Huang v Victoria Police

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION

PRACTICE COURT

No. 8540 of 1995

HONG-CHAO HUANG Plaintiff
v
VICTORIA POLICE AND ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL (MELBOURNE) LTD Defendants

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JUDGE:

HARPER J

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

21 AUGUST 2002

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

28 AUGUST 2002

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

HUANG v VICTORIA POLICE & ANOR

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2002] VSC 360

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Tort – Negligence – Allegation Victoria Police failed to act upon a complaint – Allegation St Vincent’s Hospital wrongfully and maliciously certified the plaintiff under the Mental Health Act 1996 – Action discontinued – No steps taken for six years thereafter – Application to reinstate – General considerations – Application refused.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the Plaintiff In person
For the First Defendant No appearance
For the Second Defendant Ms K Bishop (solicitor) Phillips Fox

HIS HONOUR:

  1. On 8 December 1995, the plaintiff commenced, by Writ, a proceeding against the Victoria Police and St. Vincent’s Hospital.  The statement of claim was endorsed on the writ.  It is in handwriting. It alleges, among other things, that the first defendant “[a]t all material times … held itself out as the Police station that was competent and able to care for disorders such as I suffered from.”  It then goes on to allege that both in early January 1994 and late in the same month, the plaintiff reported – to the Asian Squad of the Police – that he was being followed.  On each occasion he was told to see a psychologist. He, acted on this advice.

  1. The result, it would seem from the statement of claim, was a referral from the psychologist to the second defendant;  but I am informed by its counsel that the Hospital would, if the case were to go further, allege that the psychiatrist who thereafter treated the defendant merely rented rooms from it while otherwise having no connection with it.

  1. At all events, the statement of claim pleads that there thus began an association with the Hospital which lasted some six months.  But the situation did not improve.  The plaintiff continued to be followed.

  1. According to the statement of claim, the plaintiff only agreed to see a psychologist after having been promised by the police that, “if things (i.e. the  situation that I was followed and my room had been broken into) didn’t improve after I had consulted the psychologist, I would still ask the police for help.”  Consistently with this, the plaintiff sought that help.  The police, however, “breached the agreement we had made before, and … deliberately illegally classified me as a mental patient.”  This caused the plaintiff pain and suffering.

  1. Further pain and suffering was caused, so the statement of claim alleges, as a result of the second defendant reporting to the police that the plaintiff “had [a] mental problem.”  The hospital also incorrectly diagnosed the plaintiff and issued two reports which “were contradicted” (it is not clear what this means) but which, it…

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Details
Case
[2002] VSC 360
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Huang v Victoria Police, the plaintiff, Mr Huang, alleged that the defendant, Victoria Police, was negligent in failing to act upon his complaint regarding the alleged wrongful and malicious certification of the plaintiff by St Vincent’s Hospital under the Mental Health Act 1996. The case was before the Supreme Court of Victoria, which was required to determine whether Mr Huang's application to reinstate his action should be granted.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the plaintiff's inaction for six years constituted a sufficient ground for the court to exercise its discretion to allow the reinstatement of the action. The court had to consider the general principles of equity and fairness in determining the appropriate course of action. Additionally, the court had to assess whether the delay had prejudiced the defendant or any other party, and whether the delay was explicable or otherwise justified.

In delivering its judgment, the court held that the plaintiff's delay of six years was inordinate and not sufficiently justified. The court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances that would warrant the exercise of the court's discretion to allow the reinstatement of the action. The court emphasised that the six-year delay had significantly prejudiced the defendant, and there was no evidence to suggest that the delay was explicable or otherwise justified. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application to reinstate the action.