FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Huang v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 353
MIGRATION – protection visas – whether Minister’s refusal to consider an application on the ground of invalidity is a ‘judicially reviewable decision’ within the meaning of Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 47, s 48A, s475(1)(c), s 476, s 477, s 478(1)(b), s 478(2), s 485(1)
Soondur v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 124
Jayaweera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 955
Hocine v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 778LU KA HUANG (BY HER NEXT FRIEND, HAO BIAO HUANG) v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1363 of 2000STONE J
SYDNEY
2 APRIL 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N1363 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
LU KA HUANG (BY HER NEXT FRIEND, HAO BIAO HUANG)
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
STONE J
DATE OF ORDER:
2 APRIL 2001
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.the application be dismissed as incompetent;
2.the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N1363 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
LU KA HUANG (BY HER NEXT FRIEND, HAO BIAO HUANG)
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
STONE J
DATE:
2 APRIL 2001
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant’s father, Hao Biao Huang (“Father”), applied to the respondent (“Minister”) for a protection visa on 4 March 1999 (“the First Application”). The application was made pursuant to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). The Father’s two sons, Lu Ka Huang (the applicant) and Lu Bi Huang, were included in the application as members of the same family unit. The applicant’s mother, Zhong Lan Xie (“Mother”) was not included in that application. On 31 March 1999, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant protection visas pursuant to the First Application. That decision was upheld by the Refugee Review Tribunal on 1 September 1999.
On 1 February 2000, the Mother lodged an application for a protection visa, including the Father, Lu Ka and Lu Bi in her application (“Second Application”). On 15 February 2000, a case officer in the Department of Immigration & Multicultural Affairs sent a letter to the Father, informing him that
·as he and his sons had already applied for a protection visa, they could only be included in the Mother’s application if the Minister exercised his discretion under s 48B of the Act in their favour; and
·the case would not be referred to the Minister for consideration under s 48B of the Act because it did not satisfy the Minister’s Guidelines for Purported Further Applications for a Protection Visa subject to s 48B [sic] and Requests for Ministerial Intervention under s 48B.
The Second Application, insofar…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 353
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the arguments presented by Mr Atkins, counsel for the applicant, who argued that the Minister's decision was not a judicially reviewable decision because the obligation to consider the application continued even if the decision that the application was invalid was incorrect. The court noted that the applicant's arguments had substantial obstacles, including the decision in Jayaweera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, which held that the Minister's decision was a judicially reviewable decision within s 475(1)(c). The court held that the Jayaweera case was correctly decided and that it constituted an insuperable obstacle for the applicant. The court dismissed the application as incompetent and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs.
This case highlights the importance of understanding the statutory framework and the relevant authorities when seeking judicial review of a decision. The court's decision in this case emphasises the need for applicants to carefully consider the time limits for seeking judicial review and to ensure that their application is made within the prescribed time frame.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. the application be dismissed as incompetent;
2. the applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: STONE J
Mr Atkins, counsel for the applicant, attempted to avoid this potentially fatal objection to the applicant’s claim by arguing that the decision of the Minister was not a judicially–reviewable decision. His argument was based on a novel interpretation of s 47. It is useful, in considering this argument, to set out the section in full.“47 Consideration of valid visa application(1) The Minister is to consider a valid application for a visa.(2)The requirement to consider an application for a visa continuesuntil:(a) the application is withdrawn; or (b) the Minister grants or refuses to grant the visa; or(c)the further consideration is prevented by section 39(limiting number of visas) or 84 (suspension of consideration).(3)To avoid doubt, the Minister is not to consider an application that is not a valid application.(4)To avoid doubt, a decision by the Minister that an applicationis not valid and cannot be considered is not a decision to refuse to grant the visa.” Mr Atkins, counsel for the applicant, attempted to avoid this potentially fatal objection to the applicant’s claim by arguing that the decision of the Minister was not a judicially–reviewable decision. His argument was based on a novel interpretation of s 47. It is useful, in considering this argument, to set out the section in full. Mr Atkin argued that sub-section 2 makes it clear that the obligation to consider an application for a visa is a continuing obligation. It continues despite a decision that an application is not a valid application provided that decision is incorrect. Clearly, if the decision is correct then s 47(3) would have the consequence that the Minister’s obligation no longer continues. But, Mr Atkin submitted, if the Minister makes a decision that an application is not valid and this is an incorrect decision, then the obligation to consider the valid application still continues. In that case, he submitted, the applicant is entitled to apply for review under s 477 on the basis that the Minister, having a duty to make a judicially-reviewable decision, has not in fact done so and there has been unreasonable delay. Mr Atkin conceded that the authorities relied upon by the respondent created substantial obstacles to his clients claims succeeding. In particular, the decision in Jayaweera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 955 is relevant. This case concerned a decision of the Minister that the visa applications of two brothers were invalid. Heerey J held that the Minister’s decision was a judicially-reviewable decision within s 475(1)(c). Therefore an application to review it would fall within s476. Consequently the time limit in s 478(1) applied. Heerey J held that it is well established that the Court had no power to extend this time limit and referred to Hocine v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 778. In my opinion Jayawerra v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 955 was correctly decided and constitutes an insuperable obstacle for the applicant. I do not accept Mr Atkin’s submissions, although I admire their ingenuity. Even if his analysis of s 47 is correct, which I doubt, the application would still be out of time. On Mr Atkin’s analysis, the Minister’s communication of his decision that an application is invalid would amount, in the case of a valid application, to a statement that the Minister does not propose to discharge the continuing duty under s 47. In my opinion, time would start to run under s 478 from the date of that decision, as extended by the time provided under the legislation for receipt of such communication.