graeme Huckel - Appellant
Karla Maree Norris - RespondentJUDGMENT OF: Priestley JA at 1; Meagher JA at 2; Stein JA at 3
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION : District Court LOWER COURT
FILE NUMBER(S) :DC 50/00 LOWER COURT
JUDICIAL OFFICER :Tupman DCJ
COUNSEL: J D Hislop QC - Appellant
M G Gilbert - RespondentSOLICITORS: Thomas Laycock, Newcastle - Appellant
Stacks - The Law Firm, Port Macquarie - RespondentCATCHWORDS: PROCEDURE - limitation period expired - leave to commence proceedings - s 52(4) Motor Accidents Act 1988 - whether prejudice would deprive defendant of fair trial - whether full and satisfactory explanation for delay - ND LEGISLATION CITED: Motor Accidents Act 1988 CASES CITED: Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499DECISION: 1) Appeal allowed with costs. 2) Respondent to receive a certificate under the Suitor's Fund Act, if otherwise entitled. 3) set aside orders of Tupman DCJ made on 24 June 2000 and, in lieu thereof, order that the respondent's Notice of Motion before the District Court be dismissed with costs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COURT OF APPEAL
CA 40541/00
DC 50/00
PRIESTLEY JA
MEAGHER JA
STEIN JA
Tuesday, 11 September 2001
The appellant was the driver of a motor bike involved in an accident on 7 October 1992, where the respondent, a pillion passenger, was thrown from the bike and landed on her back. Although she attended Dubbo Hospital following the accident, the respondent did not seek any medical treatment for her back condition until mid 1999. The Motor Accidents Act required that a notice of claim be served on the appellant’s third party insurer by 6 April 1993, however this did not occur until 24 September 1999. The limitation period to commence proceedings had expired on 7 April 1996. On 12 April 2000, the appellant filed a Notice of Motion in the District Court seeking leave to commence proceedings. This motion was upheld and leave granted on 27 June 2000. The appellant appeals against this grant of leave.
Per Stein JA, Meagher JA agreeing: (Priestley JA dissenting)
1 The applicable test on prejudice to a potential defendant arising out of delay is that stated by the majority in Holt v Wynter (2000) 49 NSWLR 128.
2 The prejudice occasioned to the appellant on the issue of quantum must have been significant. It is not possible to see how the appellant could possibly have a fair trial in the circumstances. The judge’s finding that the prejudice was not such as to prevent a fair trial cannot stand, as it involved a miscarriage of her discretion and an error in principle.
3 It is unnecessary to consider the issue of a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in commencing proceedings as the appeal…
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- Case
- [2001] NSWCA 301
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the District Court judge had correctly applied the principles governing applications for leave to commence proceedings out of time under section 52(4) of the *Motor Accidents Act 1988*. Specifically, the court had to consider whether Mr Norris had provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the delay in commencing proceedings and whether Ms Huckel would suffer prejudice that would deprive her of a fair trial if leave were granted.
The Court of Appeal found that the District Court judge had erred in granting leave. The court held that Mr Norris had not provided a full and satisfactory explanation for the significant delay in commencing his proceedings. Furthermore, the court concluded that Ms Huckel would suffer prejudice if the proceedings were allowed to continue, as the delay would likely impair her ability to conduct a fair defence. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the District Court were set aside, and Mr Norris's application for leave was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1) Appeal allowed with costs. 2) Respondent to receive a certificate under the Suitor's Fund Act, if otherwise entitled. 3) set aside orders of Tupman DCJ made on 24 June 2000 and, in lieu thereof, order that the respondent's Notice of Motion before the District Court be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi